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This doctoral thesis examines the personalities of national politicians and is the first of its 
kind to apply the socio-psychological model of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1994) to 
Members of the UK Parliament. In doing so this thesis departs from the dominant traditions of 
Historical Institutionalism and, more recently, interpretivism in UK parliamentary studies. 
Interdisciplinary insights and methods from political psychology are combined to examine a 
number of important questions and findings relevant to wider pools of literature on anti-
politics, political behaviour and representation. Specifically, I investigate 'who' enters elite 
politics, 'how' they behave in elected office, and 'why' public perceptions of politicians' 
psychological characteristics might be inaccurate. To answer these questions, I collect and 
analyse original survey data on the basic values, ideologies, attitudes and demographics of a 
sample of 106 Members of Parliament (MPs). These surveys are supported by in-depth semi-
structured interviews. Firstly, these data are analysed alongside comparative data on the 
public from the 7th round of the European Social Survey to reveal a process of psychological 
self-selection to elite politics in the UK. In demonstrating that certain citizens with particular 
value profiles are more likely to enter elected office, these results make an original 
contribution to prior research into political ambition and recruitment. Secondly, I build a 
theoretically-driven model of parliamentary behaviour and test it empirically to show that 
MPs' basic values impact significantly upon legislative behaviours as diverse as voting, 
asking written questions, and signing Early Day Motions. Thirdly, the results of a conjoint 
experiment with a large sample of the British public are presented to assess the relative 
importance of various attitudinal and demographic variables, alongside basic values, for 
voters’ ideal-type politicians. Compared with self-report data on UK MPs, this conjoint 
experiment reveals a 'perception gap' whereby citizens get MPs with the psychological 
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 This doctoral thesis examines the personalities of national politicians and is the first of 
its kind in the UK to apply the socio-psychological model of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 
1994). This interdisciplinary study combines a range of quantitative and qualitative methods 
in a complementary fashion to examine the effect of basic values on elite UK politics and in 
doing so draws conclusions of comparative significance. Departing from the dominant 
traditions of historical institutionalism and more recently interpretivism, this thesis advances 
an original and rigorous approach to parliamentary studies. It raises a number of important 
questions and findings relevant to wider pools of literature on anti-politics, political behaviour 
and representation, whilst also going beyond previous psychological assessments of political 
elites done ‘at-a-distance’. The thesis is structured around three corresponding research 
questions: 
RQ1: Who enters elite politics and how are they different to the general public?  
 Gathering survey data on the basic values, ideologies, attitudes and demographics of 
106 Members of Parliament, supported by 17 semi-structured interviews, this thesis offers a 
unique analysis of parliamentarians in the UK. Academic and journalistic commentary on 
politicians and the political class has in recent years focused overwhelmingly on careerist 
attitudes, self-serving behaviour and greed. These are, ultimately, characteristics that are 
psychological in nature and I apply innovative methodological tools to assess not only their 
validity but also to link cause with effect and to discriminate between individuals at different 
levels of governance or with different occupational or cultural backgrounds. Data on the basic 
values of the British public, mined from the 7th round of the European Social Survey, are also 
used to identify distinct differences in basic values between those who choose a political 
career and those they govern. In particular, I find: 
a) basic values are associated with self-selection in elite politics more so than socio-
demographic factors and political opportunity structures. MPs are psychologically unique by 






b) politicians are not an homogenous group and actually differ in their basic values according 
to gender, age, education and partisanship. However, these differences are still smaller than 
those between MPs and their corresponding socioeconomic and demographic groups in the 
general population; and 
c) congruence between the basic values of political elites and voters occurs to a much greater 
extent on the Right of British politics than on the Left. 
RQ2: What, if any, is the impact and importance of basic values upon MPs’ behaviour once 
they are elected to Parliament? 
 At the heart of imaginative and effective political science is a desire to comprehend 
the 'why' behind political behaviours and decision-making. Engaging critically with a rich 
history of political science research on political behaviours and institutions, I build an 
Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB). The IMPPB offers an 
original blueprint by which political scientists may understand how cognitive processes based 
on basic values interact with the institutional fabric of Westminster, the effect of party 
political socialisation and organisation, and the mediating role of ideology. Using data 
collected for RQ1 and parliamentary records held by the Hansard Society, the IMPPB is 
tested using a series of quantitative analyses that demonstrate personality characteristics such 
as basic values can, in and of themselves, have a significant impact on the daily political 
behaviour of our elected politicians. In particular, I find: 
a) MPs' basic values are significantly related to legislative activities as diverse as voting, 
asking written questions, joining a select committee, and signing Early Day Motions (EDMs); 
b) these effects vary according to the institutional constraints exerted internally by party 
organisations, and externally by a range of role alters such as the media and voters; and 
c) MPs’ basic values exert a strong organising effect (direct and indirect) upon their attitudes 
towards representational focus. 
RQ3: How big is the gap between voters’ preferences about the personal characteristics of 
MPs and reality? 
 In spite of growing empirical weight behind the claim that public disengagement rests 
to a large extent on evaluations of politicians and their behaviour, politicians - as the subject 






debate about democratic renewal and anti-politics in the UK. Developing the insights of a 
burgeoning research base on the personalisation of politics, I develop and conduct a unique 
conjoint survey with 1637 members of the British public. This experimental survey design 
assesses the relative importance of various attitudinal and demographic variables, alongside 
basic values, for voters’ ideal-type politicians. Compared with data collected on MPs for 
RQ1, these results are used to bridge the ‘gap’ and ‘trap’ accounts of political disengagement 
and offer a closer examination of the gulf between personality as perception and functioning 
in modern UK politics. In particular, I find: 
a) the basic values of parliamentary candidates have a greater effect on public voting habits 
than physical attributes such as age, gender or ethnicity and socio-economic attributes such as 
schooling and occupation; 
b) meaningful differences exist between the ideal candidates chosen by the British public 
according to voters' gender, age, social grade, partisanship, and vote choice in the 2016 
referendum to leave the European Union; and 
c) there is a high degree of convergence between the basic values of elected MPs and those of 
the ideal candidates chosen by the British public. 
 The conceptual and empirical contributions of this thesis are spread across five 
sections and eleven chapters.
1
 Chapter 1 provides a critical review of the parliamentary 
studies literature in the UK in order to position this thesis within the existing intellectual 
terrain. Chapter 1 highlights the theoretical flaws of paradigms in this body of literature, 
particularly the Westminster Model and historical institutionalism, which elide the daily 
experiences of political actors and their contribution to systemic and procedural change. It 
then exposes the methodological weaknesses of sociological and interpretivist approaches to 
the study of Parliament that have, in recent years, given attention to individual agents as a unit 
of analysis. Having opened a significant gap in this research base, I propose an original, 
interdisciplinary approach to parliamentary studies in the UK that systematically unites the 
intellectual and conceptual strength of psychology and political science. It is in this context 
that chapter 2 then reviews existing psychological studies of political elites around the world 
and introduces the theory of Basic Human Values (BHV). In doing so, chapter 2 provides a 
critical exploration of BHV as both a theory and an empirically tested set of concepts. This 
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discussion thus clarifies the epistemological assumptions and methodological framework 
underpinning the specific research questions and empirical analysis presented in the rest of the 
thesis.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on the first of three research questions outlined above. It identifies 
significant gaps in the existing research base that pertain to psychological assumptions about 
the self-selection of politicians, the professionalisation of politics, the demographic 
homogeneity of Parliament, and the potential 'elitism' of MPs. These are issues that have for 
some time underpinned questions about ‘who’ enters national politics, ‘why’ they enter, and 
‘how’ they differ in their motivations from those they represent. Chapter 4 moves to research 
question 2 and provides a rigorous review of extant research into the behaviour of political 
elites. Synthesising the conceptual wisdom and empirical findings of existing research into 
the UK Parliament with the theoretical foundations of psychological studies, this chapter 
presents an Integrated Model for Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB). The IMPPB is 
built through careful dissection of research on ideology, party socialisation and institutional 
choice. It is used in this chapter to offer specific hypotheses about the role of the individual 
MP - and more precisely their basic values - upon a number of over- and under-studied 
legislative behaviours. Focusing on broader issues of representation in the UK and beyond, 
chapter 5 then addresses research question 3 through critical engagement with literatures on 
anti-politics, trust and the personalisation of politics. In doing so it develops a compelling 
explanation of popular alienation from formal politics and rising cynicism in political 
institutions, and thus provides a conceptual base for later analysis of an original conjoint 
survey. Throughout chapters 3-5, theoretically informed hypotheses are developed for 
empirical testing. 
 Chapter 6 explains the methods used to operationalise the research agenda and 
hypotheses developed in chapters 1-5. It describes the process of data collection with UK 
Members of Parliament (MPs), including sampling, participant recruitment and survey design; 
it defends a shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) used to collect data 
on BHV; it outlines the semi-structured interviews conducted with political elites to 
complement quantitative analysis; it provides a stepped explanation of the conjoint survey 
conducted with the public to evaluate the importance of BHV for voter perceptions of MPs; 




































 The results of the thesis are then presented and analysed in four substantive chapters 
(7-10). Chapter 7 analyses unique data from UK MPs alongside comparative data from the 
European Social Survey to reveal how elected representatives differ from one another as well 
as their electors in terms of their trans-situational goals and motivations (i.e. BHV). Chapter 8 
builds on these findings to illustrate that MPs are not only extraordinary in the trans-
situational goals and motivations that they bring to the job of politics, but that this 
psychological disjuncture is wider still between MPs and a range of corresponding socio-
demographic sub-groups in the UK population. Chapter 8 also reveals the psychological 
affinities of partisans on the Left and Right, and explores varying degrees of congruency 
between elites and voters on each side of British politics.  
 Applying the theoretical premise of the IMPPB, chapter 9 advances the academic 
understanding of both BHV – as active elements in elite politics – and of parliamentary 
political behaviour in the UK. It shows, in particular, that agency matters far more in UK 
parliamentary politics than the extant literature has assumed. Finally, chapter 10 analyses a 
range of extremely significant findings from a robust and original conjoint analysis of public 
voting habits in the UK. On one hand, the results demonstrate there is less of a disjuncture 
than assumed between the personalities the public want in national politics and the 
personalities they get. On the other hand, the data reveal schisms within the general 
population that translate into larger differences between MPs' basic values and the preferences 
of more conservative socio-demographic groups in the UK population. Chapter 11 draws the 
thesis to a close by reflecting on the broader implications of its central findings and the 
limitations of the research design. In its evaluation of the core results of this project, chapter 
11 also points to future avenues of research that have been opened up in the course of this 
project. 
James Weinberg 




“For today even semi-sovereignty seems to be slipping away...What we see emerging is a 
notion of democracy that is being steadily stripped of its popular component - democracy   
without a demos”                                                                                      
Peter Mair (2013) 
Rethinking Parliamentary Studies 
 Long before the election of Donald Trump, the rise of populism across central Europe, 
and the UK expenses scandal in 2009, the late Anthony King (1983) wrote of the biggest 
divide in British politics as that between Britain's whole political class and the great majority 
of the British people. The ‘anti-politics’ phenomenon is now well documented in Britain: 
declining levels of partisanship, diminished voter turnout, poor performing governments and 
failures of accountability, and plummeting trust in political elites are all common research 
foci and even book titles.
2
 Yet the literature seeking to explain and understand the crisis of 
democracy focuses almost singularly on popular notions of what politics is and how it should 
work. In doing so it fails to engage with those who actually occupy political office.  
 In this context the belief that the House of Commons is a 'remote and self-important 
echo-chamber' (Paxman, 2014) has not only become an accepted popular interpretation of 
British parliamentary politics but it has had a limiting, even detrimental effect, on the breadth 
of academic studies into the UK Parliament. Stoker (2011) highlights two contemporary 
responses to anti-politics in British academia: political engineering and democratic design. 
For ‘engineers’, our existing democratic institutions – political parties, electoral systems, etc. 
– need to be reformed so that they function more effectively. In contrast, ‘designers’ look to 
new ways of engaging citizens in the political process. Neither of these burgeoning streams of 
research in the last decade or so have given serious thought to the role of MPs as anything 
more than causal factors for the anti-political symptoms they try to unpick. In fact these actors 
are largely conspicuous by their absence. This literature is outward facing and the (relatively) 
small number of legislative scholars researching in the pool of parliamentary studies have 
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failed to acknowledge their role in bringing both politicians and Parliament into this debate as 
relevant research foci.  
 The majority of contemporary studies of the UK Parliament are emic in their attention 
to both process and policy space. There is no doubt that this research is both rigorous and 
important, adding to our understanding of a range of developments such as legislative scrutiny 
(Russell, 2016; Kelso, 2009), free and whipped voting patterns (Cowley and Stuart, 2012), 
multi-level governance (Cairney, 2015; Mycock, 2016), or ministerial power and 
responsibility (Heffernan, 2003; Elgie, 2011). Where parliamentary studies have looked 
outside of Westminster, it has been to explore the functional relationships between policy-
makers and experts (Dommett and Flinders, 2015; Durose, Justice and Skelcher, 2014), the 
executive and the judiciary (Bradley, 2008; Gee et al., 2015), or peripheral and central 
government (Blunkett, Flinders and Prosser, 2016; Matthews, 2017). However, the result is 
that this sub-discipline remains, in line with the popular narrative of politics, rather parochial 
and distant to the uninitiated. A sclerotic commitment to dominant traditions and 
methodologies has restricted the capacity for innovation in parliamentary studies, which 
might open the door to more creative research into 'the people' in Parliament. Indeed, to focus 
on the personal side of politics would not only provide a new way to conceive the relationship 
between Parliament and citizenry, governor and governed, but would also extend and nuance 
the explanatory purchase of existing research into the everyday practice of parliamentary 
politics mentioned above.  
 This chapter provides a critical review of the dominant literature in parliamentary 
studies to position this PhD in context. The chapter begins by reflecting on the pervasive 
'British political tradition' (Gamble, 1990), the Westminster Model (WM), and the 
assumptions of Historical Institutionalism (HI) that has generally taken the WM as a point of 
scholarly reference. The procedural, descriptive and often prescriptive accounts of HI research 
will be compared to those new camps in parliamentary studies that afford more importance to 
agency. This discussion will introduce recent developments in sociological research as well as 
making both explicit and implicit criticisms of rational choice models, which talk of 
parliamentary behaviour in narrow self-interested terms. In particular this review will pick out 
the contributions made to parliamentary studies by interpretivism and ethnography. Parson's 
(2007) generalised matrix of political science will be used to highlight the substantive and 
methodological flaws of these overly siloed approaches to parliamentary studies, thus opening 
a gap in the research base which this thesis, utilising an epistemological framework of neo-
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institutionalism and psychological theories of human values, hopes to occupy. This chapter 
will finish by explaining the benefits of reconciling politics and psychology - and particularly 
the Schwartz theory of Basic Human Values (BHV) - as a way to enhance our understanding 
of 'who' occupies elected office in the palace of Westminster and 'why' they choose to do it, 
'how' they navigate their daily lived experiences as politicians, and 'why' there might be such 
a gap between politicians and the public.  
I. Paradigms in Parliamentary Studies: The Rise and Fall of the Westminster Model and 
Historical Institutionalism 
 It would be difficult to talk of studies of the British Parliament without mentioning the 
Westminster Model (WM), what Andrew Gamble (1990, p.405) describes as the dominant 
'organising perspective' in British political studies. Born from the traditions of Whig 
historiography, the WM focuses on the institutions of politics and puts emphasis on the 
importance of continuity in the political system, punctuated by incremental change, since the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Gamble, 1990, p.407; see also Judge, 1993). At the heart of the 
WM are the principles of parliamentary sovereignty, ministerial responsibility and strong 
party government. These principles have become enduring realities in the literature on British 
politics. One may take Vernon Bogdanor's The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century 
(2003), Philip Norton's Parliament in British Politics (2013), or Michael Rush's Parliament 
Today (2005) as prime examples of the often descriptive, qualitative, overly technical and 
document-based analyses of Parliament that work within the central tenets of the WM.  
 Although the primacy and efficacy of the WM as an analytical framework have been 
questioned in recent years by those more interested in governance than government (see, for 
example, Bache et al., 2015; Marsh, 2012; Rhodes, 2011), there is no doubt that it remains a 
normative benchmark by which scholars continue to evaluate British politics. David Judge 
(2005, p.646) goes so far as to describe the WM as the 'constitutional morality' underpinning 
good government. Paul Seaward and Paul Silk (2003, p.185) argue that in spite of incremental 
modernisation, the organising principles of the WM are no less pertinent today, so that 
parliamentary sovereignty, for example, is 'as applicable a doctrine in 2000 as it was 1900'. 
Indeed, the WM retains currency with politicians, the media, and academics alike (Blunkett 
and Richards, 2011; Cairney, 2012; Lijphart, 2012).  
Arend Lijphart (2012) identifies the UK, with the WM as a founding principle, as a 
leading alternative to consensual European governments. Yet the majoritarian democracy that 
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he interprets in the UK, built on a disproportional voting system, concentrations of power in 
the executive, compliant parliamentary majorities, and strong unitary government, is as much 
an ideal type as the WM on which it rests. Kriesi et al.'s (2006, pp. 357-358) study of policy 
networks in Western Europe provides empirical evidence to refute the UK's majoritarian 
image: 'British policy networks turned out to be quite fragmented, resembling more closely 
those expected for consensus than for majoritarian democracies. This would imply that future 
research should no longer aim at national level generalisations about power configurations 
and policy processes.' Yet in spite of the lack of empirical support for the WM, academics still 
accept the power of the majoritarian model. For example, Matthew Flinders' (2009) theory of 
'bi-constitutionality' in the UK pairs devolution to consensual representative bodies with 
strong central government in the majoritarian image. The usefulness of the WM, both for this 
thesis and other alternative interpretations of British politics, is not the accuracy of its 
explanatory power but its reputation as an accepted reference point against which to present 
new models.   
The primary criticism, for the purpose of this thesis, is that the WM focuses so 
exclusively on the macro dimensions of British politics and the top-down nature of principal-
agent relations in British democracy, that it elides the individuals who actually inhabit the 
system and make it work on an everyday basis. There is no room for the micro, or even meso, 
level analysis that would enable scholars to engage with the personal side of politics. Indeed, 
there has been surprisingly little deviance from unfavourable categorisations of the UK 
Parliament as ‘reactive’ (Martin and Vanberg, 2011), ‘peripheral or totally irrelevant’ (King 
and Crewe, 2013, p.361), and even ‘God’s gift to dictatorship’ (Jenkins, 2006). However, 
recent landmark studies by Meg Russell et al. (2016; see also Arter 2006; Matthews, 2017) 
have challenged David Olsen’s (1994, p.84) '90 per cent rule’ of legislative dominance by the 
executive.
3
 Analysing 4361 amendments to 12 government bills and conducting over 120 
interviews, Russell et al. (2016) add empirical weight to previous work on ‘anticipated 
reactions’ and ‘preventative influence’ (Blondel, 1970) in order to show that government 
success in the legislative process is often over-stated, non-government failure is similarly 
exaggerated, and parliamentary influence before and after the formal passage of bills is often 
overlooked. These findings run in direct opposition to mainstream scholarship on the UK 
Parliament; they point to a more nuanced understanding of British government, in which 
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 Russell at al. (2016) build explicitly on the normative and empirical foundations of John Griffith’s (1974) 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills. Scrutinising government amendments, Griffiths could already 
conclude that the UK Parliament was ‘by no means negligible’ in the legislative process (ibid., p.256). 
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individual backbenchers and opposition party members may have a powerful effect upon the 
substantive direction and character of legislation. This demands greater attention and more 
rigorous research into the motivations of the people inside Parliament.  
The criticisms levelled above are as true for the WM as the broader theoretical 
underpinning it has found in historical institutionalism (HI).
4
 The institutionalist label 
distinguishes itself from the umbrella of structural causal logic by delineating action 
according to man-made conventions rather than non-malleable material structures. The logic 
runs that certain inter-subjectively present institutions direct people to act in particular 
directions at later stages. This relationship connecting constraints with action is commonly 
formulated within temporal sequences of causality, otherwise known as path dependency: the 
institutional decisions taken at time t unintentionally direct subsequential action along certain 
historical paths (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). As a foundational logic, institutionalism has 
diversified in many guises (sociological, rationalist, discursive…) but it is HI, with its specific 
blend of legitimacy and constraint, that has been most prominent in British parliamentary 
studies (Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; cf. Bell, 2017). 
The abstract concept of institutional path dependence reduces to one contingent 
decision, made in an ambiguous material landscape, that engenders future sunk costs 
(Parsons, 2007). These sunk costs should not be considered in the economic sense of the term, 
whereby capital is unrecoverable, but in a political science parlance of commitments and the 
subsequent costs of change. Paul Pierson (1993, p.609) writes: 'Policies may encourage 
individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of investments, purchase certain 
kinds of goods, or devote time and money to certain kinds of organisations. All these 
decisions generate sunk costs. That is to say, they create commitments'. As such, 
parliamentary change – as conceived in the HI tradition – is the product of ‘critical junctures’, 
which may include exogenous jolts to the political system, policy breakthroughs, or 
temporary institutional destabilisation and ambiguity. These ‘critical junctures’ allow for the 
incremental evolution implicit in the WM. It is useful at this point to draw on the generic 
matrix of political science arguments modelled by Craig Parsons (2007; Table 1.1). 
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 Alexandra Kelso (2009, p.9) argues that historical institutionalism, with its focus on historical context, is given 
credence by the UK Parliament, which she sees as a historical product forged in the image of the WM.   
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Table 1.1 Parson's (2007) matrix of dominant logics of explanation in political science. 
 GENERAL PARTICULAR 
POSITION Structural Institutional 
INTERPRETATION Psychological Ideational 
 
One half of the matrix locates logics according to the opposition of general and 
particular explanations: the former is deterministic or probabilistic, whilst the latter allows for 
contingent circumstances that cannot always be expected to turn out identically (things are 
explained as consequences of events that did not have to happen according to a general law). 
On one side of the matrix institutional and ideational (man-made) explanations, which focus 
on behaviours following as the result of resolved contingencies, are highly particularistic. By 
contrast, structural and psychological explanations flow from exogenously-derived 
regularities and as such their generality dismisses the counter-factuals inherent in the first two 
logics. The other axis in this heuristic represents a position-interpretation divide, in which the 
logics of structure and institution are pitted against those of ideational and psychological 
explanations. Whilst the former see action dictated by an obstacle course of material and man-
made constraints or incentives in the social, political or environmental landscape, the latter 
presents action as the result of people’s interpretation of what is possible or desirable in a 
context of objectively ambiguous structures and institutions (Parsons, 2007). 
For most HI scholars, the norms associated with the WM are preeminent over 
individual actors as contextual constraints on the nature and direction of parliamentary 
reform. As such it is possible to locate the WM, HI and associated parliamentary studies 
within academic approaches that take a particularistic, positional logic of explanation (see 
Table 1.1). Kelso (2009, p.25) makes a similar argument: ‘the structural institutional context 
of Parliament has a highly significant degree of influence over those actors who operate there, 
and […] Parliament’s path dependency substantially constrained the range of reform options 
that might be realistically contemplated.’
5
 However, an alternative view of change in the HI 
tradition, otherwise referred to as the ‘Norton view’, has given greater agency to actors within 
the institutional path of dependence.
6
  In this view, Philip Norton (1983) presents three 
conditions that must be satisfied to allow for parliamentary reform. There must be 
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 See similar arguments in Crick (1962) and Flinders (2010). 
6
 P. Norton (1983). ‘The Norton View’. In D. Judge (Ed.), The Politics of Parliamentary Reform. London: 
Heinemann. pp.54-69. 
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disequilibrium with the status quo; a cogent reform programme tailored to that disequilibrium; 
and the political will of a strong leader to see it through. However, Norton (1983, p.61) is 
equally adamant that the UK Parliament - as an institution whose primary function is that of 
representation - requires broader attitudinal change among its legislators as a pre-requisite to 
effective structural or procedural changes. To understand the direction of parliamentary 
change, then, requires an understanding of the people within it. 
There are a number of important lessons to draw from the ‘Norton view’ about the 
scope of parliamentary studies in the WM/HI tradition. Firstly, it acknowledges that 
individual agents have an instrumental role to play within the narrative of institutional 
landscapes. Secondly, the role of agents is downplayed as reactionary; even in the Norton 
view, politicians are symptoms of critical junctures wrought by political and historical 
contexts but do not have causal influence over parliamentary reform (see, for example, 
Armitage’s (2012) work on Speakership elections; or Flinders and Tonkiss' (2004) research 
on Parliament and Arm’s Length Bodies). Thirdly, there is an implicit assumption that 
politicians’ behaviour flows from the institutional setting and can be explained in such terms, 
even if the majority of research in this tradition is more interested in macro-level 
developments.  
In terms of understanding politicians and political behaviour in and of themselves, and 
as a causal influence on Parliamentary change on a daily basis, HI and the WM offer little 
explanatory purchase and rely heavily on rationalism. Economist Douglas North (1990, p. 4; 
Nobel Prize for contributions to institutionalist economics) defines institutions as 'any form of 
constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction', or 'regularities in repetitive 
interactions...customs and rules that provide a set of incentives and disincentives for 
individuals'. It is in linking this agreed object of study to action, in the manner implied by 
North's definition, that institutionalism shares its micro-foundations with the objective 
rationality of structural logic. Objective rationality must be assumed if institutional path 
dependence is to account for as much causal influence on behaviour as possible. Where 
regular patterns of decision-making in response to exogenously given environments are not 
assumed, then ideational and psychological (see Table 1.1) logics take over the primacy of 
causal work from institutionalism. It has been argued by some rational institutionalists that 
particular institutions were merely the product of rational decision making in a moment of 
structural ambiguity, and thereafter ongoing rational evaluation to achieve stability (see, for 
example, Shepsle, 1989). However, from the purest sense of this explanatory doctrine it may 
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be contended that such a claim undercuts the whole premise of institutionalised patterns of 
action, as dictated by the unforeseeable dynamics of path dependence. If institutions are only 
the enduring products of pre-existent self-interest, then action would seem to be the product of 
a looser structural logic or indeed ideational and psychological motivations.     
It would appear naive to insist that simply because institutions create causal pressures 
and incentives, there is not a sustained element of contingency in each case that calls for the 
agency of actors within the institution. This may be seen as the mistake of the WM paradigm, 
in which scholars judge action in the UK Parliament in light of what should happen, 
according to the constitutional morality of sorts they see in the Westminster framework, and 
not actually what happens or how (Judge, 2004; Norton, 2013). It is this realisation, grounded 
in the governance literature, that has spawned new sociological approaches to Parliamentary 
studies – particularly interpretivist and ethnographic scholarship.  
II. Sociological Studies: From Searing to Rhodes 
According to David Marsh (2008, 2012), the reformulation process of Parliamentary 
studies away from a focus on government and towards an interest in governance is complete. 
The previous section has shown why this is far from the case but the new governance 
literature, and especially work on the differentiated polity model and multi-level governance, 
has gone a long way to redressing the normative assumptions of the Westminster Model 
(WM). In particular, the increasing complexity of the government’s bureaucratic machinery 
and the diversification of the state apparatus to include a range of Arm’s Length Bodies 




The Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) pioneered by Rod Rhodes has 
reconceptualised the British state, focusing on power as ‘dispersed and based on exchange 
relationships’ (Marsh, 2011, p. 33). This redefinition of British politics moves from 
hierarchies, as implicit in the WM, to networks of self-organising actors ‘characterised by 
interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the 
state’ (Ibid., p.34). The theory denudes central government of its supreme authority and 
instead presents a far messier, yet arguably realistic, picture of ‘fragmentation and 
interdependence, and functional decentralisation’ (Rhodes, 2003, p.32).
8
 The DPM and 
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 For detailed discussions of this shift, see Goodwin and Grix (2011). 
8
 See also Christensen and Laegreid (2007). 
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associated governance models - such as the Asymmetric Power Model (APM) and multi-level 
governance literature (see, for example, Bache et al., 2015) - work within broadly similar 
parameters of the ‘hollowing-out thesis’ (see Skelcher, 2000) that were first advanced in the 
work on ‘policy communities’ by Richardson and Jordan (1979).  Their seminal text, 
Governing Under Pressure (1979), downplayed the importance of the parliamentary arena 
long before Rhodes solidified the DPM. Exploring a series of case studies that delved behind 
symbolic headline politics and examined the role of the civil service and interest groups, 
Richardson and Jordan (1979, p.91) concluded that ‘the traditional model of Cabinet and 
parliamentary government is a travesty of reality.’  
It is neither possible nor necessary for this thesis to discuss the extant governance 
literature in detail, other than to highlight the premium it has placed on the role of individual 
actors within British politics. Arguments against the DPM have tried to downplay the 
‘hollowing-out’ thesis as ‘overblown’ (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p.xiii) but even critics such 
as Holliday (2000, p.175) concede that, whilst not disabled, ‘[t]he core is to an extent 
fragmented’. This development in studies of British politics is not only important for the 
renewed interest it has given to agency in parliamentary studies, but for opening up the 
intellectual space in which new (largely sociological) theories and methodological approaches 
to studying political behaviour, systems and reforms have appeared. Particularly relevant is 
the motivational neo-institutional approach to parliamentary roles pioneered by Donald 
Searing; the interpretivist studies of everyday British governance instigated by Mark Bevir 
and Rod Rhodes; and the anthropological work on symbols and norms in Parliament of Emma 
Crewe. In order to understand the gap amidst these agency-centred sociological approaches, 
each will be critically discussed with reference to, amongst others, the leading scholars named 
above.   
(a). Motivational Studies of Socialisation and Role Formation 
Donald Searing’s (1994) Westminster’s World stands tall amidst motivational studies 
of politicians’ norms, values and experiences of socialisation in the UK. Searing’s qualitative 
analysis of MPs’ roles within Westminster dismisses the functionalist implications of the 
WM, in which the static nature of institutionalism gives limited to no agency to the individual 
in the role-formation process (for a discussion of structural-functionalist role theory, see 
Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012). Searing’s motivational approach rejects many of the 
constraints implicit in institutional theories: individuals negotiate with role prescriptions and 
adapt them, rather than simply internalising and performing pre-determined obligations (see 
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also Giddens, 1979, p. 117). In this view parliamentary or representative roles not only exist 
but evolve, and not only according to new institutional frameworks or societal pressures but 
also in tune with the changes wrought by the players that enact them. Using transcription-
based coding of 521 interviews, Searing posited eight distinct roles for MPs in Parliament. 
Four of these were backbench: Policy Advocates, Ministerial Aspirants, Constituency 
Members and Parliament Men. The remaining four were leadership roles: parliamentary 
Private Secretary, Whips, Junior Ministers and Ministers.  
Searing’s work in the motivational tradition, recognising both the power of rules and 
purposeful action of individuals, has been instrumental in producing a lasting seam of 
research broadly described as neo-institutionalist. This literature may be split two-fold. The 
first group of studies is the product of rational choice theory and stresses the institutional 
circumscription of roles via incentives for agents (Tsebelis, 2002). The second is normative 
and outlines the explicit behavioural prescriptions made by institutions (March and Olsen, 
1989). In spite of their differences, these approaches share a common focus on the individual 
and their active interplay with institutions.  The neo-institutional turn represents a vital step 
forward, recognising roles as institutionally specific but interpreted by individuals. Table 1.2 
(below) compares the motivational approach of neo-institutionalism with two competing 
conceptual frameworks that exist in the study of parliamentary actors and their roles. 
Searing was interested in both the rational choices, or 'career goals', and emotional 
incentives behind role formation. Although he states that equal attention is given to reason 
and feeling, he does admit '[e]motional incentives are the principal energising forces in all 
parliamentary roles' (Searing, 1994, p.19). It is this overwhelming concern with the emotional 
motivations of MPs that sets Searing's work apart from other dominant paradigms. When 
placing Searing within the neo-institutionalist framework, his dual narrative of role formation 
demands recognition of endogenous and exogenous factors in politics. Hence an MP's 
emotional motivations will interact with institutional constraints to produce a coherent yet 
personalised role in the actor's mind that is reflected in noticeable patterns of behaviour (see 
Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012). Whilst the theoretical framework appears admirable and 
worthwhile, its credibility lies in Searing's methodological approach and here there are a 
number of epistemological issues. 
 Firstly, the process of formulating a taxonomy of legislative roles is inductive and, 
unsurprisingly, ambiguous, subjective and strikingly creative in Westminster' s World. Searing 
claims that roles are 'reconstructions...as intelligible by identifying and describing rules and 
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reasoned choices [in MPs' interview responses]' (Searing, 1994, p. 22). Searing accepts that to 
analyse the 'desires, beliefs and behaviours' of individual actors is an interpretative process, 
but one that he thinks runs complementary to naturalistic explanations when those 
characteristics are grouped and used as dependent or independent variables (Ibid., p.22). 
Searing overlooks the fact that any valid naturalistic explanation of roles as 'groups of 
characteristics' relies on the verity of the initial interpretative enterprise. Here verification is 
practically impossible due to the qualitative methods employed to gain and assess data. 
Unless Searing is willing to admit an element of Cartesian intelligibility when choosing 
between interpretations of 'desires, beliefs and attitudes', then we can be unsure whether the 
connection between certain rhetoric and roles, or even roles and their sub-types, actually 
exists in the minds of MPs or only as an imposed construct in the mind of the author.  
 Not only could Searing's discourse analysis impose roles and groupings that do not 
actually exist in the mind of the actor, but interviews (especially on this scale) have enormous 
potential to produce distortions. Indeed Searing is 'over-reliant on information supplied by 
actors who are likely to over-emphasise certain roles' (Garnett and Morris, 1994, p.637). The 
potential for bias, both by the actor and the researcher, is extensive. Searing's constructions 
also presuppose that politicians are actually self-conscious about their roles at all and were 
able to report considered, well understood answers. His roles are ultimately built on self-
reported images from politicians whose discourse about their job will inevitably be 
constructed around institutionally prescribed norms. Thus Searing's claim to a motivational 
approach is weakened by the lack of consideration for truly exogenous factors, those 
processes and pressures in MPs' lives outside of Parliament that mould their trans-situational 
motivations and behaviours. In this sense, one might question whether Searing does little 
more than reveal those social facts (Durkheim 1982 [1895])  that exert conscious and 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Searing also claims that 'desires and beliefs' are interwoven with 'behaviour' (1994, 
p.22). Yet in explaining this connection, it becomes fuzzy as to whether Searing is trying to 
determine the validity of roles in his taxonomy; to analyse the MPs who populate his roles; or 
to assess the consequences of his roles. Each could be a valid research question in itself and in 
his determination to tie his perceived motivational typologies to behaviour, Searing lays 
himself bare to tautological criticisms. For instance, what additional knowledge is gained 
from comparing role constructions to MPs' opinions when those same roles were formed from 
an assessment of MPs' attitudes? For some critics, the 'result is page after page of very banal 
assessments' (Greenaway, 1995, p.313). 
 Searing also insists that MPs prioritise a single role focus, stressing predominance 
rather than homogeneity (1994, p.416). Searing's explanation is almost Darwinian: he claims 
that 'no one has sufficient time and energy to pursue all backbench roles at once' (1994, p.81). 
The implication here is that MPs recognise that in the tumultuous and demanding world of 
Westminster, only those who are efficient enough to specialise (and effectively at that) will 
succeed. Searing draws on the psychological work of James Payne who wrote: 'each politician 
(with a few exceptions) has only one incentive, not a mixture of incentives' (Payne et al., 
1984, p.8). Thus Searing opens a door onto the world of personal, non-political and emotional 
motivations, but brings back rationalism to avoid explaining what these are and how or why 
they interact to produce purposeful behaviour in national politics.  
(b). Anthropological Insights into Parliament 
The desire to ‘draw back the curtain’ on Parliament and to get beyond the narrow 
studies of agency conducted by institutional or rational choice theorists has spawned a nascent 
body of anthropological perspectives on British parliamentary politics.
9
 Whilst still 
exceptional in the discipline, anthropological studies of Parliament - especially the substantive 
work of Emma Crewe - have added to that body of political science literature concerned with 
the actions taken by individual actors. Qualitative by nature, these studies combine interviews 
with both participant and non-participant observation to provide ‘a rare ethnographic 
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 Principal texts include: Crewe, E. and Müller, M. (eds.). (2006). Rituals in Parliament. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang GmbH; Crewe E. (2014). The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work. London: 
Bloomsbury; Crewe, E. (2006). Lords of Parliament. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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perspective’ that takes norms, ideas and beliefs as explanatory variables in a way that goes 
beyond rational choice assumptions of human self-interest.
10
  
   In their edited volume, Rituals in Parliament, Emma Crewe and Marion Müller (2006) 
analyse the symbols of the parliamentary world that enable its actors to make sense of their 
daily experiences. The chapters cover topics as diverse as parliamentary self-expression and 
constitutional oath-taking.
11
 The common theme of these contributions is the general rejection 
of empirical, institutionalist research and the authors make this clear in the introduction: 
‘Parliament has been the preserve of historians and political scientists. Few have asked 
whether rituals affect the way Parliament operates, its reputation or its relationship with heads 
of state, government and the public’ (Crewe and Müller, 2006, p.7). The scope of these 
studies is impressive and the focus on the function of rituals performed by individuals builds 
on a very limited body of comparative work done elsewhere, for instance that of Mark Abélès 
(1988) on the French Presidency in the 1980s. However, there is some ambiguity as to 
whether the methodological ambition is matched by theoretical clarity and delivery. 
Crewe, Müller and other scholars taking similar anthropological approaches to 
parliamentary studies draw implicitly and explicitly on ideational logics; these can be 
conceived, in a political science sense, as any particularistic interpretive material that may 
extend to and include practices, grammars, symbols, models, norms, ideas, identities and/or 
beliefs (Geertz 1973; Bourdieu 1977; Sewell 1999). It is in the particularistic character of 
these elements that their work overlaps with institutionalism and defies their claims to 
‘breaking new ground’. The reliance of institutionalism upon objective rationality is a 
necessary symptom of the claim that intersubjectively agreed and understood organisations or 
rules are the arbiters of solutions to ambiguity. By contrast ideational logic often rests on a-
rationality, whereby the actor’s personal subjective interpretations of the problem, not the 
frameworks around them, illuminate a solution (Parsons, 2007). The distinction can be a fine 
line, since objectively rational MPs might act in accordance with particular symbols or 
practices in the UK Parliament because they are recognised as institutionally prerequisite for 
communication, not necessarily because they believe in the connotations of the symbol or 
practice and interpret the world through that lens. Thus institutional logic is invoked through 
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 See the blurb of Crewe E. (2014). The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work. London: 
Bloomsbury. 
11
 Patzelt, W. (2006). Parliaments and their Symbols: Topography of a field of research. In E. Crewe and M. 
Müller (eds.). Rituals in Parliament. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, p.172; Müller, M. (2006). 
Parliaments and their Liturgies. In E. Crewe and M. Müller (eds.). Rituals in Parliament. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang GmbH, pp.183-205. 
James Weinberg 




an informal institution, not an ideational one. These theoretical arguments undermine the 
uniqueness of the anthropological approach as conceived thus far, but they do not diminish 
the intent of these studies to place agency and context in a truly symbiotic relationship.
12
 
 Crewe’s most recent study of the House of Commons (2014), An Anthropology of 
MPs at Work, makes a concerted effort to get away from the symbolic rituals of parliamentary 
life to concentrate on the lived experiences of elected politicians. As Paul Evans (2015, 
p.590), Principal Clerk of the Table Office at the House of Commons, writes: 'Crewe gives ‘a 
‘thick’ account of the ethically-driven political life experienced through the emotions and 
ambiguities, the ambitions and disillusions, the joys and insults of lived experience, rather 
than a ‘thin’ account mapped on to theories of representation or accountability’. Whilst it is 
still questionable as to how far Crewe actually eschews more mainstream political science 
research that combines interviews and empirics (especially the work on socialisation by Rush 
and Giddings, 2011), this book tells the human narrative of most aspects of parliamentary life 
for an MP. The books ranges from the moment of election to friendships and rivalries, a 
detailed case study of law-making using section 11 of what became the Children and Families 
Act 2014, and the contradictions of representative governance.  
What the book appears to miss is the methodological framework with which to link 
observation with evaluation. For example, rather stretched conceptual descriptions are used to 
link MPs’ self-reported motivations and their behaviours. As earlier illustrated in the case of 
Searing’s motivational approach to role formation, anthropological studies based on ideational 
theories (like Crewe’s) open themselves to tautological criticism: people from particular 
backgrounds or in certain situations share similar thought processes, and that culture 
underpinning their shared thoughts and behaviours can be intuited from the behaviour being 
explained. For example, Crewe (2014, p.18) infers from her interview with Chris Bryant MP 
that his decision to stand for election, and his choices as an MP, are ‘an act of indirect 
reciprocity to those who inspired his gratitude’ when he received help as a child. Apart from 
bringing into question the author’s claims to neutral political science (see the introduction to 
Crewe and Müller, 2006), it is clear throughout this book that the anthropological approach to 
parliamentary studies continues to lack a coherent model to a) understand the interplay 
between the competing exogenous motivations of politicians; b) explain the link between 
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 For a related critique of Emma Crewe’s study of the Commons (2014), see Allen, P. (2016) The House of 
Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work Emma Crewe, Parliamentary Affairs 69(4), p.949. 
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personal contexts and parliamentary choices; and c) clarify the chain of agency from 
motivation to behaviour to parliamentary change or legislation. 
(c). Into Interpretivism 
The dominant methodologies of political science research in the twentieth century, 
positivism and modern-empiricism, have been challenged in the last twenty years by the rise 
of an alternative interpretive approach. In keeping with the epistemological foundation of the 
present thesis, and that of both motivational neo-institutionalism and anthropological studies, 
the interpretive paradigm takes individuals as its starting point and shares the contention that 
action can only be understood through close attention to the beliefs, ideas and desires of each 
actor (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). Using an ethnographic database, interpretivism aims at that 
'thick description' (Rhodes, 2011, p. xii) of political narratives which evades the so-called 
truths of positivist measures of external reality. According to Kerr and Kettell (2006), '[t]he 
most self-confident and influential attempt at a post-positivist approach to date, however, has 
come in the form of ‘interpretivist’ political science.' By virtue of its epistemological 
assumptions of what can be known and how it can be understood, interpretivism has further 
undermined the WM and HI as the normative frames of choice for scholars working on the 
Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) of governance or networks of exchange.  
The most influential methodological inheritance of interpretivism, for this thesis, is the 
concept of decentred governance. This account of political behaviour moves the topos of 
parliamentary studies from institutional norms or structural classifications and correlations, to 
the meaning of individual action. The focus on bottom-up governance is defined by Bevir and 
Rhodes (2006, p.100) as follows: 
Governance is a product of diverse practices composed of multiple individuals acting on all 
sorts of conflicting beliefs that they have reached against the background of several traditions 
and in response to varied dilemmas.   
A decentred approach to governance implies that social laws and objectified institutions are 
insufficient mechanisms for understanding action; rather the interpretive approach prefers to 
focus on how individuals create meanings in political contexts and thus explain behaviour as 
the product of socially constructed networks. 
Rod Rhodes’ (2011) Everyday Life in British Government provides the most 
compelling application of interpretivism to the study of the UK Parliament to date. The book 
‘aims to understand the ways in which the political and administrative elites of central 
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government departments make sense of their worlds’ (Rhodes, 2011, p.17). It is, in essence, 
the intellectual enterprise most akin to a counter-point for this thesis: a rival ‘narrative’ based 
on distinct methodologies and epistemological assumptions about what can be known and 
what should be reported. A unique ethnography of ministers and permanent secretaries across 
three government departments, Rhodes’ study provides contrasting evidence to dominant 
accounts of a British constitution in decline (e.g. Bogdanor 2003, 2011; King, 2009). Moving 
beyond the usual research foci of Parliament as a set of rules and events, or even policies, 
Rhodes (2011, pp. 282-284) examines socially constructed narratives and institutional 
dilemmas to show that ministers and civil servants still act within the constants of a mythical 
Westminster Model. Applying the hallmarks of interpretivism (practices, beliefs, traditions) to 
participant observation and interview data, Rhodes starts from the perspective of the people 
doing politics to understand the daily processes occurring inside the UK Parliament and 
Whitehall.  
However, I find fault with the interpretive approach in three key respects. Firstly, it 
only appreciates individuals, and their actions, as products of aggregated social or cultural 
norms termed ‘traditions’; it thus fails to move beyond ideational facades and explain 
individual variation sufficiently. Secondly, the interpretive approach demonstrates an 
extremely limited concept of the mode and method of interpretation. Thirdly, the interpretive 
paradigm as championed by Bevir and Rhodes in the last decade fails to realise the 
explanatory potential of interpretive mechanisms. Each criticism will be briefly discussed in 
order to strengthen the point of departure for this thesis. 
In their influential work Interpreting British Governance (2003), Bevir and Rhodes 
locate the beliefs and actions of individuals within four British political traditions: Tory, 
Whig, liberal and socialist. Although Rhodes (2011, p. 5) claims that traditions are ‘non-
deterministic’ in his analysis of Parliament, the discussion does not hold up to scrutiny. The 
final analysis in Rhodes’ (2011) study is unhitched from the decentred ‘thick description’ 
available in the data. Instead of truly individual accounts of who politicians are and how they 
behave in context, the reader gets a broad additive account of institutional processes already 
well-documented. In particular, these include managerialism (Lodge and Rogers, 2006), 
media contrivance and image control (Meyer, 2002; Ballard, 2006), institutional memory 
(Pollitt, 2007; Wilkinson, 2011), and metagovernance (Jessop, 2000, 2007). The major failing 
of interpretivism is, then, that it does not deliver on its promises. The result is a top-down, 
rather than bottom-up, analysis of the ways politicians interact with their surroundings and 
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responsibilities according to ‘traditions’. In their desperation to eschew the path dependent 
arguments of institutionalism (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2006) for traditions and narratives, 
Bevir and Rhodes bypass the ‘neo’-institutional stance that sees actors interpreting structures 
in a way that is affected by pre-existing exogenous motivators (see Hay 2007; McAnulla 
2006).  
Rhodes does not ultimately get at ‘who’ our political elites really are or why they 
chose a career path in Parliament. He merely observes and describes how they act within 
common institutional narratives. Rhodes (2011, p. 299) concludes that ‘it is individuals’ 
understandings of these roles, shaped by their personalities and experiences, which breathes 
life into the system, and determines the nature and quality of the collaboration between 
politicians and bureaucrats.’ However, the conclusion and the analysis do not correspond: 
there is nothing more than cursory acknowledgement of MPs' inherent individual differences 
throughout the study and no attempt to understand how beliefs, as his point of departure in the 
analytical process, might fit within intellectual understandings of personality. Rhodes does 
not, for example, have a rigorous explanation for why one of his Ministers perceived his role 
to be managing the department and working in conjunction with the Permanent Secretary 
when the other Ministers he observed acted according to classic Westminster notions of 
hierarchy.    
The second main objection against interpretive methodologies is the overreliance on 
qualitative (largely interview) data collection. In fact, the methodological outline provided in 
chapters 8-10 of Interpreting British Governance (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003) extensively 
privileges politicians' contemporary interpretations of their own behaviour. The argument 
presented here is not that actors' accounts are untrustworthy or irrelevant, but that they must 
also be interpreted and weighed against other evidence. Indeed to rely on interview data is to 
privilege an actor's perception of their underlying motivations when, in fact, these real 
motivations may be unconscious and the political terms they use may simply be 
rationalisations made post-hoc or social facts of political rhetoric that they understand as 
legitimate in the context under which they are being examined/interviewed. The extension of 
this critique is that interpretivism, as conceived by Bevir and Rhodes, is far too narrow and 
fails to expose the exogenous factors that influence the way politicians act and influence 
political processes.  
Aside from issues of self-report, interpretivism relies on the very conscious 
involvement of the researcher. Rhodes (2011, p. xii) describes his analysis of ministerial life 
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as his ‘interpretation of their interpretation of what the world looks like through their eyes’. 
The result is a series of interpretations that are twice or thrice removed, ‘a soft science that 
guesses at meanings, assesses the guesses, and draws explanatory conclusions from the better 
guesses’ (Rhodes, 2011, p. 8). Westminster is necessarily complex, episodic, contingent and 
ambivalent as an observational arena; as such there is certainly a need to impose some order 
on the analysis. Moreover, I agree with John Van Maanen (1988, p. 8) that ‘[t]here is no way 
of seeing, hearing, or representing the world of others that is absolutely, universally, valid or 
correct.’ However, the question is whether that endeavour should take the form of abstract 
qualitative concepts theoretically spawned and applied according to the author’s subjectivity, 
or whether there should be an attempt to make the analysis comparable by drawing on more 
appropriate empirical theories that have cross-cultural or trans-situational validity. Above all, 
the latter would limit the room for error and ‘authorship’ of the data by the researcher. In this 
respect I work with, rather than against, existing studies mentioned here in bringing 
psychological theory and measurement to the aid of interpreting the world of national 
representatives in the rest of this thesis.  
A final related point is that of explanation and goes back once again to the central use 
of ‘traditions’ in interpretive political science. Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 34) argue that 'the 
explanatory value of traditions lies in the way in which they show how individuals inherited 
beliefs and practices from their communities'. The presumption that people inherit an 
ideational heritage is not problematic but it does not have any explanatory value for individual 
action without a clear mechanism of inheritance. To draw parallels between voiced beliefs 
and prior traditions does not suffice as explanatory analysis of anything except a constitutive 
link. Bevir and Rhodes also argue that traditions motivate actors to interpret dilemmas in 
specific ways but in turn it is also the manner in which the individual views the dilemma that 
determines the tradition that they follow (this critique is developed by Finlayson, 2004). It is 
on this premise that Bevir and Rhodes claim that they do not hypostasise tradition; if so, then 
it is unclear whether traditions laud power over actors or actors command power over 
tradition. Consequently the interpretive narrative vacillates between explanation (or claims of) 
and understanding, without ever clarifying its ability for either.  
The three strands of sociological parliamentary scholarship reviewed here take the 
discipline a long way from the rigid text-based analysis of the WM and HI reviewed in 
section I of this chapter. Although HI has given the WM a more cogent theoretical framework 
with which to explain incremental change and the narrative of stability in British politics, it 
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remains ineffective as a legalistic model for assessing the more fluid concept of influence, the 
individualistic lived experiences of politicians, or the normative basis for individual 
behaviour. It is to these ends that alternative sociological research principles and methods 
have arisen. Motivational neo-institutionalism, anthropological approaches, and interpretivism 
all start from the premise of the individual actor, either as a way to scrutinise the micro-level 
of parliamentary politics or in order to extrapolate individual action to meso- and macro-level 
developments. However, each of these research strands is significantly hampered by its desire 
to develop theoretical and methodological principles from within the caucus of parliamentary 
political studies – typified by the use of British political traditions in interpretivism. Thus 
each perspective restricts itself to committing the same mistakes as extant institutional and 
ideational research. For these sociological approaches to fulfil their potential, they need to be 
operationalised with less concern for 'understanding' per se, and more focus on the ways in 
which specific understandings are able to motivate political agents to specific action. In the 
following section I demonstrate how these agent-centred philosophies can benefit from 
seeking interdisciplinary partnerships.  
III. Political Psychology and the ‘Value of Values’ 
 The sociological studies reviewed here have given renewed attention to the people 
doing politics in Parliament, but they continue to prioritise impersonal determinants of 
political events or change. Where individual action is prioritised, it is viewed in isolation from 
exogenous personal characteristics and there is a presumption that actors’ behaviour, even if 
not explained in rational choice terms, can be deduced from the normative, historical or 
cultural logics of their parliamentary setting (cf. Simon, 1985).
13
 By contrast to structural, 
institutional or sociological theories of economic or social forces, research in political 
psychology has focused on the unobservable psychological processes occurring in the minds 
of political actors. In its application of the theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1992), 
this thesis associates itself with a credible body of literature in which particular and well 
developed psychological theories are applied to the analysis of politicians and political events 
(Converse, 1964; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Tetlock 1985; Zaller 1992). This thesis will stand 
apart from the psychological political science literature on two counts. It will be the first 
application of the theory of Basic Human Values to national politicians in the UK (and as a 
feature of behavioural analysis in Parliaments anywhere), and it will be unique in gathering 
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quantitative survey data on MPs' values directly from the actors themselves. This section will 
make the case for a rethinking of parliamentary studies, opening the space for psychological 
political science to contribute to our understanding of British politics at the highest level. In 
particular I a) argue the theoretical case for crossing epistemological boundaries between 
psychological and institutional explanations, and b) make the case for values as the most 
useful psychological measure of personality for political assessment of national politicians.  
(a) A new logic of explanation: personality in parliamentary studies 
The history of psychological assessments of political elites is one of content analysis 
done 'at a distance', relying on archival documents such as letters, diaries, or speeches (See 
Winter, 2003). Noteworthy examples include studies of John F. Kennedy (Hargrove, 2008), 
Woodrow Wilson (George and George, 1956) and Josef Stalin (Tucker, 1973); in each case 
there is an attempt to fit political leaders within extant psychological typologies, the most 
influential of which have been the dogmatic, authoritarian and Machiavellian personality 
categorisations (Adorno et al., 1950; Christie and Geis, 1970; Rokeach, 1960). Although 
results across these studies have been largely confirmatory of one another, they cannot escape 
the central issue of inference. It is possible, or expected, that publically available statements 
will reveal more about a politician's attempts to influence others or manage their own media 
image than the real cognitive motivations that drive their behaviour or attitudes. Ultimately 
studies of this sort flit between analysis of rhetorical style (personality as perception) and 
personality functioning (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this distinction).  
The methodological heritage of this literature pertains to the need for data collection 
directly from political elites and the desirability of systematic consideration for contingent 
relationships within the political environment, as well as careful application of psychological 
assessments to disparate circumstances (see, for example, George, 1971) to avoid circular 
(and insular) reasoning. However, the aim of this literature is constant and central to the 
purpose of this thesis: to obviate de novo analyses of political actors as structural/institutional 
pawns by building an understanding of their personality types and thus answering important 
questions not only about ‘who’ enters politics, but also how/why they differ in their policy 
choices, their normative understanding of political institutions and situations, selective 
participation in political processes, and engagement with the public. There is a long literature 
to show that people do not appear randomly in political roles (see, for example, Browning and 
Jacobs 1964; George, 1974) and that behaviour flows from constant symbiosis between 
mental states and the environment (for an early example, see Lewin, 1936, pp.11-12). Yet 
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sound empirical studies of politicians that test these general findings are few in number, and 
practically non-existent in the UK. As Fred Greenstein (1992, p. 125) argues: ‘If the 
connections between the personalities of political actors and their political behaviour are 
obscure, all the more reason to illuminate them.’ I take up Greenstein's challenge as an 
important step forward for parliamentary studies of British politics.    
 To make the case for psychological assessments of political actors, and their behaviour 
in Westminster as active agents, I first return to the basic conceptual framework advanced by 
Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, pp.4-6): that human response (R) is a function of the 
respondent’s environment (E) and predispositions (P). This equation evokes a simple yet 
neglected truism for studies of parliamentary politics: that the environment of Parliament will 
always be mediated by the individual agents within it who are both proactive and reactive 
variables. It is useful here to return to Parson’s (2007) matrix (see Table 1.3, below). Given 
the fierce debate between Humean and Non-Humean scholars about explanation and 
causality, it seems appropriate that the strongest explanations for political action of any sort 
rest on multiple criteria; that is to say that clear explanatory claims allow for the insightful 
capacities of both within-case mechanisms and cross-case general patterns (Brady and 
Seawright, 2004). In his commentary on IR, Wight (a self-proclaimed ideational theorist) 
neatly captures the coexistence of supra-individual dynamics and individualism in state 
action: 
In the final analysis, state activity is always the activity of particular individuals acting within 
particular social contexts. There is an ontological wall here that corporate forms do not cross 
(or cross only on the backs of individuals). None of this is to deny the reality of a common 
intention, or collective action, which individuals try to realise in their practices. Nor is this to 
deny the reality of social structures that enable and constrain action. Nor does...[it] entail that 
there can be no coordinated action that is the bearer of causal powers greater than that 
possessed by individuals acting individually (Wight 2004, p. 279). 
This thesis presents an interdisciplinary position, albeit leaning towards the generality 
of psychological perspectives. I accept that the focus and even to some extent the range of 
MPs' behaviour will be particularistic, which should not necessarily be equated with chaotic, 
because of the unique institutional and normative arena of Westminster. However, using a 
psychological measure of values (see Chapter 2) that traverses that political arena and 
examines politicians for who they are as humans, and as such compares them at a base level 
to other humans in other particularistic arenas, allows for some generality in proposing 
probabilistic laws of how MPs might behave (i.e. the character of behavioural choices) in 
response to a range of ‘particular’ stimuli. Combining quantitative survey data on MPs’ 
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values with qualitative interview data, I add theoretical and empirical weight to the E-P-R 
formula and build on a history of similar attempts at interactionist research (see, for example, 
Endler, 1981; Pervin and Lewis 1978) that is sensitive to both environmental constraints or 
influences and agents’ capacity to be proactive (Murray, 1968). 
Table 1.3 Combining logics of explanation (adapted from Parsons, 2007). 
 GENERAL PARTICULAR 
POSITION Structural Institutional 
INTERPRETATION Psychological Ideational 
 
This logic (Table 1.3) is designed to work with, not against, institutionalism in 
proposing that actors themselves can both cause, and count as, critical junctures along a non-
deterministic path of dependence. For example, new MPs - having not been present at the 
initial critical juncture that elicited the institution of Parliament - are by implication making 
an individual decision to join the parliamentary ‘community’, and all of the norms, rules, 
models associated with it. To make that decision, whether you adopt a notion of objective 
rationality or a socio-psychological standpoint, implies a calculation that the act of joining 
will serve the individual's needs, desires or hard wired traits (all of those exogenous factors 
that apparently weaken an institutionalist argument). A similar case could be made for MPs 
who actively decide to stand for re-election, although the sunk costs here may be greater. The 
institution provides both a formal and informal channel of constraints or incentives, but 
sustained exogenous factors (endogenous to the individual) will be prioritised in the decision-
making process wherever the contingencies on offer allow it to be the case (reactive 
behaviour) or where an MP brings particularly strong psychological predispositions to their 
job (proactive behaviour). Given that a lot of political scenarios and responsibilities are only 
hazily defined by formal rules (especially the act of representation), there is immense latitude 
for politicians’ personalities to influence their behaviours. Thus the institutional landscape is a 
starting point that on occasion may force action according to the unintended consequences of 
decisions made long before an MP entered the House, and on other occasions allows for 
interpretation so that action is a derivation of initial or extra-parliamentary [psychological] 
conditions within the unique institutional context of Westminster. 
Unlike anthropological and interpretivist studies of politicians, I argue from this 
position that MPs may be affected by norms, symbols and practices in the House of Commons 
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in ways dependent on their psychological predispositions. Within the same group (i.e. party, 
select committee, cabinet) MPs may choose to engage in a particular behaviour because they 
hold it to be legitimate according to their personal value-informed goals and cannot 
comprehend an alternative (i.e. proactive), or because they are coerced to a greater or lesser 
extent by social expectations and the transaction costs associated with introducing the 'group' 
to a new mode of operation (i.e. reactive to institutionalist logic). The implication for the 
present research project is that personality will dictate behaviour most in those aspects of a 
politician's life where they operate individually and institutional norms or practices are 
weakest (i.e. in the constituency/on the backbench) and least in those arenas of political life 
where MPs are working directly within a group (i.e. following the whip/on the frontbench). 
This will be developed further in section 2 of this thesis.  
(b) Measuring personality? 
 The use of the term 'personality' in psychological studies is extremely broad and 
multifaceted, going beyond the narrow psychopathological differences that have preoccupied 
political science studies of politicians (cf. Caprara and Silvester, 2018). This clinical 
conception of personality ignores social cognitive approaches that make personality, in Henry 
Murray's (1968) words, 'the most comprehensive term we have in psychology'. However, it is 
especially important that academic studies crossing these disciplinary boundaries are precise 
about the terms they employ in order to avoid distorting or manipulating concepts in their 
application to new cases, what Sartori (1970) incisively critiqued as conceptual stretching.  
 This thesis is aligned with a three-tier classification of personality. At the broad level 
of self-regulation, I agree with Caprara and Vecchione (2013, p.24) that personality is a 
'dynamic system of psychological structures and processes that mediates the relationship 
between the individual and the environment and accounts for what that person is and may 
become'. Beneath this complex system exists synergistic relations between various 
subsystems - cognitive and affective - that construct and communicate an individual's 
personal identity (Caprara and Cervone, 2000). Thirdly, I narrow to focus on values, and 
specifically the theory of Basic Human Values developed by Shalom Schwartz (1992; see 
Chapter 2), as the core of personal identity (see also Hitlin, 2003). In adopting a social 
cognitive approach, I stop short of genetics and accept a dialogic understanding of the ways in 
which environments condition the functioning of personality as well as the ways in which the 
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personality of active agents influences the choice of, and change to, those environments.
14
 
Basic Human Values are a theoretically validated and empirically testable model for cognitive 
representations of sought-after, trans-situational targets that act as guiding principles in 
people's lives (Schwartz, 1992; 1994). In selecting this theory from a critical review of 
integrative personality measures, I take the advice of Hall and Lindzey (1970, p.602): to 
choose a theory and 'wallow in it, revel in it, absorb it, learn it thoroughly....and set about the 
cold hard business of investigation'.  
 Figure 1.1 represents the different 'levels' of personality (Hall and Lindzey, 1970) that 
have been variously studied as indicative of the 'predispositions' inherent in the E-P-R 
formula of behavioural explanation. Beneath the level of 'perception', which acts as a 
cognitive screen of sorts for environmental stimuli (see, for example, Lau and Sears, 1986; 
Vertzberger, 1990), exist three broad classes of internal processes also known as functional 
bases of personality (Greenstein, 1992). As cognitive qualities that bear on thought and 
perception, Basic Human Values can be situated within the functional base of cognition and 
needs.  As such they are more distal than opinions and beliefs as a structure for understanding 
the effect of personality on behaviour, but more proximal than genetic explanations that 
underpin new research in the field of bio-politics (see Hatemi and McDermott, 2011). A 
person's genetic endowment provides a range of potential values, attitudes or preferences, the 
actualisation of which and pathways between remain poorly understood and under-researched 
(Smith et al., 2011). It is for this reason that Caprara and Vecchione (2013) warn against 
current findings on the heritability of political attitudes and beliefs (cf. Alford et al., 2005; 
Hatemi et al. 2010). I heed that warning and ground this thesis in the functional base of Basic 
Human Values, which are both stable and inherent qualities of individuals and 
operationalisable to explain politicians' perceptions of, and responses to, the environment of 
Parliament and British politics.  
 Whilst I choose to invesitgate the basic values of UK politicians, the most accepted 
and researched foundation for personality studies to date is the Big Five measure of human 
traits.
15
 In political psychology, traits have been used to explain behavioural phenomena as 
diverse as voting choice (Caprara et al., 1999; Schoen and Schumann 2007), party affiliation 
(Gerberet al., 2010), ideological self-placement (Jost, 2006), candidate preferences 
(Barbaranelli et al., 2007), and public policy preferences (Riemann et al., 1993). However, 
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personality research in psychology continues to advance an integrative view of the individual 
that gives greater attention to values alongside traits as key functional bases (see Barenbaum 
and Winter, 2008; Cervone, 2005; McAdams and Pals, 2006). There is now significant 
evidence to suggest that values and traits, traditionally measured by the Big Five model 
(McCrae and Costa, 1997; Allik, 2005), capture distinct yet complementary data about 
personality (Caprara et al., 2012; Saroglou and Munoz-Garcia, 2008; Park-Leduc et al. 2015). 
For example, Caprara et al. (2006) found that Basic Human Values account for more variance 
in voting than traits, and that demographic variables such as education, location and income 
have no additional impact after values and traits have been included in regression analysis. 
Research has also shown that Basic Human Values mediate the effect of traits (Caprara et al., 
2009), thus indicating the latter’s causal primacy in behavioural analysis. However, as more 
proximal aspects of personality, values are preferable for their potential to determine political 
choices and behaviours that rely on conscious consideration of alternative choices that invoke 
motivational deliberation.  
 By contrast to studies of political values (Goren, 2005; Jacoby, 2006), Hitlin (2003) 
argues that personal values and related value commitments produce a sense of personal 
identity that offers a far more accurate and powerful explanatory tool for behavioural analysis 
in politics. Hitlin builds on the work of Gecas (2000, p.96), who describes personal identity 
arising when ‘individuals conceive of themselves in terms of the values they hold’. In this 
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view, Gecas argues that our values in and of themselves are too distal for conscious 
understanding, but the personal identity that they inform creates a reflexive view of oneself 
that is directly tied to role- and group-identities as well as behaviours. This reasoning relies on 
the permeability of personal and social identity (Deaux, 1992; Reid and Deaux, 1996) but if 
values are accepted as a significant constitutive force within the self, then they also become 
vital for understanding both situated identities and situated behaviours.
16
  
 An empirical study of MPs’ values thus conveys three key outcomes for parliamentary 
studies: (1) it allows researchers to interrogate MPs’ judgements and perceptions of varying 
parliamentary (and representative) situations – such as constituency work or legislative 
scrutiny; (2) it can enlighten MPs’ decision-making in response to situated representative 
activities – such as voting or debating in the chamber; (3) it can reveal more about their group 
identity or lack thereof – for instance at the party, House, or occupational level. Unlike the 
qualitative studies reviewed earlier in this chapter, this approach is nuanced in that action can 
be understood at both the group or institutional level, and in terms of individual agency. Not 
only can empirical measures of basic values identify the dynamics of counter intuitive 
behaviour (i.e. when MPs sacrifice their sense of self) but even if all MPs were to place 
particular importance on the same particular values (which might be articulated in an 
interview or observed in ethnographic studies), then crucial individual differences in the 
pattern of values that constitute their personal identity will allow for specific narratives of 
decision-making, perception and behaviour (see Chapter 2 for more detail).  
 This chapter has critically reviewed the parliamentary studies literature, albeit with 
broad brush strokes, to illustrate a) the theoretical flaws of the Westminster Model and 
Historical Institutionalism, which elide the daily experiences of political actors and their 
contribution to systemic and procedural change; b) the methodological limitations of 
sociological approaches that have started to recognise the importance of individual politicians 
as a unit of analysis; and c) the original contribution of an interdisciplinary approach to 
parliamentary studies that systematically unites the intellectual and conceptual strength of 
psychology (and in particular basic values as a measure of personality) and political science 
(in particular neo-institutional theories of parliamentary roles/socialisation). Having opened 
this gap, chapter 2 will now drill down into the deeper theoretical foundations of Basic 
Human Values, before chapters 3 to 5 outline a clear research agenda and hypotheses. 
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“The value concept, more than any other, should occupy a central position . . . able to unify 
the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behaviour.” 
Milton Rokeach (1973) 
Basic Human Values 
 I aim to speak broadly to a gap in the research on democratic legitimacy and 
governance by exploring the fundamental motivations that inform the (self-)selection and 
behaviour of elected politicians. In particular, I highlight a gap in study of the UK 
Westminster democracy that can be filled by an interdisciplinary synthesis of psychology and 
political science. In the opening chapter, I outlined the salient trends in parliamentary research 
in the UK and rejected, in particular, Historical Institutionalism (HI) studies in which 
structures exist autonomously as determinants of agentic action (cf. Bell, 2017). In doing so, I 
advance an original study of Members of Parliament (MPs) at the micro-, meso-, and macro-
levels, which goes beyond existing parliamentary studies in politics (see Chapter 1), notions 
of 'scripted agents' in institutional sociology (e.g. Meyer, 2008), and even behaviourist 
psychology research in which 'the actor's environment carries the explanatory weight [for 
behaviour]' (Mercer, 2005, p.82). Above all, I argue that a great deal can be gained by 
approaching the study of Parliament from an interdisciplinary perspective, whereby external 
social structures, political institutions and changes to either are only properly understood 
when researchers rigorously evaluate how they are interpreted and reacted to, in context, by 
relevant actors (see also Bell, 2012; Schmidt, 2008).  
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to unpick the theory of basic human values (BHV) and 
tease out its relevant application for this study of parliamentary representatives. It proceeds in 
five sections. The first section augments references to psychological research in politics 
presented at the end of chapter 1. The purpose of this section is to situate this thesis in the 
context of a small but highly significant body of psychological research into political elites. 
The second section then focuses on the theory of BHV itself and delineates not only what 
values are and are not, but reinforces their applicability in this thesis. Having outlined the 
theoretical underpinnings of BHV, section III reviews existing research on the variance in 
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basic values according to essential socio-demographic variables such as age, gender and 
education. Given arguments pertaining to political recruitment and professionalisation 
(addressed in Chapter 3), this section provides important insights into the stability of values as 
well as their foundations in childhood socialisation. More than simply understanding how 
MPs differ to those they govern, I seek to rigorously analyse MPs' relative heteronomy or 
autonomy as expressed in daily parliamentary behaviour. To set up a more detailed discussion 
of this in chapter 4, section IV of this chapter carefully explains the link between BHV and 
behaviour as informed by the latest research in this area. Finally, section V defends the 
primacy of BHV as compared to political values and reinforces the added value of such 
psychological studies for parliamentary research in the UK. 
I. The Psychology of Political Elites 
 In chapter 1 of this thesis, an integrated model of personality was presented as the 
basis for understanding political action and, in particular, the situated behaviour of MPs. 
Although '[t]he relationship between personality and politics is one of the oldest and most 
frequently debated topics in political psychology' (Caprara and Silvester, 2018, p.467), there 
is no direct empirical evidence on the role of personality - and specifically basic values - on 
elite political recruitment, behaviour and representation in UK parliamentary politics. In fact, 
direct empirical research into UK policy makers per se is extremely rare (Kwiatkowski, 
2016). As such, this thesis fills a highly significant gap in the research base. Whilst I focus on 
BHV as my personality measure of choice, it is also worth acknowledging important insights 
from additional research into the personality traits, intelligence, and self-belief of political 
elites. Although these were touched upon in chapter 1, this section extracts particular studies 
that inform the expectations of this thesis.  
 More than any other personality measure, traits have received the most attention in 
theoretical and empirical studies of political elites. Personality traits are quantifiable 
psychological qualities that are, generally, normally distributed in the population (Capara and 
Silvester, 2018). Research into traits has tended to diverge between single trait theories - 
focusing on one aspect of personality and behaviour - and multi-trait theories - seeking to 
capture the complete personality of participants and the relative importance of a set number of 
traits for behaviour across contexts. One of the most common single trait theories is 
Machiavellianism, which is used to understand varying levels of power-seeking behaviour 
and manipulation in target populations. For example, Ronald Deluga (2001) asked experts to 
rate anonymised profiles of US presidents using the most widely approved Mach IV scale. 
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The results showed that the most 'charismatic' leaders also scored highest for 
Machiavellianism, which implies an unconventional view on morality, lower levels of 
empathy, and a propensity to exploit others for personal gain. Deluga concluded that higher 
levels of Machiavellianism directly correlated with the confidence of US presidents in 
advancing political goals; able to detach themselves from the effects of their decisions on the 
general populace, these presidents could, in effect, psychologically depoliticse their decision-
making. Although Deluga's study, like most, was conducted at-a-distance, it points to a) 
worrying conclusions about the psychological characteristics of those in the most powerful 
political positions, and b) a link between personality and political behaviour.   
 By contrast to single trait studies, multi-trait research has been made more accessible 
by the widely used taxonomy of traits known as the 'Big 5' or the Five Factor Model 
(Wiggins, 1996). This taxonomy includes five basic traits: Extraversion (sociability, vigour, 
dynamism), Agreeableness (honesty, sincerity, loyalty), Neuroticism (impulsiveness, 
emotional stability), Conscientiousness (diligence, precision, reliability), and Openness to 
Experience (imagination, creativity, innovation). In recent years, a small pool of scholars have 
been able to obtain self-report statistics on the Big 5 from political actors. Combining data 
from elected members of the Italian and European Parliaments as well as regional councils (n 
= 230) with that of the general population in Italy (n = 3249), Caprara et al. (2006, 2010) 
found that politicians score significantly higher for the traits of Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
emotional stability and Openness to Experience. These findings run contrary to a similar 
study of local and state representatives in Germany (Best, 2011), where politicians did score 
higher than the German public for Extraversion and Openness to Experience but lower for 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness.  
 Regardless of cultural differences that might explain these variations, there are 
common trends in politics globally that require politicians to wear a number of hats. 
Politicians must, for example, persuade and convince others in Parliament, in their party and 
in their electorate of their own beliefs or a set course of action; they must be proactive and 
acclimatise to a culture of constant competition; and they must be able to balance multiple, 
often diverse and sometimes contradictory, activities (see Silvester, 2012; Silvester and 
Dykes, 2007). Whilst the populace may, theoretically, want political agents who are high in 
Conscientiousness (and therefore reliably represent the interests of the principal), it may be 
that politicians who can 'stick the course' necessarily need to move quickly, act decisively, 
take initiative and prioritise responsibilities in a calculated manner. To date, there are no 
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comparative findings on the Big 5 of national politicians in the UK, although a small-n study 
of British councillors by Silvester et al. (2014) did find a positive relationship between 
councillors' self-rated Conscientiousness and performance ratings by colleagues. This is 
affirmatory of inferences made above: that external evaluations of political success may not 
run parallel to MPs' actual personalities. 
 Another wave of personality research on political elites has focused on intelligence 
and cognitive style rather than traits. Encompassing cognitive capacities to perform 
numerical, spatial or verbal tasks, organise ideas, act reflexively, or plan according to reason, 
intelligence has a direct theoretical bearing on how politicians might conceive their duties, 
conduct themselves in office, or even appear competent or not in the eyes of their electors. As 
such, political psychologists argue that intelligence or cognitive capacity is highly significant 
for political performance (Simonton, 2006). Only one study in the UK has directly evaluated 
this relationship. Silvester and Dykes (2007) conducted a longitudinal study of candidates in 
the 2005 British General Election, in which they asked candidates to complete an intelligence 
measure prior to party selection procedures. The study found a significant positive association 
between scores on the test and the candidate's vote percentage and vote swing in the election. 
These findings build on a more established research base that has qualitatively analysed 
political speeches, debates and interviews to show that political elites score higher than 
average for integrative complexity - the ability to think multi-dimensionally and integrate a 
variety of evidence in decision-making scenarios (e.g. Suedfeld, 2010; Tetlock et al., 1984). 
Subject to more thorough direct investigation, this research indicates that political elites sit 
outside the normal distribution of another personality measure; that they are more capable 
than most at handling complex informational environments; and that voters respond positively 
to this personality characteristic. 
 By contrast to traits and intelligence, personal values operate as a motivational feature 
of personality that pertain 'both [to] the nature of goals pursued by individuals and the ways in 
which these are pursued' (Caprara and Silvester, 2018, p.473). Personal values attest both to 
the impact of childhood socialisation on our basic needs - that form cognitive principles in the 
form of values - and at a societal level to the ways in which individuals orient themselves, 
behave with others, and judge events or people around them (Hitlin, 2003). Beyond this 
precisely psychological definition, values have been the subject of a thin seam of research on 
political elites in recent years. For example, in the late 90s values became a focus of academic 
research into public sector reform, where the rising influence of personal values was seen as a 
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by-product of increasing indeterminateness in complex governance systems (e.g. Peters and 
Wright, 1996). Torben Jorgensen (1999, p.566) identified three such 'displacements' or 
moving boundaries: between politics and administration; public and private sector 
responsibilities; national and international functions. At the intersection of these fuzzy 
boundaries, Jorgensen argued that a range of new situations and accountabilities were being 
created. None of these situations were predetermined or clarified and, thus, politics became 
more open to interpretation by political actors. In light of the implications for policy-making 
at the local, national and international levels, Jorgensen (1999, p.565) argued that political 
scientists needed to give greater attention to the empirical study of agents' principles (or 
'values') in elite politics.  
 De Leon (2001) took Jorgensen's thesis further by emphasising the growing role of the 
'inner check' for civil servants, politicians and administrators. This is defined as the values of 
each individual actor on the political stage that, hopefully, constrain his or her actions within 
the parameters of democratic norms and expectations. MPs, like all public servants, conduct a 
large proportion of their jobs away from direct supervision and thus must be trusted to act 
professionally in their autonomy. However, de Leon argues that as the state fragments and 
roles multiply, so too the discretion of administrators and politicians expands. Faced with 
choices where no clear answer is legally prescribed, these public servants will be guided, 
consciously or unconsciously, by their personal values (cf. Wall, 1991). De Leon (2001) 
followed up this 'problem' by studying the values of three sets of public servants in the US, 
including one hundred elected politicians (thirty-five senators and sixty-five representatives) 
from Colorado's state legislature.  Combining the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) with a 
measure of professional values, de Leon found striking similarities between her legislators 
and the other two groups (public sector managers and policy analysts). Whilst legislators 
ranked 'leadership' and 'compromise' one place higher than the other groups, the correlations 
between the three sets of average value rankings was highly significant. De Leon's 
conclusions echo those of Public Service Motivation (PSM) theorists such as Rainey and 
Steinbauer (1999, p.23) who see a 'general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a 
community of people, a state, a nation or humanity' in all public sector professions.  
 In France, Tiberj and Kerrouche (2013) asked politicians to score their level of 
dis/agreement with ten policy oriented statements that carried implicit value assumptions 
along both cultural and economic lines. The results were then compared with data for the 
general public. The study found that a) politicians tend to be far more polarized in their values 
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than voters (Ibid., p.167), and b) voters and politicians of the same partisan affiliation largely 
agreed on both cultural and economic issues (Ibid., p.175). For seven out of ten of the value 
statements used in the test, either two principals (the electorate) and one agent (MPs) in every 
four actors agreed (or vice-versa). The implications for the nature of substantive 
representation are potentially far-reaching and point to the benefits of future work on the 
values of political elites. Not only can such research test assumptions of elite homogeneity but 
so too could it enlighten the academic understanding of democratic linkages between 
governor and governed in policy making.  
 Whilst the inferential findings in these particular studies are interesting, the research 
base has lacked the rigour of similar work in political psychology. In this field, the theory of 
basic values devised by Shalom Schwartz (1992) has greatly advanced academic research into 
personal values as a personality construct in and of themselves, as well as the empirical 
evidence surrounding the role of personal values in politics. Building on work by theorists 
such as Allport (1937), Kluckkohn and Strodtbeck (1961), and Rokeach (1973, 1979), 
Schwartz's theory proposes a near universal theory of human values that has been empirically 
tested in over 300 samples worldwide (Schwartz 1992; Cieciuch et al., 2013, p.1216). It is to 
the substance of this theory that this chapter now turns. 
II. The Theory of Basic Human Values (BHV)  
 BHV are, according to Schwartz (1992, 1994), cognitive representations of sought-
after, trans-situational targets that act as guiding principles in people's lives. By implication, 
basic values represent the axioms by which to understand human behaviour; they influence 
our judgements, our ideals and ultimately inform our daily actions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 
2006). Schwartz (1992, 2006) claims that the incremental growth of primary research into 




- Values are beliefs inextricably linked to subjectivity or emotion; 
- Values are motivational insofar as they prescribe desirable end states of attainment;  
- Values are abstract and transcend specific actions or situations in a way that norms and 
attitudes, tied to certain actions, objects or scenarios, cannot;  
- Values provide individuals with criteria by which to evaluate other people, policies and their 
transitory environment; 
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Schooler, 1983; Rokeach 1973. 
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- Values share a relationship of compatibility, unlike norms and attitudes, that allows people to 
place them in a hierarchical order of priority.  
 Using these five criteria, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) derived the first universal 
typology of basic values that also fulfilled three central requirements of human existence: the 
needs of individuals as biological organisms, the needs of coordinated social interaction, and 
the welfare or survival needs of communities (Schwartz 1992). Applying this theoretical 
framework to existing data from the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973; see also Chapter 
6 in this thesis) and various other value surveys around the world, Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) 
identified eight motivational types of values: prosocial, restrictive conformity, enjoyment, 
achievement, maturity, self-direction, security, and power. Four of these were later modified 
(Schwartz, 1992) to give ten value types that have remained constant in the theory since: Self-
Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, 
Benevolence, Universalism. Table 2.1 summarises the content of each of these motivational 
value types, their individual value markers, and their theoretical grounding. The individual 
value markers were selected to represent the range of values expressed by each motivational 
goal in multiple cultures (Schwartz, 1992, p.17) and were compiled from a detailed review of 
prior measures used in isolation around the world (Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Chinese 
Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980; Levy and Guttman, 1974; Rokeach, 1973). 
Table 2.1 - An overview of the ten motivational types in the theory of Basic Human Values, including 












parents and elders 
Restraint of actions, 
inclinations, and impulses 
likely to upset or harm others 
and violate social 
expectations or norms.  
 
In order for social interaction to take place and 
groups to function successfully, individuals 
must inhibit socially disruptive tendencies (see 
Freud 1930; Kohn and Schooler 1983). 
Tradition  
Respect, Devout, 
Respect, commitment, and 
acceptance of the customs 
and ideas that one’s culture or 
Groups necessarily require symbols and acts 
that represent shared experiences and fate; 
these customs are indicative of the group's 
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togetherness, its unique value, and presume its 









Caring for the welfare of the 
people with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact. 
 
Based on the organismic need for affiliation 
(see Korman 1974; Maslow 1959) and the 
preservation or enhancement of the in-group 
(see Williams 1968). 
Universalism 






world at peace 
Understanding, appreciation, 
tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of all people and 
for nature. 
 
Derived from survival needs that occur when 
individuals or groups are in contact with others 
from outside the primary group (see Triandis, 












Derived from the organismic need for control 
and mastery (see Bandura 1977; White 1959) 
and the needs of autonomy and independence 
in social interaction (see Kohn and Schooler 
1983) 
Stimulation 
An exciting life, A 
varied life, Daring 
Excitement, novelty, and 
challenge in life. 
 
Stimulation values arise from the organismic 
need for variety as a prerequisite for optimal 
levels of activation (see Berlyne 1960; 
Houston and Mednick 1963). 
Hedonism 
Pleasure, 
Enjoyment in life 
Pleasure, gratification of the 
senses. 
 
Sensuous gratification and the organismic need 
or desire for such (see Williams 1968). 
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 Schwartz goes further in specifying the nature of both conflict and congruence among 
basic values, as depicted in Figure 2.1. The essential premise is that values are always 
interdependent: their relationship is either more or less positive or negative depending on how 
closely situated they are to each other in either direction around the circle. The closer values 
are situated to one another within the circle, the greater the level of compatibility between 
their motivations and by implication it becomes more probable that they can be achieved or 
expressed through the same sentiments and actions. As values increase in distance around the 
circle, the greater the level of conflict between them and the more likely it is that the actions 
and attitudes used to express them will diverge.
18
  
 Each of the motivational value types is situated in a continuum around a series of 
orthogonals that reflect key differences among values. On one dimension the values in the top 
                                                          
18







Personal success through 
demonstrating competence in 
accordance with social 
standards. 
 
In order for institutional functioning to succeed 
and for individuals to acquire the resources 
necessary for survival, group members are 
required to perform competently (see Maslow 







Social status and prestige, 
control and dominance over 
people and resources.  
 
Power is treated as a value by individuals 
across cultures (Lonner 1980) as a product of 
dominance/submission in all interpersonal 
relations and social institutional hierarchies 





Sense of belonging, 
Social order, 
healthy 
Security: Safety, harmony, 
and stability of society, of 
relationships, and of self. 
Security values are extensively referenced in 
empirical research into both individualist and 
collectivist societies (see Kluckhohn 1951; 
Maslow 1959; Williams 1968). 
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left of the continuum, which are termed 'Openness to Change', are opposed to those 
'Conservation' values in the bottom right. The former stresses receptivity to change as well as 
independent thought, feeling and action, whereas the latter emphasises submissive self-
restriction, maintaining stability and the preservation of traditional practices. The second 
dimension juxtaposes 'Self-Transcendance' values with 'Self-Enhancement' values. The 
former essentially encourages acceptance of others as equals and regard for their welfare, 
whilst the latter gives weight to the pursuit of personal success and dominance over others. 
Only Hedonism defies this categorisation, overlapping both 'Openness to Change' and 'Self-
Enhancement'. The four higher order values can be used in small data sets or to pass a general 
comment on the value orientations of individuals or groups, without detracting from or 










 All research using basic values should account for the fact that motivational 
differences between value types are continuous rather than discrete; values sit on a continuum 
and as such the theory-based partitioning of the space is arbitrary (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 
et al., 2012). Values that sit near or on the boundary of partition lines embody a combination 
of motivational goals associated with the value types either side of that boundary. This has 
allowed for refinements of the theory using complex statistical testing based on multi-
dimensional scaling and confirmatory factor analysis that partition the continuum into two, 
four, ten, and nineteen motivational value types without detracting from the original content 
of the theory (Schwartz et al., 2012). This goes back to a central premise, iterated in nearly all 
Fig 2.1 Diagrammatic construction 
of the interdependent relations 
between the 10 lower-order basic 
values and the 4 higher-order basic 
values [Source: Schwartz (2012, p. 
9)]. 
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Schwartz publications, that 'the circular arrangement of values represents a continuum of 
related motivations, like the circular continuum of colours, rather than a set of discrete 
motivations' (Davidov et al., 2008, p. 424).
19
 Here the theory builds on previous work 
(Guttman 1982) that has shown that items will evenly fill a geometrical space that is created 
to represent the inter-correlations among them when those items can adequately represent all 
factors of a content domain. 
 Using an early version of the Schwartz Value Survey (this and other measures will be 
discussed in chapter 6), Schwartz (1992) tested the theory of BHV with 40 large-N samples 
from twenty countries that were representative of each nation in terms of religion, age, and 
gender. The inter-correlation matrix of the importance ratings given to values on the survey 
was projected onto a two-dimensional space using the Guttman-Lingoes Small Space 
Analysis (SSA) (Guttman, 1982); this version of non-metric multidimensional scaling for 
structural analysis of similarity data (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984) represents the values as 
points, the distances between which reflect the empirical relations among values according to 
the correlations between their importance ratings. In 92.5% of samples at least eight 
motivational value types formed a distinct region in the SSA (for criteria, see Schwartz, 1992, 
p.22); the modal number of moves (of individual value markers) required to match the 
motivational structure of the theory was 0.5 and the median was only 1.5 (Schwartz, 1992, 
p.31).  Given the expected effect of random error, Schwartz (1992, p.36) was able to suggest 
that his model accounted for 'near universality'. The content and structure of BHV has since 
been tested and reaffirmed across different socio-demographic and cultural contexts in a long 
list of studies worldwide (see Cieciuch et al., 2013, p.1216).  
 According to Sagiv and Roccas (2017), the properties of BHV provide a number of 
advantages for social science research compared to other personality constructs. Firstly, all 
values in the theory are inherently desirable and reflect important or worthy goals for people. 
Even Power values, which tend to receive the lowest scores in representative national samples 
around the world (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001), receive average ratings of c.2.3 on a scale of 0 
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 Gouveia et al. (2014, p.41) challenged the Schwartz taxonomy for its multiple configurations, which they 
believed to demonstrate a lack of 'parsimony and theoretical focus'. This criticism failed to acknowledge the 
theoretical core of BHV, that (1) values sit on a motivational continuum and (2) values are situated around the 
circle according to the congruency of their motivational goals (Schwartz, 2014). The circular continuum is in 
reality nothing more than a single curved dimension in the same manner of any theoretical circle (Borg, 2013) 
and as such the orthogonals or partitioning of the circle should not be misconstrued as dimensions themselves. 
This unifying idea is extremely parsimonious and allows researchers (guided by the principle of congruency in 
the theory) to divide the circular continuum into the smallest or largest number of values required to explain the 
focus of their study.  
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(Not important at all) to 6 (Extremely important). Instead of understanding basic values as 
distinct personality features such as traits, it is their relational rather than sum importance that 
matters most. This provides greater explanatory purchase when examining agency in 
ambiguous contexts such as elite politics. Moreover, people tend to find their own values 
more desirable than their traits and express less of a wish to change them (Roccas et al., 
2014). Their inherent desirability makes BHV uniquely powerful as a motivator of behaviour 
and, consequently, incredibly useful as a way for social scientists to explain situated agency.  
 Secondly, BHV are guiding principles that provide social justification for choices and 
behaviour in a way that traits, attitudes and intelligence do not (Sagiv and Roccas, 2017, p.5). 
Personal values are used to convey legitimacy on behaviours and can, given their trans-
situational quality, be used to justify two normatively opposing choices in relation to one 
problem (cf. Kurz et al., 2010). In seeking to explain why politicians act in contradictory 
ways, how they seek to justify their decisions to electors, or even how they reconcile personal 
beliefs with partisan actions, BHV carry greater analytical purchase than other personality 
characteristics. Finally, BHV are stable over time and across situations. Whereas attitudes 
might only predict a specific behaviour in one context, BHV can be used to evaluate specific 
and general behaviours in separate contexts. For example, Benevolence values have been used 
to predict behaviours as diverse as lending items to neighbours (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003), 
contributing money in a social dilemma game (Sagiv et al., 2011), volunteering on academic 
projects (Grant and Mayer, 2009) and career choices (Knafo and Sagiv, 2004). As a 
personality characteristic, these properties make BHV particularly appropriate for a) 
comparing MPs with the general public; b) clarifying the extent of self-selection in political 
recruitment; c) minimising the effects of occupational socialisation in the analysis of MPs' 
behaviours; and d) operationalising personality data for behavioural analysis across varied and 
often ambiguous parliamentary settings. 
III. Demographics and Life Circumstances  
 The previous section provided a detailed discussion of the theory of Basic Human 
Values (BHV) - their structure, content and advantages over other personality characteristics. 
In studying the BHV of national politicians in the UK, this thesis offers the first direct 
empirical analysis of personality in the operation of national politics in the UK. One of the 
core narratives at the heart of academic and journalistic commentary on elite politics in the 
UK revolves around the descriptive gulf between ordinary people and politicians in terms of 
occupation, education, age, and gender imbalances. In order to support the targeted research 
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agenda presented in chapters 3-5 of this thesis, this section will now briefly discuss the way in 
which salient demographic data might be expected to affect BHV in the Westminster 
population.   
 Typically basic values are adapted to an individual's life circumstances in childhood 
and adolescence (Schwartz, 1994, p.13). In most cases people will heighten the importance 
they attribute to a value that is achievable and reduce the importance attributed to one that is 
frequently thwarted or clearly unattainable (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001, 2003). The reverse 
tends to be true only for values associated with material well-being and security; when these 
are difficult to attain, their relative importance to an individual increases (Schwartz, 2005, 
p.13). The life circumstances of any person in society will be, to a greater or lesser extent, 
determined by their education, age, gender, and other central characteristics that direct their 
socialisation and learning experiences. As such these variables act as influential antecedents 
of differences between peoples' value hierarchies.  
 At the same time, it is rote in the literature on psychological assessments of political 
leaders (e.g. Post 2003) that actors' personalities cannot be conceived or operationalised in 
behavioural analysis in vacuo: the researcher must keep in mind the personal and political, 
social and cultural contexts in which that actor resides. Stone and Schaffner (1988) elaborate 
this point in their field model (Fig. 2.2, below). In order to make informed hypotheses about 
the BHV of national politicians, and in turn make reasoned judgements about the effect of 
BHV on their political behaviour, it is important to consider the contextual factors that have 
affected any MP's development. Value based decisions affect the life circumstances that 
individuals experience in their formative years, and to which they may in turn adapt their 
values (Schwartz 2005, p.23); it is likely therefore that the immediate social milieu (friends, 
colleagues, cultural environment) will share reciprocal influences with politicians' BHV. 
However, other factors have been shown to have direct developmental effects on BHV, 
including education, age and gender. These will each now be briefly discussed. 
Education: 
 In previous studies education has related most positively to Self-Direction values and 
most negatively to Security, Conformity and Tradition values (Schwartz 2005, p.14). The 
greater an individual's degree of education, the more likely it is that they have developed the 
freedom from close instruction to question given truths and act on intellectual curiosity; 
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these conditions are crucial for Self-Direction values and weaken the importance of Tradition 
values (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Education also equips individuals with the wherewithal, on 
average, to secure more financially lucrative jobs, which weakens the importance of Security 
values.
20
 To a lesser extent education has also been found to relate positively with Stimulation 
(enhancing the desire for new experiences), Hedonism (giving individuals more agency to 




 However, education shares only minimal correlations with Universalism values in 
samples around the world. When Universalism is broken down into its three component 
concepts, Schwartz (2005, p.15) found that education shared a positive and consistent 
correlation between countries with an individual's 'tolerance for difference', but shared 
correlations of zero with their 'social concern for all' and 'concern for nature'.  This poses 
interesting questions for the nature and quality of democratic representation if this trend also 
bears out in an educated elite sample. The cohort of MPs studied in this thesis, elected in the 
2015 General Election, share with their predecessors an extraordinarily high level of 
education. Of the 650 MPs elected in 2015, 33% went to fee-paying private schools 
(compared with just 7% of the population) and the overwhelming majority are university 
educated; 23% studied for their degree at Oxford or Cambridge (Hunter and Holden, 2015). 
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 This discussion is based on collated data from a number of studies around the world (see Schwartz 2005 for a 
full description of the sample populations). 
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 Data from around the world (Schwartz, 2005) shows that the order of correlations between individual 
motivational value types and education conforms to the monotonic theoretical model. The Spearman rank 
correlation for relations of education to the integrated theory of expected priorities was .95 and .89 in two large-n 
collated data samples. 
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 According to Schwartz (2005), age can affect value priorities through three specific 
systematic pathways: certain age cohorts will have experienced collective critical junctures 
such as depression or war; physical ageing is accompanied by a loss of memory and physical 
strength; and the activities associated with each life stage (such as raising a child) constrain or 
facilitate the achievement of particular values.  To take the first of these, the cohort effect is 
nothing new. Inglehart (1997) demonstrated that age came with a greater tendency towards 
materialist concerns about economic and physical security as compared to the post-materialist 
values of self-expression more common among young people. Although individual values 
may rise and fall in relative importance in the face of specific circumstances, the value 
hierarchies formed during adolescence have proven to remain relatively stable thereafter 
(Schwartz, 2005, p.18). The average MP in the 2015 Parliament was 51 years old (Hunter and 
Holden, 2015), which means that most MPs were born during or since the Baby Boom era of 
economic prosperity and security (Owram 1997). In terms of political representation, it might 
be expected that these circumstances will have a cohort effect on MPs' BHV that produces 
less emphasis on Security, Tradition and Conformity than older cohorts. This will be 
tentatively tested with cross-sectional comparisons of younger and older MPs in this study. 
 Alternatively, it is accepted that energy, cognitive speed, memory and sensory 
reactions dull with age (Shaie and Willis 1991); in the later stages of life this leads to risk 
aversion and an incremental move towards increased Security and Conformity values to 
harness predictability and avoid incomprehensible change in a way that prioritises intrinsic 
rewards over extrinsic ones (Inceoglu et al, 2012; Kooij et al, 2011). This is further supported 
by findings from the World Values Survey (Warr, 2008). Different life stages also impose 
different opportunities and constraints on individuals that can affect value priorities, or at least 
those values in an individual's hierarchy that are most frequently activated. Early adulthood 
tends to encourage Achievement and Stimulation values at the expense of Conservation 
values as young people take up challenges to 'break into' a career or succeed in education. 
Conversely middle age brings with it work and family responsibilities that prohibit risk-taking 
and limit the possibility of change in a way that emphasises Security and Tradition values. 
Taken together these various analyses of the effect of age indicate the strongest positive 
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correlations with Security, Tradition and Conformity.
22
 Given that most MPs are in their 
middle adulthood, it might be expected that they will (all other things being equal) show 
stronger scores for these Conservation values. The discussion presented here covers two 
alternative predictions for the effect of age upon MPs' BHV that will be brought to bear on the 
data analysis process.  
Gender: 
 Psychoanalytical theory has contended that women display greater communal 
affiliation to others than men, whereas men are more individualised, instrumental and agentic 
in their concerns and behaviour (Chodorow, 1990). This has been echoed in 'cultural 
feminism', which contrasts male autonomy to women's 'self-in-relation' (Scott 1988). 
Socialisation theories have also discussed the myriad ways in which communities socialise 
boys and girls to assume separate roles and life goals (Williams and Best, 1990). In student 
and teacher samples from more than 50 countries, BHV scores have confirmed these 
hypothesised gender associations: women tended to prioritise Benevolence and Universalism 
values, whilst men gave greater priority to Stimulation, Hedonism and Achievement values 
(Schwartz, 2005, p. 21). However, the size and direction of these correlations shows much 
less consistency than the effects of either age or education, implying that the associations 
implied by gender theory are not as strong as assumed.  
 Alternative interactionist theorists have proposed a fluid approach to gender studies 
characterised by variability (Deaux and Major 1987; Walker 1994); in this model transitory 
factors mean that gendered behaviour will only emerge in particular interactions that are 
socially understood or explained in gendered patterns. This is likely to provide the most 
apposite explanation of BHV variance among men and women MPs in the UK Parliament. 
Although the gender imbalance at Westminster has improved greatly since the Sex 
Discrimination (Electoral Candidates) Bill, there is still a long way to go to achieve equality 
of access.
23
 In a stubbornly masculine environment (Childs, 2010), it is likely that women 
MPs will be governed by less concern for stable or harmonious social relations (i.e.  values) 
and will be more independent and confident when it comes to violating social norms than 
their male counterparts. Such characteristics would seem highly apposite for the challenge of 
breaking into a relatively closed and male-dominated environment; one where their very 
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presence, let alone the effective execution of their jobs, entails defying social expectations and 
depends upon strong Self-Direction values. 
IV. Operationalising Basic Human Values for Behavioural Explanation 
 Studying the BHV of national politicians can not only illuminate the nature of the so-
called 'political class', but offer a more exacting and rigorous lens through which to analyse 
agency in the UK Parliament. In order to use BHV as determinants or predictors of political 
behaviour, the theoretical link between values and behaviour must first be established. 
Research in the twentieth century was mixed in its appreciation for, and understanding of, the 
role of values in affecting behaviour (cf. McClelland, 1985). This has been challenged by an 
abundant research literature in the last two decades that, using the Schwartz taxonomy of 
BHV, has shown when and how values constitute congruent behaviours and choices in 
everyday life (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Roccas and Sagiv, 2010; Sagiv et al., 2011). This 
section will now review the theoretical mechanisms by which BHV impact on behaviour. 
 The influence of BHV upon peoples' behaviour is a crucial claim for the utility of the 
theory. The extant literature outlines four 'linking processes' through which BHV affect 
behaviour: 
1. Value Activation - values will affect behaviour when the immediate situation activates them 
(Verplanken and Holland, 2002); the likelihood of a value being activated in the first place 
depends on its accessibility, which is heightened in the case of each individual's most 
important values (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001). Verplanken and Holland (2002) demonstrated 
this when they primed participants with environmental and charitable words; those 
participants who had already scored highest for Universalism and Benevolence later made 
more environmentally friendly choices in group tasks and donated more to Amnesty 
International. Activation experiments like this have shown that 'activating values causes 
behaviour' [sic.] (Schwartz, 2005, p.24). 
2. Motivation - Values prescribe motivational goals and to that extent they can induce 
valences on those actions that might promote the attainment of said goals (Feather, 1995).  
Some have taken this argument to limit the explanatory purchase of values to those 
behaviours that stem from conscious choice decisions in which the individual has the time to 
weigh up pros and cons (when basic values are most likely to be activated). This contention 
has an empirical basis but there is also a body of evidence to suggest that values, often as 
unconscious constructs (Schwartz, 1992), influence behaviour in common and spontaneous 
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real-life situations as well.
24
 As central features of the self, basic values (especially high 
priority ones) will induce automatic affective responses to direct behaviour in all and any 
situations where they are apposite (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2005).
25
  
3. Attention, perception and interpretation - This linking process relates to the focusing 
capacity of high priority values, which direct individuals to identify and address value-
relevant aspects of the immediate scenario (Schwartz et al., 2000).  Thus each individual will 
interpret a situation according to their own important values and goals, leading to a decision 
about the most desirable lines of action. 
4. Action planning - The higher the level of importance given to a particular value, the more 
likely it is that an individual will plan to reach associated goals through value-expressive 
behaviour. This theory was tested by Gollwitzer (1996) across a series of experiments that 
demonstrated how planning activities clarify goals and focus attention on the pros of 
behaviours that can service high priority values.   
 In natural settings as well as specific occupational, cultural or social domains, there 
will likely be a range of factors influencing behaviour. As such value-behaviour correlations 
might be expected to be weak. However, a number of studies, including those already 
mentioned in section II, have shown strong associations between basic values and behaviours. 
In Israel Bardi and Schwartz (2003) generated sets of 6-10 daily behaviours for each of the 
motivational types in the theory of BHV (see Fig. 2.3 for examples) and compared both self- 
and other- reports of behaviour (frequency within a year relative to opportunities to perform 
each behaviour; see Buss and Craik (1983) for more information on act-frequency measures 
of behaviour) with data from the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS). Data was collected from 
three separate samples. Correlations between values and value-expressive behaviours were 
tested and SSA (Smallest Space Analysis) projections were used to test the structure of value-
expressive behaviours according to the circular continuum of congruency inherent to BHV. 
All correlations between values and their expected behaviours when self-reported were 
statistically significant and substantial; of a possible 180 deviations from the expected 
motivational continuum, only 4 were observed (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003, p. 1211-1215).  
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 For example, basic values successfully predicted whether counselees behaved independently or dependently 
during a series of career counselling sessions (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2002). 
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 For example values have successfully predicted students' choice of university course (Feather, 1988) and 
voting patterns for political parties (Schwartz, 1996). Other examples from early studies are summarised by 
Schwartz and Bardi (2001).  
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 As expected by the prototypical structure of BHV, Figure 2.4 shows that behaviours 
are located in close proximity to the values they are supposed to express (and adjacent 
compatible values) and opposite to those values with which they are supposed to conflict.
26
 
SSA analyses usually produce distinct regions for different variables or types of measurement 
(Borg and Shye, 1995) but here it is impossible to partition the space into distinct separate 
regions for behaviours and values. This suggests that the relationship between values and 
behaviours proved to be a stronger organising principle than either the source of measurement 
or the type of variable. However, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) suggest that the differential 
strength of correlations between behaviours and values might also reflect normative pressures 
identified by the person-situation controversy, whereby internal factors that normally 
influence behaviour are mitigated by situational pressures (Shoda 1999). People may adjust 
behaviours to the norms of a group or situation even when these are in conflict with their own 
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 The structure of value-expressive behaviours cannot be explained based on the content of the behaviours. For 
instance there is no obvious compatibility between 'using environmentally friendly products' (Universalism) and 
'agreeing easily to lend things to neighbours' (Benevolence). Distinctions are equally difficult to make between 
'conflicting' value-expressive behaviours. Compatibility and conflict between value-expressive behaviours can 
only be understood according to the relations between their underlying motivations (i.e. BHV) (Bardi and 
Scwartz 2003, p. 1214). 
Figure 2.3 Table of exemplar daily 
behaviours expressive of motivational value 
types. [Source: Bardi and Schwartz (2003)] 
Figure 2.4 Joint smallest space analysis of 
values and observer rated behaviours [Source: 
Bardi and Schwartz (2003)] 
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basic values, thus the relationship between values and behaviours may be weaker in domains 
with strong normative pressures. Given the strength of formal and informal institutional 
expectations in Westminster - and within political parties - this will be a key consideration 
when assessing links between MPs' BHV and their parliamentary behaviour. 
 In addressing this 'person-situation' controversy, as well as cultural variation in the 
application of BHV, Hanel et al. (2017) augment the academic understanding of how values 
influence behaviour via the theory of instantiation - that is, the cognitive and social links 
between general categories of values and specific behavioural examples or manifestations. 
The social implications of instantiation theory have been demonstrated in a range of studies 
by Lord et al. (1991, 1994). For example, consistency between basic values and a range of 
behaviours relating to gay men, university students, those affected by social policies, and 
those with mental illness, depended upon how 'typical' the target person was for the 
participant. These results were affected, especially in the case of mental health, by how skilled 
or experienced the participant was in mental ill health and those suffering from it. In terms of 
politics, we may say that policy-relevant judgements and behaviours may overweight typical 
instances of a set category (social group etc.) and ignore or underweight atypical cases. This is 
a case in itself for a varied and diverse Parliament not only in terms of values and attitudes, 
but also in terms of a range of demographic and cultural variables that might affect the types 
of instantiations brought to bear on value-informed discussions. At the level of daily 
parliamentary behaviour, whether in the constituency or Westminster, the theory of 
instantiation may also help to explain when MPs (especially those without prior experience of 
politics) might defer to the order of the Party Whip or even why MPs with similar values 
across the House of Commons might act differently. 
 Finally, this section turns to the link between BHV and prosocial behaviours. 
Prosocial behaviour refers to actions that benefit other people or society, especially where that 
action does not also advantage the agent (Twenge et al., 2007). As such, prosocial behaviours 
are particular pertinent for the study of elite politics, where an actor's entire profession is 
dedicated to serving others locally, regionally, nationally and internationally. Daily helping 
behaviours have been associated positively with Self-Transcendence values and negatively to 
Conservation and Self-Enhancement values (Daniel et al., 2015). It makes sense that prosocial 
behaviours might fall along these orthogonals, suggesting an individual's concern for others or 
oneself might promote or inhibit helping behaviours respectively. However, Sanderson and 
McQuilkin (2017, p.78) urge caution that this pattern might be affected by the risk of the 
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requisite behaviour (in high risk scenarios, Openness to Change values might be a better 
predictor of prosocial behaviour), and the status of the 'asker' (in a situation of organisational, 
social or familial hierarchy, Conservation values might explain why individuals defer to help 
certain others). It is highly possible, therefore, that MPs high in Self-Enhancement values 
might still engage in helping behaviours if, for example, it is in response to a request from 
frontbench colleagues. In this instance, prosocial behaviour might be a product of obsequious 
deference or tactical, goal-oriented ambition for long-term promotion. 
 Three stand-out studies have examined the link between BHV and political activism as 
a prosocial behaviour aimed at societal change. Using an index of nine legal forms of political 
activism (including public demonstration and contacting politicians), Schwartz (2010) found 
strong positive associations between levels of activism and Self-Transcendence values and 
Openness to Change values, weak to non-existent associations with Self-Enhancement values, 
and negative associations with Conservation values. These results were confirmed by 
Vecchione et al. (2015), who examined data on BHV and modes of political activism from 28 
countries across four continents. They found that people were more politically active the 
higher they scored for Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values, and the lower 
they scored for Conservation values. Identical patterns were found by Pacheco and Owen 
(2015) using data from the European Social Survey. Although these studies did not use elite 
samples, they suggest that politics, as a prosocial behaviour, attracts people who are not only 
deeply motivated by concepts of equality and justice for others (Self-Transcendence values) 
but also take risks, think and act autonomously (Openness to Change values).  
 However, secondary analysis by Vecchione et al. (2015, p.19) also unearthed a 
positive association between Power values and conventional activism. In prior studies Self-
Enhancement values had failed to correlate positively with political activity.  Conventional 
activism (defined by the authors as monetary donations to parties and contacting/working for 
a political organisation) would, by implication, involve political parties, trade unions and 
other political businesses that have the capacity to produce and distribute resources (Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). This activity is therefore likely to be favoured by people whose 
value orientations favour personal prestige or control, and as such people who view 
conventional political organisations as a path to achieving those goals. The correlation was 
weak but one might expect this result to be more substantial when testing increasingly formal 
modes of political activism such as representative office.  
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V. Personal and Political Values 
 In analysing national politicians as proactive as well as reactive agents in UK 
parliamentary politics, and in bringing robust psychological theories and measures to that 
task, this thesis makes an original contribution to the academic study of democratic 
representation. The previous section made a forceful case for the causal relationship between 
BHV and political behaviour. However, Schwartz and other political psychologists working 
in this field have been accused of empirical bias in presuming direct relationships between 
personal values and political behaviours (Leimgruber, 2011). There is a strong argument to 
suggest that personal values, from a greater degree of abstraction and distance from the 
political world, require political values in order to affect behaviour (Steenbergen and 
Leimgruber, 2010). There is empirical research to support the link between personal and 
political values; for instance, authoritarianism has correlated positively with Conservation 
values (Davidov et al, 2008) and negatively with Openness to Change values (Rohan and 
Zanna, 1996). However, empirical research that integrates personal and political values into 
models aimed at explaining political behaviours is scarce. This section will address the issue 
of interaction between personal and political values, reviewing relevant empirical evidence 
and offering a model to understand the relation of one to the other in the explanation of 
political behaviour. 
 Studies in political science have focused overwhelmingly on political values, 
commonly those ‘ism’ ideologies such as egalitarianism, liberalism and so on, that are 
perceived to underpin political evaluations and behaviours. However, these political values 
are highly contextual to the domain of politics and moreover contested between political 
contexts as well (e.g. Feldman, 2003). Schwartz et al. (2010) contend that these values are 
expressions, particular to politics, of underlying personal values that direct behaviour in all 
areas of daily life.  This study adopts the theory of BHV in order to capture politically 
relevant and meaningful orientations across cultural and social contexts.  
 Two dimensional models of political orientation or ideology (e.g. liberal vs. 
conservative) are easily aligned with the bipolar orthogonals of BHV. For example, a standard 
liberalism scale, charting issues of civil liberties and individual rights, mirrors the Openness 
to Change/Conservation dimension of BHV. Similarly, a socioeconomic scale concerning 
resource distribution and state intervention, maps onto the Self-Transcendence/Self-
Enhancement dimension of BHV. In making this connection, it is assumed that individuals 
are likely to be drawn to those political values, and in turn the parties or policies that represent 
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them, that promote and defend the personal values (and the associated motivational goals) that 
they cherish (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2010). A number of empirical 
studies now support this bi-dimensional theory of BHV and political orientation (Caprara et 
al., 2006, 2010; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). 
 Using data collected using the PVQ-21 in the European Social Survey, Piurko et al. 
(2011, p.554) found that basic values accounted for more variance in self-placement on a 
Left-Right political scale than socio-demographic variables in 10 out of 11 ‘liberal’ western 
countries. However, this finding did not hold up in post-communist countries (Ibid., p.554) 
and the study points to the need for extreme sensitivity to context. For example, 'new politics' 
theory has put forward the case for ever greater individualisation in the politics of 
economically developed countries (Inglehart, 1997); where there is a strong service-based 
economy coupled with high levels of educational attainment and urbanisation, it is more 
likely that individual political choices will be influenced by personal preference and less by 
social context (Evans, 2000; Sniderman et al., 1991). It is not surprising that, at the time of 
Piurko et al.'s data collection in 2002, the 11 liberal countries in the sample were indexed as 
the wealthiest using a measure of GDP per capita, and the post-communist countries were the 
poorest. In the UK the individualisation of politics is well documented (Franklin et al., 1992; 
Inglehart, 1990) and it is expected that values will continue to supersede class and other 
collective interests as the critical foundation of political orientations (Caprara and Zimbardo, 
2004). However, the link between personal values and political orientations at the elite level, 
especially as expressed through behaviours, is yet to be tested.          
 At the public level, Leimgruber (2011) used structural equation modelling with data 
from Swiss elections in 2007 to investigate the relationship between BHV and precise 
political values in the act of voting. He found that the direct effects of personal values on 
voting behaviour became insignificant when political values were introduced (2011, p. 118). 
In other words, the effect of personal values on behaviour was entirely mediated by political 
values.  However, Leimgruber's (2011, p.119) study also showed substantial correlations 
between personal and political values, and in turn the indirect effect of personal values on 
behaviour remained substantial and highly significant in ten out of twelve pathways. It is 
entirely possible, therefore, that abstract personal beliefs require political translation in order 
to have specific behavioural outcomes in the domain of politics. Van Deth (1995, p.6) is clear 
that personal ‘[…] values of individuals can be transformed into political orientations which 
have some impact on their behavioural intentions.’ Not wanting to lose sight of what politics 
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is and how it really works, I accept that behavioural choices must be traced back to BHV 
through salient political orientations that allow a voter/citizen/politician to evaluate specific 
political issues in line with personal needs.    
 There is not yet a working diagram of this causal sequence and as such, I draw upon 
the structuring principle of socialisation research used, specifically, in an allocative model of 
politics (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969). This principle (see Figure 2.5) utilises childhood 
psychology to posit that early political learning or basic orientations acquired during 
childhood structure adult beliefs and specific political attitudes (Greenstein, 1965, p.12). The 
aim of socialisation studies has been to identify those integumented basic goals and attitudes 
that are sustained into adulthood but sit separately to overt political opinions (Pye and Verba, 
1965). This mirrors the Schwartz theory of BHV, which represents those underlying 
motivations that, whilst able to evolve, are relatively stable and change only incrementally in 
accordance with prior as well as new experiences.   
Figure 2.5. The structuring principle applied to politics as integrated with a theory of Basic Human 










 In prior socialisation research, the distinction has been drawn between political 
orientations, as central perceptions and beliefs, and political attitudes, which represent 
specific approaches to individual issues (Easton and Dennis, 1969). It is contented here that 
'political orientations' may be more suitably defined in terms of BHV, since they symbolise 
inherent motivations. The allocative model of politics has used this structuring principle as an 
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explanation for policy outputs, tracing them back to political demands which are interpreted 
as expressions of mass orientations or values among the public (Easton, 1965, p.38). The 
diagrammatic expression (Figure 2.5) of the allocative model shows: childhood political 
orientations and adult experiences combine to inform an evolving set of adult political 
orientations (as captured by BHV), which then structure specific adult issue beliefs (cognitive 
rationalities in the political domain) and in turn dictate political behaviour.  
 Although this study accepts the work of Leimgruber (2011) and the contention that 
personal values require mediation through political values, there is not yet sufficient empirical 
evidence to suggest that this holds beyond the highly politicised act of voting. Therefore, the 
dotted arrow in Figure 2.5 connecting political orientations directly to political behaviour 
reflects the theoretical primacy given to BHV, which I propose will directly guide thought and 
action when salient political terms are absent or insufficient knowledge has been accrued to 
form relevant cognitive rationalities. Socialisation research using the allocative framework 
has sought to explain policy outcomes by moving backwards through this model to mass 
political orientations. The present study moves the other way with a focus on political elites, 
determining how or if their orientations (BHV) have ultimate influence upon political 
behaviour and policy decisions. Chapter 4 of this thesis adds nuance to this model by placing 
it in the specific context of Westminster politics and thus setting up bespoke hypotheses for a 
range of elite political behaviours in the UK. 
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“In our age there is no such thing as 'keeping out of politics.' All issues are political issues, 
and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia.”  
   
George Orwell (1946) 
Who Rules? A Deconstruction of the Political Class (RQ1) 
The dominant narrative of democratic elections, large systemic policy decisions, and 
the relationship between governor and governed in the UK is changing. Whether presidential 
or not, a popular preoccupation with political personalities, especially figureheads, has 
become preeminent in major parliamentary systems (e.g. Mughan, 2000; McAllister, 2007). 
Yet in spite of a burgeoning research pool that contributes empirical weight to the claim that 
public disengagement itself rests, to a large extent, on evaluations of politicians and their 
behaviour (Birch and Allen, 2015a; Stoker et al., 2016), politicians have remained largely 
conspicuous by their absence as the subject of political research on democratic renewal in 
general, and parliamentary studies in particular. In its interdisciplinary approach to the 
personal side of politics, this thesis seeks to fill that gap identified in Jack Corbett's (2014, 
p.508) call for future 'investigation[s] of the views and experiences of political actors about 
their job', and Colin Hay’s (2007, p.162) argument for a greater study of the motivations 
behind elite political behaviour.  
 
This chapter builds on the conceptual and theoretical groundwork presented in the 
opening of this thesis to advance the first inquiry of a more specific three-part research 
agenda.
27
 This chapter focuses on 'who' occupies elected office in the palace of Westminster 
and 'why' they choose to do it. To tighten its focus and salience within these broader debates, 
this chapter interrogates the substantive and conceptual use of the term 'political class', which 
now operates as a catch-all and bluntly homogeneous metaphor, a derogative term that is 
employed as much to denote certain people in politics as it is to associate those actors with 
symptoms of social, economic, political and even moral crisis (Borchert and Zeiss, 2003; 
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understand who enters politics, b) explain how they behave in office, and c) address broader concerns about the 
nature of representative democracy. 
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Cotta and Best, 2007). However, Allen and Cairney (2015, p.6) argue that ‘many of the 
complaints put at the door of the ‘political class’ relate to Westminster politics and those with 
governing power or influence’. At the same time, the literature speaking to this debate talks of 
careerist attitudes, self-serving behaviour and greed – characteristics that are psychological in 
nature – without the methodological tools to link cause with effect or to discriminate between 
individuals at different levels of governance or with different occupational or cultural 
backgrounds. It is in this context that this chapter stakes the contribution of this thesis to three 
integrated debates: the ambition/self-selection, the professionalization, and the 
homogenisation of politicians. In doing so, this chapter scopes significant gaps in the extant 
research base and speaks to these with three theoretically informed hypotheses about ‘who’ 
occupies the UK Parliament.   
 
I. ‘Only in it for themselves!’ – Towards a Model for Candidate Entry and Evaluation 
To understand Parliament through its actors and to interrogate ‘who’ enters the 
political class, this thesis necessarily engages with derisive popular judgements about the 
moral fibre of our politicians - studied extensively by a post-millennial literature on anti-
politics (see Chapter 5). Whilst chapter 5 will deal in detail with the role of personality 
politics in public disengagement from politics, this section focuses on those psychological 
assumptions pertaining to the career choice of aspiring MPs and subsequent evaluations of 
their execution of that choice. These two processes are reciprocally connected. The personal 
factors that lead individuals to stand in parliamentary elections (candidate activation) will 
likely be sustained as influential variables ‘on the job’ (candidate performance). This section 
tackles candidate evaluation and activation in turn, synthesising literature on political 
ambition to scope a significant gap in the research base on political recruitment.  
As David Runciman (2008, p.196) argues, there are no easy answers to the question of 
what motivates parliamentary candidates to stand in the first place. The ambition that might 
come with a political class of professional politicians is not necessarily accompanied by 
material self-interest. Social psychologists researching workplace performance have already 
shown that material incentives are just one among many motivations that drive employees, 
and that extreme monetary reward can actually stymie enthusiasm and job satisfaction (Gregg 
et al., 2012). This should be set against a context of parliamentary careers that are not 
comparatively lucrative: MPs’ pay is only two-thirds that of an average GP or school Head 
Teacher, less than half that of a local authority Chief Executive and half that of elected 
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politicians in Australia, Italy and the US (see Hindmoor, 2017, p.11). The additional 
payments received by MPs with additional responsibilities (i.e. Ministerial portfolio, Select 
Committee Chairmanship) do not change this picture drastically (see Fisher, 2015). Indeed, 
the functionality of democracy relies upon capable and politically engaged citizens who are 
willing and able to run for office in order to present voters with a choice of policy alternatives 
as well as representatives. In that respect, the normative undesirability of ambition becomes 
more ambiguous. For the purpose of empirical investigation of politicians’ performance, I 
draw the analytical distinction between ambition to influence policy and politics for others, 
and the ambition to dominate resources or people for oneself. Again this distinction points to 
the necessity of interdisciplinary scholarship and appropriate methodologies.
28
 
Whilst candidate evaluation is important in and of itself, the question of ‘who’ chooses 
a parliamentary political career goes back in essence to the moment at which any one 
candidate chooses to run. In order to understand MPs in situ and to truly differentiate the 
political class from the general public, it is necessary to conceive the factors that lead them to 
a job that the vast majority of the public never even contemplates. The decision to present 
oneself to an electorate for scrutiny demands sacrifice; the individual must be able to 
surrender privacy and daily routines, experience probable and repeated rejection, and invest 
vast amounts of time and money to enter the least trusted profession in the UK (Ipsos Mori, 
2016). The question of why individuals choose a political career and what separates them 
from those who do not and never would, has troubled political scientists researching political 
ambition and recruitment for over 60 years. However, this literature is limited in its depth and 
breadth. There are case studies and historical accounts of politicians’ journeys (e.g. Gaddie, 
2004; Jenkins, 1998); there are biographies and autobiographies written by candidates and ex-
MPs (e.g. Benn, 2004; Blair, 2010; Lawson, 1992); and there are academic analyses of the 
structural conditions that discriminate levels of ambition among strategically minded actors 
(e.g. Schlesinger, 1966; Stone and Maisel, 2003). These studies not only elide the personal 
individual differences that foster aspirations of a political career but they also tend to be 
retrospective and lacking empirical rigour. 
As with research on political behaviour, the rational choice paradigm has become the 
reference point by which political scientists have studied candidate emergence and political 
ambition. This approach was spurned from Joseph Schlesinger’s (1966) Ambition and 
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Politics, which framed ambition as a response to political opportunity structures. Subsequent 
studies of the effects of term limits, legislative professionalisation, party congruence with 
constituents, and party recruitment criteria and procedures have dominated a largely US-
centric literature on political ambition (e.g. Levine and Hyde, 1977; Maestas et al., 2006; 
Moncrief et al., 2001; Kazee, 1994). This research base builds from the premise that ambition 
itself is a fixed attribute of the individual that is expressed when individuals face favourable 
political opportunity structures (Prinz, 1993). This theory has burnished a model for micro-
analysis of politicians’ decisions inter alia to remain in their elected position (static ambition), 
to seek higher office (progressive ambition), or to step down/retire before an election (discrete 
ambition).
29
 There are two remarkable limitations of this literature.  
Firstly, in treating political ambition and candidate emergence as the function of 
structural conditions in the political landscape, rational choice studies limit themselves to 
highly particularistic explanations that do not account for individual, psychological factors. 
The rational choice paradigm put forward by Schlesinger and his disciples treats all [eligible] 
members of the public as equally desirous of candidacy should they be faced with the right 
political opportunity structure. Despite a nascent body of evidence to the contrary (Lawless 
and Fox, 2005, 2010), such a model does not account for the ways in which personal 
socialisation experiences, attitudinal dispositions or individual characteristics may 
discriminate between individual interest in running for office in the first place. I contend that 
individual differences at the personal level, specifically personality differences, ultimately 
presage any cognizance of political opportunity structures (Figure 3.2, below).  
The second limitation of this research pool derives from its coalescence around 
ambition as a static psychological construct that is assessed according to exogenous 
institutional criteria (Maestas et al., 2006). Ambition is portioned out in lesser or greater 
degrees on a progressive spectrum of institutional positions of power; in this guise there is 
little wonder that ambition, when talking of politicians, has been conflated with self-interest 
(cf. Corbett, 2015). As with evaluations of office holders, empirical investigation of ambition 
requires a more nuanced understanding of where it comes from and what purpose it serves for 
each individual. By contrast to rational choice studies of political ambition, I tackle the 
candidate emergence process within an interdisciplinary framework. As a distal feature of the 
functional base of personality, basic values promote trans-situational goals and the 
instrumental behaviours to achieve them. As such, political opportunity structures should not 
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be taken as either the generator or ends of ambition, but the means by which individuals 
might service a variety of ‘ambitions’. Returning to Harold Lasswell’s (1930) search for the 
‘political type’, this thesis fills a significant gap in the research base by examining the role 
that personality may play in predisposing certain individuals to consider a career in British 
politics in the first place.        
 In her noteworthy study of the candidate emergence process, Jennifer Lawless (2012) 
also argues against the rational choice paradigm. Lawless (ibid., p.19) traces the initial 
decision to run back to the concept of ‘nascent’ ambition, which she believes to be pre-
requisite for Schlesinger’s expressive ambition and grounded in socio-demographics, familial 
and professional socialisation, and political attitudes. Analysing longitudinal data from the 
Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study Lawless (2012, pp.37-48) found that more than 50% 
of participants had considered a political candidacy.
 30
 Those that did not had not actively 
decided against a political career but rather it had never occurred to them. Lawless found that 
variables associated with the political opportunity structures in previous studies had a null 
effect on both the initial consideration to run for office as well as whether participants gained 
or lost interest over the seven-year period of the study.
31
 By contrast, Lawless found that a 
series of individual-level differences had a significant effect on eligible candidates. For 
example, men were far more likely than women to consider running for office at all; racial 
and ethnic minorities were actually more likely to consider themselves qualified for office 
than their white counterparts; individuals from a ‘political’ and supportive family home were 
more likely to consider candidacy; and levels of political cynicism significantly reduced the 
ambition to run for political office (see ibid., pp.192-193, for a comprehensive summary of 
results).  
Although far more descriptive in its methodology and analysis, these results have 
recently been replicated in a survey of 10,000 citizens in England, Wales and Scotland (Allen 
and Cutts, 2018). Unlike the US study discussed above, Allen and Cutts (2018, pp.1-2) found 
that just 10% of participants had considered running for political office, and just 9% would 
consider running in the future. The implication is, necessarily, that aspirants to political office 
form a significant minority within the general population and arguably a much smaller pool 
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James Weinberg 




than in the US if comparative data is accurate. Yet even among these ‘aspirants’, only 21 per 
cent had taken steps towards becoming an MP (Allen and Cutts, 2018, p.2). In addition to 
similar trends reported by Lawless (2012) on the effects of gender, ethnicity, political 
socialisation and political trust, Allen and Cutts (2018, pp.3-6) found: 
- Participants with a university degree were twice as likely as those with just 
secondary level education to consider any political office, and more than three times 
more likely than those who did not finish secondary education; 
- Political ambition increased significantly with social grade (12 per cent of 
individuals in grades ABC1 consider elected politics compared to just under 8 per cent 
of those in grades C2DE); 
- Income had a significant amplifying effect on political ambition over the median 
national income in Britain. Those earning 50,000, 70,000, and 100,000 pounds per 
annum were 9, 11 and 13 per cent more likely to consider political office, respectively, 
than those on average wage; 
-  Measures of the Big 5 personality traits discriminated between those who were and 
were not political ambitious. Those who had considered running for political office 
were higher in openness to experience, extraversion and emotional stability, whilst 
those who had not were higher in conscientiousness and agreeableness. These results 
mirror similar political psychology studies of elites discussed in chapter 2 (pp.35-39).  
 Taken together, these studies not only testify to the hyper-selectivity of recruitment to 
national politics, but also suggest that supply-side variables associated with the 
professionalisation of politics (e.g. salaries, diverse offices and career paths) are not as 
important as demand-side variables (individual differences and experiences). However, Allen 
and Cutts (2018, p.8) dismiss their findings on personality, in particular, far too coolly: 
‘whether or not the bias in favour of certain personality traits is worthy of concern is 
questionable. On this point, we are agnostic’. The ease with which the psychological finding 
is disregarded reflects an oversight about how personality may directly or indirectly mitigate 
other barriers/biases in the political system, influence the ambition of those in advantageous 
or disadvantageous socio-demographic positions to the point where political recruitment is as 
much about self-selection as selection, or lead the behaviour of those who do actually make it.   
 Outside of politics, basic values have been researched in depth as antecedents of a 
range of organisational workplace phenomena, including organisational culture, socialisation, 
employee performance, commitment and identification (for a review, see Bourne and Jenkins, 
2013). The Schwartz taxonomy of Basic Human Values (BHV), in particular, not only allows 
researchers to understand individual behaviour per se but has applicability across time, culture 
and situation, and has already shown itself capable of recapturing work-value factors from 
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other models such as the organisational culture profile (OCP, O'Reilly et al., 1991) and the 
McDonald/Gandz scale (1991; see also Abbott et al., 2005; Finegan, 2000). These studies 
have shown that basic values can be highly predictive of career choice. For example, citizens 
high in Openness to Change values tend towards artistic and investigative professions (e.g. 
artist, musician, doctor, historian; Knafo and Sagiv, 2004), whilst those high in Conservation 
values favour conventional, programmatic occupations (administrative and hierarchical 
professions; Sagiv, 2002). Similarly, Self-Transcendence values have been strongly correlated 
with 'calling' professions with 'social' interest agendas, where the orientation of work is 
fulfilling socially valuable tasks (Arieli et al., 2016; Gandal et al., 2005). By contrast, Self-
Enhancement values are positively associated with 'career' professions with 'enterprising' 
interest agendas, where the work involves managing subordinates towards a set of 
organisational or self specific targets (Gandal et al., 2005; Sagiv, 2002). Basic values have 
also been found to act as strong predictors of prospective performance once in role (for a full 
review, see Arieli and Tenne-Gazit, 2017). In terms of relating these findings to elected 
politics, there is a theoretical tension insofar as politics is a 'calling' profession where 
prosocial ethical behaviour - based on high Self-Transcendence orientations - is expected at 
the same time as intense conflict between tribal political parties and rigid hierarchies of 
power. Either way, it is possible that personality characteristics play a much more powerful 
role in political recruitment and, later, behaviour than Allen and Cutts (2018) acknowledge. I 
seek to test this claim using data collected directly from national politicians and a 
comprehensive model of political recruitment (Fig. 3.2). 
I agree with Lawless (2012, p.189) that individuals are not, as presumed by the 
rational choice paradigm, equally likely to possess nascent ambition to hold political office. 
Whilst political opportunity structures may help political scientists to explain successful 
candidates, they cannot differentiate between individuals who do and do not consider 
candidacy in the first place. Whilst Lawless’ (2012) study is important for highlighting the 
role of individual-level differences in producing political ambition, her model does not go far 
enough. She continues to work within existing conceptions of ambition as a function of 
unitary desire (implicitly centred on power) and she does not assess the internal attributes, 
personality factors and motivations that may distinguish between her participants. Therefore, I 
propose a model of candidate emergence that accounts for the role of personality as the 
ultimate antecedent in the decision to run for political office (Figure 3.2). This model works 
with rather than against the existing evidence base, insofar as it acknowledges that personality 
is necessary but not sufficient to explain who makes it to Westminster. However, in proposing  
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 The single-direction dotted line between personality and professional skills reflects the likelihood that 
individuals will be attracted to jobs that increase the possibility of pursuing high priority basic values 
(Gollwitzer, 1996). The multi-directional line between personality and socio-demographics reflects the 
reciprocity between basic values and child/adolescent socialisation experiences that are likely to be shaped by 
variables such as gender and ethnicity (Schwartz, 1992).  
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a framework for interdisciplinary studies of candidate emergence and operationalising this 
through data on MPs' basic values, this model makes an original contribution to empirical 
studies of political ambition and self-selection. 
H1: Selectivity Hypothesis: Personality, or specifically basic values, act as internal factors 
that activate or deactivate individuals in a self-selection process for elite politics. This will 
result in substantive differences between the value profiles of the political class and those of 
the general public. In particular, the prosocial premise of politics will attract candidates who 
score highly for Self-Transcendence values. 
II. The Professionalisation of Politics Versus Professional Politicians 
Discussions of the political class invariably extend to discussions of professional 
politicians (Cairney, 2014). The previous section of this chapter focused on the ambition of 
the political class and scoped a significant gap in the research base as well as an 
interdisciplinary research agenda to fill it. This section moves to focus on another recurrent, 
psychological criticism of politicians: careerism. The accusation proceeds that the UK 
Parliament and government are now occupied solely by those who have made politics a career 
and have no prior professional experience outside of politics (Bochert and Zeiss, 2003). The 
corollary of that statement is that such a development is negative for the state of politics and 
society more broadly. However, the rise of the career politician has proceeded reciprocally 
with a process of political professionalisation.  
In any other occupational environment professionalisation would be viewed as a 
positive step but with politics and MPs 'it is much more ambiguous as it suggests a form of 
separation and careerism' (Wright, 2010). Verba et al. (1995) argued that experience of 
professional and managerial work actually developed a number of highly apposite political 
skills. However, in democratic politics there is a fear that with such professionalisation comes 
greater independence for the political class and further detachment between the interests of 
those that govern and those that are governed. It is this issue of elite integration that has 
dominated political scientists since the mid-20th century (e.g. Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 2005).  
It is important, however, to be clear about the empirical evidence supporting this 
interpretation of modern politics and the basis upon which a causal link between 
professionalisation and careerism is justified. 
Three broad contentions in this literature need to be addressed. In the first instance 
there is a certain naivety to concerns about the rise of 'new' career politicians. The C19th and 
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early C20th were not halcyon days of amateur politicians living for politics, but were 
characterised by a Parliament filled with wealthy aristocrats who acted relatively 
independently of their constituents' interests (Berrington, 1985; Crewe, 1985; Norton and 
Wood, 1993). With neither income nor career as a primary incentive, politicians were 'self-
perpetuating aristocrats and gentry [who] regard[ed] service in Parliament and government as 
part of their inherited duties' (Riddell, 1993, p.266). Even those MPs who now make politics 
their career tend to work harder than their predecessors and in a Parliament that is both more 
transparent and better organised to hold them and their colleagues to account (Benton and 
Russell, 2012; Norton, 2001).   
The second dominant research narrative raises concerns about the occupational 
homogeneity of modern politicians (e.g. Barber, 2014). This is a subject that has interested 
both the press media, who tell the story of a politics bereft of 'real people' (Lamont, 2014; 
Kirkup, 2014), and academics who have surveyed the increasingly professionalised, paid, and 
often unelected roles that MPs occupy before entering office (Cowley, 2012). Paul Cairney 
(2007, p.6) divides these 'politics facilitating' occupations into 'brokerage' jobs such as law, 
which are conducive to entering politics, and 'instrumental' jobs such as being a full-time 
councillor, party official or parliamentary staff, which are of direct aid to election. Cairney 
(2007) illustrates that the post-war trend among parliamentarians has been heavily skewed in 
favour of instrumental backgrounds. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that MPs with 
instrumental occupational backgrounds are more likely to be elected at a younger age than 
those without, to reach higher office once elected, and to receive promotions more quickly 
(Allen, 2013).  
If we consider that politicians are advantaged by both control over public resources 
and context-specific knowledge unavailable to non-elites, then the issue of occupational 
background becomes central in the recruitment process to parliamentary politics. Working for 
political parties in Parliament itself, or in a related organisation, is likely to give aspirant 
members of the political class unrivalled knowledge about the formal and informal processes 
of elected politics and thus heighten their chances of success - both of entering Parliament and 
rising within it. If it is presumed that aspirant MPs are choosing certain instrumental 
occupations specifically as a stepping stone to elected office, then there is also an element of 
self-selection at work. However, there is a necessary psychological leap from this logic to 
comments on the substantive personal differences between these MPs and those from non-
political backgrounds. Michael Rush (2001, p.112), for instance, regards career politicians as 
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full-time MPs 'in both attitude and practice' but what exactly this means, both individually and 
in relation to the rest of the population, is rather opaque.            
The third argument in the literature on careerism distinguishes between individual and 
institutional professionalisation. Here it is useful to think of professionalisation processes as 
measures of accountability and avenues of incentive. The former, such as the establishment of 
a behavioural code by the Committee on Standards in Public Life under the Chairmanship of 
Lord Nolan, have laid down strict rules regarding parliamentary conduct and transparency in 
the House of Commons (Oliver, 1995; Rush, 1997). The latter, such as the introduction of 
MPs' salaries, select committees, and devolution, have not only made politics sustainable as a 
career for those who may have been lured into other professions but have also proliferated the 
number of prized positions (even the size of the political class itself) that those with ambitions 
for personal influence or power may pursue. These claims are, once again, conjecture until 
supported with empirical evidence about the ambitions of parliamentary politicians. 
Whilst the diminishing pool of occupational expertise in the UK Parliament is 
arguably countered by the rising use of Arm's Length Bodies, experts and the depoliticisation 
of policy (Durose, 2014; Flinders and Buller, 2006), there is a more sinister conclusion about 
professionalisation processes implicit in the literature. If it is accepted that 'reform' is 
characterised by intentionality (Peters et al., p.2), and that the political class does indeed share 
a collective consciousness (Burdeau, 1975), then the cynic may be inclined to see any or all of 
the reforms to make politics more ‘professional’ as measures of collective self-advancement 
enacted by politicians. Indeed, Dodds (1994) suggests that institutional reforms tend to be 
more successful when they translate into short- or medium-term self-interest. This argument 
echoes the work of Vilfredo Pareto (1935) in the early 20th century, who distinguished 
between two personality types in elite politics: lions and foxes. As the Machiavellian epithets 
imply, lions were conservative and favoured strong authoritarian regimes, whilst the latter 
were innovative and amassed public sentiment via persuasion. For Pareto, elites of either 
predisposition would necessarily seek to recruit their own ‘type’ and as such a closed system 
of political power would, sporadically, circulate between them (Femia, 2002, pp.71-74). 
However, prior to this thesis these causal claims linking 'professional politicians' and 
psychological flaws have been untested.    
H2: Political-Collar Hypothesis: The self-selection implicit in MPs who have worked in 
instrumental professions, entered Parliament, and pursued promotion in quick succession 
reflects an unusual level of desire to increase personal control over political resources. This 
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will be reflected in value profiles high in Self-Enhancement values (Power and Achievement). 
The self-referential and self-interested aspects of careerism will be reflected in high scores 
for Conservation values (particularly Security).  
III. ‘They’re all the same!’ – Issues of Socio-Demographic Homogeneity 
The use of the term political class has become a proxy for another long-standing 
malfunction of UK democracy and a common criticism of the UK Parliament - the socio-
demographic similarity of our politicians and their dissimilarity to the majority of the 
population. In the 2015 general election, 94% of those elected were white (compared to 82% 
of the population), 70% were male, 90% had been to Russell Group Universities, and just 2% 
had worked in blue-collar manual professions (Hunter and Holden, 2015).
33
 There is not 
necessarily such a clean causal line between the demographic (dis-)proportionality of 
Parliament and public disengagement with politics or even rising distrust of politicians. As 
Andrew Hindmoor (2017, p.7) points out, trust in politicians was actually higher in the 1950s 
but they were, as a group, less representative of society than they are today. However, 
Hindmoor (2017, p.7) admits that 'background does matter' when it comes to elections; for 
example, the decline in the proportion of working class Labour MPs has undercut the Party's 
national vote (Asthana, 2016). 
Class convergence in Parliament can be understood as a product of candidate self-
selection but equally as a product of the changing electoral climate and modernised party 
structures in the UK. The decline of near-exclusive dominance by millionaires on the 
Conservative benches and working class MPs in the Labour Party (Riddell 1993, pp.19/79) 
paralleled the decreasing stability of partisan strongholds: Webb (2000, p.79) argues that 'an 
electoral change since 1970 almost certainly implies a more open electoral market and 
increasingly complex patterns of competition'. Volatility at the polls reduced the number of 
safe seats and transformed the decisive hurdle for potential MPs from that of the inner party 
nomination to the general election. The consequences are characterised by individualised MPs 
and a ‘cartel’ thesis on the state of party democracy in Western Europe (Bochert and Zeiss, 
2003; Dommett, 2016; Katz and Mair, 1995; Mudge and Chen, 2014). Coupled with the 
modernisation of party structures, in particular Labour's gradual detachment from the Trade 
Unions (see, for example, Webb, 2000), the preconditions were set for the victory of the 
middle classes and the emergence of a centre-ground political class (in all senses of the word). 
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 Figures for the 2015 General Election are reported here in keeping with the data collection process for this 
thesis, which took place in the months immediately before the most recent 2017 election.  
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Having been socialised under different societal conditions to their predecessors, MPs today 
are not as reliant on their parties and in turn share in the self-confidence of a political class 
that might, for example, be reflected in the rising frequency of vote defections (see Norton, 
1999; Pattie et al., 1998). However, the empirical data to clarify consonant claims of 
psychological homogeneity has, until now, been lacking.    
Class convergence aside, there is a rich seam of research that tackles the political class 
– and specifically the Westminster ‘bubble’ - as symbolic of a descriptive democratic deficit 
(Phillips, 1995; cf. Pitkin, 1967). As such, 'unrepresentative' institutions are illegitimate 
institutions (Childs and Cowley, 2011). Jane Mansbridge (1999), among others, argues that 
representatives with shared experiences of race, religion, gender, nationality, or even locality 
will make better MPs, and that a political class dominated by the same 'shared experiences' is 
not able to fulfil its democratic obligations. To support these accusations necessarily requires 
political science to cross disciplinary boundaries in order to study differences and similarities 
between legislators and citizens that are not directly observable.  
Normatively, I firmly agree with proponents of the minority empowerment thesis that 
descriptive representation adds to the democratic legitimacy of political institutions. Whilst 
individual-level factors such as income, age and education affect levels of participation and 
political efficacy across all groups in the population, these disproportionately intersect with 
racial, ethnic and gender groups (Atkeson, 2003; Banducci et al., 2004; Conway, 2000; Verba 
et al., 1995). A raft of research on minority empowerment in the US has shown that 
descriptive representation can increase voter registration, turnout, political interest and 
efficacy, and informal participation among women, Latinos and African Americans (Barreto, 
2007; Burns et al., 2001; Griffin and Keene, 2006). These results have also been replicated in 
a comparative context (Barnes and Burchard, 2013; Karp and Banducci, 2008; Wolbrecht and 
Campbell, 2007). From a demand-side perspective, this evidence provides a strong bridge 
between theories of descriptive representation and democratic legitimacy. 
The common narrative of the research cited above - of a dyadic mapping of 
representation between citizen and legislator - has, however, been contested by scholars 
interested more in the collective representation of national institutions. Atkeson and Carrillo 
(2007, p. 94) find that 'collective female representation influences external efficacy in a 
positive way', whilst Rocha et al. (2010) find similar effects on the turnout of African 
Americans and Latinos.  Analysing data from seven US elections to the state legislature, 
Uhlaner and Scola (2016) show that the mobilising benefits of collective descriptive 
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representation also vary intersectionally. For example, their results show that collective 
representation increases turnout among all previously excluded groups but in particular, 
gender mattered more for white women and race mattered more for African American men 
and women (Uhlaner and Scola, 2016, pp. 247-248). These studies add to our understanding 
of empowerment via descriptive representation in national Parliaments, insofar as the latter 
provide macro-level cues to minority groups who subsequently perceive intrinsic value to 
participation (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990).   
This thesis is, however, particularly focused upon supply-side representation in the 
UK Parliament. Although the studies cited above justify descriptive representation in national 
Parliaments on the basis of participative benefits among minority groups, they do not 
interrogate the extent to which descriptive representatives share experiences, values or 
substantive interests with those represented. Such considerations are not necessarily relevant 
when focusing upon levels of trust, efficacy or participation among minority groups, but they 
do matter in the search for 'preferable descriptive representatives' (Dovi, 2002). Suzanne Dovi 
(2002, p.739) claims that proponents of self-representation have underestimated the vertical 
divisions within groups that can make physical appearance misleading as a basis for increased 
substantive representation of the whole group. Dovi (2002) argues for 'preferable descriptive 
representatives' who share the same experiences and thus the same values as the group, and in 
turn appreciate the diversity of opinion within it. Indeed, to strengthen the case for descriptive 
representation requires further research into the motivations of representatives from different 
demographic groups. I seek to fill this gap by studying the basic values of elite politicians in 
the UK alongside those of respective socio-demographic groups in the general populace. 
Analysing parliamentary questions put forward in the House of Commons between 
2005 and 2010, Thomas Saalfeld (2011, p. 283) found that some 71% of all questions relating 
to ethnic diversity and equality were put forward by 'visible minority' MPs; contrasting with 
their proportional presence in the House of just 30%. Saalfeld's work highlights a significant 
link between the descriptive nature of Parliament and the substantive representation of 
sectional interests. However, other scholars are less certain of such a direct relationship. In 
their study of descriptive representation and turnout in the US and New Zealand, Banducci et 
al. (2004, p.553) conclude: 
Because we cannot be certain of the impact that increased minority turnout has on the policy 
positions of elected representatives, it is unclear whether the net effect of any differences in 
turnout rates inside majority-minority House districts or Maori electorates leads necessarily to 
changes in the substantive representation of minorities. 
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There is also evidence of a counter-mobilisation effect whereby dominant groups perceive 
increases in the representation of disadvantaged groups and turn out in greater numbers. Such 
effects can actually reduce the overall substantive representation of previously excluded 
groups (e.g. Donovan, 2010). These concerns have worrying implications for the long-term 
legitimacy of democratic institutions. However, I contend that a) the potentiality of 
democratic representation is discernible when national institutions collectively represent the 
people; b) political science has not given sufficient attention to the supply-side factors 
involved in substantive representation of sectional interests; and c) democratic legitimacy in 
terms of substantive policy responsiveness relies on preferable descriptive representatives 
with shared psychological characteristics.  
H3: Homogeneity Hypothesis: Differences in basic values between MPs will exist according 
to demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age), and will be of a greater magnitude than 
differences between each sub-group and their counter population in the general public 
(reflecting the substantive differences generated by shared genetics and/or socialisation; e.g. 
Williams and Best, 1990). In particular, women MPs will score higher for Self-Transcendence 
values and Openness to Change values than either male MPs or women in the general 
population. 
This chapter has critiqued an array of literature on the nature of the political class, 
specifically politicians, in the UK and beyond. In doing so it has identified significant gaps in 
the existing research base that pertain to psychological assumptions about the self-selection of 
politicians, the professionalisation of politics, and the demographic homogeneity of 
parliamentarians. These are issues that have for some time underpinned questions about ‘who’ 
enters national politics, ‘why’ they enter, and ‘how’ they differ in their motivations from 
those they represent. In each case the answers are crucial precursors to developments in the 
study of legislatures and parliamentary political behaviour.  
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“As a Member of Parliament, I found a job without any job description at all, no means of 
knowing what I should be doing, and with no means of assessing how well I was doing it. The 
result is that all Members of Parliament do the job differently, having tried to work out their 
own job descriptions.”        
Tony Wright (2010) 
An Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (RQ2) 
 
 At the heart of imaginative and effective political science is a desire to comprehend 
the 'why' behind political behaviours and decision-making. This endeavour has largely 
focused on the voting public and their (dis)engagement with formal or informal avenues of 
political expression. By comparison, political science has failed in general to produce 
successful models of elite political behaviour, and behaviour within Parliaments in particular. 
For the dominant paradigms of behavioural analysis in parliamentary studies (reviewed in 
Chapter 1; see Table 3.1 below), there has been a preoccupation with institutions. These 
scholars have dismissed exogenous aspects of agency that interact with institutional 
constraints on choice. I argue that the latter bound, but do not eliminate, individual discretion. 
This is not, necessarily, a surprising trend, given that psychological studies of individuals 
within Parliaments require political scientists to traverse new disciplinary boundaries and 
deal, ultimately, with phenomena that are invisible to the naked eye of the researcher 'in the 
field'. This chapter seeks to challenge this gap in the research base. In doing so it develops the 
second of a three-part interdisciplinary agenda for psychological studies of the UK Parliament 
and presents a comprehensive model for understanding parliamentary political behaviour. 
 Where parliamentary scholars have acknowledged the importance of long-standing 
insights in psychology, particularly social psychology, they have been limited by poor access 
to elites for empirical study (e.g. Russell, 2014); they have attempted to stretch conceptual 
and empirical findings from studies of other elite groups, such as judges, to politicians (e.g. 
Gibson, 1981); they have conducted analyses at-a-distance with complex coding systems (e.g. 
Winter, 2004; 2005); and they have been almost exclusively concerned with explaining crisis 
escalation and domineering historical personas (e.g. Winter, 2011; Jost et al., 2013). In each 
case the everyday politician is forgotten and the fruits of cross-disciplinary fertilisation are 
clouded. In chapter 2, I reviewed the ability of basic values to capture causal mechanisms in 
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motivated behaviours, as well as the trans-situational capacity of basic values to direct 
everyday choices upon activation. A rigorous extant literature has reiterated the importance 
attached to values as central aspects of the self and as behavioural codebooks (e.g. Bardi and 
Schwartz, 2003; Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Verplanken and Holland, 
2002). There is no reason, then, why this same logic should not help to illuminate the 
behavioural decisions and intentions of our political elites, especially those behaviours that 
are planned and temporally free from immediate constraint (Eyal et al., 2009). The rest of this 
chapter will proceed to build a comprehensive model of elite parliamentary behaviour that 
considers how cognitive processes based on basic values may interact with the institutional 
fabric of Westminster, the effect of party political socialisation and organisation, and the 
mediating role of ideology. It will conclude with hypotheses that operationalise basic values 
to explain four parliamentary behaviours.  
I. Scoping the Limitations and Character of Institutional Choice 
Political psychologists as well as political scientists have developed a complex picture 
of how institutions channel political behaviour, giving rise to an institutional theory of 
political choice (see, for example, Adams et al., 2005; Bendor et al., 2003; Sniderman and 
Bullock, 2004). Grounded in the work of Douglass North (1990, p.3-5), this literature takes 
institutions as ‘the rules of the game in society, or more formally…the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’. The central premise of this theory is that politics, or 
more precisely the institutions thereof, provide citizens with a selection of options; they ‘do 
not get their choice of choices’ (Sniderman and Levendusky, 2009, p.437). By implication 
this theory demands multiple explanatory mechanisms that account for both citizens’ internal 
preference formation and external provision of choice.
34
 The former tends to invite heavy 
quantitative research, whilst the latter is largely qualitative and theory-driven. Where scholars 
have sought to tie these approaches, there has been an over-reliance on behavioural 
economics founded in rational choice (e.g. Sniderman and Levendusky, 2009; cf. Camerer, 
2003). This generates a research program that prioritises the properties of the choice sets 
without proper consideration for the range of internal mechanisms used to discriminate 
between them. However, in principle a theory of institutional choice offers a blueprint by 
which to unite the institutionalism of parliamentary studies in the UK with appropriate 
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 Research on internal mechanisms may include, for example, basic values (Vecchione et al., 2015), personality 
traits (Caprara and Vecchione, 2012), self-esteem (Gibson, 1981), and construal-level theory (Trope, Liberman 
and Wakslak, 2007). Research on external mechanisms may include, for example, information environments 
(Kuklinski et al., 2001), framing (Druckman, 2004), and task structuring (Saris, 2004). 
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psychological theories, in order to better understand the situated behavioural choices of our 
national representatives. 
For some time, scholars seeking to map political behaviours and institutional choice 
have been preoccupied with fitting MPs into certain parliamentary roles (see, for example, 
Müller and Saalfeld, 1997). Derived either deductively (Ilonszki and Edinger, 2007, Zittel, 
2012) or inductively (Jenny and Müller, 2012; Navarro, 2009), these literatures are severely 
limited by their use and creation of static, trans-situational behavioural categories that can be 
applied to any single representative. However, beneath the varying approaches used to 
understand role formation, there is a fundamental and clearly appraisive desire to capture the 
way in which individual actors accommodate themselves to decision-making under 
institutional pressures (e.g. Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012; March and Olsen, 1989; Searing, 
1994). Most importantly for this thesis, it is possible to discern a common sense of causality 
in this literature, whereby elite behaviour is a function of individual role orientations that 
form as the role occupant is subject to expectations exerted by role alters (e.g. party whips, 
colleagues, voters, journalists) who interact with them on a regular basis.  
 The expectations that MPs are subject to are wide-ranging and, as scholars like 
Rhodes (2011) and Crewe (2014) have demonstrated, largely normative. Other than the 
institutional code of conduct provided in Erskine May (Watson, 1995), being an MP in the 
UK Parliament is a job without a definitive description (Wright, 2010). Cues must be read off 
the culture of the workplace and responses developed with experience (Kwiatkowski, 2012). 
To the extent that such expectations in the House of Commons require interpretation, there is 
a greater premium on individual beliefs and value-driven responses. However, MPs are 
exposed to an extraordinarily wide selection of role alters, extending from their own 
colleagues (whether in the party, opposition, parliamentary staff or civil service departments) 
to the media and a national, even occasionally international, public audience. It is here that the 
formal and informal institutions of politics impinge on the individual behavioural choices of 
MPs. As explicated by theories of institutional choice, MPs must synthesise their own beliefs 
with the range of expectations they perceive from these role alters in order to reach 
behavioural choices within their occupational context. These decisions need be not only 
desirable but the role occupant must also believe them to be most appropriate. By delineating 
this process, it is possible to sharpen an image of the interaction between MPs’ personal 
motivations (i.e. basic values) and the institutions that bound their professional lives.  
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Table 4.1. Overview of paradigms in parliamentary studies (see Chapter 1 for full review). 
Approach  Principal Focus  Preferred Research 
Methods  
Theoretical/Methodological criticisms  Associated research  
Historical 
Institutionalism  
Emphasis on the continuity 
of British politics within the 
path dependency of the 
Westminster Model.  
Descriptive, qualitative, 
largely technical and 
document based analysis.  
There is an exclusive focus on the macro-level of 
political structures and incremental change, as 
well as top-down principal-agent relations.  
Gamble; Lijphart; 
Flinders; Bogdanor.  
Interpretivism  Parliamentary studies 
become about decentred 






Agency is reduced to aggregated social and 
cultural norms, whilst traditions are hypostasised 
at the expense of clear causality in behavioural 
explanation.  




Agency defined according to 
the dialectic between career-
driven rationality, emotional 




and transcription based 
coding.  
  
Personal or exogenous motivations are never 
truly understood; static role categories are 





Anthropology  Ethnographic perspectives 
on Parliament that take 
norms, ideas and beliefs as 
explanatory variables.  
Interviews, participant and 
non-participant 
observation.  
The methodological ambition is not matched by 
theoretical clarity and practical delivery. There is 
a blurred distinction between the ideational and 
institutional.  
Crewe; Müller; Abélès  
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In his recent appraisal of the UK Parliament, Philip Norton (2017) inadvertently 
summarises the advancing and retreating aspects of institutional constraint on individual MPs. 
Inside the Commons, Norton sees ‘behavioural and institutional change on a remarkable 
scale’ (2017, p.192). Parliament is far stronger in its relation with the executive, wielding the 
capacity to scrutinise and influence government legislation through departmental select 
committees (Hindmoor et al., 2009); public bill committees have given MPs greater access to 
information previously monopolised by government (Thompson, 2016); MPs are 
[theoretically] secure from snap election defeat thanks to the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 
2011; the Backbench Business Committee gives MPs the power to dictate 35 days of 
parliamentary business per year (for a nuanced discussion, see Norton, 2013); the party whips 
are increasingly unable to ‘guarantee’ votes (Cowley and Stuart, 2012, 2014); and there is 
more independent capacity for MPs to raise issues through ballot, on Opposition Days, or in 
parallel debates now held in Westminster Hall (Norton, 2013). Far from the ‘Prussian 
discipline’ talked of by Samuel Beer (1969, p.350), the UK Parliament is entering an era in 
which the independent member is given more institutional choice, faces fewer formal 
institutional constraints, and has more agency to ‘make a difference’ through diverse career 
paths (see Russell et al., 2016). 
By contrast, the informal institutional constraints exerted by external role alters have 
intensified. Parliament has become more transparent than ever before and a greater proportion 
of the population can, and do, contact their MP. Indeed, the workload imposed on MPs to 
field the scale of public communication they receive may be one of the most restrictive 
aspects of their daily job (Norton, 2012; Rosenblatt, 2006). The public can watch MPs work 
in real time through the internet or the BBC Parliament channel, and in the process it is 
arguable that the expressive function of Parliament and its members has assumed heightened 
significance. Yet in spite of efforts to increase accountability, just 29% of respondents in the 
Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement are satisfied with how MPs perform (2016, 
p.29). For Norton (2017, p.198), the (in)ability of MPs to meet expectations is affected by 
three external pressures: popular cynicism, a disinterested commercial media, and the 
immediacy of the internet. These themes have already been touched upon earlier in this 
chapter, and will be again in the final section, but for the purpose of the present discussion 
and explaining parliamentary behaviour, it points to an interesting paradox. Internal 
institutional reforms at Westminster have endowed MPs with a broader purview to act on 
individual motivation, whilst simultaneously making the House more transparent and 
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contributing to the proliferation of external expectations from a [relatively] new, or at least 
expanded, set of role alters.  
It would be amiss in this discussion to ignore rational choice scholars, whose work on 
the political behaviour of elites proceeds from similar foundations but with an almost 
exclusive concern for MPs’ strategic career choices (e.g. Downs, 1957; Strom, 1990, 1997). 
Rational choice theorists argue that such analysis is a zero-sum game, in which politicians 
reconcile the expectations of external role alters and internal gatekeepers in order to maximise 
a) their career agenda, and b) their chance of getting re-elected (see Pierson, 1994). In the 
fields of public policy and administration, this has spawned a literature on blame avoidance 
behaviour (BAB) that develops themes from rational choice work in an expanding sub-field of 
the discipline (e.g. Hood, 2011; Wenzelburger, 2014). Employing agency strategies that shift 
responsibility to colleagues, presentational strategies that distort public perceptions, and 
depoliticisation strategies that limit formal liability (Hood, 2002; 2007), this literature argues 
that politicians calculate every behavioural choice in order to maximise institutional 
advantage and minimise electoral fallout.  
As with wider rational choice scholarship, work on BAB is limited for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, there is a tendency for strategic BAB to be written about in a distant, 
theoretical and often obscure manner without empirical study (Giger and Nelson, 2011; 
Hinterleitner, 2017, p.247). Working backwards from macro-policies and electioneering, 
studies deduce and intuit BAB without looking at the micro-level of daily political behaviour. 
Secondly, these studies echo one argument of this thesis – that politicians are most 
constrained by the expectations of role alters outside of Parliament – but they also propose an 
extremely restrictive conception of agency and in doing so fail to go far enough in 
illuminating preference formation. If the basic tenets of Strom’s (1997) work hold - that 
politicians are ultimately motivated by loss and gain - then a far more nuanced understanding 
of the psychological mechanisms at work would offer more insight for behavioural analysis. 
Loss and gain, in themselves, map neatly onto the broad higher order values of Openness to 
Change and Conservation discussed in chapter 2. However, within the theory of Basic Human 
Values (BHV), these categories are interdependent, measurable, applicable with clear modes 
of activation across situations, and they operate with a more detailed second tier of 
motivations that helps to discriminate between individuals with similar behavioural choices.  
Thirdly, rational choice literature on BAB does not interrogate the variation in institutional 
choice across contextual daily environments, or different aspects of a politicians’ daily 
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experience, that produce different amounts of ‘blame-generating’ pressure (Hinterleitner and 
Sager, 2015). In this respect it is does not distinguish sufficiently between institutions as a set 
of formal rules such as MPs’ salaries or clerical support, and institutions as a range of less 
formal norms. Each is likely to elicit a different behavioural response and a different 
‘strategy’. The notion of strategy is compelling in itself but the literature also fails to account 
for the actor-related factors (i.e. psychological factors) that might determine which actors 
choose which strategies and when. 
In contrast to rational choice explanations of political behaviour, I draw on both 
psychological studies of BHV and the base instincts of role theory and institutional choice 
theory. It may be theorised that the causal influence of MPs’ personality characteristics upon 
behaviour will be greatest when those behavioural choices are least visible to, understood by, 
or of interest to those ‘looking in’. Where behavioural choices are [relatively] free from 
institutional constraint, formal or informal, it is expected that a range of individual 
motivations – not simply strategic career calculations – will account for variation in 
behaviour. This is summarised in Figure 4.1.  
This matrix is a rather crude representation of personal and institutional choice but the 
examples of behaviours included illustrate the premise of the debate above. There is no doubt 
that some MPs will have a greater propensity, based on their psychological make-up, to break 
this pattern, whilst some behaviours may also vacillate between different segments of the 
matrix. For example, parliamentary votes are recorded online, streamed on the internet and 
television, and often covered in the print media. Thus they are subject to high levels of 
external, informal institutional constraint as well as the internal formal institutions of party 
discipline. Yet on salient issues where MPs’ most prominent values are activated, and/or they 
see an alignment between their personal preferences and public appetite, then the choice may 
be value-led in spite of institutional constraint. The fluid nature of such scenarios is 
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Figure 4.1. A matrix to demonstrate the interaction between agency and institutional constraint in the 













II. Toeing the Party Line 
In UK parliamentary politics, the party system stands tall as the arbiter of institutional 
choice for both popular and elite behaviour. Whilst the previous section considered 
behavioural responses within a broad discussion of formal and informal institutions, the 
influence of the party was deliberately removed as worthy of a separate discussion. Political 
parties exert two central pressures on elite political behaviour. The first is direct and is exerted 
through a range of disciplinary incentives and punishments (e.g. Kam, 2009). The second is 
indirect and operates through the socialisation processes of party membership and selection 
(e.g. Hazan, 2003). This section will briefly take the two in turn to further add to the 
comprehensive model of parliamentary political behaviour used in this thesis and further 
cultivate the gap to be filled by informed psychological research.  
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  The extant literature on parties, mostly conducted in Europe where the party system 
still dominates, points to the unparalleled extent to which parties influence the legislative 
behaviour of their representatives. According to received wisdom, parties dictate voting 
patterns, intercede in the brokering of parliamentary positions and promotions, and enforce 
substantive policy priorities at the national level (see, for example, Hix et al. 2007). Scholars 
like Colin Crouch (2004) and Kate Dommett (2015) have gone so far as to talk of post-
democratic political parties, in which they increasingly resemble top-down hierarchical 
organisations concerned solely with electoral maximisation at the expense of their 
participatory functions. Whilst Crouch and Dommett are concerned with parties’ neglect of 
popular participation in agenda-setting, the same logic may be applied to internal party 
politics where the majority of elites will be compelled to ‘toe the line’. The literature 
surrounding political parties and elite behaviour is at best sceptical, and more generally 
dismissive, of the notion that observed parliamentary behaviour is determined by individual 
preferences or psychological factors (e.g. Dewan and Spirling, 2011). 
Dominant literatures often reduce to examinations of party organisation and discipline. 
Party leaders and party whips have far-reaching power to incentivise or punish legislators, 
whether it be exchanging the promise of promotion in return for loyalty or withholding re-
selection, career advancement, or financial resources. The dominant approach, once more, is 
to explain party discipline from a rational choice perspective: politicians weigh the costs and 
benefits of party loyalty and tend to conclude in favour of the latter (Saalfeld, 1986). In his 
Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics, Christopher Kam (2009) develops a game 
theoretic model of legislator behaviour that builds on the policy-seeking, office-seeking and 
vote-seeking desires of MPs previously highlighted in this body of literature (e.g. Müller and 
Strøm, 1999). Kam’s LEADS model is based on the assumption that even when individual 
MPs differ ideologically, their 'Loyalty [can be] elicited through Advancement, Discipline, 
and Socialisation' (2009, p.15). Kam argues that his model bridges the theoretical silos of 
preference-driven, institutional, and sociological approaches to studies of parliamentary 
behaviour, but in reality he makes rather blunt connections that portray MPs as largely 
monolithic creatures with predictable reactions to top-down pressures; he equates 
'preferenceship' between individuals with differences in Left-Right ideology on a single scale; 
and he ultimately dismisses the role of the individual MP insofar as party leaders have the 
wherewithal to offset any personal or political disagreement. Like previous scholars (e.g. 
King, 1981, pp.262-3), Kam jumps to an epistemological position that MPs are motivated in 
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essence by a desire for office, and that such motivation can be measured through proxy 
observations such as length of career, speed of promotion, or rate of dissent in the chamber.  
In its reliance on legislators’ rational self-interest, the literature on party organisations 
and incentive structures builds upon a rich seam of scholarship interested in the role of 
ambition and self-interest in politics (Black, 1972; Schlesinger, 1966). This research argues 
that politicians’ behaviour becomes a function of calculations designed to elicit satisfaction 
and support from current and future constituents (both at the popular and party level) who 
might aid career progression (e.g. Hibbing, 1986). At the level of the European Parliament, 
Stephen Meserve et al. (2009, p.1016) used a crossed random-effects model to demonstrate 
that nationally ambitious MEPs altered their voting habits in the run-up to national elections. 
The effect of time horizons on legislator behaviour was taken as an indication that politicians 
in general, and MEPs in particular, are forward-looking; in service of their ambition, 
politicians will vow allegiance to the party line until such benefits are exhausted. In the 
context of Kam’s LEADS model, such unbridled ambition would suggest that MPs’ political 
behaviours are held hostage to gatekeepers with the power to promote (i.e. party leaders and 
whips). However, these arguments are limited not simply by their unitary understanding of 
ambition (cf. Runciman, 2008) but the blunt manner in which they treat politicians as 
homogeneous in their personal interests. 
Scholars working on preference-driven models of parliamentary behaviour - Keith 
Krehbiel (1993, 1999) especially – have strived to show that the link between partisanship 
and voting is a correlative not a causative one. Krehbiel’s argument (based on voting records 
in the US Congress) states that politicians will vote with the party that advocates a stance 
closest to their personal preference on any one political issue. The problem with this view is 
that it does not clarify a priori whether party representatives vote together because of shared 
interests and only dissent when their interests diverge, or whether they vote together in spite 
of disagreements. By contrast, Kam (2009, p.15) is sceptical that members’ personal 
preferences can be sufficient to explain party (dis)unity. Yet while he eschews prior scholars 
who take single-model approaches to parliamentary behaviour (e.g. Franklin et al., 1986; 
Mughan 1990; Pattie et al., 1994), Kam’s work resembles that of institutional scholars (e.g. 
Tsebelis, 2002; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). For Kam (2009, p.32) the double monopoly of 
power ceded to party leaders in Westminster parliamentary systems (Palmer, 1995) fuses 
professional promotion and policy influence into an indivisible goal pursued by MPs with 
rational self-interest, who will only dissent when they calculate the electoral benefits returned 
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to be greater than those of party loyalty. With grave incentives to maintain a façade of internal 
unity, party leaders exploit their double monopoly to quell individual dissent through a range 
of formal and social disciplinary pressures. In this scenario, the personal preferences of 
individual MPs are merely epiphenomenal to the impact of institutional constraint on their 
behaviour.    
However, this approach has been questioned by recent work on the ‘last-term’ 
problem, which has shown that MPs’ behaviour in the UK does not alter significantly once 
they have taken the decision to retire at or before the next election. Analysing MPs' 
attendance at votes, incidents of rebellion, and the signing of Early Day Motions (EDMs) for 
the 2005-2010 and 2010-2015 UK Parliaments, Willumsen and Goetz (2017) found that 
retiring MPs alter the number of votes they attend but do not change their substantive voting 
behaviour or the rate at which they sign EDMs. If rational choice scholarship on party 
discipline and elite behaviour is to be believed, then one would expect MPs’ behavioural 
patterns to change significantly. Free from the desire to appease party gatekeepers in order to 
acquire promotion, to seek re-election through cultivation of a personal vote, and no longer 
fearful of career retribution for defying the party, retiring MPs do not need to be constrained 
by strategic rational action. The fact that their behaviour appears stable is interesting for two 
reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the extant research may have exaggerated the effects of a 
sanctions model, in which daily legislative behaviour is motivated by the threat from either of 
an MPs’ principals: the party or their constituency. Secondly, it implies that MPs are not 
necessarily self-interested but behave according to a conception of what it means to be a 
‘good representative’ (Willumsen and Goetz, 2017, p.275). Both of these conclusions support 
work previously done on the nature of individual legislators (e.g. Crisp et al., 2014) and the 
type of empirical investigation of individual differences and behaviour presented in this 
thesis.    
The second dominant approach to studies of party cohesion and elite behaviour are 
sociological in substance and method. Parties are, in essence, coordination devices that 
provide a common platform for broad coalitions of interest. However, insofar as these 
coalitions agree on their disagreement with other parties, there is at heart an overarching 
incentive to avoid dissensus. In relation to political elites, Sniderman and Levendusky (2009) 
use party cohesion to illustrate the paradoxical simplicity of those with supposedly complex 
political cognition. Ozbudun (1970, p. 305) famously spoke of parliamentary party cohesion 
in sociological terms as ‘the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be 
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observed to work together for the group’s goal in one and the same way’. Such a definition 
presumes a high level of policy agreement between party politicians, although this has not 
been supported by empirical research (Kam, 2009). Some scholars have sought explanations 
for cohesive behaviour in politicians' prior political socialisation, or the deep-seated loyalty 
and demographic similarities between MPs from the same party (i.e. Hazan, 2003). Still 
others have taken long historical perspectives to examine party behaviour before the 
introduction of official whipping in 1832 and still find evidence of cohesion (Cox, 1987). This 
literature would suggest that something more than a party’s organisation and discipline wields 
an influence over its representatives. To understand this requires a long-term view of 
developments in the study of political parties.  
In contrast to traditional Marxian conceptions of political parties - in which 
representatives were tied in their articulation and pursuit of hegemonic class struggles 
(Anderson, 1976; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) - Weberian scholarship in the twentieth century 
advanced a symbiotic process whereby parties merged with the bureaucratic machinery of the 
state (Weber, 1914 [1978], p.294). In securing candidatures and internal appointments, 
politicians within parties are, according to Weber, evaluated on partisan criteria and thus work 
under intense loyalty to embed their party in the state (1919 [1958], pp.87-95). Valdimer 
Orlando Key (1942 [1958], pp.181-182) developed this thinking to an extent with his 
distinction between the ‘party-in-the-electorate,’ ‘party activists,’ a ‘party-in-the legislature,’ 
and a ‘party-in-the government’. For behavioural analysis, I take Key’s categories as fluid 
rather than static. Legislative scholars working within the confines of role theory would seek 
clear dividing lines between these labels and the people who carried them, or otherwise seek 
to understand the progression of individuals from one to the other. By contrast, I presume that 
individual MPs may move back and forth between these categories, or even hold two or more 
simultaneously. A Minister serving with a government portfolio is at one moment bound by 
collective responsibility to agree with her party colleagues and ‘follow suit’, and the next 
moment finds herself door-knocking with her local party colleagues. There is a presumption 
that the sociological dimension of operating as a party representative differs across these 
arenas, and in doing so exerts a variable degree of influence on MPs’ behaviour. This opens a 
significant gap in the research base. Political scientists have yet to conceive of, or employ the 
interdisciplinary tools to analyse, the micro-level behaviour of politicians as the product not 
simply of party political demands but of a nexus between those pressures, individual 
differences and psychological needs, and the formal/informal institutional context of their 
daily lives.  
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Meg Russell’s (2014) research is a rare example of parliamentary studies adopting a 
psychological approach to understand cohesive partisan behaviour. Drawing on social identity 
theory, Russell found evidence among members of the UK House of Lords that psychological 
or sociological motivations for party cohesion were far more important than instrumental 
rationality. Whilst only 4 percent of those members surveyed were concerned about the 
punishments associated with dissent, a significant majority were worried that such actions 
would damage the prospects of their party (Russell, 2014, pp.716-719). Such findings are 
consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) that posit both informational 
reasons (e.g. Festinger, 1954) and normative reasons (e.g. Hornsey et al., 2003) for why group 
membership influences our sense of self and behaviour. Russell’s study is a lone but useful 
stepping stone with a number of limitations. For example, Russell’s research is limited to 
meso-level analysis of group behaviours in which psychological needs for social cohesion are 
triggered. It cannot, therefore, move beyond a focus on voting behaviour without losing its 
explanatory power.  
Whilst symbolic, votes are just one aspect of daily parliamentary behaviour. To 
understand micro-level trends and decision-making, or even to explain why MPs may buck 
cohesive voting patterns as construed by social identity theory, there is a need to return to 
micro-level analysis. In its use of basic values, I utilise a psychological construct that is 
capable of explaining a range of individual-level behaviours across different situations, as 
well as expanding our understanding of the way in which group-level cohesion and dissent 
manifests itself. However, what Russell’s (2014) study does show is that a) more research on 
the nature of legislators is needed to supplement, if not counter, the predominance of a 
sanctions model of party political behaviour, and b) important work on the sociological 
character of political parties, discredited in the last decades of the 20
th
 century for lacking 
scientific purchase, can be supported by the rigour of social psychology.   
At the same time, political parties will recruit those candidates who they believe to be 
most suitable for securing election (Daniel, 2015; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Holland, 1987). 
This raises interesting questions for this thesis regarding the personality differences between 
MPs from separate parties and the ways in which political recruitment may actually impact on 
parliamentary behaviour. Candidate selection procedures are largely non-standardised; they 
are, according to Moshe Czudnowski (1975, p.55), the process through which ‘individuals or 
groups of individuals are inducted into active political roles.’ Ultimately MPs elected to 
Westminster and socialised within that world will both determine the future image and 
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direction of the party, and be the successful product of its prior selection process (see also 
Hazan and Rahat, 2010). For Norris and Lovenduski (1995; see also Lovenduski, 2016, p. 
514), supply and demand factors operate reciprocally in the selection process, with both 
selectors and aspirants affecting outcomes that are then structured within a range of formal 
and informal institutions.  
The impact on representative behaviour is potentially two-fold. On one hand, centrally 
controlled nomination procedures can heighten the power of party discipline to suppress 
individually motivated behaviour that threatens party cohesion. On the other hand, the 
democratisation of candidate nominations (currently visible in the UK Labour Party; 
Chakelian, 2016) can produce lower levels of discipline in Parliament, since successful 
candidates do not feel beholden to any single organ of the party machine (e.g. Barnea and 
Rahat, 2007; Katz and Mair, 1995). In this context, Lovenduski (2016, p.522) is quick to 
admit that not enough has been done to expand our insight into the effect of individual 
demand-side factors, ‘especially…ambition and motivation’. In operationalising data on 
elected MPs’ basic values, I aim to fill this gap in the research base. This will not only allow 
for differentiation of the psychological motivations that distinguish politicians at each 
juncture of the ‘recruitment ladder’; it will also permit analysis of when and how institutional 
and individual level variables are superordinate or subordinate to one another in directing 
political behaviour.  
III. Incorporation of Ideology 
 Chapter 2 (pp.50-58) of this thesis presented a strong theoretical defence for the 
primacy of basic values in the organisation of political thought and behaviour. In doing so, an 
allocative model of politics and a structuring principle of socialisation were used to illustrate 
that basic values, either directly or through interaction with a series of formal and informal 
institutions, determine political ideologies and in turn behaviours. The purpose of the present 
chapter has been to build a more comprehensive understanding of those formal and informal 
institutions that MPs must navigate in their daily jobs. This section will briefly return to 
incorporate the role of ideology, as informed by basic values, within a comprehensive model 
of elite political behaviour at Westminster. 
 Political values and ideologies have been applied in numerous political contexts to 
explain behavioural phenomena at the elite and popular level, including policy choices, voting 
patterns and party cohesion (see, for example, Conover and Feldman, 1981; Pollock et al., 
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1993; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009;). This work is largely interdisciplinary and emerges from 
schools of political psychology in the US. Whilst ideology has been operationalised as an 
independent variable in political studies of behaviour, there has been only sparse engagement 
with theories and methods for understanding where ideological structures come from. This is 
a particularly important question for studies of elite behaviour, given that the extant research 
base confirms that measures of ideology (as a split social and economic construct – see 
Feldman and Johnston, 2013) increasingly covary as a function of political sophistication (e.g. 
Jost et al., 2009) and tap both the consistencies and biases in elite policy opinions (Converse, 
1964, 2000; Lodge and Taber, 2013). In order to explain when and why ideology directs 
particular behaviours and decisions, it is necessary to understand where it comes from and 
what purpose it serves at the micro-level. 
Political scientists have answered this question by explaining ideology as a product of 
top-down, discursive interaction with more politically sophisticated others or political 
structures (e.g. Layman and Carsey, 2002; Sniderman and Bullock, 2004). Ideology is, in 
political science, a sociological and institutional outcome. By contrast, political psychologists 
focus on the bottom-up psychological formation of ideological preferences, in which 
ideologies are not received in environmental packaging but adopted according to individual 
epistemic needs and motivations (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2008). In terms of the 
personality factors that represent those needs and motivations, political psychology has 
demonstrated that basic values are stronger predictors of overt political preferences and 
ideologies among elites than personality traits (e.g. Caprara et al., 2010). More proximal than 
traits, basic values are activated more readily in conscious decision-making processes. This is 
especially true of political behaviours such as voting that require the individual to choose 
between value-laden alternatives (e.g. Caprara et al., 2006). As a multi-layered and nuanced 
theory of human motivation, basic values also allow for a particularistic explanation of 
behavioural choices at the micro-level that is not possible with a simple Left-Right 
continuum. 
However, a study of elite political behaviour – especially in a highly politicised 
environment such as Westminster – would be incomplete without a measure of ideology. As 
discussed in chapter 2, individuals require overarching, collective and organisational 
principles through which to structure generalisable preferences into politically salient 
opinions and behaviours. Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione (2010) showed that political 
values, organised under a broad Left-Right spectrum, predicted up to 54 percent of variance in 
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citizens’ voting habits; these political values mediated the effect of basic values, which 
accounted for their cognitive organisation in each participant. As trans-situational functional 
goals, basic values discriminate between ideologies and prioritise those that promote them in 
specific contexts. Given that this link has been found to be strongest among politically 
sophisticated participants (Caprara et al., 2010), it is expected that basic values will, indirectly 
via ideology, predict behavioural choices made by MPs on a daily basis. Ideology must thus 
be accounted for as a facilitator of value-led behaviour alongside the institutional constraints 
already considered in this chapter.     
Having accepted that basic values operate through political values/ideology, but that 
neither of the latter is sufficient for explaining and understanding parliamentary behaviour at 
the micro-level, I offer a more comprehensive theoretical model (Figure 4.3). This model 
incorporates ideology on the basis that basic values will be operationalised consciously 
through political ideologies in explicit political environments (i.e. Parliament). This allows 
the model to differentiate with greater precision between the direct and indirect significance 
of basic values for a range of selective and non-selective behaviours. However, it is unlikely 
that the institutional choices for action presented to elites in Parliaments will always allow 
such neat delineations of personal and non-personal behaviour. Thus MPs might opt, in the 
majority of cases, for that choice which is simply most compatible with their personal values; 
this is most likely to be the ideologically charged option favoured by their party. 
Psychological research also shows that individuals are more likely to engage in ideologically 
dissonant behaviour in scenarios of low perceived choice (Kastenmüller et al., 2010; Nam et 
al., 2013). Where perceived institutional choice is low in Westminster (e.g. when voting under 
the party whip), then individual differences may be masked by collective compliance in 
counter-attitudinal behaviour. In these instances, behaviour is best explained by institutional 
constraint. In contrast, where perceived institutional choice is high (e.g. on the backbench and 
in the constituency), then individual differences are likely to be more significant as causal 
factors for MPs' behaviour.  
 This process is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which attempts to combine the hypothetical 
causal factors for political behaviour explored within this chapter. The model presents a four-
panel filter that shows how parliamentary political behaviour may be grounded in the 
psychological micro-level of basic values, whilst remaining flexible to account for a range of 
institutional constraints. The size of the arrows in the second half of the diagram indicates the 
theoretical causal primacy given to basic values - mediated by ideology - and/or institutional  
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factors (e.g. the party) in behaviours with high and low perceived choice respectively. As 
contended in chapter 2, it is expected that the effect of BHV on behaviour will only bypass 
the second panel (ideology) when the MP is faced with a scenario that is highly moralised 
and/or crosses ideological boundaries (i.e. a free vote).      
IV. Hypotheses for Parliamentary Behaviour 
So far this chapter has attempted to build a robust model for understanding MPs’ 
parliamentary political behaviour. It has synthesised a range of research from political 
science, sociology and psychology in order to precisely theorise the way in which politicians 
at Westminster navigate their daily lived experiences. This section concludes the chapter with 
four specific hypotheses that anticipate the effect of basic values upon parliamentary 
behaviours with differing levels of institutional constraint. In building this model and testing 
it empirically, this thesis fills an original and highly significant gap in parliamentary studies.  
1. Voting 
 As many of the studies already cited in this chapter indicate, voting in the House of 
Commons is characterised by high levels of intra-party unity. Peter Richards (1970, p. 179) 
wrote of this: ‘the average division list from the House of Commons is not an exciting or 
revealing document. It will faithfully reflect the size of a government’s majority’. Even in the 
case of free or ‘conscience’ votes, when members are not obliged to follow party lines, there 
is evidence that party affiliation remains the largest predictor of vote choice (Cowley & 
Stuart, 2010). Philip Cowley (1998, p. 188) concluded that free votes ‘are more likely to cut 
down party lines than across them . . . it is rare to find one vote where both of the major 
parties are significantly split’. This has been corroborated by a number of additional studies 
(see, for example, Plumb, 2015). However, rebellion by backbench MPs has become more 
frequent in recent decades: the difficulties that faced John Major over European integration, 
Tony Blair over the invasion of Iraq and the introduction of tuition fees, and James Callaghan 
over devolution to Wales and Scotland, are but a few examples that have intrigued scholars 
researching the UK Parliament (e.g. Cowley, 2002, 2005; Norton, 1980).  
The mistake of scholars seeking to explain hiccups in the dominance of party unity has 
been to take ‘the party’ as both the explanation and the cause. Political scientists have drawn 
neat dividing lines between policy issues and parties on the Left or Right.
35
 Such analysis 
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 For example, Alison Plumb (2013) suggests that the UK Labour Party and the Australian Labor Party split 
over votes on abortion and embryo research because of their Roman Catholic heritage.  
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does not get beyond the meso-level of party political history and organisation, and fails to 
interrogate differences in interest and motivation at the intra-party level that may explain 
party (dis)unity. This literature may demonstrate that political parties act cohesively and 
divide in ways that are consistent, but it does not explain ‘why’ these patterns exist. Scholars 
attempting to explain rebellions in more depth have pointed to ideological heterogeneity, the 
level of personalisation in the political system, the style of party selection, and gender as 
potential avenues for further research (see Benedetto and Hix, 2007). These explanations rely 
on system-level and at-a-distance studies of vote records. By contrast I utilise psychological 
data on basic values, gathered from the political actors under scrutiny, to discriminate 
between individual vote choices.   
In order to apply the Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB) 
to vote choice, it is necessary to consider the level of institutional constraint exerted on the act 
of voting, the party political significance of the issue being voted on, and the nature of the 
issue itself. For example, a highly politicised vote on boundary reform, in which the stakes are 
high for parties and the whip is strictly enforced, produces an extreme low-choice scenario in 
which the anticipated effect of individual basic values will be small. In a free vote on a moral 
issue such as gay marriage, where party pressure is only informal and institutional choice is 
relatively high (in a liberal western democracy), then the anticipated effect of basic values 
will be larger. Where an MP chooses to rebel, the IMPPB would predict that the vote topic 
has activated their strongest basic values, which in turn are either directly threatened by the 
party whip – in this instance the MP is unable to justify their actions and rebels in order to 
avoid cognitive dissonance – or they are supported by common feeling among role alters 
outside of Parliament (i.e. constituents) who augment the institutional choice available to the 
MP and make rebellion defendable.  
H4: As the moral dimension of the vote increases and the level of institutional constraint 
decreases, the greater the variance in individual vote patterns explained by BHV. 
2. Written Parliamentary Questions 
 Parliamentary questions are a common legislative tool used in the UK House of 
Commons; in the last two decades, a typical session has involved more than 40,000 questions 
from MPs (United Kingdom House of Commons 1998-2010). Written questions have become 
a topic of increasing academic scrutiny for their heuristic potential as a unit of analysis for 
legislative studies (Martin, 2011).  In a parliamentary system where party organisation and 
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reputation tends to dominate legislative business and elections, political scientists have 
struggled to identify objective incentives for MPs to exert additional effort on constituency 
service (e.g. Leonard, 1992; Margetts, 2011; Norris, 1997). Written parliamentary questions 
have proven one such puzzle. Typical explanations in both the UK and comparative systems 
split neatly between largely qualitative studies of MPs’ preferences and constituency service 
(e.g. Saalfeld, 2011), and quantitative studies of legislators’ rational vote-seeking behaviour 
(e.g. Rasch, 2009; Soroka et al., 2009).  
 The first of these two approaches has used the relative autonomy of parliamentary 
questions to map legislators’ substantive interests. This literature has found that MPs often 
focus their questions on one key issue in any parliamentary session (Judge, 1974), and that the 
nature of the questions often depends upon either the MP’s demographic characteristics or 
those of their constituency. For example, there is evidence that women MPs ask more 
questions related to women’s interests than male MPs (Bird, 2005), and that black or minority 
ethnic (BME) MPs or those representing constituencies with higher percentages of BME 
residents, ask more questions related to immigration and diversity (Saalfeld, 2011). This 
research base indicates a profound link, previously theorised by Donald Searing (1994), 
between MPs’ legislative behaviour and their personalities or goals. Existing scholarship is 
yet to utilise the correct psychological tools to discriminate between these substantive 
arguments or to confirm their validity. For example, it is unknown whether MPs ask questions 
in order to explicitly pursue personal motivations linked to policy preferences, to pursue 
constituency interests because they are motivated to help those around them, or in order to 
appear successful according to standards of legislative productivity.   
 The second dominant approach to studying parliamentary questions, grounded heavily 
in rational choice theory, builds on the last of these three suggestions. As formal and 
publically recorded legislative acts that are not limited in number or tightly regulated by party 
officials, and which can force government responses that may receive media attention 
(Franklin and Norton, 1993), written parliamentary questions may be used by legislators to 
build a personal vote. This electoral link has been demonstrated by Michael Kellermann 
(2016, p.91), who found that MPs in marginal constituencies asked 15% more questions on 
average than those in safe seats. This would suggest that written questions are used as a 
response to electoral vulnerability. However, Kellermann could find no commensurate rise in 
the number of constituency-related questions among ‘unsafe’ MPs. This contradicts classical 
models of the rational actor, which would suggest that the strategic incentives born out of 
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electoral vulnerability would push MPs to adopt a constituency orientation in order to secure 
re-election (Strøm, 1997). Comparative evidence is equally mixed (e.g. Blidook and Kerby, 
2011).  
 For the purpose of this thesis, these studies show that informal institutional constraints 
are more important than formal processes or party pressure when explaining MPs’ use of 
written questions. There is clear evidence of a constituency link that requires more precise 
investigation. However, there remains no evidence to suggest that parliamentary questions 
produce direct electoral returns and only an average of 7 percent of questions actually refer to 
constituencies, constituents and communities in constituencies (Kellermann, 2016, p.95). This 
would suggest that parliamentary questions are also likely to offer MPs high perceived choice 
to pursue personal motivations.  
H5: MPs’ basic values will predict a moderate amount of variance in the number of written 
parliamentary questions asked. This is specifically anticipated for MPs high in Security 
values (who are more likely to plough effort into constituency-oriented behaviours to combat 
electoral marginality); MPs high in Achievement values (who may use ex ante questions to 
signal party loyalty and ambitions for higher office); and MPs high in Benevolence values 
(who may use questions out of a genuine desire to be a good constituency representative).    
3. Early Day Motions (EDMs) 
 In studies of parliamentary behaviour, EDMs offer another indicator by which 
scholars may assess members’ preferences. Like written questions, EDMs offer backbench 
MPs an outlet to cultivate a personal image by sponsoring non-binding internal motions that 
could hypothetically – though rarely – be debated in the chamber at an unspecified date in the 
future (House of Commons Information Office, 2010). EDMs can be used to offer support or 
criticism for government legislation; they can raise local issues that concern individual MPs; 
or they can be used as an additional arena for party political point scoring. To the extent that 
EDMs are of little parliamentary significance and are not tightly regulated by party whips, the 
costs of sponsoring them are small by comparison to other parliamentary behaviours. 
Although these contextual factors make EDMs a source of expressive legislative behaviour, 
research has tended to explain them as signalling tools used by rational self-interested actors 
who seek to send internal messages to party leaders (Berrington, 1973) or external messages 
to voters (Kellermann, 2013).  
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 In a similar study to his work on parliamentary questions, Michael Kellermann (2013) 
found a strong relationship between electoral marginality and the number of EDMs 
introduced by MPs. Kellermann argues that this reflects a causal relationship in which 
peripheral legislative behaviours (i.e. EDMs) become a function of electoral pressures as MPs 
seek to improve their chances of re-election at the margin (cf. Carey and Shugart, 1995; 
Gaines, 1998). However, Kellermann (2013, p. 274) also found significant party differences 
in the introduction of EDMs. These differences were broadly reflective of Left-Right divides; 
for example, Conservative MPs were much less likely to introduce at least one EDM than 
Labour MPs, and also likely to introduce fewer when they did. This is an important finding 
that Kellermann largely dismisses, even though it holds across multiple Parliaments and 
therefore cannot be confounded simply by the added restraint of being ‘the party in 
government’. Whilst these differences could reflect styles of party organisation and selection, 
they may also reflect the types of MPs who occupy parties on the Left and Right. More so 
than written questions, which can force a government response, EDMs have trivial policy 
implications and are largely invisible to the general public. In line with the IMPPB, EDMs 
offer MPs high perceived choice with only minimal formal and informal institutional 
constraint. Therefore EDMs may be used to pursue, or at least indicate, personal preferences 
and value-led policy goals.  
H6: Basic values will predict a large amount of variance in the number of EDMs signed; the 
relationship between basic values and EDM sponsorship will reflect substantive differences in 
the values of MPs in centre-Left and centre-Right parties.  
4. Select Committee Membership 
 Select Committees (SCs) have been a feature of the parliamentary landscape since 
1979; after the Wright reforms in 2010 they have become a high profile adjunct to the House 
of Commons chamber where MPs can scrutinise the business of government and influence 
policy directions. Described as ‘the most significant change to the way that the House 
operates in 30 years’ (Hagelund and Goddard, 2015), SCs are an ‘empowered system’ 
(Marsh, 2016, p.96) that receives increasingly frequent media coverage (Kubala, 2011). 
Existing scholarship on SCs has sought to explain their power, autonomy and policy influence 
as well as the efficacy of the Wright Reforms (e.g. Bates et al., 2017; Fisher, 2015; Kelso, 
2009). Benton and Russell’s (2013) study of the impact of SCs found that they exerted 
considerable influence, both measureable and non-measurable, upon government activity. For 
example, their carefully coded quantitative analysis of SC recommendations from 1997-2010 
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found that departmental SCs were successful in securing more than 200 substantive changes 
to government policy every year (Benton and Russell, 2013, p. 781).  
 The purpose of the present thesis is not to augment this already established body of 
research on the efficacy of SC output and outcomes, but rather to add nuance to it by looking 
backwards at the types of people attracted to SCs who influence those outcomes. In the study 
mentioned above, Benton and Russell (2013, pp.782-783) argue that the success of SCs 
depends upon a combination of committee-, inquiry-, and recommendation-level factors. At 
the committee-level, Benton and Russell (ibid., p.782) refer to ‘the committee’s style and 
reputation, the nature and culture of the department that it shadows, the personality and 
effectiveness of its chair, and the drafting style of its clerk’. The personal side of SCs is also 
been discussed by Marc Geddes (forthcoming, 2019) in his interpretivist approach to role 
typologies among SC chairs. Additional research has focused on the career paths of individual 
SC members; as of 2016 11 of the 47 SC chairs elected post-2010 were previously, or went on 
to, [shadow] cabinet positions (Democratic Audit, 2016). This would suggest that the 
increasing efficacy of SCs, as well as the emergence of the ‘celebrity’ chair (see Fisher, 
2015), has transformed the career paths open to backbench MPs and especially those with 
aspirations to frontbench office. Equally intriguing, SC chairs vote against their party majority 
significantly more frequently than their backbench colleagues (Democratic Audit, 2016).
36
 
This maverick tendency among SC chairs is suggestive of either the confidence endowed 
upon these individuals by internal parliamentary elections, or substantive personality 
differences in the types of MPs pursuing these positons. This nascent feature of scholarship in 
parliamentary studies has neither been developed systematically nor supported by rigorous 
research methods. There is an over-reliance on interview data gathered from SC members as 
well as textual analysis of committee reports, both of which reflect the opinions of those with 
most reason to exaggerate the efficacy of SCs. The resultant research base is, therefore, 
largely impressionistic and vulnerable to bias.
37
      
 In light of the above discussion, the decision to stand for SC membership or 
chairmanship represents a potentially expressive behavioural decision that may reveal 
individual differences between backbench MPs. In utilising the IMPPB to understand this, 
there are a number of competing explanations. Whilst it is evident that SCs have become 
increasingly autonomous of both party and government control – this would indicate high 
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perceived choice for MPs considering a move onto the SC ‘circuit’ – this has brought with it 
an increased public profile and reputational risks. Therefore, institutional constraint may be 
low in terms of internal and formal parliamentary and party structures, but the expectations of 
external role alters are growing. This may, in itself, limit the pool of potential applicants; MPs 
with a high priority for security may be much less likely than other MPs to put themselves 
forward. SC membership also requires a level of cross-party collaboration and consensus 
rarely found in the UK Parliament. The ability to conceive of oneself working with rather than 
against political opponents may also filter potential applicants. Nevertheless, SCs allow MPs 
relatively high levels of institutional choice. 
H7: Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs’ decisions to run for SC 
membership and the relationship will be stronger among MPs who have been SC chairs. In 
particular, it is expected that MPs on SCs will score more highly for Achievement values 
(attracted to SCs by the promise of career progression and visibility) and Self-Direction 
values (MPs who struggle to conform to the party whip and see SC membership as a way of 
acting upon individual preferences).       
 This chapter provides a thorough and rigorous review of extant research into the 
behaviour of parliamentary political elites. Synthesising the conceptual wisdom and empirical 
findings of existing parliamentary research with the theoretical foundations of psychological 
studies, this chapter presents an integrated model for parliamentary political behaviour 
(IMPPB). The IMPPB offers an original blueprint by which I suggest an interactive 
relationship between cognitive processes based on basic values, the institutional fabric of 
Westminster, the effects of party political socialisation and organisation, and the mediating 
role of ideology. The precise yet flexible nature of the IMPPB allows me to frame four 













“In free governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors and 
sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not to degrade but to 
promote them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them…not [to] allow 
them to become again one of the Masters.” 
Benjamin Franklin (1787) 
Personality and Anti-Politics: Re-Examining Representation (RQ3) 
 
 In 1965 David Easton (p. 212) argued that the history of regimes is a long lesson in the 
downfall of political systems in which those with authority did not have the support or 
confidence of the governed. So far I have argued for an interdisciplinary approach to 
parliamentary studies that can augment the academic understanding, at the micro-level, of 
who is motivated to enter elite politics and, at the meso-level, of how these individual-level 
personality characteristics interact with institutional factors to shape legislators' behaviour. 
This chapter adds to that research agenda by extrapolating to macro-level issues of 
representation and anti-politics. The central argument of this chapter reduces to the existence 
of an unhealthy premium on the individual in contemporary democratic politics, both in terms 
of the ways representatives understand and execute their professional function and how/why 
voters become disillusioned regardless of their political choices.  
 
 In contrast to a post-millennial literature on political malaise that is concerned, above 
all, with institutional processes and failures of political administration (Allen, 2006; Hay, 
2007; Norris, 2011; Flinders, 2012), I trace an insidious preoccupation with political 
personalities and a growing perception gap that underpins citizens’ withdrawal from formal 
political participation. Classical and contemporary scholarship alike has made the case, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, that political scientists cannot talk of a crisis in democracy 
without talking about the people who work in and for it. This chapter clarifies that argument 
and in doing so it completes an interdisciplinary research agenda founded on the empirical 
study of Members of Parliament (MPs), their Basic Human Values (BHV), and public 
perceptions thereof.  
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 The chapter proceeds in three interrelated sections. Part I offers an extended review of 
prominent debates in the literature on democratic theory, identifying flaws inherent in the 
process of blending the institutions of representation and democracy that have set up a crisis 
built around the people doing politics. Part II builds on this discussion by outlining 'gap' and 
'trap' accounts of anti-politics as agency-oriented phenomena that necessarily emanate from 
the arguments of part I. Part III then focuses specifically on the personalisation of politics in 
the media and the ways in which anti-political sentiments revolving around politicians' 
psychological flaws have been exacerbated. Through critical exploration of these issues, I 
isolate three key hypotheses about the role of personality in democratic representation that 
will be tested empirically in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
I. The Human Process of Representative Democracy 
 
 According to Nadia Urbinati (2011, p. 24), 'representation is the locus of the dynamics 
that keep modern democracy in motion and the political process that activates the 
communication between state institutions and society.’ This definition is useful insofar as it 
succinctly captures the procedural aspect of democratic representation, but it conveniently 
elides the human relationships within and between institutions. Implicit in this definition is, 
on the one hand, the notion of one person (i.e. a citizen) authorising another (i.e. a 
representative) to act on their behalf. This is a crucial condition for understanding 
representation as a facilitative institution for democracy, for the people's sovereignty, and it 
demands proper respect and attention (Habermas, 1996, pp.462 - 515). On the other hand, this 
definition conveys the sense of unitary will that is conceived in the act of representation; this 
is a unitary will that does not necessarily pre-exist but is formed in the representative and as 
such demands an enormous amount of individual-to-individual trust (i.e. Kant, 1991). 
Moreover, representation necessarily transfers power from the principal to the agent and 
disassociates democratic liberty from the direct authorisation of will. In doing so it places a 
performative emphasis on the role of the representative to a) discern and secure the 'common 
good', or b) to enter into an enduring process of contestation on behalf of certain factional 
interests.  
 
 A relatively recent constructivist turn in this debate goes further in suggesting that 
democratic representatives are not simply responsive to the will of the people but make 
present those people they represent through a series of 'representative claims' (e.g. Saward, 
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 The implication of this constructivist approach is to grant the act of 
representation a creative force as constitutive of popular power, thus divorcing it from a 
system of elections (see, for example, Näsström, 2015). Whilst this understanding of 
representation may give rise to a broader palette of public opinions and marginal interests, it 
also assumes that representative claims will, necessarily, be democratic. As Hannah Pitkin 
(2004, p. 339) argues, any schema that decouples representation from the legitimacy granted 
by elections risks a system in which representatives 'act not as agents of the people but simply 
instead of them'. For those scholars concerned by the degenerative slide to ‘mainstream 
populism’ in western democracies (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mény and Surel, 2002) 
and the dog-whistle politics of those making representative claims that undermine democratic 
values, I argue that there is an academic imperative to understand the motivations and 
machinations of those who formally represent and thus make representative claims in that 
capacity. 
 
 This discussion has so far outlined two key repercussions of linking the concepts of 
representation and democracy: the first is the overwhelming responsibility placed upon the 
individuals elected to office and the second concerns the negative potential of a system in 
which popular power is ceded to those same individuals. This emphasis on the people doing 
politics is reinforced by the institutions of representative democracy, primarily its system of 
elections. Though supportive of the institution of representation, democratic formalists, 
particularly Hans Kelsen (1999), believe that the political binding of elections is not enough 
to ensure that representatives both reflect the will of the people and are ‘responsible’ to their 
electors. Whilst political binding introduces a host of ethical norms surrounding the prudence 
of the representative, Kelsen argues that this moral duty requires an imperative mandate 
secured by law. For Kelsen (1999, p.292) '[l]egal independence of the elected from the 
electors is incompatible with legal representation'. The UK does not provide its 
representatives with an imperative mandate, although the Recall of MPs Act 2015 (effective 
as of March 2016) has introduced rules by which an MP can lose their seat in Parliament 
subject to a successful petition, signed by at least 10% of constituents (The Electoral 
Commission, 2016). In reality the Recall of MPs Act 2015 is a limited re-balancing of 
democratic power towards the principal within the institution of representation. Petitions can 
only be triggered by the Speaker of the House on the occasion that an MP should receive a 
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custodial sentence, falsify allowances under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, or find 
themselves barred from the House of Commons for more than 14 calendar days per year. 
Parliamentary elections remain the institutional site of popular will, vested in representatives 
who, in the absence of an imperative mandate, must ultimately be judged on the merits of 
their values, opinions and ideological discourse - what Kelsen refers to as 'political fictions' 
(Kelsen, 1992). The emphasis of the debate thus switches from the institutional mechanisms 
by which democracy is enacted to the psychological characteristics of the people who are 
deemed eligible to act in one's best interests.  
 
 It is in this theoretical as well as practical context that elections arguably engender two 
of the key indicators of anti-politics explored later in this chapter: popular disengagement and 
the personalisation of politics. Firstly, insofar as elections give the people post factum control 
over their government, they make popular participation and democracy an accessory to the 
actions of representatives in the interim. Secondly, the electoral process creates democratic 
inequalities, since only those who are elected have both deliberative and decision-making 
powers. Combined these processes create a politics of personality, both in terms of how 
people characterise their democratic choices and in terms of how they evaluate the 
performance of democratic governments. For similar reasons, Sofia Näsström (2015, p.4) 
argues that elections, as an arena for perverted ideological competition about what is right for 
"we, the people", have become 'a democratic straightjacket'. If elections induce a regular 
competition about 'who' is fit to instantiate popular power, then the health of democracy 
simultaneously rests on the personal qualities of those representatives who assume that power: 
representation becomes less a process of authorisation by voters so much as a constant 
judgement about the rectitude of laws and lawmakers. Where representatives are found 
wanting in their democratic capacity, the sovereign people can either disengage with politics, 
thus threatening the very system of government, or harness negative power to censure 




  In terms of holding individual members to account, Parliaments around the world have 
responded to public approbation with a raft of reforms to both their accountability and 
scrutiny measures, as well as public engagement and education mechanisms (see, for 
example, Beetham, 2011). However, there is already a nascent body of research that 
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demonstrates a disjuncture between citizens and elites when it comes to agreeing upon 
acceptable behaviour by elected representatives (Jackson and Smith, 1996; McAllister, 2000; 
Atkinson and Bjerling, 2005). Therefore, parliamentary reforms that focus on the legality of 
representative behaviour, such as those introduced by the Independent Parliamentary 
Standards Authority (IPSA) in the UK following the expenses scandal of 2009, fail to 
appreciate that the public understanding of ethics in 'normal politics' goes beyond corruption 
or bribery. In a three-wave quantitative study of British citizens in 2009-2010, Nicholas Allen 
and Sarah Birch (2015b, pp. 62-88) found a significant mismatch between the narrow 
conception of ethics expounded by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and a public 
understanding of ethical behaviour that prioritised ideological and discursive integrity. Given 
that Parliaments are often associated with unpopular or sullied aspects of politics (Beetham, 
2011), it may be expected that the emphasis on the personal probity of representatives - 
cultivated by the concept of representation and the institution of elections - extends to meso-
level evaluations of Parliament.  
 
 As a functional arena for representation - insofar as it provides the site of 
representative deliberation and the enactment of legislation - Parliament also produces laws 
that affect all citizens, not just the electors of any one representative. As Carré de Malberg 
(1922) argued in the early 20th century, this process of representation via Parliament 
necessarily alters the act of authorisation between elector and elected in a democracy. In a 
will-based theory of representation, elected politicians must then be conscious of both the will 
of the people in general, whom their laws will affect, and their direct electoral relationship 
with a constituency (for a full discussion, see Urbinati, 2006). Coupled with a free rather than 
imperative mandate, representatives must traverse the complex nexus of being both politically 
bound by ideological similarity to their electors and yet legally independent of them in order 
to retain the political legitimacy necessary to make laws for all (Thompson, 1987). In the 
Burkean sense, democratic representatives cannot then share a dyadic delegate relationship 
with their constituents. Yet so long as they are permanently in political relation to that 
constituency, neither can they be entirely like Burke's trustee.  
 
 In its haste to categorise the focus and style of democratic representation, political 
science has not given enough thought to this mandate-independence controversy (Pitkin, 
1967). Instead a long line of quantitative and qualitative research has attempted to discern the 
antecedent conditions for, and broader systemic effects of, representatives who act as either 
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trustees, delegates, partisans, or politicos (Eulau and Wahlke, 1959; Katz, 1997; Mendez-
Lago and Martinez, 2002; Müller and Saalfeld, 1997). To the extent that the very nature of 
representation in Western liberal democracies eschews these 'pure forms', as delineated above, 
this literature brings a rigid model with weak explanatory power to the task of understanding 
how and why politicians take roles seriatim in the fluctuating context of democratic politics. 
This is reflected in a disappointing lineage of studies that find inconsistent results in 
politicians' self-reported representative focus, or alternatively counter-intuitive links between 
those answers and politicians' political behaviours (Andeweg, 2012; Gauja, 2012; Gross, 
1978; Sorauf, 1963). Using the conceptual base of the IMPPB, developed in chapter 4, I 
believe that the enduring ambiguities outlined above may be clarified according to personal 
preference and motivated decision-making.  
 
H8: Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs’ ranked preferences for 
representative focus. In particular, there will be a close correlation between Self-
Transcendence values and delegate preferences, Openness to Change values and trustee 
preferences, and Conservation values and partisan preferences.  
 
 This section has engaged with a rich umbrella of literature on democratic theory in 
general, and the nature of representation in a democracy in particular. In doing so it advances 
a series of interrelated claims. Firstly, the system of representation produces a continual 
contestation about who "we, the people" are and what is (il)legitimate in a modern democracy 
that, as a theoretical system, has no locus of power. Secondly, this contestation is given 
embodiment in the institutions of elections and Parliaments that not only divorce democratic 
norms from practice but also place an enormous emphasis on the personal qualities and 
motivations of those making representative claims. Thirdly, it is by recourse to studying the 
psychological qualities of politicians and the personalisation of politics that political science 
may better understand both how representatives decide upon their democratic focus and how 
or why citizens choose to disengage from, distrust or disparage politics. In focusing upon the 
issue of anti-politics in the following section, this chapter proceeds with an underpinning 
acknowledgement for vertical lines of causation from representative democracy as a system 
down to its institutions and ultimately the actors who make manifest the potentiality (positive 








II. The Gap, the Trap, and the Prominence of Personality  
 
 If the previous section highlighted the normative systemic catalysts for an anti-
political culture built upon personality politics, then the purpose of the following section is to 
illustrate the manifestation of this argument through existing scholarship on anti-politics in 
the UK and beyond. This body of work distils neatly into two dominant explanations (Corbett, 
2015). The first is a ‘gap’ account of political malaise and the demonisation of politicians 
based on a divergence of citizen expectations and politicians’ performance. The second is a 
‘trap’ account, in which politicians are caught between contradictory demands inherent in 
democratic publics and representative politics. More than fifty years since the publication of 
Bernard Crick’s (1962) famous defence of politics, these accounts map the change as well as 
the constants in public understandings of politics and politicians. However, even that 
literature trying to pick up where Crick left off (e.g. Corbett, 2014; Flinders, 2012; Medvic, 
2013; Riddell, 2011) fails to move beyond disciplinary boundaries to incorporate the lived 
experiences and personal motivations of those politicians they seek to defend. Instead there is 
a tendency towards theoretical debates in the academy that only stress the normative plurality 
of the discipline’s understanding of why politicians are necessary.
40
  This section draws upon 
the empirical and normative work of this literature to outline the potential contribution of a 
counter-narrative built upon careful attention to the personal side of politics. 
 
 The imperative of this research is, to an extent, two-fold. On the one the hand I have 
already outlined a range of threats to representative democracy that demand original research, 
but on the other hand I seek to answer that promise of political science to cultivate the public 
understanding of politics through engaged and relevant scholarship. By contrast the dominant 
narrative has been one of rational choice approaches and indulgent apocalyptic strap lines, so 
that ‘political scientists have contributed significantly to the demonisation of politics. [T]hey 
trained us, in effect, to be cynical. And in that respect at least, we have been excellent 
students’ (Hay, 2009, p.587). This is an argument echoed elsewhere and reduces to a 
realisation that the discipline may have failed its responsibility as a knowledge-filter and a 
knowledge-broker, not simply a knowledge-creator, when it comes to tempering an overly 
critical civic body (Flinders, 2013). Adding faux credence to a political witch hunt, the 
literature talks of ‘inevitable cases of political misconduct’ (Allen and Birch, 2015) and 
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convinces its readership that ‘one might be forgiven for thinking that the ABCs of British 
politics are arrests, bribery and cheating’ (Bowler and Karp, 2004). Such slippage in the 
discourse of this literature extends to the conceptual starting point of political analysis. One 
may go back as far as the 70s - before public indices for falling trust in politicians were the 
subject of such stark concern - and take Arnold Heidenheimer’s (1970) model of ‘white’, 
‘grey’, and ‘black’ corruption as an example of political analysis that extends only in the 
direction of elite sinning without consideration for those doing good in public life. These 
examples are typical of a political science academy that has been complacent and complicit in 
the moral degradation of politics and political office, inadvertently fuelling the anti-politics it 
now seeks to explain. 
 
 To take the first of the dominant approaches mentioned above - the 'gap' account - is to 
distinguish between two further schools of thought. On the one hand a demand-side 
explanation, energetically pursued by Matthew Flinders (2012; see also Hatier, 2012), works 
backwards from public disengagement to a certain moral panic about the quality of our 
representatives. In this view, public apathy is underwritten by a lack of political education and 
thus an inflated impression of what is deliverable in democratic politics. On the other hand a 
supply-side explanation (see, in particular, Hay, 2007; Hay and Stoker, 2009; Stoker, 2006) 
blames professional politicians and neo-liberal reform agendas for their complacency in 
fuelling anti-political sentiment. The latter explanation sits nicely with those who welcome 
the threat of anti-politics as a chance to rejuvenate democracy through new forms of popular 
deliberation and participation (e.g. Dryzek, 2000; Evans et al., 2013). Whilst these 
explanations might contend with one another, there are distinct similarities. Firstly, both 
accounts come back to the people doing politics; one to defend politicians from the 
expectation of being super-human and the other to criticise them for a range of human vices.  
 
 The evidence here is compelling whichever way it is interpreted. In their application 
of Kahneman's (2011) philosophy of fast and slow thinking, Stoker et al. (2016) confirmed 
received wisdom that the public's intuitive thinking about politicians is highly negative, 
cynical and characterised by a vernacular of disillusionment. Focus group participants 
provided 209 word associations for politicians, of which only 7 were positive. However, in 
every case the 'slow thinking phase' saw such trenchant negativity give way to a more 
considered critique and a reflective form of reasoning that was 'far more generous to the spirit 
of what politics might be trying to achieve' (Stoker et al. 2016, p.14).  
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Similarly, Allen and Birch (2015a, p.402) found a significant negative relationship 
between respondent's confidence in politicians' personality traits, such as honesty, and process 
dissatisfaction in politics. As confidence in politicians' personal qualities increased, so too the 
gap between respondent's ideal process beliefs and their perceptions of the status quo 
decreased. As a causal relationship, it would appear sensible to believe that citizens who trust 
their politicians to be honest and interested in popular opinion, will be more satisfied with the 
operation of democratic politics. Allen and Birch (2015a, p.406) also found a significant 
positive relationship between perceptions of politicians and the likelihood of respondents 
endorsing the view that voting is a duty. Studies of this kind clearly indicate an appetite for 
politics but a profound disagreement with the conduct of representative democracy that rests, 
to a large extent, on the personal qualities of representatives. From a demand-side perspective, 
the reliance of the public on subjective process-space intuitions about politicians might 
confirm a deficit of informed popular engagement and evaluation. By contrast, the same 
evidence might be interpreted from a supply-side perspective as proof that the 'wrong' people 
are governing the country in the 'wrong' interests. The point to make here is that either 
interpretation involves a significant preoccupation with the personal side of elite politics but 
neither acknowledges this explicitly nor utilises the correct methods to investigate the topic 
further. 
 
 It is striking that such critiques of politicians and their motives, let alone their 
involvement in major policy decisions, is at direct odds with the beliefs and experiences of 
politicians as presented in a relatively small pool of political studies research (e.g. Reeher, 
2006; Tiernan and Weller, 2010) and in academic texts or biographies by former politicians 
(e.g. Ignatieff, 2013; Volgy, 2001). This is a practical defense of politicians that has been 
specifically advanced in recent years by Jack Corbett (2015). According to Corbett (2015, 
pp.473-480), the disjuncture between evidence from politicians and public evaluations thereof 
points to four central defences that can be made. Firstly, the number of inter-confirmatory 
qualitative studies of politicians' ideological beliefs (e.g. Tiernan and Weller, 2010; Weller 
and Gratten, 1981), as well as various typologies of politicians (e.g. Searing, 1994; Navarro, 
2009), suggests a level of heterogeneity that does not feature in the literature on political 
'careerism' and professionalisation. Secondly, self-report and interview data on politicians 
from numerous democratic systems conveys a common commitment to serve others and 
achieve goals directed at a 'better' future (e.g. Reeher, 2006). Thirdly, accounts of political life 
are replete with references to extreme time commitments, consistent conflicts, poor health, 
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and tense family relations (e.g. Volgy, 2001; Ignatieff, 2013). This is a sentiment echoed 
succinctly by Rhodes' (2011, p.161) study of British government: 'The key task of the 
departmental court is to cope.' The final argument in Corbett's (2015) defense mirrors what 
John Keane (2009, p.51) calls 'the ubiquity of perplexity' in his Life and Death of Democracy. 
While the public criticises politicians for procrastination and grandstanding, politicians 
themselves describe political life as beset by endless contingencies (e.g. Evans et al., 2013; 
Naim, 2013). Clearly focused on politicians' integrity as well as their individual actions, these 
claims reflect an unspoken narrative dominated by the personal side of politics. 
 
 Although the literature cited above is largely based on subjective, secondary analysis, 
these arguments are compelling for the way in which they distil 'gap' accounts of anti-politics 
to common causes. In delineating the disconnect between emic and etic perceptions of 
politics, these claims also neatly bridge the conceptual divide between 'gap' and 'trap' views of 
anti-politics. For example, the obvious conclusion of Corbett's (2015, p.473) defense of 
politicians is that 'real people are neither saints nor sinners...the demonisation of politicians 
partly reflects our own discomfort with their function in a democratic system and our 
unwillingness to undertake the job ourselves.' Corbett touches on the essence of the 'trap': that 
politicians have always been plagued by their need to 'wear masks' (Runciman, 2008) and 
compromise on their own goals and those of others (Crick, 1962). Whilst the 'gap' view helps 
us to understand much of what has changed in democratic politics, from the role of the media 
to the rise of neo-liberal reform agendas, the 'trap' account clarifies a number of constants.  
 
 To meet the contradictory demands of their publics, and to take leadership positions in 
a system supposedly committed to popular sovereignty, 'trap' accounts of anti-politics argue 
that politicians must be both leaders and followers, principled and pragmatic, ordinary and 
exceptional (Medvic 2013). For example, principle and pragmatism do not necessarily 
contradict one another, but in the realm of democratic party politics one will commonly 
negate the other.  Acting on deeply held principles is noble and sustaining those values in 
politics is even more admirable, but when politicians remain dogmatic in their adherence to a 
set of principles they are decried as harbingers of stalemate and political stagnation. Should 
politicians divert from principle too easily to reach a compromise, they are cast as unreliable 
and opportunistic. As Kane and Patapan (2012, p.44) argue: '[the electors] want somebody 
who will do their bidding, listen to them, and not break promises, yet they will hold in 
contempt the leader who merely follows the polls, has no 'vision', and refuses to make tough, 
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unpopular decisions.' Thus the trap is laid. Far from being overtly political, each of these 
paradoxes reflects a popular preoccupation with process space - propounded by systems of 
representative democracy, as argued in section 1 - and thus a focus on the personal qualities of 
those people doing politics.  
 
 The 'trap' account also reflects, to some extent, disaggregated popular conceptions of 
what 'good' representation actually means (Carman, 2006). Therefore, it is necessary to ask, in 
turn, how this situation affects popular conceptions of 'what MPs are for?' and how they react 
'in office'. In their review of MPs' casework activity, Norton and Wood (1993) claim that 
constituents in the UK increasingly view their local representative as a lightning rod for 
achieving personal 'policy' goals. This is an argument mirrored in recent scholarship that finds 
a preference among UK voters for strong-willed MPs who, independent of the party line, 
prioritise the constituency over national policy work (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015; 
Vivyan and Wagner, 2015). This is particularly interesting in light of previous evidence from 
the UK indicating that citizens with the strongest preferences for a constituency representative 
are significantly more likely to believe that MPs are out of touch (Carmen, 2006). In studies 
of the US and the UK, Christopher Carmen (2003, 2006) has also found political efficacy, 
education, race and gender to be significant predictors of representational preferences.
41
  It is 
evident, then, that the public have varied normative ideas about representation and that these 
ideas have an impact on their evaluations of politics and politicians. However, these studies 
are severely limited in two respects. Firstly, they do not link representational preferences with 
popular evaluations of/votes for prospective candidates. Secondly, they draw inadequate 
causal links between representational preferences and a popular narrative about politicians 
characterised by psychological accusations (e.g. Stoker et al., 2016). To fill this lacuna in the 
representation literature, I seek to assess the extent to which popular evaluations of politicians' 
qua people dominate over political considerations.      
 
H9: Prospective MPs' personalities, as measured by basic values, will be more important to 
voters than other personal qualities such as age, gender, or faith, or a candidate's 
commitment to a specific representational style.  
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 From Hannah Arendt's (1958) description of politics as the constitution of personhood 
via the public realm to Max Weber's (1978, p.225) classic belief in politics as a vocation that 
demands the 'slow boring of hard boards', there has been a narrative of human endeavour at 
the heart of some of the greatest political thinking in the last century. However, this focus on 
the human condition - both in Parliament and outside of it - has not translated into effective 
empirical research on democratic participation and disengagement in the 21st century. This 
chapter now turns to a prominent feature of post-1945 political science research that 
epitomises the importance (and rise) of the ‘personal’ for the anti-political - the 
personalisation of politics.  
 
III. The Personalisation of Politics 
 
 As both cause and symptom of anti-politics, I argue that fluctuations of public interest, 
trust and participation in formal politics are tightly connected to another phenomenon of post-
1945 political communication: the personalisation of politics. Drawing on a range of 
contemporary and recent research in this area, I argue in this section that the personalisation 
of politics encompasses changes to the way in which power is held and deployed, a veer 
towards public understandings of politics based upon the personal qualities of representatives, 
and a self-perpetuating politicisation of the private and the personal (see, in particular Langer, 
2007; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). As such I treat the personalisation of politics as more than 
just the increasing importance of mainstream political leaders. The arrival of personalisation 
mechanisms in democratic politics is not particularly sudden; insofar as democratic political 
leadership is especially paradoxical in its demands, the roles and actions of leaders have 
always been of heightened significance (Kavanagh, 1990; Kane and Patapan, 2012). 
However, modern types and styles of media have altered the public consumption of politics in 
an overtly agency-centred and personal direction (Langer, 2007; Hayes, 2009; Garzia, 2011; 
Teles, 2015). As the vehicle for trust judgements in politics, this section presents the 
phenomenon of personalisation as the embodiment of those systemic misgivings of 
representative democracy identified in section I.  
 
 As a process, the personalisation of politics has proceeded in tandem with a range of 
concomitant symptoms of anti-politics: the rise of individualistic democratic societies and 
post-modern values; the growth of identity politics and the decline of aggregative ideologies; 
the implosion of party memberships and popular allegiances; the increasing complexity of 
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modern governance systems; and the dawn of mass media (Mughan, 2000; Poguntke and 
Webb, 2005; McAllister, 2007; Hayes, 2009). The last of these is of special significance but 
there remains a lack of joined-up thinking in the extant research and a number of unanswered 
questions. Media scholars and political scientists alike have demonstrated a growing media 
focus on process space as opposed to policy issues (Deacon et al., 2001; Heffernan, 2006; 
Wring and Ward, 2010), a trend that has been particularly apparent during election campaigns 
when 'leaders are increasingly the personification of their parties' (Heffernan, 2006, p.583; 
Stevens and Karp, 2012). These research findings chime with a literature on anti-politics that 
has shown both the importance of process space for popular evaluations of politics, and its 
significance for democratic disengagement (Allen and Birch, 2015; Stoker et al., 2016; Stoker 
and Hay, 2017). However, these two bodies of literature have not been bridged either 
theoretically or empirically. I argue that the two are inextricably linked: in democratic 
systems driven by personality politics, it is highly likely that citizens make political 
judgements (about institutions as well as actors) based on everyday inferences about the 
qualities of those they observe/read about. 
 
 There is a largely US-centric literature on personality politics that has already 
confirmed the centrality of character evaluations in American elections, based 
overwhelmingly on judgements of competence and integrity (Goren, 2002, 2007). Related 
work in Britain is generally qualitative and limited in both size and scale. It has also been 
dominated by high-profile publications and commentaries that have tended to downplay the 
effect of media discourse on public considerations of politics and voters' decisions (e.g. 
Deacon et al., 2001; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). These studies largely overlook personality 
or tend to conflate it with other personal characteristics; they are overwhelmingly 
observational; and they employ weak experimental designs in instances of empirical analysis 
(see Hayes, 2009, p. 232-233). However, the role of media effects in general, and 
personality/process space in particular, on both elections and political disengagement, cannot 
be ignored given changes to the amount of mediatised political consumption as well as the 
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their primary source of political information during a campaign, and 54% also use newspapers. This thesis 
argues, therefore, that is necessary to ask what is being consumed and how it affects popular engagement with 
politics in the UK. 
 
James Weinberg 




 In her historical exploration of the personalisation of politics in the print media, Ana 
Langer (2007) coded 2008 articles from six ‘ordinary’ weeks in three years for each British 
Prime Minister between 1945 and 1999. Langer found that there has been a significant 
increase in the number of stories about Prime Ministers, with particularly substantial increases 
in non-political entertainment or human-interest stories (ibid., p.375). The proportion of 
words given over to prime-ministerial references per article has also increased (ibid., p.377). 
In addition to increased visibility in the press, Langer found a distinct change in what 
journalists counted as ‘good leadership’ in their coverage of John Major and Tony Blair. 
Beyond traditional references to communication, strength, or their political stratagem, Langer 
(Ibid., p.3180-381) found a new focus on the personal characteristics of both Prime Ministers 
that was not present in coverage of their predecessors, as well as an increase in the number of 
illustrations of good/bad leadership qualities through the leaders’ personal lives. The number 
of these references, such as appearance, lifestyle, childhood and religion, has also increased 
exponentially since Thatcher (Ibid., p.383).  
 
There is no reason to assume that the personalisation of politics in the print media has 
not continued in the last twenty years. Langer’s findings point to a distinct personalisation of 
the political and a worrying politicisation of the personal in media coverage of politics. 
However, I argue that the significance of personalisation is not its existence per se but its 
impact on the public understanding of politics and their engagement with it. A character-
based model of political journalism not only creates false intimacy between voter and 
candidate (Hayes, 2009), but it means that policy issues that are already misunderstood or 
poorly understood by the public are made even more peripheral to political debate. Indeed the 
weight of personal characteristics in political coverage arguably heightens the salience of 
interpersonal trust in the representative chain of delegation, making politicians more 
dependent on public approbation qua humans and more vulnerable to a form of public 
accountability based on personal (in)consistency.
43
 To explore this further, it is necessary to 
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 Mayer et al. (1995, p.712) define trust as ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor’. Such 
psychological definitions of trust as an interpersonal construct map neatly to trust relationships implicit in a 
representative chain of delegation. At the ballot box most voters are faced with a choice between candidates they 
know extremely little about and must therefore commit an act of faith about where to delegate their sovereign 
liberty as a political citizen. It is likely, therefore, that voters may well prioritise non-political indicators of 
psychological qualities such as Benevolence when deciding whether or not to invest in a trust relationship with 
an individual MP or party leader, especially in an age of party congruence around the centre ground and sporadic 
media coverage of political scandals (Hindmoor, 2017). This thesis therefore seeks to assess the importance of 
personality (particularly shared values) as the basis upon which citizens might discriminate between candidates 
in an election (the vote itself representing a proxy expression of interpersonal trust). 
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examine not only which personal characteristics matters most to the public (cf. Allen and 
Birch, 2015a, 2015b) but how these characteristics affect political choices.  
 
According to Rahat and Shaefer (2007, p. 65) the personalisation of politics reflects ‘a 
process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases 
over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e. political parties) declines’. If this 
process is evident in the print media, as discussed above, then the television media’s 
ubiquitous focus on individual politicians has also perpetuated a mode of public appraisal 
based upon everyday cognitive judgements of representatives as people (McAllister, 1996; 
Karvonen, 2010). In restructuring social space, television can reposition the public’s view of 
politicians away from their role as actors in political institutions and towards their role as 
people to be trusted. As early as the 1980s, Joshua Meyrowitz (1985, p. 271) talked of the 
lowering effect of television on politicians, wherein ‘the camera minimizes the distance 
between audience and performer…[and] lowers politicians to the level of their audience’.  
Rahn et al. (1990) argue that this lowering effect facilitates public evaluations of politicians as 
‘common’ people based on inferential strategies constantly employed in our everyday lives. 
This conclusion goes back to the basilar assumptions of the previous section: absent from the 
hidden wiring of political institutions and decision-making, the public pass political 
judgements (either of individual representatives or the institutions of representative 
democracy) that are founded upon the personal characteristics they perceive in their 
representatives.     
 
The average public understanding of elite politics is, as already stated, minimal; it is 
compounded by the cognitive difficulty of not only securing relevant information but 
matching it correctly to personal preferences. This has been the premise, for example, of a 
burgeoning research pool on the benefits of Voter Advice Applications (VAAs; Fossen and 
Anderson, 2014; see also Garzia et al., 2014 for a recent overview of these studies). However, 
these studies make the same mistake as other supply-side solutions to the ‘knowledge gap’ by 
failing to account for the importance of personality in vote choice, let alone in public 
evaluations of politics more broadly. The visual consumption of politics and politicians 
through a personalised television narrative arguably gives citizens an attractive cognitive 
shortcut tailored to the essential point that ‘[w]e want to trust competent leaders, but we also 








want to like them personally’ (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004, p.590). From this perspective, 
personalisation is a product as much of supply-side changes to political communication as 
demand from any democratic public in a representative system. The media has, essentially, 
responded to ‘[a]verage news consumers [who] prefer to read about other people, not about 
abstract groups or remote bureaucracies and government agencies’ (Davis, 1990, p.169). 
 
These arguments should not be taken as evidence that political parties no longer matter 
to the public but rather these institutions have themselves undergone deep changes that are 
both cause and consequence of the personalisation of politics (see Garzia, 2011; McAllister, 
2007). Utility-maximising parties, moving from class-mass to ‘catch-all’ profiles in an age of 
ideological dealignment (Mair et al., 2004), have focused more on presenting telegenic 
leaders than ideologically-driven policy rhetoric (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Mughan, 2000). 
This has become particularly apparent as a campaign tactic, although arguably this has 
resulted in greater political power for individual politicians and a diminished role for parties 
themselves. Twenty years ago, scholars were already claiming that ‘election outcomes are 
now, more than at any time in the past, determined by voters’ assessments of party leaders’ 
(Hayes and McAllister, 1997, p.3).  
 
Comparative electoral research, especially studies influenced by the Michigan model, 
have contested the growing primacy of personality over party (King, 2002; Holmberg and 
Oscarsson, 2011). According to the Michigan model, the personality of leaders cannot 
influence voting calculus more than partisan attachments, which are deep affective 
orientations based on early socialisation and thus temporally antecedent in models of vote 
choice. The exogeneity of partisanship as a causal factor in this equation has, however, been 
challenged by recent theoretical and empirical work (Holmberg, 2007). For example, studies 
of valence politics have found voters to be Bayesian updaters whose partisan attachments are 
more flexible than believed. Using data from the British Election Study as well as 
experimental designs, Clarke et al. (2004) showed that the governing capacity of the party is 
increasingly dependent on the short-term influence of the leader and their image. Using 
instrumental variable analysis to decouple partisanship and leader effects on vote choice, 
Diego Garzia (2012, p.181) also found that leader effects dominated over parties in all three 
of his sample nations (Britain, Germany and Italy). This nascent research base indicates a 
shifting tide in the received wisdom of electoral studies that suggests the personality of 
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individual politicians may have a greater effect on political choice than party identification.
44
 
The challenge for this literature is to incorporate these conclusions into a broader set of 
political choices, i.e. not simply to explain vote choice but also levels of popular participation. 
 
At an individual level, politicians themselves are arguably tied to a circular process in 
which the increasing prevalence and impact of ‘life-style’ politics becomes a strategic 
behavioural pre-requisite - however inconclusive the evidence may be at this stage - in the 
presentation of their public personae. The politicisation of the private is hard to escape: 
 
[E]ven if some leaders were to remain unenthusiastic, they would find it ever harder to 
decline to reveal aspects of their personal lives as this is likely to be perceived as an 
indication of aloofness, weakness, or, even worse, concealment. (Langer, 2007, p. 
386) 
 
In many ways, it is possible to contend that the personalisation phenomenon has changed the 
nature of political leadership, insofar as contemporary politicians build authority ‘not by being 
beyond the people…[but] by being of and like them’ (Renshon, 1995, p.201). During times of 
systemic crisis when politics more broadly is deeply distrusted, new faces are even more 
likely to be judged by their symbolic proximity to the masses and their perceived similarity to 
each individual voter (Pitkin, 1967; Barisione, 2009). Political parties and politicians alike 
are, however, aware of the power of political advertisement on modern voter perceptions, and 
thus package candidate images to match potential constituencies (Campus, 2010). It is here 
that the distinction must be made between what the public are exposed to, that is personality 
as perception, and those cognitive or motivational processes that guide politicians' actual 
behaviour, that is personality as functioning. In this narrative, MPs themselves are obliged to 
focus on the public perception of their personalities, fuelling a self-fulfilling prophecy in 
which they honestly believe they must deceive in order to be trusted. However, this area of 
research has been sorely neglected in political science (cf. Caprara et al., 2012).  
 
To make this connection, I draw on perceptual-balance theory (Nimmo and Savage, 
1976). Unlike cognitive realism, in which objects are perceived exactly as they are (e.g. 
Gibson, 1966), or cognitive constructivism, in which understanding comes entirely from 
inference (e.g. Neisser, 1967), perceptual-balance theory strikes a middle ground in which 
voters’ perceptions of politicians are the product of both their subjective knowledge and the 
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images projected by candidates (Cwalina et al., 2008). According to Kenneth Hacker (2004), 
the construction of politicians’ images is thus voter-driven rather than candidate-driven but 
this appears to over-simplify the underlying narrative. Whilst it is certainly the voters’ final 
judgement on politicians that counts, it is not so easy to disregard the projected images 
associated with the personalisation process more broadly. Political campaigns may well read 
public mood swings and attempt to construct affable images suitable for particular audiences 
in particular moments, but as long as voters are exposed simply to constructed personae, they 
can never truly judge the personality of those ‘functioning’ in politics on a daily basis. 
Therefore, public demand for personality politics is matched by a distorted supply that 
ultimately sets up public disappointment at the first sign of disingenuity to that constructed 
image.  
 
The validity of these theoretical concerns and hypothetical commentaries relies on the 
validity of connections between identifiable personal characteristics and political choices. 
Given the ubiquity of the personalisation phenomenon in everyday political communication 
and the evidence surveyed in this chapter, it is extremely likely that citizens project from 
personal assessments of candidates to what kind of representative they might become or what 
kind of political system they symbolise. Yet whilst the literature on personalisation has 
explicitly acknowledged the importance of politicians' personalities for vote choice, 'the role 
and relevance of specific traits have not received sufficient attention' (Laustsen and Bor, 
2017). The extant research in this area agrees that the 'common traits used to characterise 
politicians tend to fall into a limited number of categories: competence ('intelligent', 'hard-
working'), leadership ('inspiring', '[not] weak'), integrity ('honest', 'moral'), and empathy 
('compassionate', 'cares about people')’ (McGraw, 2011, p.190; see also Hayes, 2005; 
Laustsen, 2016 for similar descriptions). The majority of these studies collapse the first two 
factors and the latter two into a binary opposition of competence versus warmth (Ohr and 
Oscarsson, 2013; McAllister, 2016).
45
 Both of these dimensions are well established in social 
psychology as central aspects of social perception and the unconscious categorisation of 
others (Fiske et al., 2007; Osterhof and Todorov, 2008, Bor, 2017). The political science 
literature on candidate evaluation has tended to play down the effects of warmth and focus on 
the apparent primacy of competence as a voting heuristic (e.g. McGraw, 2011; McAllister, 
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 Warmth is generally associated with morality, friendliness, trustworthiness, helpfulness and sincerity; 
competence is associated with knowledge, intelligence, confidence, skill and efficiency (Laustsen and Bor, 2017, 
p. 4). The descriptions of these two factors maps to similar implicit motivations in the two orthogonals of Basic 
Human Values (Self-Transcendence Vs. Self-Enhancement, Openness to Change Vs. Conservation).  
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2016). These studies assume that voters care most about candidate competences in order to 
secure their preferred policy outcomes.  
 
These findings, largely based on old data and small-n experimental designs with 
students, stand in stark contrast with a social psychology literature that consistently finds 
warmth to outperform competence in everyday social perceptions (e.g. Wojciszke, 2005; 
Goodwin et al., 2014). Normatively there is an evolutionary argument that suggests 'another 
person's intent for good or ill is more important to survival than whether the other person can 
act on those intentions' (Fiske et al., p. 77). Contra to the majority of political science 
scholarship in this area, Laustsen and Bor (2017) find that warmth is a more significant 
predictor of candidate preferences in both a longitudinal analysis of American National 
Election Studies (ANES 1984-2008) and an experimental text-based study of 824 voting 
adults in the UK. In their research, warmth outperformed competence across different 
methodological designs and cultural contexts, and the results held even after the authors 
controlled for party and the interaction effect between candidate party and participant 
partisanship. Laustsen and Bor (2017) provide preliminary evidence to support the arguments 
put forward in this chapter so far: that a personalised consumption of contemporary politics 
fuels everyday cognitive assessments of representatives that may inform levels of 
interpersonal trust and thus political choices (see Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1  Candidate choice and political participation in an age of personalisation (adapted 











More work is needed to hone the reliability of these results through careful 
experimental designs, in order to test the causal influence of candidate personality on voter 
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choices alongside other personal characteristics (including demographics and 
professional/educational background). The extant research has also failed to move beyond 
studies of vote choice to assess the effect of personalisation on anti-politics and political 
disengagement. Bringing together data on the BHV of national-level politicians with 
experimental data from the public, I hope to fill this gap. It is anticipated that basic values 
associated with warmth (in particular Self-Transcendence) will be most important to 
candidate selections made under experimental conditions, which – when compared to data on 
basic values collected from MPs – will reveal a perception gap based on personalised 
assessments of sitting representatives and ideal types in the public. I argue that such a 
perception gap fuels public cynicism about politics in general and politicians in particular, and 
in turn contributes to the narrative of disengagement outlined in research into anti-politics.               
 
H10: There is a distinct perception gap between the person that citizens ideally want to 
represent them, who they think represents them, and who actually represents them.  
 
This chapter has attempted to trace a narrative that explains the contemporary crisis of 
western liberal democracies, in terms of both popular alienation from formal politics and 
rising cynicism, as grounded in the fundamental misgivings of representative democracy as 
both theory and practice. It has been argued that representation, as both necessary yet 
antithetical to the realisation of democracy in complex modern societies, creates an 
overwhelming preoccupation with the personal side of politics. In relinquishing their 
democratic sovereignty, people want the right representatives. Engaging with the post-
millennial literature on anti-politics, the chapter shows how such under-researched arguments 
might underpin contemporary accounts of popular disengagement. The final section drills 
down into research on the personalisation of politics, identifying a number of worrying 
symptoms that are at once the realisation of theoretical concerns about representative 
democracy discussed in section I and the lightning rods for practical explanations of anti-
politics in section II. Focusing on the macro-level phenomenon of anti-politics, this chapter 
completes a rigorous three-part research agenda for psychological parliamentary studies and 
in particular, the study of elected representatives.  
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“[Y]our story is no longer written by you – other people are writing about it and telling you 
who you are in a way that I’ve never found before.” 
Kemi Badenoch MP (2017) 
Methods 
 I have committed considerable space in this thesis to the normative contemplation of 
the role played by the personalities of politicians in contemporary British politics. In doing so, 
I have proposed a rigorous three-part research agenda that advances an interdisciplinary study 
capable of augmenting the conceptual and empirical purview of a relatively small, largely 
qualitative parliamentary studies literature in the UK. Chapter 1 outlined the limitations of 
this research pool and the gap to be filled by a psychological study of our political elites. 
Chapter 2 introduced the theory of Basic Human Values (BHV) and placed this research 
project within the context of previous political psychology assessments of elites. The last 
three chapters have, in turn, dealt with the heavy lifting needed to demonstrate the 
significance and necessity of three interrelated research questions: 
RQ1: Who enters elite politics and how are they different to the general public? 
RQ2: What, if any, is the impact and importance of personality on MPs’ behaviour once they 
are elected to Parliament? 
RQ3: How big is the gap between voters’ preferences about the personal characteristics of 
MPs and reality? 
In addressing each of these research questions in depth, I have not only engaged with a broad 
and dense array of literature, but I have also offered a series of hypotheses (Table 6.1) that 
speak directly to gaps in the existing scholarship.  
 This chapter will describe the methods employed to operationalise these hypotheses in 
five sections. Part I will explain the process of data collection with UK Members of 
Parliament (MPs), including sampling, participant recruitment and survey design. Part II will 
focus on the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) that was used to collect data on BHV; this 
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discussion will defend the selection of both a rating mechanism and a truncated measure (the 
Twenty Item Values Inventory, TwIVI). Part III outlines the semi-structured interviews used in 
this study as a complement to the quantitative data collected on politicians' BHV. Part IV 
provides a stepped description of the data analysis, in particular the statistical tests used to 
assess the impact of MPs' BHV on a range of parliamentary behaviours. Finally, part V 
completes the research design by explaining a conjoint experiment that was conducted with 
the public to evaluate the importance of BHV for voter perceptions of MPs. 
 






RQ1 H1: Personality, or specifically basic values, act as internal factors that activate or 
deactivate individuals in a self-selection process for elite politics. In particular, the 
prosocial premise of politics will attract candidates who score highly for Self-
Transcendence values. 
  
H2: The self-selection implicit in MPs who have worked in instrumental professions, 
entered Parliament, and pursued promotion in quick succession reflects an unusual level 
of desire to increase personal control over political resources. This will be reflected in 
value profiles high in Self-Enhancement values (Power and Achievement). The self-
referential and self-interested aspects of careerism will be reflected in high scores for 
Conservation values (particularly Security). 
  
H3: Differences in basic values between MPs will exist according to demographic 
characteristics (e.g. gender, age), and will be of a greater magnitude than differences 
between each sub-group and their counter population in the general public. In particular, 
women MPs will score higher for Self-Transcendence values and Openness to Change 
values than either male MPs or women in the general population. 
 
RQ2 H4: As the moral dimension of a parliamentary vote increases and the level of 
institutional constraint decreases, the greater the variance in MPs’ vote patterns 
explained by BHV. 
 
H5: MPs’ basic values will predict a moderate amount of variance in the number of 
written parliamentary questions asked. This is specifically anticipated for MPs high in 
security values (who are more likely to plough effort into constituency-oriented 
behaviours to combat electoral marginality); MPs high in Achievement values (who may 
use ex ante questions to signal party loyalty and ambitions for higher office); and MPs 
high in Benevolence values (who may use questions out of a genuine desire to be a good 
constituency representative).    
 
H6: Basic values will predict a large amount of variance in the number of EDMs signed; 
the relationship between basic values and EDM sponsorship will reflect substantive 
differences in the values of MPs in centre-left and centre-right parties.  
 
H7: Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs’ decisions to run for select 
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committee (SC) membership. It is expected that MPs on SCs will score more highly for 
Achievement values (attracted to SCs by the promise of career progression and visibility) 
and Self-Direction values (MPs who struggle to conform to the party whip and see SC 
membership as a way of acting upon individual preferences).   
     
H8: Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs’ ranked preferences for 
representative focus. In particular, there will be a close correlation between Self-
Transcendence values and delegate preferences, Openness to Change values and trustee 
preferences, and Conservation values and partisan preferences. 
RQ3 H9: Prospective MPs' personalities, as measured by basic values, will be more important 
to voters than other personal qualities such as age, gender, or faith, or a candidate's 
commitment to a specific representational style.  
H10: There is a distinct perception gap between the ‘person’ that citizens ideally want to 
represent them, who they think represents them, and who actually represents them. 
 
I. Data Collection 
 
The literature on British MPs, both academic and (auto-)biographical, provides a rich 
minefield of insights into the world of Westminster and national representation (Radice et al., 
1990; Searing, 1994; Rush, 2001; Cowley, 2002; Childs, 2004; Rush and Giddings, 2011). 
However, empirical studies are few and far between, and largely qualitative and subjective 
(see Rosenblatt, 2006). Existing research on MPs in the UK has not, in particular, gone as far 
as breaching highly sensitive topics such as personality, which, necessarily, invoke ethical 
dilemmas regarding participant recruitment and highly politicised fears of confidentiality. 
Research in the UK is not unique in this respect. The psychological assessment of political 
elites world-wide, especially in terms of personality theory and research, is heavily grounded 
in case studies done at-a-distance using psycholinguistics, content analysis, observation and 
remote interviews (for a review, see Post, 2003; Barenbaum and Winter, 2008). Good 
research practice requires ethical recruitment of participants that includes informed consent 
(Kelley et al., 2003; Vellinga et al., 2011). In that context, even medical studies of 
psychological phenomena in the general public - relying on ‘opt-in’ survey participation – 
suffer from notoriously low response rates of 20-40% (for a review, see Nelson et al., 2002; 
Hunt et al., 2013). 
The challenges outlined above are exacerbated in populations of political elites where 
a) no code of best practice exists that combines both maximal response rates and ethical 
recruitment, and b) the response rates for political research have already dwindled 
significantly. In 1972 and 1973, Searing (1994) interviewed 521 MPs (83% of the House of 
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Commons) and achieved a 79% response rate to his follow-up questionnaire. In their study of 
the 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 Parliaments, Rush and Giddings (2011) secured response rates 
of 61% and 52%. In 2010/11, the Hansard Society could only secure a response rate of 25% in 
their study of new MPs (n = 57/232) who entered the House of Commons after the 2010 
General Election (Fox and Korris, 2012). This is in spite of the fact that the Hansard Society 
operates with a respected reputation in Parliament, the support of political parties, and uses a 
well-resourced research team in terms of finance, access and time. For their study of MPs 
conducted in 2012, Campbell and Lovenduski (2015) employed the paid services of a 
corporate research consultancy firm, ComRes, to recruit 156 parliamentarians (24% of sitting 
MPs). Not only are such methods expensive but Campbell and Lovenduski were unable to 
recruit frontbench politicians, thus introducing significant response bias and limiting the 
statistical power of their results. They admit that without similar approaches, ‘[i]t is highly 
unlikely that such a high response rate is now achievable’ (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015, 
p.695).     
A studious review of the empirical literature on British MPs and a number of informal 
discussions with authors cited above raised two central issues for this thesis: the recruitment 
of participants from a highly inaccessible population in general, and the collection of 
extremely sensitive data on their personal values, ideologies and representative styles in 
particular. To address these difficulties, the findings presented on MPs’ BHV in this thesis are 





 June 2017. This involved a customised survey procedure, in which mixed modes 
of data collection were utilised in a scientific manner to reduce the four sources of error 
(coverage, sampling, non-response, and measurement).  
Of particular concern for this research design was non-response error; regardless of 
response rate – which is often overestimated as an indicator of nonresponse bias – it was 
important that the final dataset did not over- or underestimate the prevalence of certain basic 
values in the MP population. All 650 sitting MPs were thus approached sequentially via post, 
email and phone, as well as through advocates recruited in the participation process.
46
 In 
doing so, the data collection design focused on building a positive social exchange 
relationship with the target population, using strategic methods that are founded on theories of 
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 Email communications contained a secure personalised link to the survey, which was hosted via the online 
survey platform Qualtrics.  
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cognitive dissonance, reasoned action, leverage, and cost-benefit analysis (Friedman, 1953; 
Stafford, 2008).  
Following the principles developed by Blau (1964) and Homans (1961), a number of 
steps were taken, firstly, to increase the benefits of participation. For example, each round of 
communication clearly stated the public benefits of the research project as well as the 
potential benefits accrued to future MPs in terms of reforms to working practices and public 
reputation (Appendix A). All written communications, electronic and mail, utilised visual 
sponsorship from the University of Sheffield and the Sir Bernard Crick Centre - thus 
conveying legitimacy on the study - and high profile advocates were recruited in advance to 
give their approval to the project. The survey itself was designed so that the Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ; see Part II) came before more mundane questions, and the response 
style for each block of questions was varied in order to maintain interest in completing the 
survey. Follow-up communications via email and phone also shared the ongoing response 
rate, thus conveying the participation of other in-group members and cultivating trust as well 
as an element of competition in the non-response population (Cialdini,1984). 
Communications were also personalised (using mail merge for headed letters/emails and 
hand-written compliment slips in postal communication) in order to engender a trust 
relationship between respondent and researcher. 
Likewise, steps were taken to reduce the costs of participation. Practically, there was 
no monetary cost to MPs taking part in the survey. Both rounds of mail communication were 
accompanied by pre-paid return envelopes and the sequential mixed-mode communication 
strategy allowed for varying preferences among the target population. Given that the decision 
to respond to a self-administered survey usually occurs within one to two days of receiving 
the communication (Dillman et al., 2014, p.25), the effort invested in multi-mode contact was 
vital to both a) keep the survey visible in the target population for as long as possible, and b) 
ensure ultimate convenience for respondents.
47
 The benefits of this can be seen in Figure 6.1. 
Mail and electronic surveys were designed with professionalism in mind, and participants 
were guided through each section with simple instructions. Multiple contact details were 
included in each survey communication, thus increasing the perceived authenticity of the 
request. A number of participants did utilise these contact details to verify the legitimacy of 
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 In hindsight, phone calls to MPs Parliamentary offices were particularly unhelpful. MPs were rarely available 
and their administrative support staff frequently apologised on their behalf before a conversation could begin. 
Phone calls were thus dropped from the second wave of communication. 
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Wave of Communication 
the project before participating. As per prior research collecting sensitive data (i.e. Singer et 
al., 1995), strong confidentiality assurances were made in each communication (Appendix A).    













This tailored design was followed up with a single wave of targeted email 
correspondence to former MPs recommended by those who had already participated. These 
former MPs were targeted specifically to augment the number of respondents with frontbench 
experience. The data collected produced a broadly representative sample of 106 MPs (85 
sitting, 21 former) by gender, party, age, status and length of service (see Table 6.2, below). A 
comparative data set for the BHV of the general public in Great Britain (n = 2264) was 
extracted from the 7
th
 round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014).
48
 Given the 
limitations of a) conducting sensitive research with political elites, and b) conducting that 
research within the confines of a lone doctoral research post, this response rate is highly 
encouraging. Above all, it suggests that the received wisdom of tailored design experiments, 
coupled with the resource allocation of a large scale, multi-researcher project, may facilitate 
valid future survey work with political elites in the UK. 
The survey itself was designed in two main sections with a total of 30 questions.
49
 The 
first section included the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) used to measure participants’ 
BHV. This constitutes 20 self- to other comparisons using a six-point Likert scale (see Part 
II). The second section of the survey asked MPs to provide basic demographic information, 
including their previous occupation before elected politics. These data serve to allow intra-
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 This data was extracted and downloaded from: http://  www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ES 
S7e02_1&y=2014. 
49
 An example of the mail survey can be found in Appendix A. 
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sample and external comparative analysis of the variation in BHV according to age, gender, 
education and occupational experience. MPs were also asked to report the length of their 
parliamentary service in order to facilitate comparisons between newly elected and 
experienced politicians. Although BHV are typically stable across time (Schwartz, 2006) and 
life transitions (Bardi et al., 2014), it is possible that such an extreme vocation - including 
high-level decision making that invokes value trade-offs on a daily basis - may stimulate 
value change that is revealed through cohort effects. Section two also asked MPs to report any 
additional responsibilities or offices that they may hold within the House of Commons, thus 
allowing for intra-sample comparison of front- and backbench politicians. 
MPs’ ideology was also measured in section 2 of the survey using two 11-point Left-
Right scales, reflecting the heterogeneity of economic and social ideology (Feldman and 
Johnston, 2013). This decision builds on empirical research that shows self-placement along a 
single dimension of ideology is insufficient given the multidimensionality of ideological 
preferences across policy domains (Duckitt, 2001; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Treier and 
Hillygus, 2009), the variety of symbolic connotations attached to ideology (Ellis and Stimson, 
2012), and the distinct meanings attached to a liberal-conservative continuum by participants 
within and between research populations (Zumbrunnen and Gangl, 2008). In order to sharpen 
the analysis of the relative importance of BHV and ideology when explaining MPs’ behaviour 
across both policy areas and parliamentary life, economic and social ideology were thus 
measured on two separate scales.  
Following the questionnaire design of similar studies (Katz, 1997; Müller and Saalfeld 
1997; Judge, 1999; Mendez-Lago and Martinez, 2002), section two of the survey was also 
used to ascertain participants’ attitudes to representation. Each MP was asked to rank three 
representative priorities (Nation, Party, Constituency) on a three-point scale from ‘Most’ to 
‘Least’ important (Appendix A). This question invoked the classical Burkean conception of 
political representation as developed by Eulau and Wahlke, which is central to the normative 
discussions of chapter 5 in this thesis. The use of a ranking mechanism forced MPs to 
interrogate their own hierarchy of commitments and revealed decisions of relative importance 
that were not only easy to interpret and operationalise for statistical analysis, but also 
circumvented issues of non-commitment in prior research (Andeweg, 2012). Finally, MPs 
were presented with the option to conduct a follow-up interview (see Part III). All surveys 
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were accompanied by a participant information sheet (Appendix B) and interviewees later 
signed an additional consent form (Appendix C).
50
  
Table 6.2 Descriptive data comparing a sample of 106 UK MPs with the composition of the House of 
Commons (April 2017), and a sample of the general population gathered by the 7th round of the 
European Social Survey (Figures rounded to the nearest whole number).  
 
Variable MP Sample  
(n = 106) 
House of Commons         
(n = 650) 
ESS Sample           














Age: (mean) 55 yrs  50 yrs 52 yrs 
 
Length of Service: 
(mean) 






























At time of sampling: 19% 
Over career: 63% 
42%**  N/A 
* ESS scores relate to votes cast in the 2010 general election. Bracketed Figures for the House of 
Commons indicate seat shares after the June 2017 election. 
**Based on the four most represented parties in Westminster at the time of sampling. 
 
II. Capturing Basic Human Values using the Portrait Values Questionnaire 
This thesis advances the body of knowledge on psychological assessments of political 
elites by capturing data directly from national representatives. The previous section gave a 
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 These steps were taken in accordance with ethics approval granted by the Department of Politics at the 
University of Sheffield (Appendix D).   
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detailed review of the way in which participants were recruited and the data that was collected 
in that process. This section will now turn to the format and properties of the Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (PVQ) that was used to gather data on MPs' Basic Human Values (BHV). This 
section defends this measure insofar as it not only describes the content of the questionnaire 
but outlines its development, its validity, and its superiority over alternative measures of 
personal values. The section finishes by describing the shortened version of the PVQ used in 
this study. 
a) Development of the measure: 
 
 Until the late 1990s all studies of BHV used the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) to 
measure basic values. The SVS presented participants with 56 or 57 single-value items 
(namely those value markers that underlie the motivational value types in the theory - see 
chapter 2), each of which was accompanied by a short explanatory phrase. Respondents rated 
the importance of each value item as a 'guiding principle in my life' using a numerical 9-point 
scale. Although the SVS had gathered substantial support for the content and circular 
relationship of the ten BHV in over 200 samples across more than 60 countries (Fontaine and 
Schwartz, 1996), it was excessively lengthy and did not work effectively in five percent of 
samples (taken mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, the East-Indian subcontinent and rural 
communities). Schwartz et al. (2001) subsequently devised the PVQ, which emphasises 
context-free thinking and contains short verbal portraits of 40 individuals, gender-matched 
with the respondent (Schwartz, 2005). Each portrait implicitly expresses the importance of a 
specific value according to the goals, desires and standards it describes. These portraits are 
configured as two statements, one expressing the importance of a value and the other the 
desirable goal of that motivational type. The PVQ was created in three steps: 
1. Portraits were built from the conceptual definitions of the values as identified in the 
theory. For example, one marker of Achievement values led to, “It’s very important to 
him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.”  
2. Value items from the SVS were paraphrased to emphasise the motivational goal in 
context. For example, the Universalism value “protecting the environment” became 
“He strongly believes that people should care for nature.”  
3. Abstract terms or phrases from the SVS were made more concrete. For example, the 
Conformity value “politeness” became “It is important to him to be polite to other 
people all the time.”        
(Source: Schwartz et al. 2001, p.524) 
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For each portrait, participants respond to the question “How much like you is this 
person?” using a six-point Likert scale that ranges from 'very much like me' to 'not like me at 
all' (Appendix A). The PVQ contains between two and four portraits for each of the 
motivationally distinct values, depending on their conceptual breadth. Participants' personal 
values are then inferred from their self-reported similarity to those portraits described, each of 
which has been designed a priori as an indicator of a specific value.
51
 Each value is presented 
across multiple portraits and a score for the importance of each value is calculated from the 
average rating the respondent gives to these portraits. By focusing on the goals and wishes 
that are most important to each persona in the portraits, the PVQ can measure a respondent’s 
values without explicitly stating values as the subject of scrutiny or the specific value being 
measured in each portrait. The comparison of other to self also focuses attention on the 
specific characteristics of the other, thus avoiding some of the pitfalls of similarity 
judgements in self to other surveys (Holyoak and Gordon, 1983).   
 The PVQ has been used in studies around the world and is now the survey of choice 
for measuring BHV. Academic studies have examined both the ability of the survey to capture 
the theory of BHV and the psychometric properties of the survey itself (see Schwartz and 
Cieciuch, 2016). There has been some criticism of the discriminant validity of the PVQ 
(Davidov et al., 2008) but Knoppen and Saris (2009) trace this back to the strategy used to 
select items, which attempts to cover the conceptual breadth of each value at the cost of 
homogeneity between items measuring the same value.
52
 This problem derives from 
Schwartz's (1992, 2005) commitment to operationalise BHV within a circular continuum, 
which necessarily produces fuzzy boundaries between values and multicollinearity between 
those items measuring adjacent values. To increase the number of items on a measure, as well 
as the number of values being measured (i.e. PVQ-RR), is to refine the conceptual definition 
of each value and thus reduce the chance of cross-loading among items. However, the 
problems raised above are also common to numerous psychometric surveys that aim to 
capture different aspects of personality (e.g. Marsh et al., 2010); by contrast the internal 
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 Each portrait comprises an 'importance' statement and a 'feeling' statement. There has been some scepticism 
based on cognitive response theory that a respondent's answer will be weighted towards one of these statements 
rather than both (Neuman, 2000, p. 508, Krosnick and Presser, 2010, p. 264) but in a two-nation pilot Schwartz 
used Multi-Trait Multi-Method (MTMM) analysis to conclude that 'combining the two into one item neither 
increased nor harmed reliability and validity' (Schwartz, 2003, p. 305; Schwartz, 2007). Similar studies have 
since concurred that if a study is 'interested in the goodness-of-fit to Schwartz's two-dimensional structure then it 
doesn't matter whether the combined or split version is used' (de Wet, Bacher and Wetzelhütter, 2016, p.1583). 
52
 Saris, Knoppen and Schwartz (2013) use Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to demonstrate that the PVQ 
can actually discriminate between fifteen and nineteen values that are narrower than the original ten motivational 
types. This has led to a new 57 item PVQ-RR, which yields greater discriminant validity of the measurement 
items. 
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validity of the original ten-factor PVQ-40 has been corroborated across a wide range of large-
n samples using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Schwartz et al., 2001; Vecchione, 
Casconi and Barbaranelli, 2009) and remains current among new studies of BHV.   
 
   
b) From Theory to Measurement - Schwartz versus Rokeach: 
 I selected the PVQ from amidst a number of alternative measures for personal values, 
in particular the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS, 1973). The PVQ justifies its selection for this 
thesis on the back of a number of methodological advantages over other dominant value 
questionnaires. In sum the PVQ is the most apposite measurement for the core theoretical 
principles of BHV: that personal values are a) abstract motivational goals, b) vary in 
importance within an interdependent structure, and c) sit in relation to one another on the 
basis of inherent conflicts and compatibilities (Kluckhohn, 1951; Schwartz, 1992). Given that 
the psychometric properties of survey tools hold both methodological and theoretical 
implications (Roccas et al., 2017), this section will briefly outline the strength of the PVQ in 
comparison to alternative instruments. 
 The first issue to be considered is the methodological impact of value definitions. 
Rokeach (1973, p.5) posited that values are ‘enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct 
or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode 
of conduct or end state of existence’. On this basis values guide actions but they are 
distinguishable, according to Rokeach, as either terminal or instrumental. The former 
represent desirable end-states of existence, whilst the latter are selective modes of behaviour. 
By contrast Schwartz (1992) defined values as trans-situational goals or guiding principles 
that are differentiated by their specific motivational content. The methodological impact of 
these definitions centers on the cognitive accessibility of values, presupposed by Rokeach but 
not Schwartz. This raises the opposition of a “paradigm of articulated values” versus a 
“paradigm of basic values” (Fischoff, 1991). The first paradigm presumes that individuals 
know their values and can accurately articulate them to researchers through self-report 
mechanisms. The second paradigm accepts that individuals do not have clear and conscious 
values that cover all areas of life and thus lack useful answers to such questions. In 
parliamentary studies we might expect MPs to believe that they fit into the articulated values 
paradigm, but their specific answers in this case are more likely to derive from an inferential 
process or indeed from the desirability of being self-aware and 'meeting expectations'.  
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 On the back of these paradigms, Mumford et al (2002) define two forms of 
measurement, direct and indirect, that capture the distinction between articulated and basic 
values. Relying on the fact that people have consciously articulated values, direct 
measurement techniques ask participants to rate or rank explicit value statements (e.g. the 
RVS or SVS). Conversely, indirect measurement infers values on the basis of preferences 
expressed by respondents to statements or questions that implicitly test for specific values 
(e.g. the PVQ). Direct measurement tools such as the RVS, for example, are also highly 
ipsative. They depend on the assumption that all participants will be able to place more or less 
importance on the value labels provided. The results therefore present a hierarchical picture in 
which values are not measured in and of themselves but in complete dependency on one 
another. By contrast an indirect measure in the form of a rating technique, such as the PVQ, 
allows respondents to attribute significance to values independently of one another - using a 
Likert Scale in the case of the PVQ. Whilst any additions or changes to a ranking 
questionnaire would alter the importance of all other items, a rating system like the PVQ 
allows these changes to be made whilst retaining the individual scores given to each value. 
Crucially, the flexibility of rating mechanisms circumvents the fixed distribution of ranking 
measures, which necessarily assume gaps of equal importance between all values for all 
participants (Roccas et al., 2017, p.21).  
Table 6.3 A snapshot comparison of the study of values by Rokeach and Schwartz. 




- Self-conscious and 
articulated. 
- Split into instrumental 
and terminal categories. 
 





- Highly ipsative choices and 
artificial hierarchies. 
- Assumes conscious 
understanding and evaluation 
of personal values. 
- No contingency for the 
subjective population of value 






distinguished by their 
motivational content. 
- Difficult for people to 







- Values assessed 
independently of one another, 
allowing for alterations and 
additions without loss of 
reliability. 
- The motivational continuum 
caters for inter-subjectivity.  
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 Whilst this section has chosen to compare the suitability and reliability of the PVQ to 
the RVS, attitudinal studies (e.g. Maio and Olson, 2000) have also taken a functional 
approach to studying values. These studies offer a competing conception of basic values that 
rejects the dichotomisation of Schwartz's motivational continuum. Gouveia et al. (2014, p.42) 
describe eighteen functional value items that are arranged in a three-by-two matrix of three 
guiding actions (personal, central, social) and two expressed needs (survival or thriving). 
Gouveia's (2003) Basic Values Survey (BVS) is similar methodologically to the SVS and 
RVS in that it asks participants to rate eighteen value markers on a seven-point importance 
scale. However, the BVS has only been tested in a limited number of samples and thus far the 
alpha coefficients, as well as the inter-item correlations, perform poorly in comparison to the 
PVQ (see Gouveia et al. 2014). This might reflect the conceptual breadth and thus confusion 
of the BVS items (Schwartz, 2014, p.248). The BVS also has an average completion time of 
fifteen minutes, compared to four minutes for the PVQ-21 (used in the European Social 
Survey) and about ten minutes for the latest fifty-seven portrait PVQ-RR (Schwartz 2014, p. 
248). 
In sum there are clear theoretical and methodological advantages to using the PVQ: 
1. Portraits of action place values in context and avoid the inevitable abstraction and 
variation of individual interpretations of linguistic labels (Gibbins and Walker, 
1994); 
 
2. Each value is measured using multiple items and therefore provides a stronger case 
for assessing participants’ value characteristics (Braithwaite and Scott, 1991); 
 
3. By using a multiple rather than single item measure, it is possible to carry out 
quantitative estimates of the reliability of results; 
 
4. The PVQ taps personal values through self-to-other comparison, without the 
assumption that people can a) attribute clear hierarchies to abstract values, or b) 
cognitively recognise those values on a daily basis (Maio and Olson, 1998); 
 
5. There are many existing datasets that have used the PVQ to research the basic 
values of diverse sample populations, including the British public.  
c) Using a shortened PVQ: 
 Long surveys and questionnaires, especially in personality studies, tend to outperform 
the psychometric properties of shorter instruments (Leong et al., 2016). However, social 
science research is carried out in a pressurised 'live' environment in which the luxuries of time 
and funding often share an inverse relationship with the scope of the research being 
conducted. Thus, there is frequent occasion for brief and ultra-brief instruments (Robins et al., 
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2002). This chapter has already noted the difficulties associated with extracting data from UK 
MPs and the dwindling body of empirical research that these difficulties have engendered. 
The need to present a 'quick win' with immediate satisfaction and limited repetition was an 
iterated message from parliamentarians engaged in the scoping stage of this project. Whilst 
the mainstream measures of BHV (SVS, PVQ-40, PVQ-RR) are all shown to be valid and 
reliable, they are lengthy and take upwards of 10 minutes to complete. It was therefore 
necessary to employ a shorter version of the PVQ - the TwIVI - that would ‘eliminate item 
redundancy and therefore reduce the fatigue, frustration, and boredom associated with 
answering highly similar questions repeatedly’ (Robins et al., 2001, p.152; also see Saucier, 
1994).   
 In general, shorter scales have weaker internal consistency and test-retest reliability, 
but they can still capture meaningful results (Ziegler et al., 2014). A number of studies into 
questionnaire design have also indicated that the associated costs are smaller than often 
believed (Burisch, 1984, 1997). In the case of large-scale surveys, experience-sampling 
studies, pilot studies and longitudinal studies, where participants are unlikely to complete 
lengthy multi-item questionnaires or results are needed quickly, brief and ultra-brief measures 
have proven extremely effective (Robins et al., 2001). Previous studies of personality traits 
and BHV (e.g. Leimgruber, 2011) have taken a selection of items from original instruments in 
order to produce shorter measures. However, the decision to shorten instruments in this 
manner, excluding certain items but retaining others, often reduces the predictive and 
construct validity of the data (see Boyle et al., 2015; Roccas et al., 2017). This is particularly 
true of BHV, which are conceptually broad constructs.
53
  
 To record the most robust dataset possible, I employed a twenty-item PVQ 
(henceforth TwIVI; see Appendix A) that is capable of fully recapturing the psychometric 
properties of the longer PVQ-IV (Sandy et al., 2017).
54
 Schwartz and colleagues (Sandy et al., 
2017) drew upon items from the PVQ-40 to develop the TwIVI, applying the same methods 
that had been employed to create the PVQ-40 and using equivalent samples (Sandy et al., 
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 For example, an index of Self-Direction values that only includes those items designed to measure autonomy 
of thought would neglect the autonomy of action also implicit in this value. In the context of researching 
politicians and political behaviours such as decision-making, this would significantly bias or limit the analysis.  
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 A brief twenty-one item version of the PVQ was used in the European Social Survey (PVQ-21; Schwartz, 
2003) but this measure is limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, it includes modified items from the original 
theory that make comparisons to PVQ-40 datasets difficult; it was developed without demographic data on the 
item-derivation sample; the scale was not tested against external variables; and convergent validity scores were 
not recorded. These four key steps are crucial in the creation of a viable shortened measure (Gosling et al. 2003). 
However, the PVQ-21 does provide a rich source of data on the BHV of general population samples and 
therefore continues to inform large-scale comparative research (see, for example, Piurko et al., 2011). 
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2017). The TwIVI has been tested using a derivation sample of 38,049 individuals (63% 
female; aged 18-94, mean = 26.42, SD = 10.01) and an evaluation sample of 29,143 
individuals (62% female; aged 18-92, mean = 27.45, SD = 9.52) (Ibid.).
55
 Cronbach alpha 
reliabilities for the TwIVI ranged from .33 for Security to .91 for Benevolence across the two 
samples (mean .71) as compared to reliabilities for the PVQ-40 (using the same samples) of 
.51 for Tradition to .88 for Self-Direction (mean .76). It is not surprising that the internal 
reliabilities of the PVQ-IV, with more than two items tapping each value, were higher than 
the shorter scale. However, it is recognised that Cronbach's alpha can underestimate the 
reliability of brief measures - which aim to capture a construct with as few items as possible - 
given that alpha is a function of average correlations among items on a scale.  
 In Sandy et al. (2017) vector correlations revealed that the TwIVI captured patterns of 
correlation with eleven external variables that were extremely similar to the full PVQ-40 
(mean of .93 in the selection sample and .97 in the validation sample). Sandy et al. (2017) 
drew upon the extensive literature on BHV to hypothesise the directionality of relationships 
between each value and external variables including religiosity (Saroglou, 2004), socio-
demographic variables (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005) and political conservatism (Piurko et al., 
2011). Results obtained using the PVQ-40 were able to match 82% of the ninety predictions 
in both direction and significance, compared to an 85% match for the TwIVI (Sandy et al., 
2017). When the ranking of the mean scores for the TwIVI were compared to those of the full 
scale, only four out of fifty possible deviations occurred (Ibid.). Although there are some 
apparent, not necessarily genuine, limitations to the internal consistency of the TwIVI, it has 
successfully demonstrated that it is capable of recapturing the full PVQ-40 in terms of 
reliability, external correlates and convergent validity.  
III. Interviews 
a) Mixed Methods Research 
Mixed methods research has become increasingly accepted in social science over the 
last two decades, reflecting a diverse and innovative combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods in a way that transcends the rigidity of epistemological traditions (see 
Ragin, 2008). Crude definitions of quantitative and qualitative methods have led to enduring 
oppositions of nomothetic and idiographic research, causal and interpretive, explanatory and 
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 Participants were approached using the MyType software on Facebook. Their nationalities were: United States 
(72%), Singapore (8%), Canada (3%), Australia (3%), and Great Britain (3%). 12% of participants lived in other 
countries and 11% did not report a location. 
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descriptive (Bernard, 2002; Duncan, 2008). In many cases these epistemological or 
ontological arguments, albeit important considerations, preclude the benefits of mixed 
methods research in which multiple platforms for data collection and analysis actually provide 
useful confirmatory or complementary capacity. Therefore, I employed semi-structured 
interviews with MPs to drill down into the quantitative analysis of their BHV, and thus add a 
layer of thick description to the study of personality in UK parliamentary politics. This 
section briefly defends this methodological decision before outlining the design and conduct 
of these interviews.   
 Critics of mixed methods studies continue to claim that combinations of quantitative 
and qualitative methods are impossible without inherent contradictions based on the nature of 
truth (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). By contrast, I align this thesis firmly with a pragmatist 
critique of foundationalism. Pragmatism provides a theoretical skeleton on which this study 
and many mixed methods designs favour discovery over narrow justifications or definitions of 
'truth' (Maxcy, 2003). Pragmatism encourages researchers to open their eyes to the points of 
compatibility between methods in order to prioritise the most practically useful research 
design that will enable the most detailed exploration of social science problems in the 'real 
world' (Feilzer, 2010, p.8). Thus the combination of data collection by survey and interviews 
in this study rejects the one-to-one connection of methods and paradigms (i.e. constructivism 
or interpretivism with qualitative) and speaks to the premises of both methodological 
eclecticism and paradigm pluralism (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2012). 
 Importantly, I use interviews in a complementary rather than confirmatory fashion. 
There is a dubious heritage of mixed methods studies that have sought to verify findings using 
data derived from different sources (Pager and Quillian, 2005; Miller and Gatta, 2006). Again, 
by contrast, I find profit in the capacity of different types of data to measure the same 
phenomenon in a way that compensates for the limitations of others.  As such this thesis joins 
a long list of studies that have used participant observation, interviews or other qualitative 
methods as an additional tool through which to explain, interpret or add nuance to the results 
of large-n surveys (e.g. Obstfeld, 2005; Small, 2009).  
 Given that the data produced by the PVQ and interviews are inherently different, this 
study shies away from claims to verification. By virtue of being completely different in form, 
it is possible that the two types of data might unintentionally measure entirely separate 
phenomena. For example, the results might show that MPs' behaviour, and the theoretical 
values implicit in those actions, are accurately reflected in one or both of the PVQ and 
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interviews. This will not necessarily mean that the statements in the interview 'confirm' the 
data from the PVQ but rather reveal the relationship between two phenomena: how the MPs' 
consciously perceive their behaviour as politicians and how they unconsciously report their 
character as humans. Therefore, interviews are used to enlighten and enrich the explanatory 
power of the PVQ, but they are not used to 'verify' the quantitative data.  
b) Interview Procedure 
In line with the principles of nested analysis in the social sciences (Liebermann, 2005), 
I sought to follow-up statistical analysis of MPs’ BHV with in-depth analysis of selected 
cases. However, given the difficulty of obtaining elite interviews (Richards, 1996), I 
ultimately relied on a self-selecting sample of the survey participants. At each stage of the 
tailored design method (Part I, above), participants were given the option to volunteer for a 
follow-up interview. In total, 24 MPs (23% of the sample) agreed to be interviewed; in line 
with the contingent nature of elite interviews (Huggins, 2014), a further seven of these MPs 
either cancelled their interview at the last minute or failed to respond to further email 
correspondence in order to arrange the interview in the first place. This left 17 participants (11 
sitting MPs and 6 former MPs now sitting in the House of Lords) who were willing to 
conduct in-depth interviews. As a self-selecting sample, there is an overrepresentation of 
older, Labour MPs. However, the sample is diverse in terms of gender, tenure in elected 
office, and experience of different occupational responsibilities (Table 6.4).   
As per existing scholarship on elite politics and interview methodologies, I used semi-
structured interviews (Robson, 2002; Köker, 2014). This interview design carries a number of 
advantages in that it a) allowed the interviews to relate directly to the research questions 
guiding the project and the results of the survey analysis; b) provided a structure in which a 
large amount of relevant information could be obtained within a time-pressured interview 
environment; and c) gave the interviewer flexibility to change the order of questions and offer 
bespoke follow-up questions. Given the personalised nature of each interview and the type of 
data already collected, interviews were conducted with a passive professionalism. Following 
the advice of Ruth Blakeley (2012), the utmost care was given to maintaining positive or 
neutral facial expressions and body language, hiding frustration and/or disapproval, and 
remaining wary of the fine line between pushing an interviewee further and besmirching their 
opinion. In this manner trust was built with the interviewee, who could answer honestly 
without fear of personal or professional judgement.    
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Table 6.4 Profile of Interviewees. 
 







(at any point 




(at any point 
in career) 
 
1 MALE 60-69 LAB 18 YES YES YES 
2 FEMALE 60-69 OTHER 12 NO NO NO 
3 MALE 60-69 LAB 1 YES NO NO 
4 MALE 60-69 OTHER 15 NO YES YES 
5 FEMALE 50-59 LAB 13 YES YES YES 
6 MALE 60-69 LAB 19 YES YES YES 
7 FEMALE 30-39 SNP 1 YES NO YES 
8 FEMALE 40-49 LAB 5 YES NO YES 
9 MALE 60-69 CON 3 NO NO NO 
10 MALE 70-79 LIB 
DEM 
16 NO NO YES 
11 MALE 70-79 LIB 
DEM 
20 YES YES YES 
12 MALE 70-79 LAB 11 YES NO YES 
13 MALE 50-59 LIB 
DEM 
17 YES NO YES 
14 FEMALE 60-69 LAB 12 NO YES NO 
15 MALE 70-79 LAB 18 YES YES YES 
16 MALE 60-69 LAB 8 YES YES NO 
17 MALE 40-49 CON 11 NO NO YES 
NOTE: In order to maintain the anonymity of participants, the age of respondents has been grouped. 
Party labels are only provided for respondents in the top four most populated political parties in the 
UK Parliament.  
 
Questions were grouped around three themes that directly related to the research 
questions of this project (Table 6.5). The first set of questions on personalisation within 
Parliament sought specifically to test the boundary between MPs’ conscious and unconscious 
perceptions of their own values and the personal motivations they and their colleagues bring 
to the job. The second block of questions focused primarily on identifying behavioural 
constraints and enablers in Parliament in order to a) understand how consciously MPs act 
upon or suppress personal motivations in their job, and b) add nuance to the causal 
mechanisms (or lack thereof) revealed between MPs’ BHV and a range of parliamentary 
behaviours in the quantitative analysis. The final set of questions tested participants’ 
awareness of how much they believe they are understood by the electorate and how much 
importance they attribute to this (mis-)understanding. In each case, questions were 
personalised according to prior responses in the survey phase of data collection and additional 
research carried out about the background of the participant prior to the interview.  
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Table 6.5 Semi-structured interview plan. 
 
Block 1: Personalisation 
(RQ1) 
Block 2: Political Behaviour 
(RQ2) 
 
Block 3: Anti-Politics 
(RQ3) 
If you were to describe yourself 
in 3 words, what would they be 
and how have those 
characteristics helped you in 
politics? 
 
To what extent do you feel that 
you act according to your own 
motivations as an elected 
politician on a daily basis? 
 
Do you think that the public 
perception of politicians is 
accurate? Why/Why not? 
 
There is a dominant media 
narrative that paints politicians 
as greedy and self-interested. 
What do you think of those 
accusations? 
How do you find the Palace of 





Has public/media approbation 
of politicians had any impact on 
you personally? 
In your professional experience, 
is there a certain type of person 
who enters elite politics? And 
do you think there are any 
personal similarities between 
those who rise to the 
frontbench? 
Are there any aspects of your 
role as an elected representative 
that you feel you can/cannot be 





Are you satisfied with your 
performance as an MP? 
Why/Why not? 
Do you agree or disagree with 
the majority of your colleagues’ 
opinions? 
What do you perceive to be 




If we stopped one of your 
constituents on the street, how 
do you think they might 
describe you in three words? 
 How do your prior beliefs about 
elite politics compare to your 
experience of elected office? 
 
Is it important, in your opinion, 
that the public like MPs? 
 Have you achieved what you set 
out to achieve as an elected 
politician? Why/ Why not? 
What is the biggest reason, in 
your opinion, for popular 
disengagement from politics? 
 
Interviews lasted an average of 30 minutes; the longest went on for over an hour and 
the shortest finished after 17 minutes. Given the different occupational demands on each 
participant, there was significant variation in how much time each MP was willing or able to 
give to the interview. All of the interviews were conducted in person at the Palace of 
Westminster, although individual participants expressed different preferences about where in 
the Palace they would like to meet. Whilst some were happy to conduct the interview 
publically in the atrium of Portcullis House, others insisted on meeting in their private office. 
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Three MPs would only be interviewed at more discrete locations in a parliamentary 
outbuilding, Millbank House, away from the eyes and ears of their colleagues. From an 
anecdotal perspective, these requests reflected not only the highly sensitive nature of the 
discussions but also the varying experiences and personal characteristics of those being 
interviewed. At the start of each interview, the purpose and nature of the research project was 
described again for complete transparency. Interviewees were provided with a repeat copy of 
the participant information sheet and signed a consent form. Every interview was recorded, 
transcribed and later coded thematically.       
IV. Outline of Data Analysis 
 
 So far this chapter has explained how data was collected from MPs using surveys and 
semi-structured interviews. This section will briefly outline the analysis conducted on this 
data, the process and results of which are explored in depth in subsequent chapters of this 
thesis.   
a) Correcting for socially desirable responding   
 Each value in the BHV theory receives its score from the mean of the raw ratings 
given to the items on the PVQ measuring it. However, it is advisable or rather necessary at 
this point to correct for individual differences in the use of the response scale before carrying 
out analyses (Schwartz et al., 1997). In spite of the comparison of self-to-other, the PVQ 
remains a self-report questionnaire and is thus vulnerable to socially desirable responses 
(Paulhus, 1991). For two reasons this may be amplified in the current study: firstly, MPs are 
by definition dependent on public support and thus rely on a positive public image. Secondly, 
the subject of values itself may encourage socially desirable responding, since values are 
loaded as preferences that ‘people consider to be justifiable by certain moral, aesthetic or 
logical bases that are mutually ‘desirable’ (Kluckhohn, 1951). 
Socially desirable responding comes in multiple forms but personality researchers are 
particularly concerned with impression management (Paulhus, 1991). Impression 
management involves the purposeful depiction of oneself as socially conventional in a precise 
manner aimed at eliciting positive social responses (Paulhus, 1986, 1991).  However, large-N 
studies in Israel and Finland (Schwartz et al., 1997) have shown that BHV surveys remain 
relatively robust in the face of socially desirable responding. Using the Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability index (Crowne and Marlow, 1960), Schwartz found only weak 
associations between BHV data and stylistic impression management (whereby all values are 
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rated slightly higher on the belief that all values must be socially desirable). A similarly small 
variance in the results (3-7%) was explained by substantive social desirability bias, whereby 
the scores given to values associated with, for example, Conformity or conversely Stimulation 
and Self-direction were exaggerated by participants to appear socially cohesive or 
independent (Schwartz et al., 1997). Even relatively small degrees of bias such as these can 
lead to systematic underestimates of negative correlations and overestimates of positive 
correlations in later statistical analysis.  
The effect of substantive and stylistic impression management can be countered by 
partialling out the data of the PVQ, using the mean of responses to all items as a covariate. All 
individuals will use the scale differently and this partialling also focuses the data on the 
relative importance of values for each individual, which is the most useful result for 
comparative comments. Therefore ‘centred means’ for each value are produced by subtracting 
MRAT (total Mean RATing) from the mean scores of the raw data for each value. Partial 
correlation also suits the theoretical assumption that values operate interdependently as part of 
a circular system. Values affect emotion and behaviour through a constant balance of those 
that are most poignant in any given decision or situation; thus to focus on individual raw 
scores for single values would be to ignore the basic premise that values work in patterns of 
constant (in-)compatibility with each other (Schwartz, 2006). The scale correction method 
used for the PVQ thus converts raw data into scores that represent the relative importance of 
each value for the individual. By centring values within cases rather than standardising, 
according to the standard deviation across all items, the results of the PVQ retain the 
meaningful variance between individual’s value ratings; even when individuals assign the 
same mean importance to all values, they may well discriminate more or less sharply among 
them.  
b) Statistical testing  
 
 Prior to carrying out statistical tests on the survey data collected from UK MPs, a 
series of robustness tests were conducted to check that the data adequately fit the theory of, 
and previous research on, BHV. In the present sample, Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients 
for the four higher order values were .718 for Conservation, .666 for Self-Transcendence, 
.824 for Openness to Change, and .870 for Self-Enhancement (alphas for the ten individual 
values ranged from .443 for Security to .880 for Achievement with seven values scoring 
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 Factor analysis (Principal Components) revealed a four factor model 
(eigenvalues > 1.00, cumulative variance = 58.5%) that captured all items on the measure 
within the expected pattern of the theory (Table 6.6). Cross loading of items, in this instance 
Security and Conformity, is expected given that basic values share interdependent relations 
within a quasi-circumplex space (Vecchione et al. 2015). However, for the purposes of 
comparative validity, these results demonstrate that the theory of BHV works with a new 
target population – national politicians in the UK.   
 
 In order to advance an answer to research question 1 (Who enters elite politics and 
how are they different to the general public?), a series of parametric tests were conducted. 
Pearson's correlations were carried out to explore the relationships between the PVQ centred 
means for each of the ten lower-order basic values and a series of additional variables (Table 
6.7). Tests of difference (independent t-tests and one way ANOVAs) were then conducted to 
compare the PVQ centred means for each of the ten lower-order basic values between MPs by 
demographic and occupational variables such as gender, age, political party, prior occupation 
and political status (frontbench versus backbench). Where significant differences were 
identified, post-hoc Tukey tests were conducted to explore these further. Having identified 
value differences within the parliamentary sample, MPs were then compared to the British 
public (n = 2264) using a sample that had completed the PVQ-21 in the 7th round of the 
European Social Survey (ESS; see Table 6.2, above). 
 
 Although the PVQ-21 and the TwIVI vary in their item descriptors, both measures are 
derived from the same theoretical framework and share extremely similar properties (Sandy et 
al., 2017). A series of factorial ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) models were used to assess 
the differences in BHV between and within each sample (MPs vs. public) according to age, 
gender and partisanship.
57
 These ANCOVA models also revealed the interaction effects of 
each combination of independent variables (e.g. MP/Public and Centre-Left/Centre-Right) on 
BHV scores. In order to maximise the statistical power of the models and counter the 
disparity in sample sizes, these analyses were conducted using the four higher-order basic 
values (Conservation, Self-Enhancement, Self-Transcendence, and Openness-to-Change), 
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 High internal reliabilities are not expected for two reasons. Firstly, each value index only uses two items; 
secondly, each value has multiple component meanings that are being measured. However, these alpha scores 
relate favourably to prior studies using the TwIVI (Sandy et al., 2017), the PVQ-21 (Piurko et al., 2011), and the 
PVQ-40 (Schwartz et al., 2001). 
57
 Partisanship for the public sample was measured using their self-reported vote choice in the 2010 UK General 
Election.  
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Table 6.6 Varimax Rotated Component Matrix - Four Factor Model. 
Summary of Portrait Item Value Component 
  1 








Likes risks and adventures 
 
Stimulation .826    
Important to be curious 
 
Self-Direction .734    
Important to enjoy life 
 
Hedonism .706    
Important to try new things 
 
Stimulation .689    
Important to have fun 
 
Hedonism .677    
Important to be original 
 
Self-Direction .578    
Important to be successful 
 
Achievement  .785   
Important to be in charge 
 
Power  .767   
Important to get ahead 
 
Achievement  .709   
Important to be the leader 
 
Power  .667   
Important to be organised 
 
Security  .564   
Important to be traditional 
 
Tradition   .817  
Important to show respect 
 
Conformity   .762  
Important to follow religion 
 
Tradition   .712  
Important to have stability 
 
Security   .627  
Important to behave properly 
 
Conformity    .531 
Important to care for others 
 
Benevolence    .795 
Important to support others 
 
Benevolence    .738 
Important to promote peace 
 
Universalism    .681 
Important to have equal 
opportunities 
Universalism    .539 
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thus maximising the number of items/responses per index. Significant differences were 
followed up with independent samples t-tests. A full discussion of these analyses can be 
found in chapters 7 and 8. 
  Research question 2 (What, if any, is the impact and importance of personality on 
MPs’ behaviour once they are elected to Parliament?) was addressed using the specific 
hypotheses built in chapter 4 and the theoretical model of the IMPPB (chapter 4, p.90), which 
specifies the causal primacy of personality (specifically basic values) in explaining MPs’ 
behaviour within contingent contexts of varying institutional constraint. In the first instance, 
logistic regression models were built to test the effect of BHV upon three high profile votes: 
the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (free vote), the vote on military action in Syria 
2013 (whip enforced for one major party), and the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (whip enforced for both major parties).
58
 These voting records were 
chosen a) for their high profile nature and the contrast in party lines/discipline, and b) to 
maximise the number of MPs in this sample who could be included in the analysis. Additional 
logistic and poisson regression models were run to test the effect of MP’s BHV upon their 
membership of a select committee
59
 and the number of written questions submitted/Early Day 
Motions (EDMs) signed by MPs (over one parliamentary calendar year, 2015-2016).
 60
 A full 
discussion of these analyses can be found in chapter 9.  
To determine the effect of BHV upon MPs' self-reported focus as a representative (i.e. nation, 
party or constituency), structural equation models (SEM) were built. Following preliminary 
analyses in SPSS 22, AMOS 24 was used to create SEMs with a weighted least squares 
estimator; probit regressions were used to estimate categorical dependent variables and linear 
regressions were used to estimate continuous dependent variables in the model. Following the 
advice of Rex B. Kline (2015), this analysis was conducted in two steps. Firstly, a 
measurement model was built and tested using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA); secondly, 
a series of alternative SEMs with differing pathways were constructed (these are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 9). In doing so, I sought to demonstrate the supremacy of one theoretical  
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 These divisions were recovered online from The Public Whip (http://www.publicwhip.org.uk), a non-
governmental, non-for-profit repository of Parliamentary debate transcripts and voting records taken from 
Hansard. 
59
 Records of select committee memberships (as well as written questions and early day motions for the 
Parliamentary year 2015-2016) were retrieved online from TheyWorkForYou (https://www.theyworkforyou.co 
m/), a repository of open data taken from the UK Parliament.  
60
 Poisson regression is commonly used when the dependent variables are count variables observed over the 
same length of time for all units in the analysis.   
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RQ1: Who enters elite politics? 
(Variation of Basic Human 
Values  among MPs and the 
public) 
- Length of service 
- Age 
- Gender 
- Party  
- Political Status 
- Prior Occupation 
- Education 
 
- Pearson's correlations 
- Logistic Regression 
- Independent t-tests 
- One-way ANOVA 
- ANCOVA 
- Post-hoc Tukey tests 
RQ2: Parliamentary behaviour 
(Variation between MPs) 
Independent Variables:  
- Basic Human Values (BHV) 
 
Dependent Variables:  
- Voting records 
- No. of written questions (2015 - 
2016) 
- No. of Early Day Motions signed 
(2015-2016) 
- Select Committee membership 
 
- Independent t-tests 
- Logistic regression 
- Poisson regression (count 
model) 
RQ3: Representative focus 
(variation in MPs' priorities)  
Independent Variables:  
- Basic Human Values (BHV)  
 
Dependent Variables:  
- Self-reported priority (Nation, 
Party, Constituency) 
- Structural Equation 
Modelling (SEM) 
  
model - based on the IMPPB - over others by comparing the strength of direct and indirect 
causal pathways running between BHV and this abstract behavioural decision.
61
 
 In line with the pragmatist critique of foundationalism advanced in Part III, this thesis 
is problem-driven rather than method-driven. The theory of BHV and the mixture of 
quantitative survey techniques with semi-structured interviews were all selected for their 
suitability to the problems raised in the project's research questions. However, I also accept 
that data cannot speak for itself. The post-positivist philosophy underpinning this thesis is 
concerned with prediction and explanation but clearly acknowledges that social scientific 
inquiry is ultimately hermeneutic. As Veronique Mottier (2005, p.3) argues, '[i]nterpretation 
and explanation, objectivity and subjectivity, cannot be clearly separated'. In analysing both 
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 Follow up studies may wish to collect related data to test the reliability of these self-reported priorities (i.e. 
does an MP with a 'constituency focus' actually spend more time in their constituency?). 
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the quantitative and qualitative data collected for this thesis in tandem, and attempting to 
construct an explanation for the ways in which MPs make sense of their daily lives as elected 
representatives, I engage reflexively throughout the analysis process.  
V. Conjoint Analysis 
In the final sequence of this thesis design, a conjoint experiment was used to test the 
hypotheses (H9-10) proffered in support of research question 3 (How big is the gap between 
voters’ preferences about the personal characteristics of MPs and reality?). As outlined at 
length in chapter 5, it is possible to trace a contemporary crisis of popular disengagement 
from, and distrust of, politics back to the agency-centred focus of democratic representation. I 
use an experimental survey technique known as a conjoint experiment to assess who, and with 
what type of personal profile, the British public would ideally vote for in a General Election. 
Coupled with data on the BHV of MPs, these results are used to test the existence of a 
perception gap based on personalised assessments of sitting representatives and ideal types in 
the public. 
A conjoint experiment is a multivariate choice-based survey technique that originated 
in marketing research. Typically, consumers are faced with an array of products that have a 
broad range of characteristics and must choose which of these they prefer. A conjoint 
experiment works on the premise of utility, which refers to each individual's unique subjective 
preference formation (Hair et al., 2008). Consumers can evaluate the objects offered as a 
whole, thus reducing the cognitive fatigue demanded of the participant. Conjoint experiments 
have been common in marketing research for over 40 years and their versatility has attracted 
the attention of scholars in other fields as diverse as transport management and financial 
services, oncology and taxation (Beusterien et al., 2014; Hundsdoerfer et al., 2013). In 
politics, conjoint experiments have been rare and sporadic (cf. Vivyan and Wagner, 2015). 
The conjoint experiment used in this study presented members of the public with 
hypothetical profiles of MPs who varied in the following attributes: gender, age, ethnicity and 
disability; religion; family status; personality; education; prior occupation; accent (as a proxy 
for region); and political priority.
62
 These variables were chosen in order to a) reflect a variety 
of personal characteristics that are focused upon by empirical research into descriptive 
representation; b) create an experimental scenario in which candidates appeared credible; and 
c) force a highly personalised decision without the distortion of partisanship. The variable 
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Biometrics PUT Face database. 
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'personality' was presented using a series of 10 statements taken directly from the PVQ 
(TwIVI) used to collect data on BHV from MPs. The variable 'political priority' constituted 
three statements related to party, constituency and national policy objectives. This variable 
was included to provide a direct comparison with prior survey work on public preferences for 
MPs (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015; Vivyan and Wagner, 2015). Figure 6.2 shows a 
screenshot of one random survey iteration.  
Given that the number of potential combinations in a conjoint experiment grows 
exponentially with each additional attribute and level (i.e. how many random options are used 
to populate, for example, the attribute 'Religion'), a fractional factorial design was used so that 
the participants were only ever presented with a selection of levels for each attribute at once. 
The number of attributes in the design was limited to eight, including the image, in keeping 
with received wisdom on the limits of this experimental design and its cognitive accessibility 
(Bradlow, 2005). The compensatory model underpinning conjoint surveys posits that 
participants evaluate an object in comparison to another object by combining the positive or 
negative value they assign to each of its different attributes. Where participants are presented 
with too many choices at once, they engage simplified criteria of selection (Hauser, 2014), 
whilst a large choice set also reduces the amount of data available for each attribute and 
therefore limits the accuracy and weight of statistical estimates (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; 
Huertas-Garcia et al., 2016). To maximise the statistical power, efficiency and cognitive 
accessibility of this conjoint analysis, a sample of 1637 UK adults were asked to choose 
between three randomly populated profiles of MPs with eight attributes each and to complete 
this process five times. Participants responded to the question: Which of the following 
candidates would you elect to represent you as a Member of Parliament? Apart from the 
image of each candidate, the order of attributes changed randomly between participants to 
control for order effects in the survey design.  
In total, a representative sample of 1637 UK adults participated in the conjoint 
analysis. The participants were recruited by the polling agency, YouGov, and surveys were 
completed on the 23rd and 24th October 2017. Demographically, the sample is broadly 
representative of the UK population. The median age is 48 years old (range of 19 - 117) and 
participants resided in 11 different regions of the UK. No single region accounted for more 
than 13% (London) of the sample. Although the number of participants who voted in the 2017 
General Election was slightly higher than the national average (80% compared to 69%), it 
included a good mix of supporters from different political parties: 34% Conservative, 33%  
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Figure 6.2. A screenshot from the conjoint survey. 
 
 








Labour, 6% Liberal Democrat, 1% UKIP, 1% Green and 4% Other. Approximately equal 
numbers of men and women completed the survey (51% of the sample is female) and 
participants are evenly spread across social grades: 28% categories AB, 29% category C1, 
21% category C2, and 22% categories DE.
63
 In the context of the highly contested Brexit vote 
in 2016, this sample was split between those who voted remain (38%), leave (41%), and those 
who claimed they did not vote or could not remember voting (21%). In sum, the survey data 
reflected a representative mix of the UK population. 
The conjoint experiment confers a number of advantages over more traditional ranking 
and rating survey techniques used to assess voters' perceptions of politics. Given that the 
choice-based model creates a total utility value for each profile (or bundle of attributes), it is 
also possible to isolate the part-worth utility of individual attributes and their levels. This 
allows the researcher to capture not only the specific effect of certain attributes but also their 
effect when interacting with other combinations of attributes. For example, it might be that 
voters in highly professional occupations or social grades AB prefer MPs with a similar 
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occupational background, but only when that MP is also committed to their party manifesto. 
In particular, the conjoint analysis enables me to draw conclusions about the relative weight, 
if any, that citizens place on different BHV when asked to simultaneously judge other 
personal attributes such as gender, age, and education. Faced with complex hypothetical 
profiles, participants are also presented with realistic choices that makes the findings more 
transferable to 'live' environments beyond the survey. Indeed, the profiles were purposefully 
designed to include the same types of personal information that appear on candidate flyers 
and websites. 
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"There are 650 people in Parliament and so with any group of 650, there is good and bad. 
There are people in Parliament I wouldn’t trust as far as I could throw them and there are 
people in Parliament I would trust with my life." 
 
Conservative MP (Interviewee 17) 
The Basic Human Values of UK Members of Parliament 
 Members of Parliament (MPs) are unique among elite groups for their capacity to 
'affect political outcomes regularly and substantially' (Higley and Burton, 2006, p.7). Even 
backbench MPs, who are traditionally seen as party political lobby fodder, play an important 
role in moulding crucial and far-reaching policy decisions, in assuming the most influential 
roles in the state (either as a pool of potential recruits for the executive or by granting and 
withdrawing support for the government of the day), and in helping to design and reform the 
institutional nature of the state (Best and Vogel, 2018). However, the existing parliamentary 
studies literature has only given limited attention to the individual, psychological 
characteristics of those actors who hold elected office and exercise these powers. As such, this 
thesis advances a highly original interdisciplinary study of MPs' personalities (specifically 
their Basic Human Values (BHV)) that offers significant insights into the ways that 
politicians operate, horizontally at the institutional level of the UK Parliament, and vertically 
as democratic agents of the electorate. 
 
 The first half of this thesis engaged in depth with a range of literature to expose gaps 
in the study of structure and agency in elite politics, the nature of principal-agent relations in 
democratic representation, and elite political behaviour. Fresh conceptual thinking has been 
matched by a careful research design and extensive quantitative and qualitative data collection 
with 106 MPs and survey data from the British public (Chapter 6). This chapter now turns to 
the empirical results of these efforts. In particular, this chapter focuses on research question 1, 
which pertains specifically to the basic values of MPs and their differences from and 
similarities to the wider British public. Section I reports descriptive results about the entire 
sample of MPs and compares their values to comparative data extracted from the 7
th
 round of 
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the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014).
64
 Section II focuses on MPs' Power values, 
comparing their motivational drive for prestige and authority with that of the public. This 
section also uses MPs' BHV to differentiate between the goals and ambitions of 
representatives at different levels of the parliamentary hierarchy. Section III uses both data 
sets to model elite political recruitment, examining the effect of basic values upon political 
ambition alongside commonly studied variables such as profession, education and gender. 
The final section of this chapter builds upon the results of section III to interrogate the 
personality differences of career politicians and those without prior employment in politics. In 
each section, highly significant quantitative results are accompanied by qualitative findings 
from 17 in-depth interviews with a diverse sample of MPs.  
 
I. Psychological Scrutiny: Who are our Representatives? 
 
 The observable nature of democratic politics makes possible a host of hypothetical 
contestations about the personal characteristics required, expected or assumed of political 
elites. I test these claims with a unique study of MPs' basic values. This section reports value 
hierarchies for MPs and the public, compares centred mean scores for basic values across 
these two groups, and closely examines the nature of political ambition by differentiating 
between front and backbench participants in the elite sample. The findings suggest that all 
MPs are psychologically different from those they represent in terms of their basic values and 
that these differences are exaggerated among MPs who advance to the highest levels of 
political office.  
 
 A comparison of basic value scores in the elite sample and the ESS general population 
sample provides strong support for the suggestion that personality influences selectivity in 
parliamentary recruitment (Hypothesis 1). The average value hierarchies for MPs and the 
British public only overlap in three of ten positions (Table 7.1, below).
65
 For both samples, 
Self-Transcendence values are the most important motivational goals. In each case, 
Benevolence values - which relate to the preservation and support of those known personally - 
are scored as more important than Universalism values - which represent an understanding of 
and protection for the welfare of all people. However, across the remainder of the value 
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to the Portrait Values Questionnaire (see chapter 6 for more detail). The hierarchies run from most positive to 
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hierarchies, there are a number of distinct differences. The elite sample of MPs reveals greater 
priority for Openness to Change values, whilst the public sample gives more importance to 
Conservation values. This would suggest that MPs are motivated more by the need for 
independent thought and action, and autonomy in exciting, novel or challenging 
circumstances (Self-Direction and Stimulation values), whereas the public are more likely to 
respect and commit to traditional customs or ideas and in turn restrain their action so as to 
maintain social expectations or norms (Security, Tradition and Conformity values). 
 
Table 7.1 Value hierarchies compared for UK Members of Parliament (n = 106) and the general 
population (N = 2154). 
 












 A correlation matrix (Appendix F) containing centred mean scores for each of the ten 
lower order BHV and each participant's status (MP or public) reinforces a number of the 
inferences that can be made from these value hierarchies. After combining these data sets, 
eight BHV (not including Achievement and Hedonism) share statistically significant 
relationships with whether a participant was an MP or a member of the public. Benevolence, 
Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Conformity and Power values all shared positive 
relationships with being an MP, whilst Tradition and Security values shared a negative 
relationship. These results reflect the findings of previous studies that have demonstrated 
strong positive associations between levels of political activism in mass samples and Self-
Transcendence values as well as Openness to Change values, and negative associations with 
Conservation values (Pacheco and Owen, 2015; Schwartz, 2010; Vecchione et al., 2015). 
Whilst wary of generalising these findings across cultures, it might be inferred that in order to 
be motivated strongly enough to work doggedly in a political party, to secure a candidacy, and 
to operate in an elected capacity, one must not only care about improving the lot of those they 
work for (i.e. Self-Transcendence values), but also be particularly motivated to defy 
James Weinberg 




expectations, confront the status quo and take personal risks in that process (i.e. Openness to 
Change values).  
 
 These results are revealed in greater detail by a direct comparison of group means. The 
centred mean scores for the basic values of the elite and public samples differ significantly 
across eight out of ten lower order values (Table 7.2). The results of a series of independent 
samples T-tests suggest, for example, that MPs are significantly more driven by motivations 
to care for those around them and support those they know personally (higher scores for 
Benevolence: t (2257) = 4.26, p < 0.001); they are significantly more driven by originality and 
a desire for new experiences (higher scores for Openness to Change values: t (2257) = 3.49, p 
< 0.001); and they are significantly less motivated to preserve tradition (Tradition values: t 
(2257) = -10.56, p < 0.001) or to secure stability in their own lives or society (Security values: 
t (2257) = -8.71, p < 0.001). The size of these differences and the test statistics, as well levels 
of significance, point to specific personality factors in the selection and self-selection of UK 
MPs. In particular, higher scores for Benevolence, Universalism and Self-Direction indicate a 
greater commitment among MPs [than the public] to those political values of individual 
freedom, social welfare and equality among citizens (cf. Caprara et al., 2006). 
 
 One noticeable anomaly to these trends is the positive association between Conformity 
values and elected office (Appendix F), and the higher average ratings given to Conformity 
values by the elite sample. This result is antithetical to the assumptions of the Schwartz 
taxonomy and its sinusoidal structure. Indicative of obedience, self-discipline and social 
inhibitions, Conformity values are expected to operate in opposition to Openness to Change 
values such as Self-Direction and Stimulation (Schwartz, 1992). However, in the elite sample 
Conformity values are rated as almost equally important. This result may reflect a 
measurement issue. Conceptually, Conformity values are conceived in the Schwartz 
taxonomy as comprising two related subtypes: the first is interpersonal (maintain harmonious 
social relations) and the second is compliance (conforming to expectations). In the traditional 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), each of these subtypes is measured with two items and 
the mean score of all four provides an individual rating for Conformity values in sum. In the 
shorter twenty item PVQ used for this research project (Appendix A), one item expressed 
compliance (behave properly/avoid doing anything people say is wrong) and another 
expressed interpersonal Conformity (respect parents/obey). Although principal components 
analysis (Chapter 6, p.140) shows that both items load onto a single latent Conservation 
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Table 7.2 Mean differences between the Basic Human Values of UK MPs (n = 106) and a 
representative sample of the British population (N = 2154). 
Basic Human Values 
(Lower Order)  
          Centred Mean Scores (MRAT) 
MP/Public † 
MRAT Difference 
Benevolence  1.13 (.07)/0.85 (.01) 0.28 ** 
Universalism  0.88 (.09)/0.64 (.01) 0.23 ** 
Self-Direction  0.63 (.08)/0.47 (.02) 0.17 * 
Stimulation  - 0.14 (.08)/- 0.64 (.02) 0.50 ** 
Hedonism  - 0.49 (.08)/- 0.41 (.02) - 0.08 
Achievement  - 0.48 (.09)/- 0.56 (.02) 0.08 
Power  - 0.47 (.08)/- 1.08 (.02) 0.61 ** 
Security  - 0.15 (.09)/0.55 (.02) - 0.70 ** 
Conformity  0.02 (.09)/- 0.19 (.02) 0.22 * 
Tradition  - 0.93 (.13)/0.05 (.02) - 0.98 ** 
Two-tailed significance: ** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05 
† Standard error of means in parentheses. 
 
factor, empirical evidence from other studies suggests that these two subtypes are more 
readily distinguishable. 
 In multidimensional scaling analyses of PVQ data (Schwartz et al., 2012), the 
compliance items have emerged closer to Security values and the interpersonal items have 
been closer to Self-Transcendence values. Similar results have been achieved with 
confirmatory factor analysis (Beierlein et al., 2012). Schwartz et al. (2012) have used these 
results to partition a more refined 19-factor taxonomy of values in which Conformity-
Interpersonal values are recognised and measured as a distinct factor compatible with 
Universalism values. It is anticipated that the ratings given to Conformity values by this elite 
sample - who also score much higher than the public for both Self-Transcendence values - are 
inflated by participants' heightened sensitivity to its interpersonal elements. Individuals high 
in Conformity-Interpersonal values are motivated to 'avoid negative social reactions [and] to 
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consider the desires of others' (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 670). Both of these motivations seem 
highly apposite for MPs, who must win the hearts and minds of voters to sustain their time in 
elected office and who, according to the Self-Transcendence scores above, are particularly 
concerned to help, rather than upset or harm, those around them. This result demands future 
research of elite samples using the PVQ-57, which measures the 19-factor BHV taxonomy. 
 These quantitative results are supported by interview data. Although MPs might have 
a vested interest in self-reporting an inflated image of their own altruism, nearly every 
interviewee recognised that politicians of all partisan affiliations are driven, first and 
foremost, by a desire to help others and enact change. As one very experienced Conservative 
MP commented: 
I mean I’ve met literally thousands of politicians from all over the world in the course 
of my years. They all believe that they’re trying to do good and many of them are 
doing good and they’re not in your party either, which is quite annoying. The idea of 
the self-seeking politician, it might have been true in Tammany Hall and in some of 
the murkier bits of the Italian political system, but overall people seek elected office to 
change things, particularly in the western democracies (Interviewee 9) 
66
 
This observation was as common among interviewees with relatively little experience of 
elected office. One newly elected member of Scottish National Party (SNP), who had been in 
office for less than 18 months at the time of interviewing, said: 
I think probably some politicians are here to further their own personal life to get more 
money, to be more powerful, but a huge number of people from across the House, not 
just SNP members, Labour, Lib Dem, Tory members are actually here to try to make a 
positive difference to their communities. I could disagree with them on how to make 
that positive difference but that’s actually their intention when they come here 
(Interviewee 7) 
These comments are particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they indicate that Self-
Transcendence values are as clearly observable to those who have been socialised into elite 
politics for many years as for those who are new to Parliament and its milieu of elected 
representatives. Secondly, these comments (especially that of interviewee 7) are indicative of 
the ways in which all participants articulated the principles of value instantiation - i.e. the 
cognitive and social links between general categories of values and specific behavioural 
manifestations (Hanel et al., 2017). As such, interviewees were adamant that the majority of 
their colleagues came to Parliament with well-meaning intentions to change the lives of others 
for the better, but at the same time they often voiced disagreement with the policy or 
behavioural instantiations of those intentions. It is important to acknowledge, therefore, that 
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the overall motivational goals of Self-Transcendence values may take a variety of behavioural 
forms in elite politics, dependent upon other variables (e.g. age, gender, education) that may 
affect an individual's perception of the 'common good'. These differences will be explored 
later in this chapter and the next.   
II. Dark Intentions? A Focus on Power Values 
 The previous section presented descriptive results for MPs' BHV that show a 
significant difference between the personalities of the governors and the governed. In 
particular, these results indicate that elected representatives are far more motivated by 
equality, social justice and caring for others (Self-Transcendence values) than the public. This 
section now focuses in more detail on another interesting discrepancy between the BHV of 
MPs and their electors: Power values. 
 Although the results discussed thus far have demonstrated a normatively positive 
image of MPs, who - contrary to media speculation - are more motivated by the welfare of 
others than themselves, the data collected here also suggest that they are more motivated than 
the public to control resources and be in charge of others (Power values: t (2257) = 7.12, p < 
0.001; Table 7.2). In representative national samples around the world, Power values have 
consistently received the lowest average ratings (c.2.3) on the PVQ's Likert scale of 0 (Not 
like me at all) to 6 (Very much like me) (e.g. Bardi and Schwartz, 2001). This is likewise the 
case for the ESS sample used in this thesis (Table 7.1), in which Power values are rated as 
least important among all basic values for the British public. However, in the elite sample of 
MPs, Power values are rated as more important than Achievement, Hedonism and Tradition 
values, and receive an average rating among participants of 3.6.  
 A correlation analysis of Power values and 'being an MP' reveals a positive 
relationship (r (2258) = 0.15, p < 0.001) that, taken together with the results above, adds 
weight to a previously anomalous association found in a large-N study of Power values and 
conventional political activism across four continents (Vecchione et al., 2015). Given the 
unparalleled access to personal and political resources and knowledge provided by elected 
office, these results support claims that politics necessarily attracts individuals who are more 
motivated by authority, social recognition and, importantly, control than those who elect 
them. It is crucial to interpret this result holistically, given that basic values must be 
understood relationally rather than in isolation (Schwartz, 2014). In the elite sample, Power 
values remain subordinate to Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values. Whilst 
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they may be more likely to influence MPs' decisions or behaviour than those of the public, 
they remain less likely to be activated in decision-making scenarios, to guide perceptions and 
interpretations, or influence action planning than, in particular, MPs’ Benevolence and 
Universalism values.  
 Interview data provide two key complementary insights to this finding. Although 
interviewees talked of colleagues' motivations in terms readily relatable to Self-
Transcendence values, they were quick, for example, to argue that elite politics required 
personality characteristics typical of Self-Enhancement values (Power and Achievement). 
One former Liberal Democrat frontbench MP even claimed '[t]here are quite a number – a 
disproportionate number – of aggressive people in politics, but I think politics is dominated 
by people who are, I would say, at least assertive' (Interviewee 13). Given that democratic 
politics in the UK is characterised by partisan competition and constant debate and 
deliberation between elected representatives, one could argue that MPs must necessarily come 
to the job with the confidence to put themselves forward and push their cause. As one Labour 
MP characterised it, '[y]ou have to have a personality that can project because people, and it 
sounds dreadful, but people need you to perform a bit. It’s no good creeping into a room as a 
wallflower' (Interviewee 14). Whilst the majority of interviewees cast such characteristics as 
either necessary and/or desirable in elite politics, others were more candid about the 
prevalence of Self-Enhancement values among MPs and the accompanying self-interest: 
If you look at the people who succeeded in the Labour Party to get to the top, they 
were people who put ambition above anything and everything else – above family, 
above other social activities. They all, with the notable exceptions of Robin Cook and 
John Smith, I think, they all came down and lived in London. You had to be in the 
centre of things. You had to have ambition. You had to, to some extent, push people 
aside, even though they were your friends, and trample on them (Interviewee 12)  
 Secondly, for a number of interviewees, Self-Enhancement values were activated 
when they joined the House of Commons or at some point during their career there. This is 
unusual given that extant research in political psychology - and psychological studies more 
broadly - testifies to the stability of people's basic values across time and situation, as well as 
people's conscious desire not to change their values in adulthood (Roccas et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, a number of interviewees talked about an increase in their ambition and self-
belief as an MP. As one Liberal Democrat put it: 
I would say – and I think this is probably an important bit of your note on me – that I 
used to be actually very shy, and not terribly assertive, and didn’t speak very much at 
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meetings, but you gain confidence sometimes by engaging and sometimes being 
forced into the limelight (Interviewee 13) 
There are two possible explanations for this result. Either the immense stresses, challenges 
and unparalleled experiences of elected office are capable of generating value changes, or the 
parliamentary environment is more immediately geared towards activating Self-Enhancement 
values in the first place. Correlations between MPs' Self-Enhancement values and tenure 
(length of service) are virtually non-existent and non-significant in the elite sample. 
Therefore, the second explanation seems more plausible. Given that MPs attribute more 
importance to Power values than the general public in the samples used here, then the 
principles of value activation suggest that those motivations will be more accessible to MPs 
when placed in an immediate situation that activates them (e.g. Verplanken and Holland, 
2002; Schwartz, 2005). 
 If this theoretical explanation is correct, then it is anticipated that the activation of 
Power values will be strongest among frontbench MPs. Being in a position of authority or 
responsibility in Parliament, especially a post in the executive, confers upon MPs 
incomparable influence over policy decisions. With this come innumerably more scenarios or 
opportunities (media interviews, public speaking requests, civil service portfolios, extended 
administrative support, access to classified information) that may activate Power values and 
associated motivations towards social status and prestige, control and dominance over people 
and resources. One interviewee, a former Secretary of State, articulated this when she recalled 
her time in office: 
A certain amount of arrogance and self-belief, I suppose, that you have to have as a 
politician. In fact, if anything, I grew those. I grew the idea that I was quite good at it 
(Interviewee 5) 
Likewise, it may be that the individuals who come to Parliament with higher Power values in 
the first place are also those who are attracted to the upper echelons of the democratic 
hierarchy. As one former Labour frontbench politician sagely reflected: '[s]elf-belief, I think, 
is quite an important thing. If you want to advance in politics, you can’t really afford to be 
self-deprecating, unless it’s no more than an artifice' (Interviewee 16). In order to explore the 
potential self-selection among those who do and do not pursue top parliamentary and 
governmental positions, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with post-
hoc Tukey tests (Figure 7.1).     
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 The analysis split the parliamentary sample into those MPs who reported frontbench 
experience at the time of investigation or previously (n = 63) and those who did not (n = 40). 
Frontbench experiences ranged from Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Minister, 
Secretary of State, and Prime Minister. Parliamentary Private Secretaries were also included 
in this group; although not technically a frontbench role, the position offers additional 
responsibility and proximity to decision makers, and often acts as a career stepping stone to 
higher office (Searing, 1994). The one-way ANOVA showed that any variations between 
conditions were unlikely to have arisen by sampling error. Although harmonic means were 
used to counter the contrast in sample sizes, the results here (especially between each elite 
sub-sample and the public) are treated as indicative and preliminary to more extensive future 
research. To maximise the reliability of the data, only higher order values are used to compare 
MP sub-samples and the public. 
 The results show that MPs with frontbench experience differ significantly from the 
public on all four higher order values (p < 0.001), whilst backbench MPs only differ 
significantly from the public on two higher order values (Self-Transcendence and 
Conservation, p < 0.05). An additional independent samples T-Test showed that the 
differences between frontbench and backbench MPs were highly significant for one higher 
order value (Conservation) and three lower order values (Conformity, Tradition, 
Achievement).
67
 MPs with frontbench experience also scored higher for Power values, 
although this result was not significant. These results show that a) the differences in 
personality between MPs and the public are not uniform and are, in fact, greatest at the 
highest levels of parliamentary responsibility; and b) basic values act as internal criterion for 
self-selection within Parliament (Hypothesis 2; Figure 7.2, below). 
 In particular, these tests show that frontbench MPs are far less motivated than either 
their backbench colleagues or the public to abide by or protect rules and traditions, or to 
maintain harmonious relationships (lower scores for Conservation values: F (2, 2245) = 
34.884, p < 0.001). This result falls in line with previous research by Schwartz (2010) that 
showed a strong negative correlation between levels of political activism and Conservation 
values. Schwartz (2010) also reported strong negative correlations between Conservation 
values and a range of other 'political' measures, including tolerance of immigrants and support 
for organisations that promote or protect animal rights, peace, and the environment. Two  
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Figure 7.1 Comparison of higher order values (centred mean scores) across frontbench MPs, 
















conclusions may be drawn here. Firstly, these results suggest that MPs who rise to the top of 
the 'greasy pole' are those least committed to cultural or religious norms (Tradition values), 
least restrained in their actions, impulses or inclinations (Conformity values), and least 
concerned about the stability of their own relationships or society (Security values). These 
findings would seem appropriate, given the sacrifices required in order to build a successful 
political career in Parliament (Childs, 2016). However, they also raise some worrying 
questions about the circumspection of those MPs who hold the most power over far-reaching 
policy decisions and who make those decisions under the time pressure of fixed term 
Parliaments in the UK. Secondly, this result would suggest that frontbench MPs of all partisan 
affiliations are far more liberal in their psychological outlook than the public they represent. 










Figure 7.2 Comparison of lower order basic values for frontbench MPs (n = 63) and backbench MPs 
(n = 40).
 
 Within the context of the earlier debate in this section about parliamentary self-
selection and power, it is especially interesting to note the difference in Self-Enhancement 
values between frontbench and backbench MPs (Figure 7.2). Although the difference here is 
amplified by Achievement rather than Power values, the result is still highly significant. The 
data would suggest that those who rise to the top are far more ambitious, self-respectful, and 
desirous of influence than those who remain on the backbench. Asked if they could describe 
those MPs who succeeded in gaining additional responsibilities, interviewee 6 responded: 
'People with ability. People with ambition. People who are connected.' As powerful 
motivators of goal-oriented behaviour, it seems that Achievement values are as evident to 
MPs in the actions of their more 'successful' colleagues as Self-Transcendence values appear 
to be as motivators across the House. Answering the same question as above, another 
interviewee commented: 
[A]mbition is a wonderful thing. They’re all driven by extreme ambition; even in the 
Lords. And people, of course, who acquire ambition by the time they get to 50 or 60 
can’t give it up. How do you give up being what you are? It’s habit (Interviewee 2) 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these results. In the first instance, these data 
show that MPs are not psychologically homogeneous. In particular, ambition - in the sense of 
pursuing personal gain or success as implied by Achievement values - is not evenly spread 
across the so-called political class. The skew in these results neatly captures significant 
differentials within the elected parliamentary community that run along hierarchical 



























indict a self-interested elite within an elite. As argued in chapter 3, the extraordinary ambition 
of those who seek and secure elected office, and in turn climb to positions of influence, may 
not necessarily be negative if, in turn, that ambition works with and services more important 
motivational goals aimed at improving the lives of others (i.e. Benevolence and Universalism 
values). This line of inquiry demands further research. 
III. The Role of Basic Values in Parliamentary Recruitment 
 So far this chapter has compared the basic values of UK MPs and the British public, 
revealing a number of highly significant differences. MPs are, by comparison to their electors, 
'extraordinary' in their motivation to secure justice, equality and help others (Self-
Transcendence values). However, they are also relatively more motivated by personal success 
and the desire for social influence (Self-Enhancement values). This extreme ambition not only 
differentiates MPs from those they represent but similarly distinguishes between those who 
occupy frontbench offices and those who do not. This section now turns to examine the role 
of that ambition in parliamentary recruitment. In doing so, the relative contribution of basic 
values to the exercise of political ambition (and successful candidacy) is examined alongside 
socio-demographic variables. 
 The results presented in the previous sections demonstrate that basic values can 
capture meaningful distinctions between the governors and governed. It is reasonable to 
expect, therefore, that those same distinctions - and the substantial variations in personal 
motivations that they represent - might also help to explain why certain individuals are 
attracted to politics and run for office (i.e. candidate activation). Contra to rational choice 
studies of political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966; Stone and Maisel, 2003), chapter 3 of this 
thesis argued that explanations of candidate emergence that depend entirely on the structural 
conditions of political and social systems are insufficient. Instead, it is argued that members 
of the public are not equally desirous of political office. Differences in personality are 
anticipated to characterise what Jennifer Lawless (2012, p.19) calls 'nascent ambition' and 
ultimately forecast its expression through elite political participation. The comprehensive 
model of candidate emergence presented in chapter 3 (Figure 3.1, p.66) therefore predicts that 
basic values will exert a significant effect on political ambition in tandem with previously 
researched socio-demographic variables such as profession, education and gender (cf. Allen 
and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012). 
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 In order to test these predictions, comparative data were again combined from the elite 
sample of MPs collected for this project and the ESS sample of the British public. Together, 
these data sets provide information on participants' basic values, age, gender, education, 
occupations and experience of politics. Prior involvement with politics - in the formal sense 
of working with, being an active member of, or volunteering for political parties and trade 
unions - is used here as a proxy for the political opportunity structures faced by participants. 
Although prior experience may interact with other socio-demographic variables, it is assumed 
that a) participants will be more likely to have accrued these experiences where opportunities 
to do so were transparent, and b) that formal political participation will provide the contacts 
and knowledge necessary to secure a successful candidacy. As anticipated, preliminary 
analysis revealed a significant correlation between being an MP and having prior experience 
of politics (r (2369) = 0.129, p < 0.001). In line with prior research on the political ambition 
of the British public (Allen and Cutts, 2018), being an MP also correlated positively with 
levels of education (r (2369) = 0.239, p < 0.001) and whether participants worked in high-
earning private sector professions (r (2369) = 0.403, p < 0.001), but correlated negatively with 
being a woman (r (2369) = -0.088, p < 0.001). Correlations between being an MP and each of 
the higher order basic values were also statistically significant. These correlations were 
positive for Openness to Change, Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement values, but 
negative for Conservation values. These trends might be anticipated, given the differences 
reported in section I between the basic values of MPs and the public.  
 To investigate the predictive power of these variables, a logit regression model was 
calculated using the statistical software SPSS (Table 7.3).
68
 Based on the theoretical 
assumptions of the model presented in chapter 3 (Figure 3.1, p.66), variables were included 
sequentially to test the cumulative effect of personality (basic values), demographics (age and 
gender), socialisation and professional skills (education and profession), and political 
opportunity structures (experience of politics). Eight of the ten lower order basic values were 
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 Dependent variable MP(Dummy): 1 = Elected MP; 0 = Member of the public.  
Independent variables: Basic Human Values (Conformity, Tradition, Security, Benevolence, Universalism, 
Self-Direction, Stimulation, Power) = centred mean scores (MRAT); Age = continuous data; Gender (Dummy) 
= 1 - Female, 0 - Male; Education (rescaled 0-1) = 1 - No qualifications, 2 - Apprenticeship, 3 - A-
Levels/Vocational Diploma, 4 - Bachelor's Degree, 5 - Postgraduate Degree; Occupation 1 (Dummy) = 1 - 
Brokerage professions (e.g. law, finance, consultancy, public relations), 0 - Other occupation; Occupation 2 
(Dummy) = 1 - Manual or administrative professions (e.g. construction, public amenities, personal assistant, 
secretary), 0 - Other occupation; Occupation 3 (Dummy) = 1 - Public sector professionals (e.g. teacher, doctor, 
lecturer, civil servant), 0 - Other occupation; Occupation 4 (Dummy) = 1 - 'Helping' professions (e.g. third 
sector charity or NGO, emergency services), 0 - Other occupation; Political Experience (Dummy) = 1 - Prior 
experience (e.g. trade union member, political researcher, involvement with a political party), 0 - No experience. 
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included in these models. Due to the multicollinearity of factors that sit in a sinusoidal space, 
regression coefficients can be inaccurate and misleading if all ten values are included in 
regression equations (see Appendix E). To limit the number of variables, Achievement values 
and Hedonism values are excluded here a priori on the basis that they do not reveal any 
significant differences between MPs and the British public (see section I, above). 
 The regression coefficients for all variables are presented in Table 7.3; the odds ratios 
for each variable have also been included for ease of interpretation.
 
The results show that 
basic values are strong predictors of whether someone becomes an MP, even after controlling 
for age, gender, education, occupation and prior experience in politics. Taken together 
Benevolence values and Conformity values (again presuming inflated scores according to 
interpersonal elements) are particularly important. These results suggest that individuals who 
score highest for these values - and are by implication most motivated by caring for and 
supporting the welfare of others - are much more likely to become an MP than individuals 
who score lowest for these values. The same is true of Stimulation values, indicating that 
those most motivated by excitement, novelty and challenge are more likely to enter elected 
office.   
 Tradition and Security values, by contrast, are negative predictors in these models. 
Therefore, those individuals scoring highest for values of respect, stability, and commitment 
to accepted norms and customs were less as likely to be MPs.  Of all the basic values included 
in these models, Power values are the strongest predictors of being an MP. Each unit change 
in the average scale response to items tapping Power values in the PVQ is associated here 
with a five-fold increase in the odds of the participant being an MP. Hence, those individuals 
most motivated by social influence, authority and public recognition were many times more 
likely to be an MP than individuals least motivated by Power values.
 69
 These results should 
be interpreted in relative terms. Although, for example, Power values are the strongest 
predictor of whether someone is an MP, this does not show that Power values are most 
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 Robustness checks were conducted to rule out the effects of multicollinearity in the regression model. Firstly, 
the inter-item correlations between each basic value in the model were inspected. Only one correlation exceeded 
.5 (Power and Universalism, r = .54) but this was not strong enough to cause concern. Secondly, a series of 
linear regression models were conducted that replaced status (MP or Not) as the dependent variable with each of 
the basic values in turn. All other variables were retained in these models. These regression equations allowed 
for more precise collinearity diagnostics, in particular the Tolerance statistics and Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) of each value item. For each value item, the tolerance levels of the other value items were well above the 
recommended levels of .10 (e.g., Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), .20 (Menard, 1995), and even .25 (e.g., Huber 
and Stephens, 1993). Similarly, the VIF statistics for each value item - as a predictor of another value item - were 
below 2, and thus well beneath the maximum VIF scores of 5 (e.g., Rogerson, 2001) and even 4 (e.g., Pan & 
Jackson, 2008) recommended in the literature. 
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B(S.E.)                      Exp(B) 
(+) Demographics 
 
B(S.E.)                         Exp(B) 
(+) Professional skills/resources 
 
B(S.E.)                              Exp(B) 
(+) Political Opportunity 
 
B(S.E.)                            Exp(B) 
1. Basic Values:     
Conformity 1.05 (.14) ***               2.846 1.00 (.15) ***                  2.728 1.39 (.22) ***                       4.053 1.39 (.22) ***                    4.012 
Tradition -.47 (.13) ***                 .624 -.54 (0.14) ***                   .585 -.48 (.18) *                              .619 -.46 (.18) *                           .629 
Benevolence 1.16 (.21) ***               3.198 1.31 (.21) ***                  3.719 1.47 (.28) ***                       4.337 1.41 (.29) ***                    4.092 
Universalism .88 (.19) ***                 2.431 .86 (.20) ***                    2.352 .75 (.26) ***                         2.113 .67 (.26) *                          1.944 
Self-Direction .28 (.16)                        1.321 .19 (.16)                           1.216 .11 (.21)                                1.112 .11 (.21)                             1.119 
Stimulation .87 (.17) ***                 2.396 .82 (.17) ***                    2.276 1.03 (.24) ***                       2.802 1.01 (.24) ***                    2.732 
Power 1.51 (.19) ***               4.543 1.52 (.19) ***                  4.556 1.68 (.27) ***                       5.383 1.65 (.27) ***                    5.210 
Security -.36 (0.15) *                   .696 -.38 (.16) *                         .684 -.25 (.22) *                              .783 -.34 (.22) *                           .713 
     
2. Demographics:     
Age - .02 (.01) **                      1.020 .05 (0.01) ***                       1.051 .05 (0.01) ***                     1.052 
Gender - -0.957 (0.26) ***             0.384 -.92 (0.34) **                          .397 -.94 (0.34) **                       .390 
     
3. Professional:  -   
Education - - 4.09 (0.64) ***                   60.090 4.18 (0.66) ***                65.460 
Occupation 1 - - 3.55 (0.46) ***                   34.740 3.46 (0.46) ***                31.954 
Occupation 2 - - -1.56 (0.73) *                          .210 -1.67 (0.75) *                       .188 
Occupation 3 - - -.74 (0.64)                               .477 -.69 (0.65)                            .504 
Occupation 4 - - 2.23 (0.66) ***                     9.251 2.22 (0.67) ***                   9.245 
     
4. Political 
Opportunity: 
    
Prior Experience - - - 1.06 (0.35) **                    2.889 
     
Model Statistics:     
Chi Square 261.59 *** 277.09 *** 513.72 *** 524.83 *** 
Cox & Snell R 
Squared 
0.112 0.122 0.217 0.221 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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important to those same individuals by comparison to other basic values.
 
This is evident from 
the results presented in sections I and II. 
 The results show that demographic variables are also, as expected, powerful predictors 
of being an MP. Each additional year of age in the sample population is associated here, for 
example, with a 5% increase in the likelihood of the participant being an MP. Gender also 
exerts a statistically significant effect: the odds ratios indicate that women are 2.5 times less 
likely than men to become an MP. Second to basic values, socialisation variables (education 
and occupation) are the strongest predictors of being an MP. In the first instance, the highly 
educated (those with postgraduate qualifications) are 65 times more likely to be an MP than 
those without any qualifications. Occupational experiences are also powerful predictors. 
Individuals working in Brokerage professions (now or previously) are, in particular, 32 times 
more likely than those in other professions to become an MP. Though weaker, a similar 
positive association can be seen between elected politics and 'helping professions' such as 
charity work and the emergency services. By contrast, individuals in manual or administrative 
professions are 4.5 times less likely as those in other professions to become an MP. Being in a 
public sector professional occupation such as teaching or medicine exerts a negative, yet not 
significant, effect on the outcome variable.   
 As rational choice theorists would anticipate, the results also show that individuals 
with prior experience of formal politics are almost 3 times more likely to be an MP than those 
without. However, by comparison with the effects other variables in this model, political 
opportunity structures appear to be helpful, yet insufficient, when it comes to explaining 
successful candidate emergence. The pseudo r-squared scores reported in Table 7.3 show that 
the amount of variance in the outcome variable explained by the predictors increases in each 
model cumulatively. That said, basic values jointly account for 11.2% of variance in the 
outcome variable, more than any other set of variables tested here. This supports the 
theoretical assumptions proposed in chapter 3: that a) personality characteristics act as a 
highly effective self-selective mechanism in political recruitment, and b) personality 
characteristics contribute as much or more weight to explanations of who enters elite politics 
as other individual differences or structural conditions. 
 The results presented in these regression models are testament to the hyper-selectivity 
of elite politics in the UK. Above all, these data show that basic values are - as in other 
occupational domains - highly predictive of career choice (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013; Knafo 
and Sagiv, 2004; Sagiv, 2002). On one hand, the strong associations found here between 
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Openness to Change values and political office are indicative of the creative, problem-solving 
nature of the job, as opposed to more programmatic and risk averse professions that tend to 
attract individuals high in Conservation values (Arieli and Tenne-Gazit, 2017). The predictive 
power of Stimulation values, in particular, suggests that this link is more affect-oriented than 
cognitive (associated with the explorative and investigative motivations of Self-Direction 
values); it is the desire for excitement, impulsiveness and diversity that attracts people to elite 
politics. On the other hand, these results also complement previous research demonstrating 
the link between Self-Transcendence values and 'calling' professions (Gandal et al., 2005). It 
would appear that citizens attracted to political office have an intense calling orientation and 
see elected politics as a vehicle through which to fulfil socially valuable work and obtain 
some level of self-actualisation.   
 A ‘calling’ orientation was also a common theme in the interview data. As interviewee 
7 commented, '[w]hen I left school, I had this plan that I wanted to help people and that was 
kind of my aim in life.' For most interviewees, their decision to enter politics had been a 
value-laden one. There was, across nearly all interviewees, a sense of injustice or inequality 
that they perceived in the world around them and sought to correct through the political arena. 
One Labour MP expressed this sentiment in forceful terms: 
I don’t remember ever deciding to [enter politics], it was more that it felt very natural 
to do it... I think the world seemed an unfair place. I felt incredibly… Nothing else 
interested me, really. I felt that that was so urgent. That it was what one should devote 
one’s life to doing. That was kind of in my late teens. I just, I don't know, I suppose I 
was just awakened. I had no idea why anyone would do anything else (Interviewee 8)  
However, the prosocial side of politics as a vocation is juxtaposed against politics as a tribal, 
competitive, and (inside Parliament) hierarchical occupation. It is possibly not surprising, 
therefore, that the results presented in Table 7.3 show that individuals who attribute more 
importance to Power values are more likely to enter elite politics. This was captured neatly in 
the comments of one former Secretary of State: 
I am ambitious and, luckily, not too worried about showing it, which is always helpful, 
I think. [...] I’m strongly of the view that politics is a collective process. However, 
being an MP is one of the more individualistic things that I’ve ever done in my life. 
You need to have quite a strong sense of self-belief and ambition in order to survive 
and be successful (Interviewee 5) 
If politics per se attracts people with a calling orientation, then parliamentary politics in the 
UK also attracts individuals with an above-average level of enterprising interest (see also 
Holland, 1997). Given that basic values have been found to predict employee performance as 
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well as career choice, it may be that individuals scoring highest in Self-Enhancement values 
are necessarily those most adapted to survive and succeed once they enter Parliament. 
 Asked why they entered politics, interviewees also placed a great deal of emphasis on 
their education. In line with the results presented in Table 7.3, interviewees were particularly 
insistent that university life had presented them with a gateway for politics. As a former 
frontbench MP reflected: 
I think I really started to get interested at university. I didn't get really involved in 
student politics but I know while I was at university, I remember, was the first time I 
actually went canvassing for the Labour Party in a general election (Interviewee 15)  
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data presented here point to the powerful 
socialising effect of higher education on future politicians. This effect would seem to be as 
much about initiating individuals into political debate and thought as providing them with 
new opportunity structures to engage with formal institutions. The following interviewees 
typify this distinction: 
[M]y political education really started at university. I went to university at a time of 
ferment, when people said you don’t come to university to get a degree and a good 
job, you come to university to change the world (Interviewee 1) 
I was at XXXX University and involved with student politics. I was President of the 
XXXX, the Student Representative Council, which is the Scottish equivalent, I 
suppose, of the Students’ Union, and then became President of the XXXX. So, I was 
active in student politics, but I joined the Labour Party at the same time (Interviewee 
12) 
 In addition, the interviews revealed limitations with the statistical analysis. They 
highlighted variables that were neither measured nor considered in the survey data. In 
particular, interviewees talked about the importance of familial connections with politics and, 
above all, about luck. In the first instance, it was apparent to a number of interviewees that 
their political ambitions, or at least their readiness for political participation as an adult, had 
been burnished by familial networks. 
My idea of fun when I was a child was when election day came round, and I got to 
cycle backwards and forwards to the polling station and pick up the numbers, because 
my mum and dad were both actively involved as local councillors. So, I had a strong 
sense, from quite an early age, of debate and political process, and also, I suppose, was 
motivated by the idea that I could play a role in changing the way that things worked 
(Interviewee 5) 
This would add weight to prior research indicating the link between individuals interested in 
running for political office and individuals whose parents had been politically active (Allen 
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and Cutts, 2018). Given that basic values are at their most flexible in childhood, it is possible 
that this level of early socialisation into politics shares a powerful interaction effect with them 
when it comes to predicting an individual's future political involvement. What survey data and 
statistical analysis cannot account for, however, is the role played by luck. On top of the self-
selection for elite politics demonstrated in this thesis, there is also a long list of potentially 
uncontrollable variables - for example, the inclinations and preferences of party selectorates 
and the wider electorate, or the performance of party leaders - that may help a candidate to 
reach office. Interviewee 6 reflects upon one such series of events: 
I looked at London, I was chair of the London Labour party then, and I looked at the 
map of London, saw boundary changes: two old seats had been put together near 
where I lived, where I had some contacts. I put my hat in the ring with 60 other people 
and managed to use the lesson that I'd learnt from Margaret Hodge and beat the other 
59 people and got selected as a candidate and ended up here.   
For others, their introduction to formal politics was far more coincidental and unplanned. 
Recalling a chance encounter with the Young Liberals in the basement bar of a hotel, one 
interviewee described the happenstance occasion that sparked their political career: 
One of the young persons walked towards me and he said, “Excuse me, we are the 
Young Liberals.” No idea what the Young Liberals was, I said, “What’s your 
problem?” He said, “We can’t get on with our meeting because we haven’t got a 
quorum." I said, “What’s a quorum?” He said, “We need four or five people to make a 
quorum.” I said, “What do I have to do?” He said, “You pay half a crown,” that was 
two shilling six pence, "and you’re a member." I said, “Great,” paying two shilling six 
pence, something to chat about and that was my introduction to the Liberal Democrats 
(Interviewee 11) 
  The data presented in this section are rich in both the breadth and depth of the insights 
they provide about elite political recruitment. The quantitative data indicate that personality - 
here measured using the Schwartz taxonomy of BHV - can significantly discriminate between 
'who' enters Parliament and the motivations that they bring to the job (Hypothesis 1). Contra 
to previous studies (Allen and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012; Schlesinger, 1966), it is argued 
that structural and socialisation variables, as well as political opportunity structures, do not 
inculcate political ambition but rather facilitate the expression of particular psychological 
motivations through the realm of politics. As such, future studies should study political 
ambition and political recruitment within a far more holistic approach, one that recognises the 








IV. Professional Politicians and Claims of Careerism 
 The logistic regression models reported in section III indicated a strong association 
between brokerage professions (law, management consultancy, public relations, journalism 
and finance) and becoming an MP. This finding is broadly in line with prior research by Paul 
Cairney (2007, p.6), who argues that these professions provide the skills, resources and 
proximity to elite politics that are conducive to seeking election. Of the elite sample surveyed 
in this research project, 60% had previously worked in these professions (Table 7.4). Given 
that these occupations are generally used as proxy indicators of social grades A and B (NRS, 
2016), these results would also seem to confirm comparative research on a) the amplifying 
effect of wealth upon political ambition (Allen and Cutts, 2018, p. 3) and b) the increasing 
exclusion of the working classes from elite politics (Evans and Tilley, 2015, 2017). However, 
there is a leap of abstract reasoning required to presume that these 'career' oriented 
professions, and the conveyor belt between their offices and Westminster, necessarily produce 
MPs of questionable moral fibre (Allen and Cairney, 2015). This final section of chapter 7 
focuses on the effect of wealth and prior political employment to test derogative claims about 
'career politicians' as a new breed of MP. 
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 If MPs from brokerage backgrounds are, in fact, more self-interested and career 
oriented than their colleagues from 'real jobs' (cf. Lamont, 2014), then these differences 
should emerge in their BHV. However, an independent samples T-Test indicates no such 
trend (Figure 7.3). MPs from brokerage and non-brokerage professions share very similar 
value profiles. Although MPs who have worked in brokerage occupations score slightly 
higher for Self-Enhancement values, none of the differences seen between the higher order 
values of these groups are statistically significant. If MPs are not matching up to public 
expectations for ethical integrity (cf. Birch and Allen, 2015), this data would suggest that it is 
not because of their occupational homogeneity. Moreover, the relative proportion of MPs in 
this sample from 'helping' professions - and the predictive strength of this occupational 
category upon becoming an MP (see section III, Table 7.3) - runs counter-intuitive to the 
claim that elite politics is restricted to those with wealth or those only interested in the pursuit 
of wealth.  
 
Figure 7.3 A comparison of MPs from brokerage (n = 64) and non-brokerage (n = 41) professions. 
Scores show centred mean ratings (rescaled 0-1) for MPs' higher order basic values. 
 
 
 Of equal if not greater concern for those studying and commenting on the 
professionalisation of politics has been the rise of the career politician (Allen, 2013; Cowley, 
2012). Indeed, Cairney (2007) argues that the post-war period has seen a proliferation in the 
number of 'instrumental' jobs (from local councillor to party official, parliamentary staff to 
special advisor) that are of direct aid to election and, increasingly, occupy the majority of 
MPs' pre-parliamentary careers. In the present study, 76% of MPs surveyed (n = 80) had 
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worked in politics at some point before entering Parliament. The current sample ranged in 
their prior experience of politics from ‘none at all’ to elected office in local or devolved 
governments, working as a party researcher, Trade Union official, special adviser and party 
campaign manager. However, tests of difference revealed no statistically significant 
differences in BHV between those with and without pre-parliamentary political careers. The 
data also revealed no significant correlations between MPs' previous political experience and 
their basic values. 
 
 Adapting Cairney's (2007, p.6) categorisation of politics-facilitating professions, 
participants from ‘instrumental’ careers were split further between ‘elected’ and ‘non-elected’ 
subtypes. It was anticipated that those who had pursued elected office elsewhere might share 
substantive psychological motivations (i.e. to serve others through meaningful policy or, 
alternatively, to dominate policy resources) that are not necessarily served in other 'political' 
careers. The differences in BHV between these subgroups, though still not statistically 
significant, show interesting variation between those with non-elected political experience and 
the rest (Table 7.5). For example, the data indicate that non-elected instrumentals are actually 
more likely to seek risks, challenges and to innovate (Openness to Change values), and to be 
less concerned with conforming to traditional ways of thinking or acting (Conservation 
values). This suggests that 'new' pre-political careers inside the Westminster bubble - those 
that are of politics but do not carry elected responsibility - are potentially producing a 
different kind of MP. These trends warrant further research with a larger sample. 
 
Table 7.5 Comparison of MPs’ basic values according to prior political experience. 
 
Centred Mean Scores (S.E) 
 
Higher Order Values No Prior Political 
Occupation (n = 26) 
Elected Instrumental 
Occupation (n = 44) 
Non-Elected 
Instrumental 
Occupation (n = 36) 
 
Openness to Change - 0.071(0.11) 
 
- 0.054 (0.09) 0.115 (0.09) 
Self-Transcendence 0.896 (0.15) 
 
1.017 (0.10) 1.067 (0.10) 
Self-Enhancement - 0.440 (0.14) 
 
- 0.547 (0.13) - 0.413 (0.13) 
Conservation - 0.232 (0.13) - 0.260 (0.13) - 0.551 (0.13) 
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 The data presented here contradict assumptions made in the political class narrative 
about the careerism of MPs who have only ever worked in politics (Hypothesis 2). If they are 
desirous of personal gain, policy control, or wealth, this is not borne out in their basic values. 
If anything, they are just as committed to helping others and seeking equality for all groups 
(Self-Transcendence values) as their colleagues from 'normal' professions. Only two of the 
MPs interviewed disagreed with the principle of professionalisation and the idea, in particular, 
that MPs might only ever work in politics prior to election.  However, these MPs were 
adamant that non-political careers provided more balanced representatives who were in tune 
with the zeitgeist of their electors. 
I sound like a fuddy-duddy now but I think it's good to have done something else. To 
have what Dennis Healey used to call a "hinterland" [...] I was a mental health social 
worker for six years sectioning people in my twenties, which is something else, I can 
tell you. Then I was on the staff in XXXX of teaching various bits of social work and 
social policy, and law and stuff. It didn't actually change my political stance right left, 
as it were, but it gave me a huge insight into [...] what my constituents are struggling 
with. So, when I got here I think I was fully fledged (Interviewee 4) 
The idea of building a community connection was a common theme among interviewees 
when discussing this topic. For the majority, political jobs provided aspiring MPs with far 
greater exposure to people's needs and indeed, the salient social, economic and political 
feelings of a time, than 'ordinary' occupations.  
I’m not sure, actually, because you’ve had a life in politics, meeting ordinary people 
through campaigning, fighting elections, working with experts in lots of different 
fields, makes you any less qualified to stand up in Parliament and speak up on causes 
than if supposedly you’ve done something like, say, run one business for 20 years and 
then after 20 years of running a single business become an MP. It means as an MP you 
know an awful lot about that one business you’ve run, but not necessarily much else 
(Interviewee 13)  
Contrary to accusations that career politicians might be out of touch, interviewees argued the 
exact opposite. For most, politics necessarily involved listening to people and getting to know 
their problems and their beliefs. Starting early was, therefore, not simply an advantage in 
terms of forging links with all types of people but it also produced more competent 
representatives when those individuals finally stood for office. Interviewee 8 - who had been 
both a councillor and a political researcher prior to entering Parliament - talked passionately 
about the effective foundations provided by her previous employment: 
It all felt very familiar. Especially as well as being a researcher, being a councillor. It 
really helped, understanding how Whitehall worked, because you could make them 
work for you when you were trying to get stuff done as a constituency MP. You knew 
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who to speak to, you knew how the processes worked. I think it saved me a lot of time 
as junior minister having been a special adviser, because I knew how to operate within 
that system [...] I think that was unbelievably helpful, just made me more effective. 
Taken together, the anecdotal evidence provided by interviewees and the quantitative data 
collected from all survey participants, suggests that career politicians are not substantively 
different in terms of their basic values than MPs without prior political employment. 
Alongside the results presented throughout this chapter, these findings have far-reaching 
implications for academic studies of elite politics and, in turn, the causes of psychologically-
based anti-political rhetoric in the media and the public domain.  
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"[W]e’re so keen to find fault – not just with our politicians but with our political system – 
that we very frequently forget, as citizens, that democracy is what we collectively make it. 
Casting stones at politicians, and diminishing the importance of the democracy in which we 
live, ultimately damages us all." 
Labour MP (Interviewee 16)  
Psychological scrutiny of UK Representatives in an Age of Anti-Politics 
 The personalities of politicians are playing an ever more prominent role in political 
leadership around the world (Caprara and Silvester, 2018). This was particularly stark in both 
the US presidential election of 2016 and the UK General Election of 2017. In the latter, for 
example, voters compared the candidates as much on psychological characteristics as physical 
ones; the 'robotic' yet 'decisive' Theresa May was contrasted with the 'principled' yet 'weak' 
Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn (YouGov, 2017). A burgeoning literature has testified to the 
frequency with which voters are now using personality as a human yardstick for making 
judgements about political candidates (Bittner, 2014; Garzia, 2011; Stulp et al., 2013). 
However, most studies focus only on the voting public or are, where they introduce elite 
analysis, severely limited by at-a-distance methodologies and, in political science in 
particular, a reluctance to cross disciplinary boundaries (cf. Wyatt and Silvester, 2018). This 
thesis joins a select body of research that has managed to extract self-report data from 
politicians themselves, and is the only research project to obtain data on the Basic Human 
Values (BHV) of national politicians anywhere outside of Italy (Caprara et al., 2003).  
 This chapter builds on the results presented in chapter 7 to add more depth and nuance 
to the understanding of research question 1: how different are MPs, psychologically, to those 
they represent. The chapter is organised into two substantive sections, each of which has three 
sub-components. Section I interrogates the model of candidate emergence (Chapter 7, section 
III) in more detail, focusing in particular on the effects of age, gender and education upon the 
BHV of both MPs and the public. Section II then focuses on the interaction between 
partisanship and basic values in British politics. This section analyses data on basic values to 
a) understand psychological differences between MPs from different political parties, b) 
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delineate psychological representative links between MPs and their party's voters, and c) 
assess the psychological characteristics of those who disengage from formal politics. Where 
possible, qualitative evidence from 17 in-depth interviews with UK MPs is used to support 
quantitative analysis. 
I. At the Intersections: Descriptive Representation of Multiple Publics 
 I have argued in this thesis that the legitimacy of Parliament, as a democratic 
institution, depends upon substantive policy responsiveness to the interests of all socio-
demographic groups in the polity. However, existing research into democratic deficits has 
largely focused, instead, on the participative benefits generated among under-represented 
groups by the individual or collective presence of descriptive representatives (Childs and 
Cowley, 2011; Rocha et al., 2010; Uhlaner and Scola, 2016). In order to add to the minority 
empowerment thesis and build a case for 'preferable descriptive representatives' (Dovi, 2002), 
this PhD analyses self-report data on the BHV of 106 MPs in the UK. This section divides 
this sample by age, gender and education in order to compare their psychological 
characteristics to corresponding groups in the general population (European Social Survey, 
2014; N = 2154). A series of factorial ANOVA models is used to assess the extent to which 
MPs are more or less similar to one another in their basic values than the 'descriptive' sub-
populations to which, either by nature or nurture, they are drawn from. In each model the 
participants’ higher order values were analysed using two between-participant factors of 
status (MP vs. Public) and either gender (male vs. female), age (Under 50 vs. Over 50), or 




 The first factorial ANOVA showed that the main effects of both status (Openness to 
Change, F(1, 2254) = 11.22, p < 0.001; Self-Transcendence, F(1, 2254) = 16.94, p < 0.001; 
Self-Enhancement, F(1, 2254) = 24.6, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 2254) = 60.92, p < 0.001) 
and age (Openness to Change, F(1, 2254) = 4.27, p < 0.05; Self-Transcendence, F(1, 2254) = 
5.55, p < 0.05; Self-Enhancement, F(1, 2254) = 11.25, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 2254) = 
9.65, p < 0.01) were unlikely to have arisen from sampling error. The F statistics are 
significant for both predictor variables, indicating that each has an effect upon an individual's 
basic values regardless of the other. Put another way, being an MP significantly predicts an 
individual's BHV (as per Chapter 7) and being over or under 50 years old also influences an 
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individual's BHV.  However, the interactions between status and age were not significant, 
indicating that those over and under the age of 50 displayed similar variance in basic values 
within each status group.
71
 Together, these variables accounted for 18.7% (adjusted partial η² 
= 0.187) of the variance in participants' four higher order values.  
 Independent t-tests were conducted to explore these intra-group differences further 
(Table 8.1). The results show that amongst both MPs and the public, the over-50s are more 
motivated by justice, equality and caring for others (Self-Transcendence values). By 
comparison the under-50s are more open to risk and challenge (Openness to Change values), 
and also more motivated by success and power (Self-Enhancement values). At a between-
groups level, the over-50s in the elite and public samples are significantly different on all four 
value factors, whereas the under-50s are only significantly different from one another for 
Self-Enhancement and Conservation values. This implies that MPs under the age of 50 in 
Parliament are more representative, psychologically, of their corresponding cohorts in the 
public than those over the age of 50. In particular, MPs over the age of 50 are far less 
motivated by traditions and maintaining social or religious order (Conservation values) than 
comparable age groups in the British public.  
Table 8.1 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by age (under-50 vs. over 50). 
Mean Differences 
 










































- 0.35 * 
 












N 2154 106 1057 1201 
Two-tailed significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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 Physical changes that accompany the aging process have been shown to affect people's 
tolerance for risk and their capacity to comprehend and cope with large-scale change (e.g. 
Inceoglu et al., 2012). It is not surprising, therefore, that older participants in this study score 
higher for Conservation values in both the elite and public samples. However, this age 
differential is more muted (and not statistically significant) among MPs. Although the age 
categories used here are necessarily blunt to maximise the statistical power of the data, this 
result may also suggest that MPs are less susceptible to cohort effects (cf. Inglehart, 1997). If 
collective critical junctures can have an impact on the basic values of certain age cohorts 
(Schwartz, 2005) then such effects are not as easily discernible in elected politicians, whose 
personalities appear to be less different from one another than those of corresponding citizens 
at a similar age. 
b) Gender 
 The second factorial model shows the main effects of status (Openness to Change, 
F(1, 2254) = 12.27, p < 0.001; Self-Transcendence, F(1, 2254) = 31.06, p < 0.001; Self-
Enhancement, F(1, 2254) = 26.87, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 2254) = 76.01, p < 0.001) 
and gender (Self-Transcendence, F(1, 2254) = 8.91, p < 0.01; Conservation, F(1, 2254) = 
7.72, p < 0.01), as well as the interactions between them (Self-Enhancement, F(1, 2254) = 
15.12, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 2254) = 14.67, p < 0.001).
72
 This model accounted for 
13.2% (adjusted partial η² = 0.132) of the overall variance in the four higher order values. The 
main effects are broken down further and illustrated in Figure 8.1. These results show that 
when one ignores the presence of gender, MPs and the public significantly differ across all 
higher order values (as per Chapter 7); when one ignores whether a participant is an MP, 
gender has a significant effect on two of the higher order values; and, finally, the interaction 
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Figure 8.1 Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): plots to show the effects of status      (MP vs. 
Public) and gender (male vs. female) on four higher order basic values. 


































































 A series of additional independent samples t-tests adds nuance to these results (Table 
8.2). The data presented above and below show that - apart from Self-Transcendence values – 
men and women MPs show inverted differences in basic values by comparison with men and 
women in the general population. Women MPs are, for example, more self-motivated and 
curious to try new things (Openness to Change values) and more ambitious to succeed and 
gain recognition (Self-Enhancement values), than male MPs. However, these differences were 
not statistically significant in the present sample. By contrast, men and women in the general 
population differed across all four value factors to a high degree of statistical significance 
(Table 8.2). Unlike their parliamentary counterparts, women in the general population sample 
were less motivated than men by the need for creativity, autonomy, excitement and pleasure 
(Openness to Change values) and by the need for prestige, social status and demonstrating 
their competence (Self-Enhancement values). Yet as with women MPs, women in the general 
population sample were more motivated than men by understanding, appreciating, and 
protecting others (Self-Transcendence values). The last of these findings complements prior 
research on the heightened psychological need for communal affiliation among women 
(Chodorow, 1990) and the impact of socialisation variables in childhood upon women's BHV 
(Schwartz, 2005). 
 These findings are also extremely informative at a between groups level: 
supplementary t-tests show that women MPs differ significantly in their basic values to 
women in the public on all four value factors, whereas male MPs only do so for two. This 
would suggest that male MPs are psychologically more representative - in terms of BHV - of 
men in the general public than women MPs are of women. As with age, these data show that 
the differences in basic values (by gender) are greater between MPs and their corresponding 
cohorts in the public than within either group (Hypothesis 3). This finding is significant given 
that the political class narrative often collapses to complaints about failures of descriptive 
representation (in that politicians do not look like the people they represent) and failures of 
substantive representation (in that politicians are out of touch with popular interests) (Allen 










Table 8.2 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by gender (male vs. female). 
Mean Differences 
 
Basic Values Public 
Men vs. Women 
MPs 
Men vs. Women 
Public Men vs. 
MPs Men 
Public Women 




















- 0.37 *** 
 























N 2154 106 1043 1215 
Two-tailed significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 Within the parliamentary sample, it seems appropriate that these findings be placed, 
for example, within the context of Westminster's enduring gender imbalance. Although all-
women shortlists and parliamentary reforms to working hours and childcare have greatly 
improved gender parity in Parliament, the institutional fabric of formal and informal 
parliamentary politics remains overwhelmingly masculine (Campbell et al., 2010). Not 
enough has been done to challenge an historical culture of male dominance and corresponding 
exploitation of women MPs (Meakin, 2017). In a report on the representativeness of the 
House of Commons, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Women in Parliament (2014, p.26) 
noted: 'You see pictures of men on the walls; you see statues of men lining the corridors; you 
see men everywhere'.  
In this context, the findings presented here indicate the strength, or at least style, of 
character needed by female candidates. The results indicate that women MPs are governed by 
less concern for stable or harmonious social relations than their male colleagues; they are 
more confident when it comes to violating social expectations and norms; and they are more 
independent than male MPs. These characteristics are arguably appropriate for anyone 
entering politics but especially so for women, who require extraordinary resilience and 
ambition to overcome the effects of generalised political socialisation patterns and to succeed 
in a highly gendered working environment. 
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 Whilst it is clear that women MPs differ from their male colleagues and bring different 
values to their job, it is not clear that these values align with women in the general population. 
In fact, on all higher order value factors, women MPs in this sample were significantly 
different from women in the public. This would suggest that, from a psychological 
perspective, women are not descriptively represented in Parliament and – given that basic 
values inform particular behaviours (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003) and political attitudes 
(Leimgruber, 2011) – the increasing number of women MPs in the UK Parliament may not be 
impacting as much as assumed on women’s substantive representation. Such a claim would 
require more extensive research of individual patterns of behaviour, especially since it runs 
contrary to prior research showing distinct policy preferences among women legislators for 
issues concerning women, health, education, family care and equality (Childs and Krook, 
2008; Dodson, 2006). However, these gender differences in policy preferences may be 
skewed due to the unequal success of parties on the Left in recruiting women candidates (Best 
and Vogel, 2018, p.351). Of the 36 women MPs recruited in this study, 22 were, for example, 
members of the Labour Party. The unequal ratios of men:women within parliamentary parties 
may, given the differences in basic values presented above, inhibit the advances made in 
descriptive representation when it comes to the substantive representation of all women in 
Parliament.  
 As Anne Phillips (1995, p.157) rightly argues, ‘the presumption that all women or all 
black people share the same preferences and goals, […] is clearly - and dangerously – 
erroneous.’ Indeed, I am conscious that the research here is not used to argue for undesirable 
constraints on the behaviour or beliefs of members of any historically under-represented 
group. Rather this discussion builds on the work of Suzanne Dovi (2002, p.738), who has 
argued for preferable descriptive representatives who share mutual relationships and aims 
with dispossessed subgroups in the population. If women politicians are more significantly 
outside the normal distribution for women in the population (psychologically) than their 
colleagues in historically dominant groups (i.e. white men), then Dovi’s criteria for group 
representation raise important questions about the inequalities of political recruitment to 
Parliament. I do not seek to undermine the advances made in gender equality in elite politics, 
but rather to highlight how much more needs to be done in this area of policy and scholarship. 
As discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Lovenduski, 2015), the blame here must lie with 
both Parliament and political parties (as the organisations responsible for candidate selection 
and outreach) for not committing to supply-side reforms that improve institutional access and 
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incentives for equal political participation by 'ordinary' members of all under-represented 
groups.     
c) Education 
 The comprehensive model of candidate emergence tested in chapter 7 (section III) 
revealed a positive relationship between educational attainment - specifically university 
education - and becoming an MP. However, those results did not explain whether or not 
education per se had an effect on participants' BHV and whether or not these effects were 
consistent across MPs and the public. A two-way ANOVA indicates that the main effects of 
status were, as expected, highly significant (Self-Transcendence, F(1, 2254) = 12.59, p < 
0.001; Self-Enhancement, F(1, 2254) = 5.93, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 2254) = 12.19, p < 
0.001). Similarly, education (whether or not someone acquired a university qualification) 
influenced both Openness to Change values (F(1, 2254) = 5.15, p < 0.05) and Conservation 
values (F(1, 2254) = 11.26, p < 0.001). However, the interactions between status and 
education were not statistically significant, indicating that educational attainment had a 
similar effect on basic values among both the elite and public sample. In total, this model 
accounted for 10% (adjusted partial η² = 0.099) of the overall variance in the four higher order 
values. The main effects are broken down and illustrated in Figure 8.2.  
Figure 8.2 Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): plots to show the effects of status (MP vs. 
































































 These results are directly comparable to prior research by Schwartz (2005, p.14) that 
highlights positive associations between Self-Direction values and education, and negative 
associations between the latter and Security, Conformity and Tradition values. Although basic 
values have proven to be remarkably stable after adolescence in large-N samples around the 
world (Schwartz, 1992, 2005), these results would suggest an important socialising effect in 
young adulthood for university students. Given that a disproportionate number of MPs 
attended independent secondary schools (34% of the current sample) and went on to gain 
graduate or post-graduate qualifications (89% of the current sample), it is expected that these 










Table 8.3 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by education (university 
graduate vs. pre-university qualifications). 
Mean Differences 
 
Basic Values Public 
Uni vs. Pre-Uni 
MPs 
Uni vs. Pre-Uni 
Public Pre-Uni 
vs. MPs Pre-Uni 





















- 0.36 * 
 























 2154 106 1617 642 
Two-tailed significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
  
The main effects illustrated in Figure 8.2 are supported by the results of a series of 
independent samples T-tests (Table 8.3).
73
 Focusing solely on those participants who went to 
university, the differences presented in Table 8.3 show that the basic values of MPs and the 
public remain significantly different. MPs who went to university score much higher for 
Openness to Change values, Self-Transcendence values, and Self-Enhancement values than 
graduates in the general population, and much lower for Conservation values. If educational 
attainment may help to explain who enters politics (via the opportunity structures provided at 
university), these results imply that future parliamentary candidates still remain outside the 
personality norms of their peers. Given the links between basic values and political 
attitudes/behaviours (Leimgruber, 2011; Vecchione et al., 2015), these data suggest that 
shared social backgrounds (i.e. university education) will not necessarily produce shared 
common interests and not, thus, decrease the likelihood of agency loss (cf. Pitkin, 1967). 
Congruence between the educational experiences of principals and agents may, given the 
findings presented here, make it easier to communicate and/or justify political decisions (Gay, 
2002), but it is not possible to assume fixed vertical links between the preferences of 
university graduates and the majority of MPs. Similarly, the accusation that MPs are affiliated 
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to elite social groups (i.e. the university educated and the wealthy) and, by virtue of these 
backgrounds, share values, cognitions or dispositions that make them 'out of touch' with the 
majority, is weaker when these results are considered (cf. Bovens and Wille, 2017).  
II. Basic Values and Partisanship 
 Research into principal-agent relations has long contested whether the principals' 
interests and preferences are cause or consequence of the political process (Best and Vogel, 
2018). In the former interpretation, principals select agents who appear most able and 
trustworthy to convert their fixed and exogenous interests into policy (Stimson et al., 1995) 
and in the latter interpretation, elites enjoy wide autonomy from their principals and influence 
popular thought by offering competing political preferences (Körösényi, 2018). The results 
presented in the previous chapter and section I of this chapter have shown that a) principals 
are driven by a different hierarchy of psychological motivations than their agents, and b) that 
they are more similar to one another in these motivations than their corresponding socio-
demographic groups in the general population. Whether researchers assume a populist model, 
in which democratic legitimacy is secured by agent responsiveness, or a trustee model in 
which it is exclusively assured by elite accountability, these findings have far reaching 
significance. In the populist model, these data imply that elites are forced to curtail their own 
psychological drives in order to tailor policies that fit, ex ante, a popular electoral mandate; in 
the trustee model, they suggest that MPs might be more inclined to anticipate citizens 
preferences and, ex post, mould and manipulate them to suit their own value valences when it 
comes to policy-making. This section now turns to examine whether these results are 
sustained when elites are broken down by partisan affiliation. Findings are examined 
horizontally between MPs of different parties and vertically to reveal the extent to which 
party leaders and followers converge in their BHV.    
a) Elite Comparisons 
 A series of correlations was run to test the relationship between, in particular, the four 
most represented parties in the current elite sample (106 UK MPs) and the ten lower order 
basic values (Table 8.4, below). The results reveal opposing trends between parties on the 
Left and the Right. In particular, Labour Party membership correlated significantly and 
positively with Universalism values, Self-Direction values, and Power values, and correlated 
negatively with Conservation values. By contrast, Conservative Party membership correlated 
positively and significantly with Conservation values, and negatively with Self-
Transcendence values. These results are reinforced by the correlations between MPs' social 
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and economic ideology (as measured on two Left-Right scales of 0-10) and each value factor. 
Again, those scoring to the Right and Left on both measures are differentiated, in particular, 
by inverse relationships with Conservation and Self-Transcendence values.
74
 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that these correlations translate 
into stark differences between the basic values of MPs according to left- and right-wing party 
affiliations, replicating the congruency principle developed in previous research with 
politicians in Italy (Caprara et al, 2012). Although the numbers of MPs sampled from smaller 
parties makes statistical comparison difficult, the trends in the data reveal, for example, that 
Labour, SNP and - to a lesser extent - Liberal Democrat MPs scored significantly higher for 
Self-Transcendence values than their Conservative colleagues. These results reflect the 
ideological foundations of the UK’s centre-left parties, in particular their strong advocacy of 
social welfare and the ideal of 'a fair, free and open society, in which we seek to balance the 
fundamental values of liberty, equality and community' (Liberal Democrat Constitution, 
2013). By contrast, Conservative MPs scored higher for Conservation values, again in line 
with the Party's historic ideological roots in social and economic hierarchy (Dorey, 2011). 
The data reinforce conclusions drawn in chapter 7 that personality acts as both an internal 
selection criterion for candidates who are drawn to parties with a shared set of values, and as 
an external criterion by which party-specific selection mechanisms favour or disfavour 
candidates in the recruitment process (Hypothesis 1). 
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Table 8.4 Partial correlation matrix of Basic Human Values and Members of Parliament (n = 106) from different UK political parties. 
 Conformity Tradition Benevolence Universalism Self-
Direction 
Stimulation Hedonism Achievement Power Security 
Labour 
(n - 49) 
-.267 *** -.446 *** .152 .293 ** .258 ** .102 .160 .024 .225 * -.166 
Conservative 
(n - 33) 
.314 *** .452 *** -.242 * -.410 *** -.257 ** -.060 -.174 -.024 -.111 .164 
Liberal 
Democrat 
(n - 5) 
-.124 -.127 -.101 .058 .022 -.155 -.027 .264 ** .099 .082 
Scottish 
National Party 
(n - 10) 
-.098 -.054 .074 .206 * .005 -.005 .095 -.024 -.052 -.085 
Other 
(n - 8) 
.159 .210 * .138 -.108 -.057 .043 -.079 -.190 -.250 ** .054 
Social 
Ideology 
(Left - 0 
Right - 10) 
 
.356 *** .568 *** -.273 *** -.634 *** -.410 *** -.091 -.164 .067 -.052 .201 * 
Economic 
Ideology 
(Left - 0 
Right - 10) 
.243 * .403 *** -.194 * -.512 *** -.266 ** .033 -.075 .057 -.093 .105 
Two-tailed significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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  In prior research on the value convergence of party members, Caprara et al. (2006, 
p.2) argue that personal values ‘are the crucial grounding of ideology' (see also Leimgruber, 
2011). Prior research on the links between basic values, ideology and partisanship (Davidov et 
al., 2008; Steenbergen and Leimgruber, 2010) are complemented in the data presented below 
(Figure 8.3). Labour Party MPs attribute greater importance to a broad world view based on 
equal access to social welfare and justice (Universalism values), whilst also being more 
motivated by independent thought and action (Self-Direction values). Conversely 
Conservative MPs are more authoritarian, placing more importance on discipline, customs 
and traditions, personal and national security (Conservation values). 
Figure 8.3 Comparison of lower order basic values for Labour MPs (n = 49) and Conservative MPs (n 
= 33). Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences in this sample.  
 These differences were also borne out by in-depth interviews with elite participants. In 
particular, it was clear for a number of MPs that their respective affiliations to political parties 
had been motivated by personal value judgements. One former Labour frontbench MP 
recalled: 
I got to know a South African student [at University] quite well. He was a black South 
African student who had come on a sort of scholarship. Just talking to him about the 
realities of apartheid really opened my eyes to some of what was going on in the 
world. I suppose I felt back then there were things that needed to change. Which party 
most fitted? It was Labour (Interviewee 15) 
For these MPs, there was a tendency to talk of personal priorities, interests and motivations in 































especially, reflected very clearly on the values of their colleagues and the political manifestos 
that were produced from value calculations: 
Wealth is power. We see now what I was saying to you earlier, where the real power 
lies in the establishment, where the mega-corporations, the newspaper barons, the 
hedge fund managers, that’s where all the power is. I think it’s only radical parties, 
like the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, the German Social 
Democratic Party that ultimately can do something about it (Interviewee 12) 
Other MPs were more pragmatic, acknowledging a diversity of opinion within each political 
party. However, even these interviewees were adamant about the ideological differences 
between the two main parties and the need to join one side of a dividing line: 
I think politics is about coalitions. In that each political party is a coalition and we live 
in a two-party country, pretty much, so you need to accept that and you know, work 
out which side you’re on. And that there are good reasons for wanting your side to win 
(Interviewee 8) 
 Subject to further investigation and analysis, these results contradict much of the work 
done in recent decades on mass, catch-all (e.g. Kirchheimer, 1966) and cartel (Katz and Mair, 
2009) theses of party competition. The arguments routinely stated - that ideological conflicts 
between parties have become little more than amorphous differences in Left-Right 
orientations – are not reflected in the basic values of MPs within UK parties. Richard Katz 
and Peter Mair’s (2009, p.758) claim that ‘party psychological identification’ has declined 
does not hold at the elite level. In light of the findings in this article, future research might 
address these contradictions by focusing on a) the dissonance between the beliefs of 
individual MPs and party manifestos; b) the value trade-offs caused by professionalization 
processes (e.g. salaries), which encourage MPs and parties to shy away from ideologically 
driven campaigns and focus on the ‘reasonably anticipated minimum pay-off’ (Katz and Mair, 
2009, p.758); and c) the centralisation of party organisations that distances the leadership 
from those below and thus transforms party representation from an ideological loyalty to one 
of employment.   
b) Leaders and Followers 
 A two-way ANOVA (status and partisanship) was conducted to investigate the 
congruence between MPs on the Left and Right and their corresponding partisans in the 
general population. To maximise the statistical power of the data - and based on the 
similarities identified in Table 8.4 - parties on the left of centre (Labour, SNP, Liberal 
Democrat) and on the right of centre (Conservatives, Democratic Unionist Party, Ulster 
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Unionist Party) were grouped together. The elite sample as well as the ESS sample of the 
general population, as used in chapter 7 and section I, were grouped in the same way. The 
partisanship of the public sample was based on participants' last recorded vote, which in this 
case was the UK's 2010 General Election. After excluding all participants who did not vote in 
the election, 1342 participants remained. These voters were reasonably well split between 
those on the Left (738) and the Right (604).   
 The analysis showed that the main effect of being an MP was, as per discussions in 
chapter 7, highly significant for all higher order values (Openness to Change, F(1, 1445) = 
11.55, p < 0.001; Self-Transcendence, F(1, 1445) = 7.38, p < 0.01; Self-Enhancement, F(1, 
1445) = 26.81, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 1445) = 47.21, p < 0.001). Regardless of 
whether someone was an MP, partisanship also exerted a significant influence on three of the 
four higher order values (Openness to Change, F(1, 1445) = 10.32, p < 0.001; Self-
Transcendence, F(1, 1445) = 51.00, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 1445) = 78.48, p < 0.001). 
The interactions between the two variables were also significant, indicating differences in the 
effect of partisanship upon basic values in each status group (Openness to Change, F(1, 1445) 
= 4.04, p < 0.05; Self-Transcendence, F(1, 1445) = 13.59, p < 0.001; Conservation, F(1, 1445) 
= 27.57, p < 0.001). This model accounted for 21% (adjusted partial η² = 0.209) of the overall 
variance in participants' higher order basic values. There are a number of relevant inferences 
to be made from this data.  
 Of particular note, the main effect of partisanship (unlike gender or age) was equally 
strong or in excess of status for three of the four higher order values, indicative of the 
antecedent relationship between basic values, ideology and party allegiance (Leimgruber, 
2011). At first glance, these results also reinforce the findings presented in chapter 7: that 
Self-Enhancement values are particularly different among MPs than the general population. 
Self-Enhancement values were the only higher order value factor affected substantially more 
by status than partisanship in this model. This would suggest that, regardless of ideology or 
party preferences, people who become MPs are more ambitious and desirous of control. On 
the other hand, partisanship had a particularly strong effect on participants' Self-
Transcendence and Conservation values, indicative of the differences already reported above 








Figure 8.4 Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): plots to show the effects of status (MP vs. 
































































 The interactions between these variables show that there are not only substantive 
differences in basic values between MPs and the public, and between those on the Left and 
Right, but that those on the Left and Right also display significant psychological differences 
within each status group. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate these 
differences further and to rule out sampling error (Table 8.5, below). The results confirm 
significant differences across three out of four higher order values within each status group, 
and these differences run in the same direction. For example, the Left are more receptive to 
change (Openness to Change values), more committed to equality, care and support for others 
(Self-Transcendence values), and less motivated by preserving rules, traditions and stability 
(Conservation values). Whilst wary of the difference in sample sizes, the data show that these 
differences are more exaggerated in the MP sample than the public, supporting prior research 
that has shown greater polarisation among elites than publics around the Western world (e.g. 
Sood and Iyengar, 2014). The interactions of the variables also suggest that it makes a distinct 
psychological difference to both be on the Left and to be an MP. Whilst MPs on the Right 
only differ significantly from their supporters on one higher order value factor, MPs on the 
Left differ significantly from their supporters on all four factors.     
Table 8.5 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by partisanship (Centre-Left 
(CL) vs. Centre-Right (CR)). 
Mean Differences 
 
Basic Values Public 
CL vs. CR 
MPs 
CL vs. CR 
Public CL vs. 
MPs CL 
































- 0.54 *** 
 





- 0.23 *** 
 





Two-tailed significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
  
 Of the sub-group variables tested, partisanship is the only one that revealed greater 
mean differences in basic values within the political class than between the political class and 
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the public (Hypothesis 3). Close inspection of value differences at a between-groups level 
shows that the congruency principle (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004) appears to hold on the 
Right but not the Left in the samples used in this study. Whilst politicians and voters on the 
Right were congruent and statistically similar in their value orientations, politicians and voters 
on the Left were statistically different. This provides a nuanced picture of the leader-follower 
match previously researched by scholars like David Winter (1987). On the ideological Right, 
it would seem that basic values, as part of a reflexive and purposive system of personality, 
help people to make political choices consistent with the basic principles that guide their lives. 
Thus there is psychological congruence between leaders and followers. On the ideological 
Left, the leader-follower match fails in this study. This may reflect the broader ideological 
space on the Left and the challenge facing centre-Left parties, particularly Labour, who must 
bridge support from small-c conservatives, cosmopolitan liberals, and democratic socialists in 
the public. The incongruence between politicians and voters on the Left also suggests a 
greater need for self-presentation strategies in order to secure core votes. Thus MPs on the 
Left have a greater incentive, in an age of telegenic personality politics, to convey an altered 
impression of their personal motives that conforms either to those attributes perceived to be 
most important to the electorate, or to party policy. This need for cognitive dissonance in the 
presentation of personality may explain both the successes and failures of the Left in the last 
100 years; the attitudes of Corbyn and Blair make an interesting comparison in this respect. 
These results will be discussed in more depth in chapter 11.  
c) Non-Voters  
 The results presented so far in this section have illustrated distinct differences between 
the basic values of those on the Left and the Right of politics, differences that are sustained to 
a greater extent among political elites. However, I am also interested in understanding the role 
of personality, and specifically basic values, in contemporary political disengagement. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis argued that the personalised nature of modern political consumption 
underpins everyday assessments of politicians that heighten or lower valences on the act of 
voting. If non-voters do disengage for reasons grounded in their own basic values and their 
value judgements about politicians, then it might be expected that a) non-voters exhibit 
differences in BHV to other voters, and that b) non-voters are more different to MPs in terms 
of their BHV than voters.  
 To test the first of these assumptions, an ANOVA between voters and non-voters in 
the general public was conducted using the ESS 2014 general population sample for Britain. 
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The voting population remained split between those on the Left and Right, in order to identify 
the ideological affinities of those who disengage (Figure 8.6). The results show that non-
voters attribute less importance to Conservation values than voters on the Right and less 
importance to Self-Transcendence values than voters on the Left. In terms of the main 
psychological divisions illustrated between the Left and Right (see above), these results 
would suggest that non-voters are no more or less similar to either ideological bloc of the 
voting public. However, the data do show that non-voters differ from both voting groups in 
terms of their Self-Enhancement values. More so than either voters on the Left or Right, non-
voters attribute relatively more importance to social power, authority and self-respect.    
Figure 8.6 Comparison of lower order basic values for voters on the Left (n = 738), voters on the 
Right (n = 604) and non-voters (n = 812) in the UK 2010 General Election.  
 
Note: * - Non-voters significantly different to both voting groups (p < 0.05); † - Non-voters 
significantly different to voters on the Left (p < 0.05); x - Non-voters significantly different to voters 
on the Right (p < 0.05). 
 Having ascertained that non-voters differ from the voting public in terms of the 
relative importance they attribute to a variety of personal goals and motivations, a logistic 
regression was conducted to assess the impact of these differences upon turnout.
75
 In order to 
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 Dependent variable Turnout: 1 = Did not vote; 0 = Voted.  
Independent variables: Basic Human Values (Conformity, Tradition, Security, Benevolence, Universalism, 
Self-Direction, Stimulation, Power) = centred means scores rescaled 0-1; Age = continuous data rescaled 0-1; 
Gender (Dummy) = 1 - Female, 0 - Male; Education = 1 - No qualifications, 2 - Apprenticeship, 3 - A-
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avoid multi-collinearity between the lower order basic values, Self-Direction and Hedonism 
values were dropped as predictor variables in the model.
76
 Control variables were included for 
socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, education and occupation as well as ideology. 
The results are presented in Table 8.6.
77
 The data show that of all the variables included in the 
model, only Power values and Stimulation values were statistically significant predictors of 
not voting. For the purpose of the present investigation, these data suggest that personality 
plays an important role in discriminating between those who engage with formal politics and 
those who do not. 
 The results also show a highly significant relationship between age and voting, 
testifying to a large literature on youth turnout (e.g. Sloam, 2014). In this sample, the oldest 
participants were 25 times more likely to vote than the youngest (exp(b) =.04). Other 
significant predictors included occupation: individuals in manual and administrative jobs or 
public sector professional vocations were roughly a third more likely to vote than those in 
other occupations. Educational attainment had a large impact on turnout; the odds ratio 
indicates that those with postgraduate qualifications were almost twice as likely to vote than 
those with no qualifications at all. With basic values included in the model, the effects of 
ideology were weak and non-significant.  
 These results may have far-reaching significance for the study of anti-politics in the 
UK. They suggest that those who are most motivated by excitement, novelty and variation 
(Stimulation values) and ascribe most importance to social recognition, wealth and authority 
(Power values) are more than 3 times more likely not to vote than citizens who are least 
motivated by these values. In the first instance, it is possible that citizens high in Stimulation 
values are not energised by contemporary politics. For people whose typical behaviours 
might, necessarily, involve more unconventional activities than the average citizen (Bardi and 
Schwartz, 2003), politics may seem anything but unconventional. This judgement may apply 
as much to the people doing politics as its conduct. A parliamentary population of  
   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Brokerage professions (e.g. law, finance, consultancy, public relations), 0 - Other occupation; Occupation 2 
(Dummy) = 1 - Manual or administrative professions (e.g. construction, public amenities, personal assistant, 
secretary), 0 - Other occupation; Occupation 3 (Dummy) = 1 - Public sector professionals (e.g. teacher, doctor, 
lecturer, civil servant), 0 - Other occupation; Occupation 4 (Dummy) = 1 - 'Helping' professions (e.g. third 
sector charity or NGO, emergency services), 0 - Other occupation; Ideology = Continuous scale from 0 (Left) to 
10 (Right) 
76
 This decision was made on the basis that Self-Direction values were not significantly different between voters 
and non-voters, and Hedonism values only differed slightly. More than 8 values in any one regression model 
risks skewing the results and producing inaccurate findings. 
77
 Variables have been rescaled from 0-1 and odds ratios are reported for ease of interpretation. 
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Table 8.6 Logistic regression model to test the effect of basic values on political disengagement in the UK. 
 
Variable Turnout (not voting in 2010 General Election) 
 
             B(S.E.)                                                                                                 Exp(B) 
1. Basic Values:  
Conformity              .146 (.43)                                                                                              1.157 
Tradition -.005 (.49)                                                                                               .995 
Benevolence -.326 (.51)                                                                                               .722 
Universalism -.495 (.66)                                                                                               .610 
Stimulation .929 (.49) *                                                                                           2.531 
Achievement .375 (.48)                                                                                              1.455 
Power 1.322 (.48) **                                                                                       3.752 
Security .565 (.43)                                                                                              1.759 
  
2. Demographics:  
Age  -3.159 (.28) ***                                                                                     .042 
Gender .168 (.12)                                                                                              1.183 
  
3. Socialisation:  
Education -.556 (.17)***                                                                                         .573 
Occupation 1 -.267 (.24)                                                                                               .768 
Occupation 2 -.428 (.15) **                                                                                          .652 
Occupation 3 -.344 (.17) *                                                                                            .709 
Occupation 4 .055 (.29)                                                                                              1.057 
  
4. Ideology:  
Left-Right (0-10) -.011 (.03)                                                                                              .990 
  
Model Statistics:  
Chi Square 256.008 *** 
Cox & Snell R Squared 0.132 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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disproportionately white, older, male figures in business attire is unlikely to inspire someone 
who is easily turned off by the mundane or stereotypical. 
 In the second instance, those citizens high in Power values may be the most likely to 
disengage when they cannot perceive their own influence in politics. For these citizens, there 
needs to be a tangible benefit to their daily behaviours (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003). Thus the 
inability to engage with politics at a local or national level and the staid nature of political 
processes, let alone the sclerotic pace of political change, may antagonise a psychological 
need for control and influence that is higher than in the average citizen. Citizens high in 
Power values may, therefore, be far less likely to engage in the act of voting if they perceive 
that act as one in which they a) give up control to others to make change on their behalf, or b) 
confer a mandate on politicians who fail to deliver.  
 The corollary of both of these interpretations involves personal judgements about 
politicians who fail to meet the same psychological standards - or trans-situational goals - by 
which certain citizens govern their own daily lives. These claims are hypothetical (see 
Chapter 5) but may be supported by comparing non-voters to MPs. An independent samples t-
test shows that non-voters differ significantly from MPs on eight lower order value factors (all 
except Achievement and Hedonism), whereas voters only differ from MPs significantly 
across six (except Self-Direction, Conformity, Achievement and Hedonism). These 
differences are illustrated in more nuance in Figure 8.7, which compares non-voters to MPs 
on the Left and Right for all four higher order value factors. An ANOVA comparing these 
three sub-groups confirms the trends revealed in Figure 8.7: non-voters are significantly 
different from MPs on the Left in terms of their Openness to Change values (F (2, 916) = 
6.273, p < 0.01), Self-Transcendence values (F (2, 916) = 38.811, p < 0.001), Self-
Enhancement values (F (2, 916) = 5.239, p < 0.01) and Conservation values (F (2, 916) = 
50.807, p < 0.001). By contrast, the differences between non-voters and MPs on the Right 
were much smaller and none reached statistical significance. If voters seek congruent 
personalities in elite politics and vote accordingly (see Caprara et al., 2003), these findings 
suggest that non-voters are more likely to be re-engaged by politicians on the Right than the 









Figure 8.7 Comparison of higher order values (centred mean scores) across MPs on the Left, MPs on 















 The results presented in this chapter contribute to the existing understanding of 
representative parliamentary politics in the UK at a number of levels. Firstly, these findings 
illustrate that the political class are not only extraordinary in the trans-situational goals and 
motivations that they bring to the job of politics, but that this psychological disjuncture is 
wider still between MPs and a range of socio-demographic sub-groups in the population than 
it is between MPs of differing backgrounds and socialisation experiences. Thus these data 
provide a new lens through which to study democratic deficits in UK politics and demand 
further research. Moreover, this chapter has operationalised a unique data set to a) 
complement prior research around the world on the psychological differences between those 
on the Left and Right of politics, b) expose a significant contrast in the psychological 
affinities of elites and voters on the Left and Right, and c) identify a number of psychological 
characteristics underpinning formal disengagement from politics. Given that issues of partisan 
dealignment and political participation are current in the study and practice of politics, these 










"I have no idea and I quite often wonder this, how people that are kind of 40 years my senior 
manage to do this because I regularly miss meals, I don’t get nearly enough sleep, I do an 
incredible amount of travelling on aeroplanes, which are not the healthiest kind of way to 
travel. I don’t understand how people who are much older than me can manage to put 
themselves through this, just even physically, if nothing else." 
 
Scottish National Party MP (Interviewee 7) 
Personal Choices, Political Behaviours  
Members of Parliament (MPs) operate with unparalleled pressure from role alters 
inside and outside of Westminster, as well as formal constraints in the parliamentary process. 
Together, these expectations and the 'rules of the game' provide an institutional map that MPs 
must navigate in order to fulfil their representative function (Kwiatkowski, 2012; Wright, 
2010). Yet studies of elite political behaviour in the UK Parliament and abroad are severely 
limited by their substantive preoccupation with crisis management and, in particular, their 
inability to extract data from political elites (e.g. Winter, 2011; Jost et al., 2013). So far I have 
operationalised a unique data set on 106 UK MPs to demonstrate that they are, by comparison 
to their electors, psychologically unique in terms of their Basic Human Values (BHV). 
However, public dissatisfaction with British politics often reduces to internalised 
preconceptions about the immorality or corruption of MPs' political behaviour in Parliament 
(Bowler and Karp, 2004; Birch and Allen, 2015). In order to understand a) how MPs interpret 
and respond to the formal and informal institutions of elite politics, and b) the extent to which 
their behaviour is self-led, chapter 4 (p.90) of this thesis proposed an Integrated Model of 
Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB). Founded upon the trans-situational capacity of 
basic values to direct everyday choices upon activation (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 
1992; Verplanken and Holland, 2002), this model prioritises MPs' internal, psychological 
interpretations of their political environment. In doing so, it argues that MPs must synthesise 
their own beliefs with the range of expectations and constraints they perceive in order to reach 
behavioural choices within their occupational context.   
In order to test this model, this chapter presents highly original analysis of MPs' 
parliamentary behaviour. Data on MPs' basic values are used to assess to extent of political 
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agency in a range of contexts of varying institutional constraint. The chapter proceeds in three 
extended sections. The first section examines MPs' voting behaviour in the House of 
Commons chamber, taking both a free or 'conscience' vote and a whipped vote as its 
substantive focus. Data on basic values are used to explain how and why MPs may vote with 
or against their party on any particular cause. Section II takes the same psychological lens and 
applies it to the study of Early Day Motions (EDMs), parliamentary (written) questions, and 
select committee membership. These analyses examine the relative importance of MPs' 
personal motivations in [objectively] more autonomous conditions than legislative voting. 
The third section uses self-report data on participants' political priorities to analyse the factors 
that influence MPs' abstract decisions about who or what they represent. This section also 
uses structural equation modelling to test the indirect effects of BHV posited in the IMPPB. In 
each section, quantitative findings are complemented by qualitative data from 17 in-depth 
interviews with elite participants. 
I. 'Ayes to the Right': Basic Values and Voting Behaviour in the House of Commons. 
 
 Popular access to 24-hour commercial media and the immediacy of the internet have, 
in recent years, greatly increased the transparency of Parliament (Norton, 2017). However, 
these technological advances have, at the same time, increased the external pressure on MPs 
to 'behave'. Nowhere is this pressure more acute than in the voting chamber, where every 
decision an MP makes upon legislation is available, either recorded or streamed live on the 
internet and television, or covered in the print media. Voting in the House of Commons is also 
characterised by party political blocs (Cowley and Stuart, 2010). Indeed, voting records have 
been the subject of a rich literature on the hierarchical nature, agenda-setting function, and 
disciplinary powers of party organisations (Saalfeld, 1998; Hix et al., 2007; Kam, 2009; cf. 
Krehbiel, 1999). Subject both to intense external informal pressures and internal party 
constraints, MPs vote on legislation in a 'low perceived choice scenario' (see Chapter 4). The 
IMPPB would predict, therefore, that party affiliation might explain more variance in vote 
patterns than other variables (i.e. BHV), thus masking counter-attitudinal behaviour at the 
micro-level of each politician that, occasionally, produces rebellions on particularly 
contentious topics.  
 
To test this theory, this section analyses the voting records of 106 MPs in three 
different contexts: a free or 'conscience' vote for both of the largest political parties, a Bill on 
which only one of the largest parties gave its members a free vote, and a vote in which both of 
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the largest parties enforced a three-line Whip. It is anticipated that basic values will explain 
more variance in MPs' voting patterns in a free vote scenario than a whipped one (hypothesis 
4). In order to amplify the rigour of the analysis, votes were selected that maximised the 
number of participants who a) could be used in each analysis, and b) voted in each of the 
scenarios selected.
78
 At the same time, votes were selected that received attention in the 
media, thus accounting for maximum exposure to public scrutiny and the degree of agency 
exercised by each MP under the watch of external role alters (i.e. their electors). I therefore 
examine the 2013 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill - third reading; the 2017 European 
Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill - third reading; and the 2015 vote to sanction 'UK Air 
Strikes Against Islamic State in Syria'. Full party summaries of the three votes are presented 
in Table 9.1.  





EU (Notification of 
Withdrawal) 
Bill - Third Reading 
8 Feb 2017 
Marriage Same Sex 
Couples Bill - Third 
Reading 
21 May 2013 
UK Air Strikes Against ISIL 
in Syria 


















313 (+2 tell) 7 
Democratic 
Unionist Party 
8 0 0 8 
8 0 
Green 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Independent 0 3 0 1 1 2 
Labour 163 52 194 14 66 153 
Liberal Democrat 0 7 43 (+1 tell) 4 6 2 
Plaid Cymru 0 3 2 0 0 2 (+1 tell) 
SDLP
80
 0 3 2 0 0 5 
Scottish National 
Party 
0 52 (+2 tell) - - 
0 53 (+1 tell) 
UK Independence 
Party 




2 0 - - 
2 0 
Total: 494 122 359 154 397 223 
Turnout: 96.4% 82.4% 96.9% 
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 Not all participants were present in the House of Commons at the same time and many did not vote at the 
same time on specific legislation when they were. 
79
 As explained in chapter 6, all data was retrieved from Hansard records via http://www.publicwhip.org.uk 
80
 SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party 
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The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill of 2013 extended the Civil Partnership Act 
2004 to allow same sex couples to get married lawfully in England and Wales. The Bill 
provided that such marriages would be treated equally to those between man and woman; that 
same sex marriages be permitted religious rites in the process; that, at the same time, religious 
organisations or individual ministers of religion would not be obligated to conduct a same sex 
marriage ceremony. Following the lead of a handful of other nations, this highly progressive 
Bill split MPs in both of the major political parties. Both Labour leader Ed Miliband and 
Conservative leader David Cameron granted their MPs a free vote.  
The decision by UK MPs to support military action in Syria followed a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (No. 2249) in November 2015.
81
 The motion acknowledged 
requests from France, the United States and regional allies for UK military assistance and 
recommended all necessary measures short of ground combat - specifically air strikes - to, in 
the words of the United Nations, ‘eradicate the safe haven [ISIL] have established over 
significant parts of Iraq and Syria.’
82
 Although the motion was carried, it deeply divided the 
Labour Party. Then newly elected leader, Jeremy Corbyn, unambiguously opposed military 
intervention, whilst a number of his shadow cabinet and backbenchers vehemently supported 
it. The Labour leader consequently granted his MPs a free vote on the motion.  
Following a politically charged referendum - in which UK citizens voted by a small 
majority to leave the European Union (EU) - and a protracted legal battle to allow Parliament 
a vote on the outcome, the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill empowered the Prime 
Minister to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. This Bill was highly 
significant, not least because of the intra-party divides caused by the referendum campaign 
and the overwhelming majority of MPs who had supported Remain.
83
 Both of the major 
parties enforced three-line Whips to enact the referendum result.  
These votes each attracted significant media attention that placed MPs, and the 
decisions they made, under public scrutiny. At the same time, each vote was emotionally and 
politically charged, not only tapping a range of competing personal preferences but also 
divides within and between political parties. Correlations between MPs' BHV and their votes 
on each of these motions are reported in Table 9.2. Clear and statistically significant 
                                                          
81
 The UN Resolution can be downloaded here: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RE 
S/2249%282015%29 
82
 For full quotation, see UN Resolution 2249. 
83
 MPs' declared stances were reported by the BBC the night before the referendum (22nd June, 2016): 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946 
James Weinberg 




relationships are evident in each case. Not surprisingly, Conformity and Tradition values are 
negatively associated with voting for same sex marriage, whilst Universalism values are 
positively associated. Given that Conformity and Tradition values commonly express 
commitment to orthodox religiosity and social conventions, it is understandable that MPs 
scoring higher for these values would be less likely to endorse a major social and religious 
change such as same sex marriage.  
Strong negative correlations are also reported between MPs' Universalism values and 
voting for military action in Syria. This would suggest that MPs particularly motivated by 
peace, tolerance, and the welfare of all peoples were, understandably, less likely to endorse 
war. In the case of the EU Withdrawal Bill, Self-Transcendence and Conservation coefficients 
were again statistically significant. The positive relationship between Conformity and 
Tradition values and voting for Brexit indicates that MPs who are more attached to known 
cultures and customs were also more likely to vote to enact the referendum result. To analyse 
the causal effect of MPs' basic values upon their vote choices, a series of sequential logistic 
regression models were conducted. With a reduced number of participants in each model, 
only five lower order basic values were entered as predictors. These were selected a priori for 
theoretical reasons and based upon correlations reported in Table 9.2. Controls were included 
sequentially for party membership, length of service in Parliament, and the size of an MPs' 
majority in their last election. The latter two of these variables are used to assess potentially 
strategic decisions taken by MPs' to appease either of their main principals: voters and party 
leaders (cf. Willumsen and Goetz, 2017). 
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Table 9.2 Partial correlation matrix of MPs' basic values and their votes on three pieces of legislation in the UK House of Commons. 
 Conformity Tradition Benevolence Universalism Self-
Direction 
 




































































































































a) Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill 2013: 
 
 The results of the first analysis are reported in Table 9.3. Tradition and Universalism 
values are significant predictors of whether an MP voted for same sex marriage; these values 
remain statistically significant, along with Achievement values, when controls are added for 
partisanship, tenure and electoral margin. In the values-only model, BHV account for a 
substantial 49% of the variance in participants' voting behaviour. A further 14% of the 
variance is explained when the control variables are added. The reduction in the number of 
available observations means that the standard error scores of the variables, especially party 
dummy variables, are large. Statistically this means that the results may not reflect meaningful 
variation in the general population. However, the size and direction of the coefficients do 
compare meaningfully to the party voting summaries presented in Table 9.1. The Chi-Square 
test statistic is also relatively small and highly significant, indicating that the model 
adequately measures relationships in the data.  
 
 These results suggest that MPs' basic values have a substantial effect upon their 
legislative voting record when the whip is withdrawn (as predicted in hypothesis 4). These 
data run contrary to prior research, which argues that party affiliation remains the largest 
predictor of vote choice in free vote scenarios (Cowley and Stuart, 2010). Even after 
controlling for partisanship, MPs scoring highly for Universalism and Achievement values 
were still significantly more likely to vote for same sex marriage. The opposite was true for 
Tradition values. Whichever party they were in, MPs' who attributed most importance to 
equality and tolerance were more likely to support same sex marriage. The relationship 
between Achievement values and voting for same sex marriage is intuitively more 
problematic. It is possible that this result is linked to public attitudes and, in turn, instrumental 
vote-seeking behaviour. Data from the British Social Attitudes survey shows that more than 
70% of the public supported same sex marriage by the 2010 Parliament, as opposed to less 
than 50% in the 1980s.
84
 MPs high in Achievement values may, therefore, have seen this vote 
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 This data is published online by NatCen and available publicly at: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/blog/charting-
changing-attitudes-%E2%80%93-same-sex-relationships 
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Table 9.3 Hierarchical logistic regression model to show the effect of MPs' basic values upon their 









B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
Basic Values:     
Conformity .44 (.6) 2.71 (1.69) 
Tradition -.89 (.46) * -2.20 (1.16) * 
Universalism 2.16 (1.00) * 4.09 (2.48) † 
Achievement .80 (.68) 3.39 (1.92) † 
Power 1.02 (.87) 1.37 (1.66) 
     
Party:     
Labour - -1.83 (26481.48) 
Conservative - -6.00 (26481.48) 
SNP - -  
DUP/UUP - -22.82 (32090.20) 
     
Additional 
Controls: 
    
Tenure - 12.56 (5.92) * 
Margin - -7.11 (4.79) 
     
Model Statistics:     
Chi Square 32.276 *** 47.607 *** 
Cox & Snell R 
Squared 
.490 .629 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10 
  
  
 The value trade-offs reported here may also help to explain the split in the 
Conservative Party on this vote. As shown in chapter 8 (pp.189-194), Conservative MPs score 
much higher than their Labour peers for Conservation values but still, relatively, attribute 
great importance to Self-Transcendence values as well. Basic values tend to directly guide 
behaviour when they are a) activated by the immediate scenario (Verplanken and Holland, 
2002), and b) accessible based on the importance attributed to them by the individual (Bardi, 
2000). The same sex marriage bill evidently activated both Conservation values and Self-
Transcendence values in MPs; the split in the Conservative vote may, therefore, reveal a 
divide between MPs in that Party who assign more importance to Universalism and those who 
are more motivated by Tradition values respectively. In contrast to the assumptions of the 
'congruency principle' (Caprara et al., 2012), whereby political allegiance and values share a 
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 All predictor variables in these models are re-scaled from 0-1 in order to ease interpretation. 
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reciprocal relationship, these data suggest that free votes can reveal stark psychological 
differences within groups of partisan elites.  
 
 These findings are complemented by interview data from 17 participants. It was 
evident from each of the in-depth interviews that participants were aware of the trade-off 
between values and party loyalty that they engaged in on a daily basis. Some participants had 
made a conscious decision to ignore the whip upon their election but recognised, in turn, that 
they limited their career prospects in doing so: 
 
In answer to your question “Have I been able to be myself?”, then yes, I made a 
special effort that I would always stick up for what I believed in. That’s why I said in 
my maiden speech in Parliament that I would never accept a promotion. I would 
always stay on the backbenches so that I could actually always stand up and say what I 
thought rather than say what might help get me promoted (Interviewee 17). 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by other MPs in both of the major parties. There was, 
however, more of an attempt among Labour MPs to reconcile cognitive dissonance as a 
foregone aspect of representing citizens who had, ultimately, voted for a party. As one former 
frontbench MP (Interviewee 12) reflected: ‘what was best for my constituency was usually 
what the party wanted anyway. It made it easier.’ This justification was developed by a 
number of interviewees, who described party loyalty as a fundamental function of democratic 
politics: 
 
I think politics is about coalitions. In that each political party is a coalition and we live 
in a two-party country, pretty much, so you need to accept that and you know, work 
out which side you’re on. And that there are good reasons for wanting your side to 
win, and then you need to be loyal (Interviewee 8) 
 
In contrast, the majority of interviewees were quick to eschew the issue. Instead they spoke of 
personal and party values as one, and where possible reasserted this connection. Interviewee 
15, for example, reflected on joining the Labour Party ‘[s]imply because that was the party 
that fitted most neatly or nearly to [their] views. Nothing more or less than that.’   
 
b) UK Air Strikes Against Islamic State in Syria: 
 
 The vote to sanction military action against Islamic State in Syria is equally revealing 
as a test of the IMPPB. Crucially the logit shows that BHV again significantly predict voting 
behaviour after controls have been added to account for internal party constraints and external 
public scrutiny (Table 9.4, below). However, the additional variance in the results explained 
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by the variables in the model increases by a larger margin (from 30% to 64%) than it did for 
the Same Sex Marriage Bill (from 49% to 63%). Although the regression coefficient is not 
statistically significant with such a small sample size, being a Conservative MP does correlate 
strongly and significantly with voting 'yes' for the motion (r (66) = .690, p < 0.001). Given 
that Conservative MPs voted under the influence of the Whip, this testifies to the power of 
disciplinary sanctions/incentives to override psychological differences within the 
Conservative Party and unite them in the division lobbies. This may be compared to the free 
vote on same sex marriage, where these intra-party differences meaningfully split 
Conservative MPs. 
 
Table 9.4 Hierarchical logistic regression model to show the effect of MPs' basic values upon their 
decision to vote for UK Air Strikes Against ISIL in Syria 2015 (n = 66). 
 





B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
Basic Values:     
Tradition .28 (.28) -1.04 (.74) 
Benevolence -.42 (.48) -.59 (.73) 
Universalism -1.28 (.43) ** -2.44 (1.17) * 
Self-Direction .05 (.42) -.61 (.81) 
Power -.71 (.41) † -2.77 (1.31) * 
     
Party:     
Labour - -22.32 (40192.98) 
Conservative - 2.35 (40690.25) 
SNP - -44.23 (41353.97) 
DUP/UUP - -21.69 (40192.98) 
     
Additional 
Controls: 
    
Tenure - 3.29 (3.07) 
Margin - -2.12 (3.81) 
     
Model Statistics:     
Chi Square 23.972 *** 67.368 *** 
Cox & Snell R 
Squared 
.305 .640 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10 
 
Over and above the effects of party membership, tenure and electoral margin, 
Universalism and Power values were statistically significant predictors of whether MPs voted 
for military action in Syria. Both values were negative predictors, indicating that those most 
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motivated by Universalism and Power values were more likely to vote against air strikes than 
those less motivated by these values. This is a theoretically ambiguous result, given that 
Universalism and Power values sit opposite one another in the sinusoidal continuum of BHV 
and denote incongruent motivational goals (see Chapter 2, p.43). On the one hand, MPs 
highly motivated by Universalism values may have opposed military action to protect the 
welfare of Syrian civilians and to protest against British military involvement in any violent 
conflict. It is also possible that Universalism values interact with Labour Party membership 
here, given that the majority of Labour MPs score higher than Conservative MPs for these 
values (Chapter 8, pp.189-200) and also voted against air strikes in greater numbers.
86
 By 
comparison, it is harder to explain the effect of Power values in this instance, given that the 
motivational goals of this factor - such as authority, control and dominance - usually predict 
competitive and subordinating behaviour (Gandal et al., 2005) that one would associate with 
military conflict.  
There are three possible explanations that demand further consideration. Firstly, there 
may be confounding variables that are not included in this model. With more participants, a 
more complicated model could unearth these effects. Secondly, the ambiguity of this result 
may reflect differences proposed by the theory of instantiation (Chapter 2, pp.50-55; Hanel et 
al., 2017). It could be that military action does not, understandably, count as a ‘typical’ 
instantiation of Power values in terms of central tendency, ideals or familiarity for citizens 
who have grown up in the UK.
87
 Thirdly, this could be an instrumental decision. A decade 
previous, MPs voted to engage in military action in Iraq and faced a steady backlash of public 
disapproval.
88
 Only two years previous in August 2013 MPs had overturned a Government 
proposal to intervene in Syria, which made David Cameron the first prime minister since Lord 
North in 1782 to lose a parliamentary vote on military action. For MPs who are highly 
motivated by Power values, and thus attribute great importance to the authority, recognition 
and influence accumulated via their parliamentary office, then support for another potentially 
failed military campaign without clear public support would be a highly risky decision (see 
also Strong, 2015). It is neither possible nor necessary to explore these explanations in further 
depth here, but each warrants future investigation.  
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 A larger sample size is required to test this interaction effect. In the present sample, 19 Labour MPs voted 
against air strikes and 7 voted in favour. 
87
 Refer to chapter 2 (pp.50-54) for more information on the theory of value instantiation. 
88
 A YouGov poll in June 2015 showed that only 37% of the public ever believed that military action against 
Saddam Hussein was the correct decision (https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/06/03/remembering-iraq/). 
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The power of party incentives and sanctions to override personal motivations in the 
Commons’ chamber was also starkly revealed in the interview data. Interviewee 1 – a Labour 
MP who had previously held ministerial office – not only recalled voting against their own 
beliefs for the Party but having done so to start a war, specifically the invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Describing the period before the vote, this participant experienced sustained pressure 
from the highest offices: 
Yes I did, and particularly if I can be specific, over Iraq and the invasion of Iraq… I 
was in interview after interview. I had a discussion with the Foreign Secretary, Prime 
Minister, three or four times, all about this issue and gradually they wore me down, in 
the sense of I had to balance my own individual point of view with what would be the 
impact on the Government and the future of the Labour party in government, should 
anything negative happen…Blair said he would have resigned, in fact he claimed he 
was going to. He said to me several times in private meetings that if he didn’t get a 
majority of Labour members, he would resign…I eventually, reluctantly, came down 
on the side of trying to maintain the Government.
89
 
Whilst this data is compelling as evidence of the extent to which MPs are manipulated to 
uphold the party directive in the Commons’ chamber, the interview was even more telling for 
the way in which the participant went on to justify their actions. Rather than placing blame on 
the Party leadership, the interviewee started to evoke value judgements in order to make sense 
of the invasion. Talking in terms indicative of Universalism values, the interviewee explained 
how they had attempted to soothe their own conscience: 
Iraq had gone through hell long before the invasion. They were subject to an embargo 
that embargoed critical medicines. Thousands upon thousands of children were dying. 
Others were dying as well. There was a no-fly zone, there was anarchy in the country. 
And I convinced myself while the invasion might be bad, it would bring some stability 
to the country. We’d get rid of a dictator…[I] tried to justify it on the basis of the 
balance of probabilities. The people of Iraq would be in better shape with the invasion 
than without it. I have to say, looking back on that now, that was totally naïve. The 
people of Iraq have suffered tremendously since the invasion… Through heart-
searching I still think I bear a responsibility for that (Interviewee 1) 
This qualitative data adds nuance to the statistics presented in Table 9.4. It both adds colour to 
narratives of party ‘loyalty’ and exposes the degree to which party organisations can mask 
their internal differences to secure legislative victories. Taken together, the data presented 
here testifies to the mitigating effect of party structures upon MPs’ psychological agency as 
elected representatives in the UK Parliament.   
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to vote with the party whip or act in a certain way against their conscience. I wondered whether you’d 
experienced that, and how you dealt with it? 
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c) European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017: 
 
 The EU Withdrawal Bill is the only one of the three votes analysed in this thesis 
where both major political parties enforced a three-line Whip. It is revealing, therefore, that 
this is the only one of the three votes where the statistically significant effect of MPs’ BHV, 
in particular Universalism values, is eradicated after control variables for party affiliation are 
introduced (Table 9.5). By themselves, basic values account for just 17.5% of MPs’ voting 
behaviour on this Bill, less than either of the other two votes studied above. The jump in 
variance explained by the model after controlling for each MP's party, tenure and electoral 
majority is also considerable (a rise of 32%). In the values-only model, Universalism values 
are highly significant predictors of not voting to trigger Article 50. Given that Universalism 
values denote an understanding and appreciation of all peoples, as well as a greater inclination 
towards social contact with out-group members, it makes sense that MPs particularly 
motivated by these values would not endorse risking the diverse social, cultural and even 
economic opportunities afforded by EU membership. According to this model, MPs were 3 
times (Exp(B) = 0.331) more likely to reject the referendum result with each average unit 
change in their response to items measuring Universalism values on the PVQ. 
 
 A larger sample size is needed to test the robustness of this result. However, the data 
indicate that MPs accept cognitive dissonance in low perceived choice scenarios. Put another 
way, MPs are willing to vote against their personal preferences and goals when external 
constraints impinge on their freedom of choice (cf. Nam et al., 2013). In this instance, MPs 
were cajoled by both party Whips – and the prospect of disciplinary repercussions if they 
rebelled – and a fragile external environment in which the ‘majority’ of UK citizens (i.e. their 
electors) had already chosen to leave the EU. In terms of Kam’s (2009) LEADS model, there 
was no possible benefit for MPs to accrue from not following a public/party directive. As 
anticipated by the IMPPB, MPs’ values become epiphenomenal to behavioural outcomes in 
the context of such extreme formal and informal constraints. However, it is also possible that 
MPs’ personality characteristics continue to influence these behaviours indirectly. The clear 
differences in the BHV of Labour and Conservative MPs reported in chapter 8 indicate a 
powerful self-selection process in party recruitment to elite politics. It is possible, therefore, 
that MPs’ values are merely mediated by party structures in low choice scenarios. This 








Table 9.5 Hierarchical logistic regression model to show the effect of MPs' basic values upon their 
decision to vote for UK the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (n = 69). 
 





B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
Basic Values:     
Tradition .19 (.29) -.44 (.47) 
Universalism -1.11 (.42) ** -.79 (.58) 
Power -.24 (.38) -.92 (.92) 
Security -.09 (.32) .10 (.44) 
Self-Direction . .23 (.41) -.05 (.57) 
     
Party:     
Labour - 21.81 (40193.14) 
Conservative - 42.37 (40951.88) 
SNP - -.58 (41948.91) 
DUP/UUP - 21.64 (40193.14) 
     
Additional 
Controls: 
    
Tenure - -1.09 (2.01) 
Majority - -.97 (2.67) 
     
Model Statistics:     
Chi Square 13.264 * 47.245 *** 
Cox & Snell R 
Squared 
.175 .496 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10 
 
 
  Whilst institutional constraints appear to mask the majority of individual differences 
between MPs in the context of the EU withdrawal Bill, there were still some MPs on both 
sides of the House who defied the Whip. These MPs did not respond to the surveys issued by 
this study in sufficient numbers to pass quantitative judgements, but interview data revealed a 
number of key insights about the act of rebellion in general. A handful of participants 
admitted to being serial rebels. Some had rebelled against their party out of frustration and a 
sense of principle. As interviewee 9 put it, ‘I was bored with them, I was fed up with them, I 
didn’t like Blair, I thought the Labour Party stood for nothing.’ Others were compelled to 
rebel because of the strength of their local support base; interviewee 15, for example, ‘never 
really got any sort of aggravation from the local party because of the times when [they] voted 
against [the Whip]. Local Party were very supportive.’ Yet for others still, the prospect of 
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rebelling had become more attractive as they approached the end of their careers. Reflecting 
specifically on the EU withdrawal Bill, interviewee 3 said: 
 
I’ve seen Labour leaders make mistakes and I’m old enough, I’m not worried enough 
and not on the career path enough to really give it more of a cursory thought. I 
absolutely feel I was in the right position on [welfare in 2015] and I feel I’m 
absolutely in the right position on Brexit. I wasn’t cavalier about it. I knew that I 
might be sacked. I didn’t want to be but I love whichever role I’ve got, but had I been 
sacked, I would have said, “Well, that is fair dues since that is what normally 
happens.”       
 
Whilst these participants were able to reconcile the act of rebellion, others could not. 
For many interviewees, the prospect of rebelling in the Commons’ chamber was tantamount 
to treachery. These participants were quick to recognise that their colleagues may have 
genuine grievances with party policies but they advocated compromise and consensus behind 
closed doors.  
 
[M]y starting point is the importance of party loyalty – not just to the party to which 
you owe your seat, but also to the electorate that voted for that ticket. I do respect the 
fact that some of the times people either absent themselves or will vote against their 
party, but I think you’ve got to do a lot of soul-searching before you commit to that. 
There were quite a few of my colleagues who saw it as a badge of honour to vote 
against their party, and I rather despised that (Interviewee 16) 
I don’t even like the use of the word ‘rebel’. I prefer the use of the word ‘traitor’. 
(Laughs) I never was attracted to the idea that there was something virtuous about 
rebelling against your party. I feel slightly different about it now, but actually, on the 
whole, the people I really respected were the ones who did support the party when 
they had difficulties with it, not the ones who bailed out at the first whiff of gun smoke 
(Interviewee 5) 
 The results reported in this section are compelling for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
quantitative data presented show that MPs’ personality characteristics do matter for voting 
behaviour in the House of Commons. As anticipated by the IMPPB, it is also possible to 
discriminate between free and conscience votes. As a proxy for MPs’ agency in the division 
lobbies, basic values explain a substantial amount of variance in MPs’ voting behaviour when 
the whip is withdrawn. This result holds event after controlling for party affiliation, length of 
service and the size of an MP’s majority. Contra to rational choice depictions of MPs as 
strategic and predictable party animals (Hazan, 2003; Kam, 2009), as well as rival studies that 
give pre-eminence to sociological unity within political parties (Daniel, 2015; Russell, 2014), 
I find that political elites will diverge on legislation according to deep-seated personality 
characteristics. MPs in general, and the main political parties in particular, are not monolithic 
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psychological groups. Internal party constraints (i.e. the Whip) and external public 
expectations can, it seems, force a false image of unity that disguises more nuanced 
psychological cleavages at the intra-party level. These results will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 11. 
II. Moderate Constraint: Explaining Early Day Motions (EDMs), Written Questions and 
Select Committee Membership. 
 
 The previous section analysed three separate votes in the House of Commons to 
determine the causal influence of MPs' personality characteristics upon legislation in the UK. 
The results showed that even in the legislative chamber, where internal and external 
constraints upon politicians are greatest, MPs' basic values have an important impact on their 
political choices. This section now analyses three different parliamentary behaviours that are, 
by comparison to voting in the Commons' chamber, more distant from institutional constraints 
(formal or informal). In line with the propositions of the IMPPB put forward in chapter 4, it is 
anticipated that basic values will have a significant effect on these behaviours, which are less 
visible to or understood by public role alters and, in turn, less important to party officials. The 
section proceeds in three short parts. The first analyses the number of Early Day Motions 
(EDMs) signed by participants in the parliamentary year 2015-2016.
90
 The second examines 
the number of written questions asked by participants in that same year. The final, third 
section assesses the impact of participants' basic values upon their historic record of working 
on a select committee.  
a) Early Day Motions (EDMs) 
 Prior research on EDMs has examined these expressive acts as indicators of 
ideological blocs in political parties (Franklin and Tappin, 1977), proxies of elite opinions on 
specific legislative issues (Childs and Withey, 2004), measures of party cohesion (Bailey and 
Nason, 2008), and as signalling tools used by MPs in a competitive electoral climate 
(Kellermann, 2013). Within this small and under-developed literature on peripheral legislative 
behaviour, there has not been any attempt to understand EDMs as a function of personal 
preferences or psychological differences within the legislative body. However, EDMs are 
often loosely regulated by party officials and unknown to electors. As per the IMPPB, it is 
anticipated, therefore, that EDMs might reveal meaningful expressions of MPs' basic values 
in their representative role. 
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 This Parliamentary year was chosen to maximise the number of participants that could be used in the analysis. 
Given that contextual factors are likely to impact on MPs' propensity to sign EDMs or ask written questions (in 
response to the political context), a single Parliamentary year was selected.  
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 To account for the dispersion of scores and the skewed distribution caused by 
participants who signed no EDMs in 2015/16, the effect of BHV upon MPs' sponsorship of 
EDMs was tested using a poisson loglinear count model.
91
 To maximise the statistical power 
of the data with a limited pool of participants, only those basic values with statistically 
significant or particularly large correlations with the dependent variable were included in the 
regression model. Two demographic control variables (age and gender) were included along 
with three variables to measure additional constraints. Firstly, controls for the party affiliation 
of the participant accounted for whether or not the MP was a member of the ruling party. The 
number of years served by each MP (tenure) was included to assess whether or not a two-
tailed causal relationship might exist between signing EDMs and electoral longevity. Finally, 
each participant's 2015 election margin was included to account for the added pressure of 
cultivating constituency support. The results are presented in Table 9.6.  
As predicted by the IMPPB, BHV were highly significant predictors of how many 
EDMs each participant signed in 2015/16 (Hypothesis 6). The relative public anonymity of 
EDMs, as well as their political triviality in terms of party dynamics, produces a 'high choice 
perceived scenario' in which MPs' personal preferences seem to have a substantial impact. 
The incident rate ratios indicate that Universalism and Power values are particularly relevant.  
Those MPs in the sample scoring highest for Universalism values signed over 24 times more 
EDMs in one parliamentary year than those scoring lowest for that value factor. Similarly, 
those participants with the highest scores for Power values signed just 17% as many EDMs as 
those MPs who attributed least importance to that value factor. This result not  only conforms 
to the sinusoidal model of incongruence expected of Universalism and Power values 
(Schwartz, 1992) but offers a stark insight into the types of legislators most likely to use 
EDMs. 
 In contrast to prior work that suggests peripheral parliamentary behaviours such as 
EDMs are, above all, expressive signals for party leaders or MPs' electors, and thus used 
strategically as a function of electoral pressure (cf. Kellermann, 2013), this result suggests 
that MPs might use EDMs to service personal motivations. The relationship between 
Universalism values and EDMs indicates that MPs with particularly strong commitments to 
furthering the interests and welfare of all electors equally, may express that motivation 
through sponsorship of as many EDMs as possible. It is, however, impossible to know 
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 20% of participants signed 0 EDMs in the Parliamentary year 2015-16. The maximum number of EDMs 
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whether the increased frequency with which these MPs sign EDMs is matched by their 
commensurate substantive focus. By contrast, the relationship revealed between Power values 
and EDMs indicates that those MPs most concerned with their own authority and recognition 
do not perceive EDMs as a way to further those goals. This is understandable, given that 
EDMs very rarely influence parliamentary debate or manifest in legislation. To the extent that 
they might accrue benefit to the signatory, EDMs are little more than a signal of support to 
party gatekeepers.  
 Reproducing trends from Kellermann's (2013) longitudinal study of EDM 
sponsorship, MPs in right-wing parties signed fewer EDMs than participants in left-wing 
parties. However, this effect is marginal and may simply reflect the differences in BHV 
between the two main parties (see chapter 8) - in particular the higher scores for Universalism 
values among Labour MPs. Contra to Kellermann (2013), the data here reveal a positive 
association between an MP's electoral margin and signing EDMs. Whereas Kellermann's 
study found that MPs with the smallest margins signed more EDMs, participants with the 
largest margins in this study signed 27% more EDMs than those in the most competitive 
seats. However, this data relates to the first year after the 2015 General Election. It may be 
that those MPs in the most marginal seats were expending energy to consolidate their victory 
in more visible ways (i.e. in the constituency) at this point in the parliamentary cycle or, 
alternatively, were not yet turning to EDMs as a defence against electoral vulnerability. 
 Participants who had served in Parliament the longest also signed 92% more EDMs in 
2015/16 than those MPs who had just been elected. On one hand, this may simply reflect 
differential experience and knowledge of parliamentary procedure. Newly elected MPs may 
be less likely to sign EDMs by virtue of not fully understanding what they represent, due to 
myriad other new and demanding commitments, or from a desire to throw themselves into the 
fray of more symbolic parliamentary action. Given prior evidence of a positive relationship 
between signing EDMs and electoral returns at the ballot box (Kellermann, 2013, p.269), this 
finding might also reflect the strategic behaviour of MPs who have successfully utilised 
peripheral parliamentary behaviours to appeal to constituents. Without longitudinal data and 








Table 9.6 Regression analysis of the effect of MPs' basic values upon the number of early day motions they signed in the parliamentary year 2015-16, the number of 




Variable Select Committee Membership 
(n = 91) 
B(S.E.)                                     Exp(B) 
No. of Early Day Motions Signed 
(n = 83) 
B(S.E.)                                          Exp(B) 
No. of Written Questions Submitted 
(n = 75) 
B(S.E.)                                                   Exp(B) 
1. Basic Values:    
Conformity 1.39 (.49) **                                  3.996 .278 (.08) ***                                     1.321 - 
Tradition - .225 (.09) **                                       1.253 - 
Benevolence -.04 (.49)                                          .964 -1.07 (.08) ***                                      .344 - 
Universalism .53 (.45)                                         1.692 3.18 (.09) ***                                   24.145 .74 (.08) ***                                              2.103 
Self-Direction .17 (.56)                                         1.188 -.18 (.08) *                                            .834 -1.22 (.08) ***                                            .296 
Stimulation .28 (.51)                                         1.318 - .26 (.08) ***                                                1.30 
Achievement 1.19 (.49) *                                    3.271 .30 (.10) **                                         1.345 -.21 (.08) **                                                .810 
Hedonism - - - 
Power .19 (.48)                                         1.210 -1.75 (.08) ***                                      .173 - 
Security - - 1.85 (.08) ***                                            6.358 
 
   
2. Demographics:    
Age -2.85 (2.33)                                    .058 -.96 (.07) ***                                        .382 .02 (.10)                                                1.022 
Gender .405 (.76)                                    1.499 -.49 (.03) ***                                        .611 - 
 
   
3. Career 
Considerations: 
   
Partisanship .546 (.88)                                     1.726 -.09 (.03) **                                     .912  -.399 (.03) ***                                           .671 
Tenure 3.96 (2.09) *                              52.458 .65 (.06) ***                                   1.923 .2 (0.08) *                                                  1.215 
Majority -1.11 (1.75)                                   .328 .24 (.06) ***                                  1.268 -.81 (0.07) ***                                            .443 
    
Model Statistics:    
Chi Square 24.73 ** 5650.47 *** 1365.94 *** 
Cox & Snell R Squared 0.238 - - 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10
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 Independent variables: Basic Human Values  = centred mean scores (rescaled 0-1 for Poisson models); Age = continuous data rescaled 0-1; Gender (Dummy) = 1 - Female, 0 - 
Male; Partisanship (Dummy) = 1 - Centre Right Party, 0 - Centre Left Party; Tenure = continuous data rescaled 0-1; Election Majority = continuous data rescaled 0-1.    
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b) Written Questions 
 In spite of a compelling body of evidence that points to the marginal, near non-
existent electoral impact of individual legislative behaviour in the UK's tight party system 
(Margetts, 2011), parliamentary questions are asked on a daily basis by MPs of all partisan 
affiliations and occupational grades (except members of the Executive). The extant research 
base analyses written questions, in particular, as either an expression of substantive 
representational interests (Bird, 2005; Saalfeld, 2011) or a rational electoral stratagem 
(Kellermann, 2016; Soroka et al., 2009). As with EDMs, however, political scientists in the 
UK are yet to study this relatively autonomous representative behaviour as a function of MPs' 
personality characteristics. Following the theoretical logic of the IMPPB, it is expected that 
MPs' basic values will have a substantial impact on the number of written questions they ask 
in any one parliamentary year.     
 The distribution of the number of questions asked by participants in the current sample 
is skewed considerably. Participants asked an average of 86.6 written questions in 2015/16, 
with individual results ranging from 0 to 858. However, only 5% of the observations 
exceeded 300 questions, highlighting the effect of individual participant variation. To account 
for this skew in the data, a poisson loglinear regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
impact of MPs' basic values on the number of written questions they asked in the 
parliamentary year 2015-2016. Once again, a limited number of BHV were selected a priori 
based upon correlation analyses and the same political control variables were included as with 
the analysis of EDMs.  
 The results (Table 9.6) confirm trends in prior research (Kellermann, 2016; Rasch, 
2009) that find a link between electoral vulnerability and the number of questions asked by an 
MP. Participants in the present sample who won with the largest margins in the 2015 General 
Election asked just 44% as many written questions in the following parliamentary year as 
those participants who had won with the smallest margins. Given the immediacy of the 
election result in 2015/16, MPs in marginal seats may have felt an additional impetus to 
plough their efforts into communicating an active and committed profile to their electors. This 
effect may reflect the pressures exerted by 24-hour news media, in which the public can easily 
access proxy metrics for legislator's productivity. The House of Commons, for example, now 
publishes lists of the questions asked by each MP (Young et al., 2003) and the media have 
even used written questions as the basis for league Tables that rank MPs on their (pro-
)activity (Leapman, 2005). Whilst composing and submitting written questions to the 
James Weinberg 




government takes time, it is therefore understandable that MPs in marginal seats might try to 
ask as many questions as possible in order to signal their commitment to external role alters.  
 Even after controlling for important contextual factors such as electoral margin and 
partisanship, MPs' BHV still had a statistically significant impact on the number of written 
questions they asked in 2015/16.
93
 Above all, Security values had a strong positive effect 
(Hypothesis 5). Participants scoring highest for these values asked over six times more 
questions in one parliamentary year than those MPs who attributed least importance to 
Security values. This result may signal strategic behaviour by those MPs who are most 
motivated by stability in their own lives and thus ask more parliamentary questions in order to 
attract positive support from their electors. Unlike prior research into the substantive base of 
written questions, the data imply that questions are used as much to look busy as they are to 
confer importance on any representational issue. As such, this gives credence to theories of 
rational vote-seeking behaviour (i.e. Kam, 2009) but adds nuance to that conclusion insofar as 
it reveals an underpinning psychological motivation.  
 To assess the relationship between BHV and electoral strategy in the context of asking 
parliamentary questions, the count model was re-run to incorporate an interaction term 
between Security values and electoral margin. A significant regression equation was found (F 
(1, 10) = 7.49(.39), p < 0.001) that suggests a mutually reciprocal relationship between these 
variables. Given that both variables were rescaled 0-1 for ease of interpretation, the 
interaction term indicates that MPs who attribute most importance to Security values asked 7 
more questions in 2015/16 when they were, simultaneously, in a position of electoral 
vulnerability. This result complements prior research on BHV, which suggests that the 
immediate context of action can activate relevant values and thus cause behaviour (Schwartz, 
2005; Verplanken and Holland, 2002). Where MPs had been elected to a marginal seat and 
faced uncertainty in terms of their personal and professional lives, Security values were likely 
to be activated and to promote behaviours (i.e. asking written questions) that might mitigate 
risk. This connection is also appropriately enhanced in MPs who already attribute more 
importance to Security values and thus access those values more readily in any context. 
 In contrast to Security values, Achievement and Self-Direction values displayed 
highly significant negative effects upon the number of written questions asked by participants. 
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 Participants in right-wing parties (majority Conservative MPs) asked just 67% as many questions as 
participants in left-wing parties (majority Labour MPs). This arguably reflects the dynamic of two-party politics 
in the UK, whereby the opposition must hold the Government to account and be sure that it is seen doing so. 
James Weinberg 




In the first instance, MPs scoring highest for Achievement values asked only 81% as many 
questions as those who attributed least importance to this value factor. This suggests that the 
most ambitious MPs who are motivated to demonstrate success, do not - to a moderate extent 
- perceive written questions as a beneficial expenditure of time and energy. In the second 
instance, MPs scoring highest for Self-Direction values asked just 30% as many written 
questions as those participants who attributed least importance to that value factor. For MPs 
motivated by creativity and independent thought and action, it is possible that the perfunctory, 
often ex ante nature of parliamentary questions deters them. Whilst both of these results 
require more detailed longitudinal analysis with a larger number of observations, the data do 
highlight the individuality of UK MPs in Parliament. In particular, this section shows that 
written questions are used in varying measures by different MPs to service a range of 
psychological goals and motivations, even after controlling for party affiliation and electoral 
competition.  
c) Select Committees 
 A growing literature on the role and influence of Select Committees (SCs) in recent 
years has cast a spotlight on their increasing impact upon parliamentary procedure and 
legislation (Benton and Russell, 2013; Kelso, 2009; Marsh, 2016). With this augmented 
presence in Westminster has come greater media attention outside of Parliament as well as a 
diversification of attractive career paths for backbenchers (Fisher, 2015). However, the 
existing research base has not yet supplemented its qualitative conclusions that a) the 
personality and efficacy of an SC's membership influences its success, b) the work demanded 
of SC members is unique in Parliament and antithetical to the ethos of British politics, and c) 
SCs now entice ambitious MPs away from mainstream career paths (see Benton and Russell, 
2013; Geddes, 2016). Using rigorous interdisciplinary analysis of MPs' basic values in the 
context of the UK Parliament, I offer preliminary clarification of these statements.   
 A binary logistic regression was conducted that modelled the effect of basic values 
upon an MP's historic record of select committee membership. Records of membership details 
are now freely available for the public to access online via the website TheyWorkForYou. In 
total, records were available for 91 participants in the current sample. As with written 
questions and EDMs, correlation analyses were conducted first to determine which BHV to 
drop from the regression model. Additional control variables were included to account for 
demographic and contextual factors such as party affiliation, tenure in Parliament, and 
electoral majority. The purpose of the analysis was not to differentiate within or between SCs 
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per se, but rather to provide a preliminary perspective on 'who' puts themselves forward to 
these committees in the first place. In line with the IMPPB, it is expected that MPs' basic 
values will successfully discriminate between those who do and do not join SCs (Hypothesis 
7).  
 The results of the regression model (Table 9.6) reveal three statistically significant 
predictors: Conformity values, Achievement values and tenure. The first of these results 
suggests that MPs who are most restrained in their actions and impulses, and prefer to avoid 
conflict with others, are also more likely to join SCs. In fact, the odds ratio indicates that 
participants were 4 times more likely to have served on an SC with each average unit change 
in their Likert scale response to Conformity items on the PVQ. Individuals who are motivated 
by Conformity values tend to inhibit disruptive tendencies in order to facilitate successful 
social interaction (Schwartz, 1992). It is possible, therefore, that these MPs - who do not 
enjoy or do not want to engage in the competitive party political sparring of the Commons' 
chamber - may see SCs as an alternative, collaborative forum in which to advance policy 
specific goals. This finding supports previous observations that 'politicians who are less party-
political tend to be selected, affording the committees greater independence from divisive, 
partisan politics' (Fisher, 2015, p.421). This is highly significant, since it suggests that SCs' 
reputation for avoiding the adversarialism of the Commons' chamber is a product not only of 
their remit but also, crucially, of the personalities that comprise them. To move as one with a 
shared purpose, SC members must be able to reach a consensus on, for example, the wording 
of a report. This requires diplomatic compromise with colleagues from all political parties. 
The success of SCs in achieving consensus, and thus presenting robust and unified scrutiny of 
the Executive, appears to be a function of the MPs who join them. 
 The importance of Achievement values in predicting SC membership also supports 
prior research on the career paths of MPs (Democratic Audit, 2016). The data indicate that the 
most ambitious MPs, desirous of success and influence, are much more likely to join a SC. 
The odds ratio indicates that participants were more than 3 times more likely to have served 
on a SC with each average unit change in their Likert scale response to Achievement items on 
the PVQ. As a member of a SC, an MP has the potential not only to achieve measurable 
impact upon government policy (cf. Benton and Russell, 2013) but also avoids the protocols 
that bind ministers, for example, from commenting on issues beyond their portfolio. 
Ambitious MPs can thus use SCs to speak openly on contentious or sensitive topics and, for 
those MPs highly motivated by Achievement values, have the opportunity to demonstrate 
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their competence to party gatekeepers. In turn, SCs command an increasingly high profile 
media presence that gives MPs a platform to engage with, and impress, external role alters. 
Inquiries into, for example, phone hacking at News International, security at the 2012 London 
Olympics, or female genital mutilation have, in recent years, given MPs such as Tom Watson, 
Keith Vaz, Margaret Hodge and Sir Alan Beith a media presence akin to that of junior or even 
senior ministers in the government. The data suggest that these changes have also affected the 
type of politicians seeking to join SCs.  
 The logit also revealed a positive significant relationship between how long an MP 
had served in Parliament and whether or not they had served on a SC. This might suggest that 
SCs are not so much stepping stones to higher office but equally end goals for long-serving 
MPs. As Keith Vaz MP, former chair of the Home Affairs SC, told a Hansard Audit: ‘I think 
being chair of a committee is probably one of the last jobs you do in Parliament, and rightly 
so’ (reported in Fisher, 2015, p. 422). It is possible that ambitious MPs who have failed to 
take up ministerial roles across their careers seek consolidation in SCs as an alternative end-
of-career role. To substantiate this claim, the logit was re-run to test for an interaction effect 
between Achievement values and tenure but the coefficient was negative and non-significant. 
Far from being the domain of ambitious yet bitter MPs nearing the end of their career, this 
might indicate simply that longstanding MPs garner more support from their colleagues and 
enter SCs in higher numbers - especially post-2010 and the Wright reforms. This inference 
requires future research into the personality characteristics of SC members.  
III. Representing 'What' or 'Whom'? Basic Values and MPs' Representative Priorities. 
 So far this chapter has analysed a series of parliamentary behaviours as diverse as 
MPs' legislative voting and the submission of written questions to the government. In each 
case, it has shown that MPs' personality characteristics, specifically their basic values, have a 
meaningful impact on the way they behave in Parliament. This effect holds across scenarios 
where it is expected that MPs are exposed to high and/or moderate levels of institutional 
constraint from their political parties and external role alters (i.e their electors). These findings 
are not only highly original but significant as a step forward in the academic understanding of 
representative agency in the UK Parliament. This section advances this analysis further by 
interrogating the motivational reasons that inform 'who' or 'what' an MP perceives as their 
representative priority in elected office (Hypothesis 8). 
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 The outcome in this case is defined as a three category variable. MPs were asked to 
rank three representative foci in order of importance: their political party and its manifesto, 
the common good of the nation, and the wishes and welfare of their constituency. Chapter 5 
of this thesis has already critiqued a long literature on democratic focus and style (Andeweg, 
2012; Eulau and Wahlke, 1959; Gauja, 2012; Judge, 1999); I argued, in particular, that both 
the theoretical implications of the mandate-independence controversy and the natural flux of 
democratic politics in the West undermine studies that seek to draw neat causal links from 
political behaviours to politicians' representative foci/style or vice versa. Whilst I maintain 
that MPs must take political roles seriatim, their abstract priorities are nevertheless important 
as an indication of how they perceive their democratic duty - whether or not this is translated 
directly into tangible political behaviour is of secondary consideration for this study. More so 
than the other behaviours already explored in this chapter, the institutional constraints upon 
participants' responses were entirely informal. The decision about how or who to represent (or 
at least how or who an MP would like to represent) is an abstract choice conceived within a 
political, ideological context, but one that reflects significant personal motivations. In line 
with the IMPPB, it is anticipated, therefore, that MPs' BHV will have a powerful indirect 
effect upon participant responses.        
 To model causal pathways between variables and to understand complex direct and 
indirect relationships between variables - as represented in the IMPPB - I use Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM). In this section, SEM is carried out using the statistical package 
AMOS 24 to model the pathways by which basic values might affect MPs' representative foci 
using the full sample of data (n = 106). The four higher order basic values (Conservation, 
Self-Transcendence, Self-Enhancement, and Openness to Change) are included at one end of 
the model as measured by all 20 items on the TwIVI portrait values questionnaire. The 
measurement model (Figure 9.1) shows that these items measure the latent constructs 
accurately. Nearly all factor loadings between the questionnaire items and the latent values 
are above .5 and every factor loading is statistically significant at p < 0.05 or p < 001.  
 Two additional independent variables were included. Firstly, MPs' economic and 
social ideology was measured using two independent scales of 0-10 (Left-Right).
94
 Secondly, 
MPs' party affiliation was included. To reduce the number of parameters in the equation and 
thus maximise the power of the data, party affiliation was coded as a binary variable that 
designated MPs as members of centre-Left or centre-Right parties. Due to the limited number 
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of observations available, it was not possible to include socio-economic correlates of either 
basic values or ideology (cf. Feldman, 2003, p.488). However, the ANOVA models reported 
in chapters 7 and 8 show that the effects of age, gender and education upon BHV are all 
relatively homogeneous within this elite sample. In their responses to the survey, only 7% of 
MPs (n = 8) reported their political party as their top priority in elected office. Therefore, to 
limit the number of parameters in the model, these results were re-coded as two dummy 
variables for those MPs who prioritised the nation (i.e. Trustees) and the constituency (i.e. 
Delegates). 













Note: Maximum likelihood estimation was used to calculate the measurement model. All factor loadings are 
standardised regression coefficients and measurement errors indicate the percentage of variance (squared 
multiple correlations) of each questionnaire item explained by the model. All factor loadings are significant at p 
< 0.05. N = 106, AIC = 450.633, RMSEA = .09. Refer to Table 6.6 (p.140) for unabbreviated item descriptors. 
 Following the advice of prior methodological research on Structural Equation 
Modelling (MacCallum and Austin, 2000, Homer and Kahle, 1988), three alternative models 
are tested here to assess the supremacy of the IMPPB (Figure 9.2, below). The first model, the 
direct model, replicates prior research in which BHV directly influence political outcomes 
without mediation (e.g. Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Devos et al., 2002, Caprara et al., 2006). 
In the second (complicated) model, economic and social ideology and party affiliation are 
introduced. This generates additional paths of causation, so that the outcome variables 
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(trustee/delegate) are explained both directly and indirectly by basic values (cf. Leimgruber, 
2011). In the final (theorised) model, all of the assumptions of the IMPPB are reproduced. In 
this model, the direct effects of BHV upon the outcome variable are set to 0. The model 
dictates that BHV are wholly mediated by ideology, and in turn indirectly impact on party 
affiliation and representative focus. As per the IMPPB, this model assumes that BHV are 
mobilised in political contexts by corresponding political values or ideologies and that, 
secondly, their indirect effect upon abstract, unconstrained behaviours (i.e. representative 
focus) will be greater than that of institutional factors such as party affiliation. The accuracy 
of these theoretical propositions is demonstrated if (a) basic values have a significant direct 
effect on representative focus in the direct model but (b) lose significance in the complicated 
model when indirect effects are included, and if (c) the theorised model fits the data as well as 
or better than the complicated model.    
Figure 9.2 Three theoretical models of MPs' representative focus. 
  































 The results of all three models are reported in Table 9.7. The direct model shows that 
BHV have a highly significant impact upon the outcome variables. The only pathway where 
this is not the case is between Self-Transcendence values and being a trustee. In chapter 5 of 
this thesis, I tentatively hypothesised relationships between Self-Transcendence values and 
constituency service (delegate model), and between Openness to Change values and a national 
‘trustee’ mindset (Hypothesis 8). These claims are borne out by the data, which reveal 
stronger effects between Openness to Change values and whether an MP self-reported as a 
trustee than as a delegate. Similarly, Self-Transcendence values have a highly significant 
effect upon MPs' self-reports as a delegate but share no significant relationship with being a 
trustee. However, the strongest effect revealed in the direct model is between Conservation 
values and being a trustee. This suggests that MPs who are most motivated by traditions, 
security and social cohesion are also more likely to prioritise national politics.      
 In the complicated model, the pathways between basic values and ideology/party 
affiliation and from both of the latter to the outcome variables are freed. As anticipated, all of 
the direct effects of basic values upon representative focus become insignificant. Put another 
way, the effects of BHV upon MPs' self-reported priorities are now fully mediated by 
ideology and party affiliation. In this model, the data indicate that MPs' choices are now fully 
explained by the direct paths from economic ideology to representative focus. MPs scoring 
higher for economic ideology (i.e. more right-wing) were more likely to self-identify as a 
trustee and less likely to self-identify as a delegate than MPs with left-wing ideologies. These 
same trends (for all variables) hold in the theorised model where economic ideology is, again, 
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the only variables to exert a statistically significant effect on the outcome variables. The 
complicated and theorised models also both perform better than the direct model, as indicated 
by their similar fit statistics (loglikelihood and AIC scores).  




 Direct Model Complicated Model Theorised Model 
 Est. Sig. SE Est. Sig. SE Est. Sig. SE 
Direct Effects           
Trustee ON          
OC .862 *** .239 -.169  .234 Fixed to 0 
ST -.001 - .213 -.316  .252 Fixed to 0 
SE .588 ** .216 -.145  .227 Fixed to 0 
CON 1.347 *** .217 -.080  .244 Fixed to 0 
Econ. Fixed to 0 .082 ** .027 .081 *** .025 
Social  Fixed to 0 -.006  .030 .011  .026 
Party  Fixed to 0 .039  .156 .053  .146 
          
Delegate ON          
OC .747 ** .237 .348  .236 Fixed to 0 
ST .741 *** .211 .148  .254 Fixed to 0 
SE .479 * .214 .037  .228 Fixed to 0 
CON .509 * .215 .128  .246 Fixed to 0 
Econ. Fixed to 0 -.071 ** .028 -.068 ** .025 
Social  Fixed to 0 .012  .030 -.002  .026 
Party  Fixed to 0 -.062  .157 -.062  .147 
          
Economic 
Ideology ON 
      
  
 
OC Fixed to 0 1.187  .994 1.187  .994 
ST Fixed to 0 -3.952 *** .882 -3.952 *** .882 
SE Fixed to 0 -.280  .896 -.280  .896 
CON Fixed to 0 3.149 *** .902 3.149 *** .902 
          
Social Ideology 
ON 
      
  
 
OC Fixed to 0 .135  .790 .135  .790 
ST Fixed to 0 -4.277 *** .701 -4.277 *** .701 
SE Fixed to 0 -.049  .712 -.049  .712 
CON Fixed to 0 3.976 *** .716 3.976 *** .716 
          
Party ON          
OC Fixed to 0 -.366 ** .143 Fixed to 0 
ST Fixed to 0 -.255  .156 Fixed to 0 
SE Fixed to 0 -.639 *** .128 Fixed to 0 
CON Fixed to 0 -.145  .153 Fixed to 0 
Econ. Fixed to 0 .103 *** .014 .102 *** .014 
Social  Fixed to 0 .066 *** .018 .084 *** .015 
          
 Est. Sig. SE Est. Sig. SE Est. Sig. SE 
Indirect 
Effects 
         
Trustee ON          
OC via Econ. -  - 1.111  .087 1.12  .086 
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ST via Econ. -  - -2.514 * .129 -2.626 *** .122 
SE via Econ.  -  - -.311  .073 -.311  .073 
CON via Econ.  -  - 2.291 * .113 2.375 * .107 
OC via Social -  - -.13  .006 .158  .009 
ST via Social -  - .198  .128 -.422  .111 
SE via Social -  - .065  .005 -.068  .008 
CON via Social -  - .199  .119 .422  .104 
Econ. via Party -  - 0.25  .016 -.421  .015 
Social via Party -  - 0.249  .01 -.421  .012 
          
Delegate ON          
OC via Econ.  -  - -1.08  .078 -1.093  .074 
ST via Econ. -  - 2.207 * .127 2.325 * .116 
SE via Econ.  -  - .306  .064 .310  .061 
CON via Econ.  -  - -2.052 * .109 -2.146 * .099 
OC via Social -  - .157  .01 -.067  .004 
ST via Social -  - -.399  .129 .077  .111 
SE via Social -  - -.068  .009 .051  .002 
CON via Social -  - .399  .119 -.077  .103 
Econ. via Party -  - -.394  .016 -.421  .015 
Social via Party -  - -.393  .01 -.421  .012 
          
Party ON          
OC via Econ. -  - 1.179  .104 1.178  .013 
ST via Econ. -  - -3.821 *** .106 -3.817 *** .106 
SE via Econ. -  - -.312  .092 -.312  .019 
CON via Econ.  -  - 3.154 *** .103 3.148 *** .102 
OC via Social -  - .171  .052 .171  .066 
ST via Social -  - -3.14 *** .089 -4.126 *** .087 
SE via Social -  - -.06  .047 -.069  .059 
CON via Social -  - 3.059 ** .086 3.943 *** .085 
          
N 106 106 106 
Loglikelihood - 885.817 - 629.348 - 612.154 
AIC - 845.817 - 537.348 - 544.154 
Note: Estimator is Maximum Likelihood. Directs effects on representative priority (Trustee, Delegate) and Party 
affiliation (1 = Centre-Right) are unstandardised probit regression coefficients. Other path estimates are 
unstandardized linear regression coefficients. The statistical significance of the indirect effects is calculated 
using Sobel’s (1982) test of mediation based on the standard errors of the unstandardized coefficients for direct 
pathways. Due to the combination of continuous and nominal data in the model, the indirect effects are not 
directly interpreTable and are therefore italicised in the Table. Statistically significant results are highlighted as 
follows: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001.  
  
 In both the complicated and theorised models, Self-Transcendence values and 
Conservation values exert a substantial effect upon economic and social ideology. The direct 
pathways between these variables show that MPs attributing importance to Self-
Transcendence values were more likely to report left-wing ideologies on both the economic 
and social scales. The data suggest that MPs with the highest scores for these values in the 
sample population reported economic and social ideology scores of roughly 4 scale points 
lower than those participants with the lowest scores for Self-Transcendence. The reverse was 
true for MPs scoring highest for Conservation values, who reported comparatively right-wing 
ideologies on both scales. These results corroborate prior research in which Self-
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Transcendence and Conservation values have successfully discriminated between citizens' 
Left-Right self-placements and political attitudes around the world (Barnea and Schwartz, 
1998; Davidov et al., 2008; Caprara et al., 2006; Steenbergen and Leimgruber, 2010). 
 To replicate the IMPPB, the direct pathways between basic values and the outcome 
variables are fixed to 0 in the theorised model. Crucially for this thesis, the data show that 
Self-Transcendence and Conservation values successfully discriminate between trustees and 
delegates indirectly through economic ideology. Whilst MPs' Self-Transcendence values had 
a significant positive effect on self-reporting as a delegate and negative effect on self-
reporting as a trustee, the reverse was true for Conservation values. This result partially 
confirms hypothesis 8 put forward in chapter 5. The data suggest, firstly, that those MPs most 
motivated by equality, justice and responsibility to others, are also more likely to perceive 
their democratic duty in terms of the welfare of their constituents. By contrast, those MPs 
most motivated by traditions and customs are, as also revealed in the direct model, more 
likely to approach politics as a patron of common interests at the national level. More research 
is required to discern whether these pathways from personality to representative focus also 
inform related behaviours in office.  
These differences are, to some extent, replicated in the interview data. Participants 
who reported as delegates were more likely to talk of their representative duties in terms of 
both advocating causes and helping constituents. As interviewee 8 reflected: 
I was very, very clear that I wanted to be a good constituency MP and that that was 
sufficient. Both because it’s very important, and I really liked the idea of representing 
somewhere that kind of needed advocates. I don’t see how you could represent a sort 
of very affluent area, that’s not the point of it really. 
In this vein, delegates described their purpose in office as bound to the welfare of their 
constituents and issues of (in)equality. In doing so, they spoke in value-laden terms indicative 
of the link between constituency representation and Self-Transcendence values revealed in the 
quantitative data. It was in following through on these commitments that delegates also 
seemed to be most satisfied with their performance in Parliament: 
Just a few weeks back I was in my local pub and somebody came in, saw me and came 
over and wanted to talk…Years and years back I was sorting out quite serious 
immigration problems for him and he was saying, "You changed my life." It's great, 
when somebody comes along and says that to you (Interviewee 15) 
In contrast, interviewees who self-reported as trustees did not speak in terms reflective of 
Conservation values. They continued to advocate for public interest as grounded in principles 
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of equality and justice, but expressed these commitments through a vernacular of national 
politics. As interviewee 1 put it, Parliament is ‘there as the national forum, the national 
debating chamber, the national voice and [MPs’] primary responsibility is national-based. 
Towards what’s good for the nation.’ By comparison to delegates, trustees saw their elected 
remit as one defined by shaping national discourse, not following it. Interviewee 11 was 
particularly adamant: 
Even in this country, if you take it forward tomorrow, I bet you, like Brexit, people 
will say, bring back hanging…It’s not [MPs’] job to simply follow public opinion, but 
[their] job is also to lead public opinions. 
 The quantitative results reported in Table 9.7 also add nuance to the partisan 
comparisons presented in chapter 8. In the complicated model, where direct pathways 
between basic values and party affiliation are freed, both Openness to Change and Self-
Enhancement values exert a significant effect. MPs scoring higher for either of these value 
factors were also more likely to be members of political parties on the Left (represented in 
this sample by a majority of Labour MPs). In the theorised model these pathways are fixed to 
0, but Self-Transcendence and Conservation values continue to exert an indirect effect upon 
party affiliation via both social and economic ideology. MPs scoring higher for Conservation 
values were more likely to be found in parties on the Right, and vice versa for those scoring 
higher on Self-Transcendence.  
 The fact that Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values impact directly on 
other variables (i.e Party), whilst Self-Transcendence and Conservation values do so 
indirectly via ideology, suggests a differentiated relationship between MPs' basic values and 
their political behaviours. In chapter 4 of this thesis I argued that BHV, as broad principles 
that humans use to make decisions and evaluate behavioural options in many situations 
(Feldman, 2003), require translation in politics in order to guide context specific choices. The 
results presented above indicate that this may only be true for Self-Transcendence and 
Conservation values when it comes to politics. By virtue of not directly relating to common 
political orientations (i.e. Left and Right), it is possible that Openness to Change and Self-
Enhancement values impact directly on the political behaviour of MPs from all party 
affiliations. Further research is needed to interrogate this finding properly.  
Building on the conceptual and empirical work of previous research, the results 
presented in this chapter advance the academic understanding of both BHV – as active 
elements in elite politics – and of parliamentary political behaviour in the UK. Grounded in 
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the theoretical premise of the IMPPB, this chapter makes a highly original, interdisciplinary, 
contribution to the study of elite agency in the UK Parliament. It shows, in particular, that a) 
elected representatives make important decisions based upon their own personality 
characteristics; that b) this effect operates in flux with informal pressures exerted by external 








"[W]e have a role beyond making the machine here work better for everybody and that is, 
without being too grand about it, we have a national purpose being here. It is to make 
ourselves redundant." 
UK Member of Parliament, 2017 (Interviewee 4) 
In Search of the 'Perfect' Politician 
 So far in this thesis I have discussed a range of original findings that have important 
consequences for the conduct and study of representative parliamentary democracy in the UK. 
Data on Members of Parliament (MPs) have been compared with the British public to show 
that personality matters in differentiating the political class from the rest of society. Political 
elites in the UK differ from their electors in terms of the goals and motivations that drive their 
daily behaviour, even when compared to corresponding socio-demographic sub-groups in the 
general population. The data also reveal distinct divisions between those on the Left and Right 
of politics that are exacerbated among elites. However, these findings suggest, in turn, that the 
gap between governors and governed is particularly acute - in psychological terms - on the 
Left of British politics. The final related, substantive results of this study are presented in this 
chapter, which analyses data from a conjoint experiment conducted with a representative 
sample of 1637 British citizens in October 2017 (see Chapter 6, pp.143-146). The data are 
operationalised to reveal the relative importance of personality characteristics - specifically 
Basic Human Values (BHV) - to public voting habits and, at a further level, the types of 
people most desired in national politics. In line with hypotheses built in chapter 5, these 
results are used to assess the existence of a mediatised perception gap between citizens' ideal-
type MP and the politicians they elect.  
I. Basic Values and Political Preferences 
 The extant research base on the role of personality in politics has gathered pace in 
recent years (Caprara and Silvester, 2018; Dietrich et al., 2012). Studies have examined the 
links between personality and political ideology (e.g. Fatke, 2016; Lewis and Bates, 2011), 
political attitudes (e.g. Jonason, 2014), political participation (Vecchione and Caprara, 2009) 
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and voting behaviours (e.g. Bakker et al., 2016). However, studies of personality in leadership 
(cf. Zaccaro, 2007) and, moreover, studies that examine Basic Human Values (BHV) in 
politics are more scant (cf. Vecchione et al., 2015). Within this smaller literature, studies that 
gather representative self-report data on elites' personalities are particularly unique (cf. Wyatt 
and Silvester, 2018). Not only is this thesis highly original for analysing data on MPs' basic 
values and comparing it to the voting public - the first study of its kind in the UK - but this 
has been followed by a robust experimental survey in which public preferences vis-a-vis the 
values of elected representatives can also be compared to reality. The data presented and the 
methodology used to gather it are unique in existing political science and political psychology 
research.  
 Existing studies - including the results presented in this thesis so far - suggest that 
political elites and voters of similar partisan blocs share congruent personality characteristics 
(Caprara et al., 2003; Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). However, less is known about the 
importance of this congruency effect for voting habits and the extent to which voters seek to 
elect politicians with similar personalities to themselves. Given the increasingly personalised 
nature of contemporary democratic politics (Barbaranelli et al., 2007) and the near ubiquitous 
use of social media technologies by political parties, it is entirely possible that the salience of 
personality as a voting heuristic has increased as voters have more opportunities to see, hear 
and scrutinise candidates. In the United States, for example, Ryne Sherman (2018) has used 
large-N online data from the Trump Similarity Values Test to show that people with similar 




 The results of the conjoint experiment augment this literature in a number of 
directions. The average marginal component effects (reported graphically for the full sample 
in Figure 10.1) show, firstly, that voters have very distinct preferences when it comes to 
selecting their elected representatives. In comparative studies of the public-opinion/public-
policy nexus, the 'Ostrogorski Paradox' (Rae and Daudt, 1976) stipulates that the collective 
outcomes of elections, by virtue of representing the aggregated interests of individual 
decisions borne from individual causes, cannot convey coherent policy mandates. Yet in this 
case, even when the sample is combined and 'individual' characteristics are elided, there 
remain clear and statistically significant trends in the data. This would suggest that regardless 
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of sub-group variety, it is possible to identify common preferences among the public about 
'who' they want to represent them - even if the same cannot be said of the policies these sub-
groups want those MPs to enact. 
 The z scores reported in Table 10.1 and the change in predicted probabilities 
illustrated in Figure 10.1 show, for example, that the sample slightly prefer female and older 
candidates to male or young candidates. The first of these results presents somewhat of a 
paradox, given that the majority of MPs are male. It may be assumed, therefore, that public 
preferences in terms of gender are not translated into electoral choices due to a lack of women 
candidates (see also Fox and Lawless, 2010; Holman and Schneider, 2017). By contrast, it 
seems that public preferences for older politicians are successfully reproduced in a Parliament 
comprising MPs with an average age over 50.  
 The data also suggest that the British public moderately prefer candidates who went 
through state education as opposed to private schooling, reflecting the majority experience for 
members of the public (93% attend state schools) and, in turn, the disparity between public 
preferences and the composition of Parliament (33% attended independent schools). The 
public show moderate preferences for MPs who have worked in teaching or the charity sector 
over those who have already held elected office locally. This result echoes sentiments found 
in the political class literature, which highlights public dissatisfaction with the 
professionalisation of career politics. In addition, participants moderately preferred candidates 
who were married with children, indicating greater trust in politicians from nuclear families.     
 Whilst the preferences reported above were all relatively marginal, participants were 
more concerned about the religion, political priorities, and personalities of candidates. 
Although the ethnicity of a candidate had no significant effect on vote choice, participants 
expressed strong preferences for Christian candidates over, in particular, Muslim ones. 
Muslim candidates were, in fact, more than 10 percentage points less likely to be selected than 
Christians. This result may reflect conflicted public fears about radicalisation, extremism and 
terrorism that have, in recent years, manifested in anti-Muslim, anti-immigration attitudes 
(Fisher et al., 2015). If these findings generalise to wider voting patterns, it suggests that 
Muslim candidates face a much more difficult task getting elected to Parliament than their 
Christian peers. Considering that religious minorities are already under-represented in British 
politics, this is a worrying finding. 
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Figure 10.1 Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of 1637 British 
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 Similarly strong preferences were expressed for participants whose political message 
prioritised the good of the nation or their constituents over party interests. This extends a 
dense literature on attitudes to representative roles and confirms research indicating public 
preferences for constituency MPs (Childs and Cowley, 2011; Campbell and Cowley, 2014). 
However, these data also support previous empirical studies that find surprisingly small 
differences between these 'local' inclinations and public support for other representative tasks 
(Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015). The Hansard's audit of political engagement in 2010, 
conducted at the height of the parliamentary expenses scandal, found that there was little 
difference between the number of citizens who preferred MPs to focus on local issues in the 
constituency (46%) and those who preferred MPs to focus on national interests (40%). Yet as 
with that study, the results presented in this conjoint analysis show that the public prefer 
politicians to prioritise either of those interests over those of their political party. This finding 
reinforces existing literature on public antipathy for partisan politicking (Jennings et al., 
2016). 
 Asked to rank their Party, the nation, and their constituency in order of importance, 
MPs in the elite sample analysed for this thesis overwhelmingly reflected similar preferences 
to public participants in the conjoint experiment. Only 7% of MPs (n = 8) reported the party 
as their top priority as an elected representative. The other 93% (n = 98) reported the 
constituency or the nation as their most pressing priority in politics, and some 52% placed 
party interests at the bottom of their list. The comparisons drawn here imply that MPs and the 
public are broadly in line with one another when it comes to defining the purpose of national 
political office. 
 Finally, the conjoint analysis reveals specific personality preferences among the 
British public when it comes to choosing elected officials for Parliament. In particular, 
citizens want MPs who are high in Self-Transcendence values. Candidates whose personal 
statement reflected Universalism or Benevolence values were approximately 30 percentage 
points more likely to be chosen than candidates who expressed Power values.
97
 This would 
suggest that, above all, citizens are looking for MPs who are tolerant, broad-minded, honest 
and loyal. Self-Direction, Security and Conformity values also had a strong positive effect on 
vote choice. This implies that after Self-Transcendence values, citizens are most concerned 
about selecting representatives who are creative and independent but who, simultaneously, 
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will apply themselves to protect the safety, stability and dominant character of society. For 
participants in this conjoint survey, these personality characteristics had a greater impact on 
vote choice than any other physical or social variable (Hypothesis 9). 
Table 10.1 Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) for a conjoint analysis of public voting 
preferences (N = 1637). 
Attribute of 
Candidate 




































































0.043 0.008 5.110 *** 
Religious 
School 







(Baseline = Local 
Councillor) 
    
Armed Forces 0.016 0.013 1.199 
Stock Broker -0.024 0.013 -1.898 
Lawyer 0.008 0.013 0.638 
ChariTable 
Worker 
0.025 0.013 1.978 * 
Teacher 0.029 0.013 2.316 * 
Consultant 0.001 0.013 0.113 
Party Official -0.011 0.013 -0.839 
Builder -0.006  0.013 0.482 
Trade Union 
Representative 





    
Married 0.010 0.008 1.254 
Married with 
Children 
0.030 0.008 3.603 *** 
Single Parent 0.023 0.008 2.529 * 
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Muslim -0.107 0.009 -10.871 *** 
Buddhist -0.042 0.009 -4.328 *** 
Jewish -0.044 0.009 -4.642 *** 







    
Welsh 0.011 0.012 0.884 
Scottish 0.007 0.012 0.566 
Irish -0.012 0.012 -0.978 
Mancunian 0.016 0.012 1.331 
Liverpudlian -0.001 0.012 -0.103 
West Country 0.017 0.012 1.351 
Yorkshire 0.020 0.012 1.613 
North-East 0.005 0.012 0.418 
 
Political Priority 
(Baseline = My 
Party and its  
Manifesto) 
 
    
Common Good 
of the Nation 
0.097 0.008 12.362 *** 








    
Conformity 0.124 0.0130 9.547 *** 
Tradition 0.038 0.0130 2.985 ** 
Benevolence 0.291 0.014 20.705 *** 
Universalism 0.305 0.014 21.445 *** 
Self-Direction 0.162 0.013 12.209 *** 
Stimulation 0.047 0.013 3.752 *** 
Hedonism 0.038 0.013 3.018 ** 
Achievement 0.012 0.013 0.996 
Security 0.171 0.013 13.175 *** 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
 
 A comparison of MPs' average BHV hierarchy with public preferences expressed in 
the conjoint survey (Table 10.2, below) shows distinct similarities at the top end. The fact that 
MPs attribute most importance to Self-Transcendence values and these are, at the same time, 
most important for citizens' candidate selections, implies that voters get MPs with the 'right' 
personalities. If a hypothetical line of causation is drawn between public preferences and 
candidate success, then this result would suggest that either a) voters correctly perceive 
congruent personality characteristics in potential candidates and fill Parliament with MPs high 
in Self-Transcendence values, or b) mediatised party political campaigns adeptly manipulate 
candidate images to meet the public's psychological preferences. Either way this is a highly 
significant finding, given a large extant research base now pointing to the importance of 
leader evaluations for vote choice (Garzia, 2012; Lausten and Bor, 2017).  
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Table 10.2 Value hierarchies compared for UK Members of Parliament (n = 106) and public ideal-
types (N = 1637). 







POWER HEDONISM   
ACHIEVEMENT TRADITION 
HEDONISM ACHIEVEMENT 
TRADITION POWER (BASELINE) 
  
 At the same time, it is clear that MPs attribute more relative importance to Self-
Enhancement values and less relative importance to Conservation values than the public 
would like. Whilst these values are relatively less important to MPs and voters than Self-
Transcendence values, these differences would seem to be crucial for understanding 
contemporary disaffection with political elites. It is on these characteristics that anti-political 
media arguably concentrates, focusing public attention on the incongruence between public 
preferences and the personalities of their politicians. These results do, to an extent, confirm 
the model theorised in chapter 5. A preoccupation with finding fault in parliamentary 
representatives, as well as a string of unfortunate moral scandals, arguably distorts the public 
perception or projection of MPs' most important motivations. The public thus consume a 
skewed and often homogenised set of political personas in the press that emphasise MPs' Self-
Enhancement values and, consequently, undermine the interpersonal trust judgements 
necessary to sustain political participation (see Chapter 5, Hypothesis 10). 
 These conclusions require further research but they are also supported here by 
interview data with elite participants. Not only do the comments reported in chapter 7 testify 
to MPs' overwhelmingly positive appraisals of one another - regardless of partisanship - but 
nearly all participants also spoke of the damage done by a voyeuristic media and, in 
particular, the parliamentary expenses scandal of 2010. Interviewee 5 was adamantly 
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dismissive of the media but also blamed their biased coverage of MPs' moral fibre for 
diminishing the transparency between politicians and the public: 
I think it’s bollocks. The hardest-working, most virtuous [...] people that I’ve ever met 
have been fellow politicians. There’s a certain hypocrisy amongst journalists in 
particular who claim to be disappointed about the fact that MPs aren’t more open and 
free-thinking about what they say, when actually the thing that most shocked me about 
becoming Home Secretary was the way in which every single thing that I said was 
pored over, and dissected, and kept on record [...] To protect yourself, rightly or 
wrongly, you tend to be very careful about what you say.     
Other MPs were quick to point out the irony of a media profession that seeks to expose the 
worst traits in politicians without acknowledging the 'small number of press barons who are 
mostly tax exiles and are just, in some cases, vile, and run campaigns against individuals that 
are disgraceful' (Interviewee 12). One senior Labour MP reflected that the media purposefully 
homogenised its coverage of MPs in order to ingratiate itself to the public: 
So, it’s nonsense to say we’re all any one thing, but it makes the media more powerful 
if we’re useless because then they are absolutely, amazingly clever and you can trust 
them to tell you what to think rather than trusting the politicians. That’s really what 
they’re after (Interviewee 14) 
 For more experienced MPs, it was the expenses scandal of 2010 that sparked an 
intensification of the personalised pillorying of MPs. Interviewees expressed a sense of 
injustice that for the sake of a few 'who quite deliberately worked the system' (Interviewee 
16), they could no longer instil trust in their electors: 
The expenses did us a terrible amount of damage. There's always been this view that, 
"Oh, politicians are just in it for themselves. They don't represent us. They just think 
whatever they can achieve for themselves." That's always been there but I think the 
expenses stuff made that far, far worse. It didn't matter whether you were one of the 
people who were having fingers pointed at them in the press or not (Interviewee 15) 
Taken together, these findings represent a significant step forward in the academic 
understanding of the role of elite personalities in anti-politics and voting behaviour. 
Ultimately, citizens appear to place great importance on the personality characteristics of 
those whom they elect to represent them. Based on congruence between their priorities in this 
respect and the importance attributed to those same basic values by MPs, it is possible to 
argue that citizens get the representatives they desire. It is, however, the points of dissonance 
between these ideal-types and the personalities of elected MPs - and not their congruence - 
that occupies the public perception of national politicians. 
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II. Leadership Emergence  
 So far this chapter has presented original survey data to illustrate that the British 
public have distinct preferences about the personalities of their representatives. Compared 
with self-report data from a representative sample of UK MPs, the most important of these 
preferences appear to be reproduced in the strongest basic values of those occupying 
Parliament. However, to test this democratic link between principal and agent requires some 
understanding of the extent to which it is based on causal mechanisms. For example, in a pure 
experimental scenario such as the conjoint analysis reported in this thesis, those candidates 
who match the public's BHV ideal-type are more likely to get elected than those who do not. 
Yet the world of democratic elections is far more messy and layered. Firstly, the clean 
theoretical statement above does not account for the fact that most voters will ascribe 
personality characteristics to candidates based on secondary sources (Bhattacharya et al., 
2016). Secondly, in line with ascription-actuality theories of leadership (cf. Judge et al., 
2002), there is no guarantee that those candidates who match public preferences in terms of 
their personality characteristics will also succeed once they are in the role.  
 In a recent study of 138 local politicians in the UK, Wyatt and Silvester (2018) found 
evidence for the ascription-actuality theory in British politics. Gathering self-report data on 
the Big 5 personality traits from local councillors, ascribed traits from 526 members of the 
public based on candidate image only, and at least two peer appraisals of political 
effectiveness for each councillor, Wyatt and Silvester found that Agreeableness was the most 
important predictor of candidate success in an election but a negative predictor of efficacy in-
role. To check whether or not these results replicate at the national level, an elite sample of 
106 MPs is used here to test the effect of BHV upon leadership emergence (the majority 
achieved by each MP in their last General Election) and leadership effectiveness (whether or 
not an MP has occupied a frontbench role). The results of a poisson loglinear regression 
model between basic values and each MPs' vote majority are reported in Table 10.3 (below). 
Controls are included for age and gender as well as party performance in the relevant election 
for each participant, thus accounting for the strength of partisanship as a predictor of vote 
choice in the UK system (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014). The model also controlled for the number 
of years each participant had held office, thus accounting for advantages accrued to an 
incumbent candidate.  
 The results show that all of the variables included in the model had a significant effect 
on participants' election majorities. However, there are clear differences in the direction and 
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magnitude of these effects. Not surprisingly, a participant's tenure in office was the single 
biggest predictor of the size of their majority. MPs with the longest record of service in this 
sample gained majorities in their last election win that were almost 60% larger than the least 
experienced candidates. Incumbent politicians necessarily have opportunities to cultivate 
relationships with their voters, accrue context-specific knowledge about an area, and develop 
necessary skills for campaigning that a new candidate does not. By contrast, participants' 
margins only increased by 5% between those elections in which an MP's party had performed 
worst and best in terms of its overall vote share. The results also indicate that women 
candidates achieved larger margins in their last election than men, which contradicts prior 
research showing voter preferences for male candidates but runs in line with the findings of 
the conjoint analysis presented in section I (above). It is possible that this finding is 
confounded by the over-representation of Labour women MPs in the sample. 
 When it comes to personality characteristics - measured here using MPs' basic values - 
it appears that MPs who are motivated by Conservation values were most successful in 
achieving large majorities. Those participants who scored highest for Conformity, Tradition 
and Security values won majorities that were 46%, 34%, and 43% greater respectively than 
those MPs who scored lowest for these value factors. However, the voter preferences revealed 
in the conjoint analysis (section I) suggest that Self-Transcendence values should impact on 
an MP's election success more than any other. There are two possible reasons for this result. 
Firstly, the model of candidate emergence tested in chapter 7 showed that individuals who are 
attracted to politics attribute extraordinary importance to Benevolence and Universalism 
values. It is possible, therefore, that the uniform presence of these values in campaign rhetoric 
decreases their salience as a measure by which voters can actually discriminate between 
candidates. Secondly, it is possible that voters - conditioned by an anti-political media filter - 
either do not acknowledge candidates' behavioural and rhetorical expressions of Self-













Wald Chi Square 
 
Exp(B) 
1. Basic Values 
(rescaled 0-1): 
   
Conformity .381 (.0098) 1506.911 *** 1.464 
Tradition .291 (.0099) 865.095 *** 1.338 
Benevolence .053 (.0086) 37.519 *** 1.054 
Universalism -.063 (.0093) 45.407 *** .939 
Self-Direction -.475 (.0081) 3449.935 *** .622 
Stimulation .460 (.0087) 2791.960 *** 1.584 
Achievement .091 (.0105) 75.403 *** 1.095 
Power -.363 (.0092) 1547.243 *** .695 
Security .361 (.0084) 1847.996 *** 1.434 
    
2. Demographics:    
Age (continuous data 
rescaled 0-1) 
 
-.070 (.0082) 73.885 *** 
 
.932 
Gender (dummy = 1 - 
Female, 0 - Male) 
.211 (.0023) 8067.886 *** 
 
1.235 
    
3. Contextual:    
Party Success (% vote 
share in relevant 
General Election) 
.050 (.0039) 169.323 *** 
 
1.052 
    
Candidate tenure (no. of 
years as an elected MP) .469 (.0062) 
5801.727 *** 
1.599 
Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
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 Whereas abstract political psychology research with voters has shown that warmth is 
the most significant predictor of candidate preference (Goodwin et al., 2014; Lausten and Bor, 
2017), the results presented above suggest that UK MPs do not actually maximise their vote 
tallies by stressing their integrity, honesty, or commitment to social equalities. Instead, those 
candidates who were able to articulate a sense of belonging, self-discipline, family and social 
security, and social order won their elections by bigger margins regardless of how long they 
had been in office previously or how well their party did in the election. This does support the 
results of the conjoint analysis, in which hypothetical candidates with personal statements 
defined by Conformity and Security values were 12% and 17% more likely to be selected than 
those who defined themselves by Power values (Table 10.1, above). It also complements the 
research conducted with local politicians by Wyatt and Silvester (2018, p.7), who discovered 
negative associations between voter ascriptions of warmth and candidate's leadership 
emergence.  
 Wyatt and Silvester (2018) also found positive relationships between councillors' self-
rated personality trait Agreeableness and election success. In previous research (Park-Leduc 
et al., 2015, p.13), the personality trait Agreeableness has correlated with Benevolence (ρ = 
.61), Power (ρ = −.42), Universalism (ρ = .39), Conformity (ρ = .26), and Tradition values (ρ 
= .22). At a local level, it is possible that the trans-situational goals associated with 
Benevolence values translate into poignant, vote-winning issues that are important to local 
residents. However, at the national level, results presented here would suggest that it is the 
more conservative aspects of Agreeableness (i.e. shared characteristics with Conservation 
values) that predict candidate success. This is understandable in the context of post-millennial 
Britain and rising concerns about national/social stability and a fractured social fabric 
(Runciman, 2018). 
 To an equal extent, the model tested here shows that those MPs who scored highest for 
Stimulation values in this sample also won their last election by the largest vote margins. 
Stimulation values motivate people to seek challenges and take chances, and moreover to 
enjoy novel or uncertain situations (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1992). Given the 
unique pressures of running a political campaign as well as the stakes of losing, it is 
understandable that those candidates most suited, psychologically, to that environment will 
also be most confident and successful when canvassing voters, generating public support and 
keeping up with the pace of the campaign. These results support prior research demonstrating 
a link between the personality trait Extroversion and candidate success (Roets and Van Hiel, 
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 It also augments a literature on apposite political skills in 
parliamentary politics, which has tended to focus on competences such as communication, 
persuasion and intelligence rather than more affective motivations (Silvester et al., 2014; 
Silvester and Dykes, 2007). 
 Although the results presented here suggest a strong positive association between 
Conservation values and leadership emergence, as measured by a candidate's election 
majority, these same values were negative predictors of whether MPs in the sample held/had 
held frontbench offices. Frontbench MPs in the sample scored considerably lower for 
Conservation values than backbench MPs; by contrast MPs in frontbench roles scored higher 
for Self-Enhancement values (Chapter 7, p.157). This finding echoes the 'trait paradox', which 
has shown personality traits to be productive in some scenarios but disadvantageous in others 
(Judge et al., 2009). Here it would seem that the same principle applies to basic values in 
British politics: the goals, motivations and behaviours associated with Conservation values 
help MPs to get elected but inhibit their advancement once they are in-role. Holding 
frontbench political office demands a certain set of skills and characteristics that are 
associated with confronting others, arguing for and defending beliefs, leading others and, at 
the same time, manipulating or persuading them to behave for you in certain ways (Deluga, 
2001). MPs who score above average for Conservation values and thus attribute importance to 
stability, respect and moderation may naturally find it harder to succeed at these tasks than 
those with above average scores for Self-Enhancement values. As gatekeepers to these roles, 
senior party officials and other MPs will also have different standards and expectations by 
which to select suiTable candidates than the wider public ascribe in a general election 
scenario. 
III. Conjoint Analysis of Candidate Preferences by Sub-Groups  
 In previous chapters of this thesis, I have used data on MPs' BHV to show that 
members of the political class are distinct from one another, from the British public in 
general, and from corresponding socio-demographic sub-groups (Chapter 8). The data also 
revealed that those sub-groups are, themselves, characterised by meaningful variations in their 
basic values. It is plausible, therefore, that those variations are translated into differing 
candidate preferences when it comes to democratic elections. The final section of this chapter 
therefore divides the conjoint analysis discussed in section I above and presents results on the 
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political ideal-types of the British public by gender, age, social grade, partisanship, and vote 
choice in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union. It is neither necessary nor 
possible to discuss all of these results in the depth they deserve within this thesis, but 
supporting graphs can be found in appendices G to K. 
i. Gender (Appendix G) - A longstanding literature on gender differences indicates that men 
and women approach politics in separate ways (see Elder and Green, 2003), emphasise 
difference political topics (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Schlozman et al., 1995), consume 
political information differently (Elder and Green, 2003), and express different preferences 
for modes of political activism (e.g. Rosenthal, 1998). In this thesis, I have also shown that 
men and women are distinct in their basic values among the general British population and 
political elites. It is expected, therefore, that together these differences will inform a range of 
separate preferences when it comes to choosing an elected representative.  
 Dividing the conjoint analysis by gender supports these predictions. In terms of 
candidates' socio-demographic characteristics, men and women differed in their preferences 
for education, occupation and family status. For example, women preferred candidates who 
attended a religious school instead of a private school but men did not. Trends in the data 
showed that women had much stronger preferences for candidates from chariTable or 
teaching professions, whereas men displayed a stronger sense of anti-careerism in their dislike 
of all 'political' backgrounds. Women also revealed a slight preference for single parent 
candidates, whilst men clearly valued nuclear families where the candidate was married with 
children. Surprisingly, there was not a significant difference in men and women's preferences 
for candidates according to their gender - in both cases, women candidates had a slight 
advantage. 
 Finally, the conjoint analysis shows that men and women do have different 
psychological preferences when it comes to democratic elections. In particular, Self-
Transcendence values had a greater impact on women's vote choice than men's. Candidates 
with a personal message linked to Benevolence values, for example, were almost 35 
percentage points more likely to be chosen than those with Power values by women. The 
same Figure was only just above 20 percentage points for male participants. Male participants 
also demonstrated larger preferences for Conservation values than women. Given that the 
analysis of European Social Survey (ESS) data (Chapter 8) showed that men in Britain score 
significantly higher for Conservation values than women - whilst women score significantly 
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higher for Self-Transcendence values - the results of the conjoint would suggest that men and 
women project their own value priorities into candidate preferences at political elections.  
ii. Age (Appendix H) -  The data presented in chapter 8 showed that there are clear cleavages 
in the basic values of the young and old. The young are more motivated by Openness to 
Change and Self-Enhancement values, whereas older citizens attribute more importance to 
Conservation values. It is possible that these differences are the cause of either lifecycle or 
cohort effects, or both (Schwartz, 2005). However, these findings link to a wider long-
standing literature on the liberal political attitudes of young voters and the more conservative 
inclinations of older voters (Russell et al., 1992). In the last UK General Election, age became 
a deciding factor in the resurgence of the Labour Party under socialist leader Jeremy Corbyn. 
Young voters were attracted to a Labour manifesto that pledged progressive policies on 
university tuition fees, investment in social housing, re-nationalisation of the rail network, and 
rent controls for the private sector (Sloam and Ehsan, 2017). It is expected, therefore, that age 
will have a significant effect on voters' ideal-types when it comes to selecting a national 
representative.  
 As anticipated, the candidate selections of young participants (18-29 years old) were 
more objectively liberal than either the 30-49 or 50+ age cohorts. They were, for example, 
more likely to select women candidates and did not show the same religious biases as older 
participants. The over-50s were more anti-political in their selections than the other age 
groups: they preferred candidates from all occupations (except finance) more than those from 
'political' jobs, which were represented in the conjoint by the categories of party official, trade 
union representative and councillor. The over-50s were also the only age cohort to express 
preferences for candidates from manual professions over those with political experience.  
 In terms of BHV, Self-Transcendence values were almost equally important to all age 
groups. However, Self-Direction values were, in particular, more important to the youngest 
participants and those in the middle-aged bracket than the over-50s. Hypothetical candidates 
with a personal message characterised by Self-Direction values were, on average, 20 
percentage points more likely to be chosen by the two younger cohorts than those candidates 
who prioritised Power values. By contrast, the over-50s only expressed a 12-14 percentage 
point preference for those same candidates, less than the swing in this age bracket for 
candidates who prioritised Conformity or Security values. In light of the analysis presented in 
chapter 8, these results suggest that age has a significant effect on the personal and 
psychological characteristics that citizens seek in candidates for Parliament.      
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iii. Partisanship (Appendix I) - The strong connections between partisanship and basic values 
discussed in this thesis (chapter 8, pp.185-200) and elsewhere (Bakker et al., 2016; Fatke, 
2016; Lewis and Bates, 2011) provide compelling evidence that suggest stark psychological 
divisions between those on the Left and Right of politics, and potentially those who do not 
vote at all. In a parallel small-n, standard survey of voters in Belgium, Roets and Van Hiel 
(2009) found that these partisan differences re-emerged in the personality traits desired in 
politicians by voters on the Left and Right. Both ideological blocs wanted their 
parliamentarians to be high in Conscientiousness but voters on the Left also demonstrated a 
preference for Agreeableness and Openness, whereas voters on the Right wanted their 
politicians to be higher in Extraversion (Roets and Van Hiel, 2009, p. 62).  
 These findings reproduce in the current conjoint analysis. Self-Transcendence values - 
which tend to correlate with the personality traits Agreeableness and Openness (Parks-Leduc 
et al., 2015) - were more important for Labour voters (and to a lesser extent non-voters) than 
Conservative Party supporters.
99
 For example, Labour voters were almost 40 percentage 
points more likely to choose candidates who prioritised Benevolence values than those with a 
statement reflecting Power values. Among Conservative voters, this swing was only just over 
20 percentage points. Accounting for the error terms in these results, Security and Conformity 
values were almost as important as Self-Transcendence values for Conservative voters. These 
results again indicate that citizens project from their own values (see Chapter 8) to ideal-types 
when it comes to abstract choices about the characteristics of elected representatives.  
 Non-voters were also included here as a comparative group. By contrast to both 
Labour and Conservative supporters, non-voters showed more distrust of hypothetical 
candidates who were characterised by Power values. Assuming that voters are discouraged 
from formal politics by specific evaluations of incumbent politicians (Bowler and Karp, 2004; 
Easton, 1965), then it makes sense that these citizens will also be most sensitive to those basic 
values that imply Machiavellianism. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, non-
voters were more conservative in their selections. Though not statistically significant, non-
voters showed preferences for non-disabled and white candidates that were not present in the 
results for the other two voting groups. However, Conservative voters were the most pro-
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Christian and anti-Muslim, and also preferred candidates who spoke with Queen's English to 
all other accents.
100
 The opposite was true for Labour supporters.  
iv. Social grade (Appendix J) - Political scientists writing in the second half of the 20th 
century documented a decline in class voting. On one hand, it was argued that social and 
cultural issues - independent of class - overtook economic concerns as people's material 
standard of living improved (Inglehart, 1990). On the other hand, class was assumed to lose 
its importance as a political umbrella as divisions and diversity within classes became more 
prominent and created new shared interest groups in society (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985; 
Lash and Urry, 1987). This research has been accompanied by a vast literature on party 
politics, in which class cleavages are no longer indicative of either partisan affiliation or party 
political stratagem. Taken together, the research on class dealignment in the twentieth century 
argues that the differences in voting behaviour between classes have greatly diminished (see 
Crewe, 1986; Heath and McDonald, 1987). However, more recent research has also shown 
that political attitudes as well as political ambition remain clearly distinguishable between 
citizens in the lowest and highest social grade groups (e.g. Allen and Cutts, 2018). Given that 
social grade also tends to intersect with educational attainment, wealth and socialisation 
experiences, the gap between the socioeconomic profile of citizens and the political class is 
greatest for those in the lowest social grades. 
 The results of the conjoint experiment confirm both similarities and differences in 
voting preferences across social grades in the UK. When selecting ideal candidates for their 
political representation, those participants in social grades AB attributed much more 
importance to Self-Transcendence values and Self-Direction values than those participants in 
social grades DE. By contrast, participants in social grades DE assigned more relative 
importance to Security values. Theorists have long argued that class voting patterns will 
intensify and decrease according to short term changes in material well-being (Converse, 
1958; Inglehart, 1990). In the UK, austerity policies since 2010 have drastically affected the 
living standards of those on low incomes in socially precarious situations (Belfield et al., 
2014; Pemberton et al., 2016). It is possible, therefore, that these experiences are reflected in 
the values that citizens desire in their policy-makers. Affluent citizens in social grades AB can 
afford to think in more abstract terms about the welfare of others (Self-Transcendence values) 
and are happy to delegate this at a political level to independent and creative politicians (Self-
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Direction values). On the other hand, citizens in social grades DE who are struggling to 
provide material safety and stability for themselves and their families, want MPs who will not 
only promote their welfare (Self-Transcendence values) but at the same time prioritise social 
and national security (Security values). 
 In the present sample, the Labour and Conservative Party vote in 2015 was almost 
equally reliant on citizens from social grades AB (31% and 32% respectively). However, 
participants in social grades DE made up significantly more of the Labour vote in this sample 
(25%) than the Conservative vote (16%). Taken together, these statistics would appear to 
testify to an enduring class affiliation among working class Labour voters as well as New 
Labour's success in attracting votes from the wealthier, cosmopolitan elite (cf. Cruddas, 
2006). However, the ideal value profiles of an MP for those in social grades DE are, by 
comparison to the elite of sample of MPs gathered for this thesis, much more similar to 
Conservative MPs than Labour ones. This finding reinforces the results presented in chapter 8 
and adds nuance to the subsequent inference: that the psychological gap between the political 
class and the rest of the population is largest on the Left of politics and, in turn, between 
working class voters on the Left and their Labour representatives.   
v. Brexit (Appendix K) - On the 23rd June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union in 
a historic referendum. Political journalists and researchers alike have spent much of their time 
since then trying to unpick who voted for Brexit and whether the decision was instrumental or 
affective. Both avenues of investigation point to a highly divided nation. In their multivariate 
analysis of vote and turnout share in 380 local authorities, Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2017) 
show that the key correlates for 'Vote Leave' were low educational attainment, a 
disproportionate reliance on manufacturing work, low income, and high unemployment. 
These were much stronger predictors of Vote Leave than participants' exposure to substantive 
political debate in the run up to the referendum (Ibid., pp. 644-646). However, research on 
public attitudes to the European Union suggests that voters take influential cues from the 
images and rhetoric of prominent politicians (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). In a large-N panel 
study of the Brexit vote, Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley (2017, p. 455) found that high 
likeability scores for Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson (the de facto leaders of the Leave 
campaign) significantly increased a) the probability of voting Leave and b) the chance of 
perceiving fewer costs than benefits in making that decision. 
    Taken together, these studies suggest that voters in the European Union referendum 
brought very different trans-situational goals (i.e. BHV) to their evaluation of the vote and, in 
James Weinberg 




turn, sought congruence between their values and those of leading figures in the campaign. 
The conjoint analysis presented in this thesis is the first study to test this hypothesis. The 
results indicate a number of relevant insights. Firstly, Self-Transcendence values were far 
more important to the candidate selections of Remain voters than Leave voters. For example, 
'Remainers' were almost 40 percentage points more likely to choose a candidate with 
Universalism values over one with Power values; the same statistic for Leave voters was a 
swing of just 20 percentage points. Whilst Remainers also prioritised Universalism values 
over Benevolence values, the opposite was true for Leave voters. It is possible that the local 
dimension attached to Benevolence values - the motivation to care for the welfare of those 
one knows personally and to be loyal to those around you - was much more important to 
Leave voters, whose concerns were dominated by their own well-being and that of other 
working class British citizens (see Becker et al., 2017). By contrast, Remain voters appear to 
be more broad-minded and attribute more importance to the need for, and potential benefits 
of, collaboration with other social and cultural groups (Universalism values). These are 
motivational goals that are, necessarily, supported by integration with other European states. 
 Two other differences appeared between these groups. Leave voters attributed more 
importance to Conformity values, whilst Remain voters showed larger preferences for Self-
Direction values. This would imply that Leave voters are more likely to prioritise discipline, 
honouring past generations, and social cohesion. These values support extant research on the 
socially conservative nature of Leave voters and, in particular, their negative perceptions of 
immigration.
101
 Although Leave voters in the conjoint survey did not express significant 
preferences for white candidates, they did show a much stronger dislike of Muslim candidates 
than Remain voters. This suggests that religion rather than race is a more important factor in 
political decisions for Leave voters. Remainers, on the other hand, are more motivated by 
freedom of choice and curiosity when it comes to social interactions and new experiences 
(Self-Direction values). These are psychological needs that are arguably met by European 
Union membership and the opportunities inherent in the principle of free movement of goods 
and people.  
 Not only do these results reveal significant differences in the personality 
characteristics valued by Leave and Remain voters in politics, they also support the model of 
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personalised candidate choice/political participation developed in this thesis (Chapter 5). Put 
another way, the value preferences expressed by Leave and Remain voters map neatly to the 
rhetoric of respective campaign leaders. Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson pedalled a pseudo-
nationalistic message to British citizens that centred on 'taking back control', British 
sovereignty, securing borders, and saving money for the NHS. By contrast, David Cameron 
and (to a lesser extent) Jeremy Corbyn led a Remain campaign with the slogan 'Britain 
stronger in Europe', warning citizens that exiting the European Union would have catastrophic 
global as well as domestic effects on the economy. Ultimately the Remain camp's 'Project 
Fear' did not appeal as effectively as the Leave campaign to a largely conservative British 
public and, in particular, the values of future Leave voters.  
 If the model presented in chapter 5 is accepted (Figure 5.1, p.116), then it is 
anticipated that the perception and projection of MPs' personalities underpins voters' political 
participation. Where there is perceived congruence between the values of citizens and 
politicians, interpersonal trust between the former and latter is increased and voters relinquish 
their democratic liberty accordingly. In the case of the European Union referendum, the 
conjoint survey analysed here suggests that Leave voters trusted political leaders (ie. Farage 
and Johnson) who managed to project congruent basic values and speak to the public's deep-
seated psychological needs. Whether that congruence was true or not, these results testify to 
the power of personality as an elite cue for public political decision making (cf. Gigerenzer et 
al., 2011). However, that same public have made a monumental political decision that will 
now be carried out by frontbench politicians who are, by and large, very different in their 
personality characteristics (see Chapter 7, section II).  
 This chapter has analysed a range of extremely significant findings from a robust and 
original conjoint analysis of public voting habits in the UK. These data show that in 
experimental scenarios where voters do not know the partisanship of a candidate, personality 
outweighs other political and socio-economic variables as a voting heuristic. Compared with 
elite data from 106 MPs, these results also indicate that at the aggregate level there is less of a 
disjuncture than assumed between the personalities the public want in national politics and the 
personalities they get. MPs' basic values reflect, for example, a public desire for politicians 
who prioritise Self-Transcendence values. This reinforces theoretical propositions made 
earlier in this thesis: an anti-political media is exacerbating a 'perception gap' that undermines 
interpersonal trust between governors and governed. However, the conjoint survey also 
reveals significant schisms within the general population that translate into larger differences 
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between MPs' basic values and the preferences of more conservative socio-demographic 
groups. These highly original findings greatly extend the academic understanding of electoral 
























“Then [Aneurin Bevan] realised he wasn’t really very powerful as a backbench member of 
Parliament, so he eventually got into the Cabinet. Then he got into the Cabinet, and he 
wondered where on earth the power really lay and came to the conclusion, as I have done, 
that most of the power lies with the establishment. Parliament is just there to try and 
moderate the excesses of some parts of the establishment.”  
Labour MP (Interviewee 12) 
The Personal Side of Politics: Implications, Limitations and Next Steps 
 
 In writing this thesis, I set out to augment the conceptual and empirical purview of 
parliamentary studies in the UK. In doing so, I have executed a study that is purposefully 
ambitious in its scope, theory, and methodologies. Gathering unique quantitative and 
qualitative data on the Basic Human Values (BHV) of 106 national politicians, I departed 
from the rigid dominant traditions of historical institutionalism and opened a black box on the 
personal side of representative democracy in the UK. Through rigorous analysis of this data, 
as well as the results of a complementary conjoint analysis of public voting habits, I have 
made a number of highly significant and original contributions to both the parliamentary 
studies literature in the UK and additional subfields such as anti-politics, political behaviour, 
leadership and representation. Drawing on the interdisciplinary wisdom of political 
psychology in general, and the study of basic values in particular, I have attempted to traverse 
complementary areas of the academe to reveal new insights about the people who enter elite 
politics, the motivations they bring to the democratic arena, the ways in which they navigate 
institutional environments, and the divergence between popular rhetoric about politicians and 
reality.   
 The previous four chapters not only presented the results of this project but evaluated 
these findings in relation to both the extant literature and a series of theoretically informed 
hypotheses. The purpose of this final chapter is thus threefold: to tease out the broader 
implications of some of the central findings in this project and to suggest future avenues of 
research that have become apparent in the course of this study. For clarity and consistency, 
these objectives are met concurrently in five short substantive sections. The first three 
sections reflect on the core results presented in chapters 7 and 8 about 'who' enters elected 
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office and what these findings suggest about self-selection to elite politics, partisanship and 
descriptive representation in the UK. The fourth section builds on the data discussed in 
chapter 9 about the behaviour of politicians in Westminster and the implications of these 
results for debates about structure and agency in British politics. The fifth section adds to the 
findings of chapter 10 and drills down into issues of media bias, political choice and the 
quality of democracy. A final, sixth, section then reflects on specific limitations to the 
research design and the generalisability of the results. 
I. Self-Selection and Democratic Elitism? 
 Through this thesis I committed to challenge the restrictive paradigms in studies of the 
UK Parliament that have, in line with an archaic notion of the Westminster Model, privileged 
the institutions inherent in the 'British Political Tradition' (Gamble, 1990). To achieve this 
objective, an innovative research design has been advanced that focuses, primarily, on the 
people 'doing' politics. Building on a nascent base of agency-centred research into the UK 
Parliament (Bell, 2018; Crewe, 2014; Rhodes, 2011; Searing, 1994), I executed a novel 
psychological study of UK Members of Parliament (MPs) as a way to cast new insights about 
representative agency inside Westminster, as well as the link between public disengagement 
from politics and a popular focus on political personalities. Combining new survey data on 
MPs' BHV with existing comparative data for the British public taken from the European 
Social Survey (ESS), I find: 
a) MPs are psychologically unique in terms of their basic values and that the differences 
between MPs and their electors are greatest at the highest levels of political office (RQ1; H1); 
b) political ambition is grounded in certain psychological motivations that contribute to elite 
self-selection as much or more so than socio-demographic factors and political opportunity 
structures (RQ1; H1); 
c) career politicians are no different in terms of their goals and motivations than other MPs 
from 'traditional' backgrounds, and appear equally committed to concepts such as equality, 
justice and welfare (RQ1; H2); 
d) politicians - as a significant proxy of the political class - are not an homogenous group. In 
fact, they differ in their everyday goals and motivations according to gender, age, education 
and partisanship (RQ1; H3); but 
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e) the psychological differences between MPs are still smaller than those between MPs and 
their corresponding socioeconomic and demographic groups in the general population. The 
only exception found in this study relates to the effects of partisanship, where a significant 
divergence in popular and elite basic values occurs on the Left but not the Right (RQ1; H3).  
 Through this thesis I have demonstrated a distinct self-selection to elite UK politics. 
Going beyond previous work on the demographic and socioeconomic predictors of political 
ambition (Allen and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012), the data presented in this thesis suggest that 
aspirations towards elected office - and indeed the success of fulfilling those aspirations - 
relates strongly to certain psychological backstops (cf. Lasswell, 1930). As discussed in 
chapter 7, these results tap two features of democratic politics - competition and social change 
- that map onto two [normally] separate dimensions of psychologically 'sorting' into 'calling' 
and 'career' professions (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013; Knafo and Sagiv, 2004). The intense 
combination of prosocial public service and conflictual, hierarchical, even resource-driven 
party politics appears to attract people with an unusually high commitment to Self-
Transcendence values and a relatively strong orientation towards Power values.  
 From a normative and empirical standpoint, these results should be interpreted 
carefully and, in the first instance, holistically. When MPs' basic values are assessed as a 
whole, then the results presented in this thesis are indicative of the democratic elitism 
previously found in the US (e.g. McClosky, 1964; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2013) - a 
highly liberal political elite (strongly motivated by Self-Transcendence and Openness to 
Change values) representing a comparatively authoritarian public (more motivated by 
Conservation values). Charges related to the flawed characters and self-serving nature of the 
political class (Oborne, 2007) do not withstand empirical scrutiny. Although the data indicate 
that MPs score significantly higher than the public for Power values, implying a greater desire 
to seek and control resources, the ‘motivational differences between [basic] values can be 
seen as continuous rather than discrete’ (Schwartz, 2014, p.247). Therefore, MPs' scores for 
Power values must be understood against their conflict with the opposing values of 
Universalism, Benevolence and Self-Direction (on which MPs score more positively overall). 
People who give high priority to Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values tend to 
prefer and promote policies that they believe will extend and defend individual freedoms 
(Piurko et al., 2011). If one assumes a normative position that a) democracy is preferable to 
other political systems and that b) it is best protected by those who are motivationally aligned 
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to its core principles, then the psychological (self-)selection of MPs discovered in this study is 
a positive outcome. 
 These findings are highly significant for the original insights they provide about 
political recruitment in the UK and, in turn, anti-political sentiments about the 'quality' of its 
political class. Recent survey research by Will Jennings et al. (2016) showed that political 
discontent with contemporary politics in the UK revolves around presumptions about the 
necessary characteristics of politicians. In line with the perennial debates first raised by David 
Easton (1965), specific appraisals of moral malaise in elite politics have gravely impacted on 
diffuse public support for politics per se (cf. Jennings et al., 2017). In this context, the 
relevance of the data collected and analysed for this thesis centres on the extent to which 
politicians act upon the incongruent motivations expressed by Self-Transcendence and Power 
values. On one hand, if MPs primarily act upon Self-Transcendence values in their 
representative roles - or have the freedom to do so - then public fears about self-serving elites 
are unfounded, or at least exaggerated. If in fact MPs act more often than not on Power 
values, then scholars might conclude that public apathy and discontent is grounded in 
impressively perceptive psychological judgements that go beyond media negativity bias.       
 To the extent that chapter 9 did show that MPs' BHV impact on their daily 
parliamentary behaviours, it also showed that certain values became prescient depending on 
the context of the behaviour. These findings conform to previous research on the link between 
BHV and human behaviour, which suggest that values are often activated by the immediate 
situation (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Verplanken and Holland, 2002). In order to answer the 
dilemma raised above, future studies might conduct a more detailed analysis of the 
Westminster environment and the nature of those dominant stimuli under which MPs must 
act. These studies might, then, ascertain whether MPs' general commitment to the 
motivational goals of Self-Transcendence values are, or are not, activated by comparison to 
Power values. Experimental surveys and ethnographic research might also assess the extent to 
which MPs are able to withstand institutional cues and, instead, reconceptualise the political 
environment proactively in line with their most important values. Such inquiry is beyond the 
scope of this PhD. 
 This study has also shown that the 'personality gap' in the UK is greatest between the 
public and frontbench MPs, indicating that basic values also act as an internal criterion for 
self-selection within the political class. Those MPs who make it to the top are significantly 
more motivated to seek out new experiences, to be driven by original thought and action, and 
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to desire success that is recognised by others. This reinforces prior scholarship on the 
'ambition factor' of political ‘high flyers’ (Hibbing, 1986; Macdonald, 1987; Searing, 1994). 
Whilst it may sound self-evident that the executive of any Parliament are different from their 
backbench colleagues, this finding has interesting repercussions for the functioning of a 
representative democracy. It implies that those actually making policy and running the 
country are the least like those they are representing. These differences are particularly 
interesting in the context of Brexit: a relatively conservative public has voted to revert to a 
past political situation, which will be carried out by politicians who are significantly less 
concerned about maintaining harmonious relations, stability or conforming to rules than either 
their constituents or their backbenchers. The repercussions of this can already be seen in the 
volatile handling of UK-EU negotiations since the Brexit referendum, both in the legislative 
debacle that led up to triggering Article 50 and afterwards (May, 2017). 
 As Allen and Cairney (2015, p.6) argue, ‘many of the complaints put at the door of the 
‘political class’ relate to Westminster politics and those with governing power or influence’. 
Highlighting this distinction is important because it indicates that popular perceptions of 
politicians reflect a degree of unconscious sensitivity to the psychological differences among 
MPs that are presented in this thesis. Psychologically speaking, it is in talking of high-level 
policy (decision-)makers that the gap between ‘them and us’ is greatest. However, these 
results are not necessarily negative, depending on the subjective understanding of democratic 
leadership brought to bear upon them. A rich literature on the ‘mandate-independence’ 
controversy (Pitkin, 1967) and more recently a ‘trap’ account (Medvic, 2013) of politics 
makes it clear that ‘electors want their leaders to be just like them but also much better than 
them’ (Kane and Patapan, 2012, p.44). Indeed, the well-established 'stealth' view of 
democracy indicates that citizens are more interested in the general character of those 
entrusted to rule than actually participating in politics themselves or even holding politicians 
to account over the details of their decisions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). I have 
demonstrated in this thesis that, psychologically, political leaders in the UK are not like the 
vast majority of the British public and that these differences are largely supportive of a 
Westminster system that depends upon representatives with an acute sense of democratic 
duty. Frontbench MPs score, for example, higher than their backbench colleagues and the 
public for Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence values, which have been shown to 
underpin liberal democratic attitudes (e.g. Caprara et al., 2006; Leimgruber, 2011). 
James Weinberg 




 Again, however, there is an aspect of the results of this study that demands future 
research. The frontbench MPs in the current sample also score higher than their backbench 
colleagues for Self-Enhancement values, indicating a heightened desire for success and 
control that may be theoretically linked to accusations of self-interest. In a qualitative and 
largely theoretical discussion, David Owen (2012) reflects on the intoxication of power and 
its effects upon the character of political leaders in his book The Hubris Syndrome. As more 
central to the self-identity than episodic experiences or actions (e.g. political office), people’s 
Basic Human Values are typically stable across time (Schwartz, 2006) and resistant to change 
across a range of life transitions (Bardi et al., 2014). This premise has, in fact, underpinned 
many of the inferences made in this thesis about the effect of basic values upon political 
ambition. However, it is possible that experiences of extreme political responsibility, 
especially during critical junctures in public life that trigger difficult value trade-offs (such as 
the Brexit vote), could reveal evidence of the types of troubling reverse causation that Owen 
alludes to in his book. 
 Assuming that MPs come to parliamentary politics with the values discovered in this 
thesis, and that those values do remain stable, then future studies might also examine the job 
satisfaction of our political elites. To the extent that this thesis uncovers a relationship 
between basic values and self-selection to elite politics, then the actual nature of political 
office - grounded in compromise and negotiation - may thwart those very same intentions that 
attract people to it in the first place (particularly Self-Direction and Power values). In itself 
this may seem a slightly innocuous research agenda. However, a large number of the 
interviewees in this study talked about the psychological toil of the job and the mental ill-
health that they had suffered as a result. Prospective and serving MPs find themselves in or 
entering a job that requires constant impression management, both at the internal level within 
political parties and at the external level with the voting public. This environment may 
exacerbate the tendency towards surface acting prevalent in other public sector service 
industries (e.g. Hochschild, 1983; Pugh et al., 2011) and, in turn, place our governors at a 
heightened risk of poor mental health and wellbeing. Future research should address this 
concern.  
II. Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Gender  
 Taking basic values as a specific focus, I have shown that MPs in the UK differ from 
their electors in relevant demographic subgroups by greater margins than they differ from one 
another. These findings have significant implications for broader literatures and debates about 
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agency loss (e.g. Best and Vogel, 2018), the public-opinion/public-policy nexus (e.g. Shapiro, 
2011) and the substantive representation of sectional interests (e.g. Barnes and Burchard, 
2013; Childs and Krook, 2008; Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). Of these findings, arguably 
the most interesting relate to gender and, in particular, the 'personality gap' between women 
MPs and women in the population. Not only do women MPs appear to invert the gender 
differences in basic values seen between men and women in the general population, but they 
also differ significantly from women in the public on all four higher order values whereas 
male MPs only do so for two. 
 In its contribution to the existing knowledge base, this thesis joins a number of studies 
that have recently called for a move away from numeric measurements of group 
representation (for a review, see Celis and Mügge, 2018). This claim is not intended to 
question the valuable and evident benefits to political participation that arise from an increase 
in descriptive representation (e.g. Atkeson, 2003; Banducci et al., 2004; Saalfeld, 2011; 
Uhlaner and Scola, 2016). Rather, I argue that academia also has a responsibility to move 
beyond a crude litmus test for political equality, whereby democracy 'works' when certain 
thresholds or critical masses are met (e.g. Studlar and McAllister, 2002). Indeed, a nascent 
body of scholars has claimed that the simplicity of the 'politics of presence' thesis (cf. Philips, 
1995) elides far more complex yet pertinent debates about women's influence in leadership 
positions (Dahlerup, 2006), the actual implementation of laws relating to women's interests 
(Mazur and Pollock, 2009), and the contested content of women's issues (Celis et al., 2014). 
Yet this research remains relatively staid in its conceptualisation of how, and to what extent, 
debates in the UK Parliament (or any other) about equal pay, reproduction, or maternity leave 
are representative of all women. Utilising unique data on the basic values of national 
politicians, I offer a new avenue of investigation for this research arena and demonstrate, 
specifically, that the motivational goals and interests of British women do not align with those 
of their descriptive representatives in Parliament. 
 Building on discussions in chapter 5, I explore these arguments in line with 
scholarship in the constructivist paradigm. From this perspective, research on representation 
should not start with the citizen but with those who are actually in the political arena doing 
the act of representation. MPs constantly make representative claims about specific groups of 
citizens (see Saward, 2010) in which they not only identify or constitute the group's problems 
but also the political solutions that are needed. There is clearly not a linear conveyor belt 
between citizens and representatives in this scenario, and the extent to which representative 
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claims are accurate will depend upon a) an MP's perception of citizens' views and life 
experiences, and b) the pre-existing interests or opinions that the MP brings to their decision-
making and political attitudes (see also Arnold and Franklin, 2012). In the first study of elite 
and mass basic values in the UK, I have revealed a distinct mismatch between the 
psychological backstops that women MPs bring to the act of representative claim-making and 
those of the women they claim to represent. Put another way, British women do not appear to 
get the 'preferable descriptive representatives' (Dovi, 2002) called for in chapter 3. There are 
obvious limitations with the sample sizes used in this study and therefore the generalisability 
of the results. If future studies can gain access to a larger sample of UK elites, then there is 
significant work to be done to establish a) how far basic values (or other personality 
characteristics) inform elite and public attitudes to specific sectional group interests or issues, 
b) whether these results reveal similar patterns or not, and crucially c) the degree of 
congruence between elite attitudes and those of citizens in corresponding groups (i.e. women). 
 The results presented in this thesis are equally significant for what they say about the 
political (under-)recruitment of women in the UK. Traditionally this scholarship splits 
between supply-side explanations focusing on the lifestyles and attitudes of women that 
inhibit their participation, and demand-side explanations focusing on features of political 
systems or institutions that limit their opportunities (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013; Holman 
and Schneider, 2017). In the first of these traditions, a growing research base shows that 
women express less political ambition than men, are more deprecating of their own suitability 
for office, and are less likely to consider politics as a vocation in the first place (Fox and 
Lawless, 2011; Holman and Schneider, 2017; Lawless and Fox, 2010). This thesis makes a 
significant contribution to this literature. In particular, the results show that women attribute 
less importance to Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values, both of which appear 
to predict candidate emergence and political activism (chapter 7, p.162; see also Pacheco and 
Owen, 2015; Vecchione et al., 2015).  
 In line with demand-side theories, the results of this thesis also indicate that the 
women who do successfully enter politics are more likely to share similar motivational goals 
with men than their fellow women in the general population. Recent research in the US by 
Kathleen Dolan and Michael Hansen (2018, pp.5-7) has shown that women are more likely 
than men to perceive systemic barriers and discrimination in public life when it comes to 
explaining their under-representation in political office. This research is desperately needed in 
the UK but assuming similar results, I expect that such findings reflect a gendered 
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institutional design. As well as instigating political and social debates about women's under-
representation (descriptive and substantive), the findings of this thesis may be developed by 
future research programmes to influence parliamentary design processes as well as to lobby 
political parties and campaign professionals. The latter have a moral responsibility to alter the 
tone and nature of political environments in order to encourage participation by all women.  
III. Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Partisanship 
 Whilst the previous section was concerned with opening up the results of this study in 
terms of the descriptive and substantive representation of demographic group interests, this 
section focuses on findings related to basic values and partisanship. In essence, I have shown 
in this thesis that clear personality differences exist between partisans on the Left and Right in 
the UK; that these differences are exaggerated among political elites; and that congruency 
between elites and voters occurs to a much greater extent on the Right than the Left. In the 
presentation, analysis and evaluation of these results, I add to a well-developed but diffuse 
literature on the relationship between personality, ideology, political orientation and 
behaviour (e.g. Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2008). As the first comparison of elite and 
public basic values in the UK and one of only a handful of such studies worldwide, this thesis 
provides original insights with broader comparative relevance. 
 Of these findings, the most compelling relate to the 'personality gap' found between 
voters and political elites on the Left of British politics (mostly comprising Labour 
participants; see Chapter 8, pp.189-194). This is particularly compelling in the context of 
previous research on the congruence between personality factors and political ideology, 
choice and partisanship (Caprara et al., 2006; De Neve, 2015). Indeed, a recent large-N study 
of political orientation in the UK found that personality traits contribute double the variance 
in political orientation explained by demographic factors such as gender, age, religion, and 
social class (Furnham and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2018). However, the results of this thesis 
question the validity, or at least parsimony, of these results in general and the congruency 
principle in particular.  
Whilst voters on the Left did score higher for Openness to Change and Self-
Transcendence values, and those on the Right higher for Conservation values, these 
differences were relatively muted compared to differences in the elite sample. On one hand, 
these findings corroborate previous measures of cognitive style, which affirm a more stable 
and tenacious link with political ideology among elites than in mass samples (e.g. Caprara et 
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al, 2012). Put another way, the data presented in this thesis indicate that values direct 
politicians towards certain career choices that encourage them to endorse particular ideologies 
and political programmes (via parties), which in turn reinforce their personal preferences. On 
the other hand, the data suggest that the basic values of voters on the Left (and non-voters) 
are, if anything, more congruent with MPs on the Right than their own representatives 
(Chapter 8, pp.189-200). If voters do judge political candidates according to personality 
characteristics and vote for those they deem as similar to themselves (i.e. Bittner, 2014; 
Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara et al., 2012), then I only find indicative evidence in this 
thesis of such a link between voters and representatives on the Right of British politics. 
Assuming that these differences hold in larger samples of UK political elites, then the 
results of this thesis suggest that voters on the Left do not identify with corresponding 
political parties because of perceived similarity to MPs on the Left. To make sense of this 
finding, I turn to dual motivations theory (Groenendyk, 2018). This theory identifies two 
pathways to partisan affiliation. On one hand, partisanship comes from instrumental 
evaluations of the political environment, in which citizens are attracted to parties (and their 
policies as well as politicians) that best suit their personal and political preferences (e.g. 
Brader and Tucker, 2012; Dalton and Weldon, 2007). On the other hand, partisanship is an 
expressive choice grounded in social identity and therefore resistant to changes in party 
personnel or policy platforms (e.g. Huddy and Bankert, 2017; Mason, 2015). In a recent study 
of political systems in Europe, including the UK, Huddy et al. (2018) find strong evidence of 
the latter among partisans who, for example, engage more in motivated reasoning, display 
more animosity to out-groups, and exhibit defensive or positive emotions respectively when 
their party is threatened or reassured. This thesis makes a highly significant addition to this 
research. The differences between voters and elites reported in chapter 8 show that 
partisanship may be more of an expressive identity on the Left and an instrumental choice on 
the Right (grounded in value congruence).  
These findings need to be replicated in larger, longitudinal samples that can a) account 
for interaction effects within the data, and b) assess the stability of these results across 
multiple UK elections. However, if the results hold in those analyses, they pose a number of 
unanswered questions worthy of future research. For example, to what extent do basic values 
inform policy attitudes at the mass and elite level, and how far do these attitudes overlap 
between elites and voters on the Left and Right? What opportunities are there for voters to 
learn about party issues and ideological positions? And do these opportunities, as well as the 
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attention paid to them, differ in the extent to which they predict vote choice on the Left and 
Right? In particular, these findings might inform future studies of party election campaigns 
and even electoral success.  
If Labour Party MPs represent a comparatively conservative partisan bloc in the 
general public, whose support is a consequence of expressive social identity, then this has 
clear implications for how the Party may win or lose votes in general elections. For example, 
a rich literature on expressive partisanship (largely in the US) has demonstrated that social 
identification with a political party can be reinforced through ‘negative partisanship’ or 
negative campaigning (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). In this scenario, animosity towards 
the out-group (i.e. opposition party) becomes a more powerful driver of voting behaviour than 
positive affects about the in-group (i.e. host party) (e.g. Iyengar and Westwood, 2014). Based 
on the findings of this thesis, future research might look, therefore, for associations between 
negative campaigning by the Labour Party and its electoral success.  
Whilst negative campaigning might reinforce the partisan sentiments of long-term 
supporters on the Left, the results presented in this thesis also suggest that the Left 
(particularly the Labour Party) will have more difficulty in attracting new or floating voters 
than the Right. In line with notions of instrumental partisanship, the data analysed in chapter 8 
indicate that the average British citizen will be more likely to vote for parties on the Right. It 
is on this side of politics that the personalities of potential representatives (as well as policy 
platforms) appear to have greater resonance with citizens' own personal goals and motivations 
(i.e. basic values). The Labour Party has only held a majority in the UK Parliament for 28 
years during the last century and to some extent, it is possible that this statistic reflects the 
political difficulties posed by a ‘personality gap’ between elites on the Left and the general 
British population.  
In this context, the results of this thesis can also add retrospective nuance to 
scholarship on the successes of New Labour under Tony Blair, which were elsewhere 
attributed in large part to the Party’s move towards the ideological centre-ground (Hay and 
Farrell, 2014; Hindmoor, 2017; Turner, 2013). In 1997 Labour offered a modest yet 
unashamedly neoliberal policy agenda that included, for example, fast-track punishment for 
young offenders, no further rises in income tax, and dropped the Party’s commitment to 
national ownership of public services. These are policies that drastically reduced the rile 
scores between Labour and Conservative campaign manifestos, and arguably made the former 
far more attractive to ‘instrumental partisans’ motivated by Conservation values. However, 
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the New Labour movement simultaneously violated many of the norms associated with 
expressive social identification among its traditional support base. As the perceived 
differences between the two main parties increased, it is possible that the cohesion of this 
support base dwindled (cf. Cruddas, 2006). The inferences made in this section are broad and 
have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of British politics. Whilst there are 
distinct limitations to the size and power of the data in this thesis, these preliminary findings 
and the questions raised by them are deserving of future research. 
IV. Agency Matters 
 In an attempt to reinvigorate a rather limited parliamentary studies literature in the 
UK, I have added theoretically and empirically to the academic understanding of agency in 
representative politics. Building upon psychological and institutional theories of logic (see 
Parsons, 2007), I offer an Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB) 
that eschews qualitative, structure-dominated and normatively charged generalisations about 
the 'organising perspective' of the Westminster Model in British political studies (cf. 
Bogdanor, 2003; Norton, 2013; Rush, 2005). Employing unique quantitative data on MPs’ 
basic values alongside qualitative accounts from the actors themselves, I find: 
f) MPs' BHV have a substantial effect upon legislative activities as diverse as voting, asking 
written questions, joining a select committee, and signing Early Day Motions (EDMs) (RQ2; 
H4-7); 
g) these effects vary according to the institutional constraints exerted internally by party 
organisations, and externally by a range of role alters such as the media and voters (RQ2; H4); 
h) MPs’ BHV exert a strong organising effect on their attitudes towards representational foci 
(RQ2; H8); and 
i) the effects of BHV upon MPs’ political behaviour are both direct and indirect. 
 Whilst a voluminous comparative literature has explored the effects of institutional 
factors such as electoral systems and party structures upon legislative behaviour (André and 
Depauw, 2013; Shugart et al., 2005; Sieberer, 2006), it has also tended to elide individual 
differences by treating legislators as monolithic groups of rational actors with parallel 
behavioural incentives (cf. Fernandes et al., 2018). As Audrey André et al. (2015: 468) argue, 
'studies that focus on electoral institutions have largely ignored within-system differences in 
favour of differences across systems – as if legislators operating under the same set of rules 
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all behave in a similar manner.' I present preliminary evidence in this thesis to suggest that, in 
the UK at least, representatives are neither psychologically homogeneous at the inter- or intra-
party level and that these differences have a real impact on their behaviour in elected office. 
Whilst these findings have been discussed in detail in chapter 9, there are five broader 
comments to make. 
 Firstly, I have shown that a range of internal motivations affect elite political 
behaviour across a variety of different parliamentary contexts in which they are activated. For 
the purpose of enriching future research, this finding offers a sharp rebuke to a long list of 
scholars who have prioritised behavioural economics and rational choice explanations of 
political agency (e.g. Downs, 1957; Strom, 1990). That BHV were able to predict significant 
representative activities such as legislative voting and MPs' use of parliamentary written 
questions, suggests that research into parliamentary political behaviour (and public policy) 
should - as anticipated in chapter 4 - start from an institutional theory of political choice (e.g. 
Sniderman and Levendusky, 2009). Rather than assuming strategic and unitary desire on the 
part of all political elites, and applying this same logic sequentially to behavioural scenarios, I 
find evidence that MPs constantly synthesise their own trans-situational goals and motivations 
with an extended climate of expectations from both internal and external role alters. Thus to 
provide a satisfactory account of elite behaviour, future studies must consider a) the extent to 
which any behavioural choice is transparent to/of importance for a cynical media/electorate, 
b) the extent to which the choice is affected by internal scrutiny and accountability procedures 
or party interests, and c) the specific personality characteristics that inform each agent's 
interpretation of the choice itself as well as the constraints outlined in a) and b). Taken 
together and measured using appropriate variables, this triangulated approach to studies of 
elite political behaviour may provide a much more accurate understanding of structure and 
agency in the UK Parliament and other representative chambers around the world. 
 Secondly, I offer complementary evidence for the psychological basis of what Fenno 
(1977) describes as the 'perception' of the principal-agent relationship. Put another way, MPs 
understand the mechanical rules of the game and the strategic choices that may or may not 
attract electoral benefits, but these 'facts' operate alongside or subordinate to a range of 
psychological beliefs or attitudes about the act of representation. Chapter 9 (pp.223-231) of 
this thesis showed, for example, that BHV not only inform MPs' economic and social 
ideologies, as well as their partisan affiliations, but also indirectly structure their orientation 
towards national or constituency level representation. These results require further 
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investigation with a larger sample of elites, so as to account for a wider range of confounding 
factors. However, they remain highly significant as an indication of the direction in which 
scholarship on legislative role formation must move. Studies that seek to group elites in 
representative categories (e.g. Jenny and Müller, 2012; Müller and Saalfeld, 1997) or use 
these categories to explain elite behaviour (e.g. Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005, Gauja, 2008) 
must account for the psychological backstops that underpin these categories and the variable 
ways in which actors might apply them under a range of institutional constraints.  
 Thirdly, the results of this thesis call into question many of the paradigms in 
parliamentary studies of party politics and elite behaviour. To the extent that political parties 
still dominate the character and electoral outcomes of representative politics in the UK, I find 
competing psychological motivations among the MPs of different parties and those within 
them. If frameworks of accountability and delegation rely upon a consensus of support among 
political elites, I suggest that such antagonistic cooperation (see Best, 2010) relies on broad 
coalitions of personality characteristics. The fact that Labour MPs share heightened 
psychological commitments to Self-Transcendence values, whereas Conservative MPs do so 
for Conservation values, binds individuals who are otherwise competing contenders for vote, 
office, and policy success. Beyond these broad coalitions of primary motivation, the data 
indicate that significant variability exists within parties according to secondary motivations 
and even their instantiation in MPs' political actions.  
 These findings have significant repercussions for dominant rational choice studies of 
party politics. Kam's (2009) paradigmatic LEADs model, for example, no longer seems 
sufficient as an explanation of elite behaviour. When party representatives act as one, this 
solidarity has as much basis in common personality characteristics as it does in their 
membership of a political movement. In fact, the analysis in this thesis suggests that the 
former facilitates the latter. Similarly, when MPs act against the grain of their party directive, 
it appears to be as much or more so about a divergence of their personal beliefs as any 
strategic decision related to electoral outcomes. However, the analysis of voting records in 
chapter 9 (pp.201-214) does show that Kam (2009) and other scholars in this field (e.g. Hix et 
al. 2007; Meserve et al., 2009) correctly predict the power of party organisations to enforce or 
encourage representative decisions that run contrary to MPs' personal motivations. This 
suggests that future studies should draw on the insights of psychological and preference-
driven models of party politics (e.g. Krehbiel, 1999) in order to understand when and why 
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political elites within and between parties compete or cooperate with one another, and in turn 
the impact this has upon representative outcomes. 
 Fourthly, the results of this thesis make a direct contribution to the academic 
understanding of psychological processes in political decision-making. A rich literature shows 
that voters and citizens commonly employ psychological heuristics to make decisions in 
political situations (Redlawsk, 2004; Bang Petersen, 2015), but comparative empirical studies 
of political elites are extremely rare (exceptions include Kropp, 2010; Weyland, 2014). These 
studies focus on cognitive shortcuts such as availability and representativeness biases (see 
Vis, 2018) but their use of the term 'heuristic' is vague and often relates to any psychological 
tactic employed by participants in the absence of adequate information (for a full discussion, 
see Druckman et al., 2009). Whereas citizens may often use heuristics to overcome political 
ignorance, this small literature shows that political elites may use them to overcome an 
abundance of [often contradictory] information (see Kropp, 2010). Focusing on a distinct 
personality characteristic rather than heuristics and biases, this thesis is the first study in the 
author's knowledge that demonstrates a causal link between national MPs' basic values and a 
range of parliamentary behaviours in the UK (and possibly any developed western 
democracy).  Adding to the literature above, these findings suggest that UK MPs employ their 
personal goals and motivations to make sense of decisions in complex political environments. 
Future research should now attempt to clarify the extent to which these causal mechanisms 
are consistent, conscious and function at the highest levels (i.e. foreign policy decisions or 
crisis management by political leaders). 
 Finally, the link between MPs' basic values and parliamentary behaviour demonstrated 
in this thesis provides an empirical standard by which to measure their integrity in democratic 
politics. In political theory, integrity is overwhelmingly understood as a property of character 
exhibited 'in a person's resistance to sacrificing or compromising [their] convictions' 
(Scherkoske, 2013, p.29; see also Williams, 1981). From an external, anti-politics perspective, 
it is this understanding of integrity as propriety that also underpins popular evaluations of 
political conduct (Hall, 2018; Jennings et al., 2016) and stands at odds with institutional, even 
elite conceptions of the term (Allen and Birch, 2015). In this respect, official documents like 
the Principles of Public Life produced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life - 
designed to circumscribe official misconduct or malfeasance - do not satisfy unanswered 
questions about the integrity of our elected representatives. I suggest two preliminary 
observations. Firstly, MPs' personal convictions (measured as basic values) appear to exert a 
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sustained impact on their elected behaviour in spite of a complex political system 
characterised by compromise (i.e. evidence of integrity as propriety). Secondly, those 
convictions are also generally positive and reflect personal commitments to other- rather than 
self-enrichment. I did not set out upon this doctoral study to build a sympathetic counter-
narrative about the political class, or specifically politicians, but rather to test unfounded 
psychological claims that underpin popular disillusionment with democratic politics and to 
clarify the contested and amorphous nature of related academic debates. In doing so, I have 
tried to recall many of the themes advanced in Bernard Crick’s (1962) In Defence of Politics 
and have shown that public understandings of political conduct are often distorted and 
simplified versions of a complex truth.  
V. Personality and Democracy 
 So far this chapter has reflected upon a range of significant findings from this thesis, 
such as who enters elite politics in the UK, how their basic values compare to those they 
represent, and the extent to which these personality characteristics influence agency in the UK 
Parliament. However, I also operationalise these data alongside a conjoint analysis of public 
voting preferences to augment the academic literature on personalisation and democracy (e.g. 
Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; McAllister, 2007; Karvonen, 2010). In doing so, I find that: 
j) followed by their religion and political agenda, the personality characteristics of 
parliamentary candidates have a greater effect on public voting habits than physical attributes 
such as age, gender or ethnicity and socio-economic attributes such as schooling and 
occupation (RQ3; H9);  
k) meaningful differences exist between the ideal candidates chosen by the British public 
according to voters' gender, age, social grade, partisanship, and their vote choice in the 2016 
referendum to leave the European Union (RQ3); 
l) on average elite participants attribute most importance to Self-Transcendence values and 
these are, on average, the most desirable and influential feature of a citizen's ideal candidate 
(RQ3; H10); but 
m) MPs still attribute more relative importance to Self-Enhancement values and less relative 
importance to Conservation values than the public would like to see in their ideal 
representative (RQ3; H10); and therefore 
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n) MPs who are more motivated by Conservation values than their colleagues are also more 
successful in achieving large majorities at general elections (RQ3; H9). 
 Whilst most parliamentary scholars in the UK seek objective measures of democracy 
based upon institutional indicators, I argue that political scientists must also study citizens' 
subjective evaluations of democracy in order to understand when, why and how it succeeds or 
fails (see also Fuchs and Roller, 2018; Mayne and Geissel, 2016; Pickel et al., 2016). In 
chapter 5 I synthesised the insights of a varied yet relevant intellectual terrain in order to 
develop a model that might explain the role of personality, and specifically a personalised 
feedback loop between citizens and elites, upon democratic engagement. In its analysis of a 
highly original conjoint survey, chapter 10 found evidence that this model might capture 
significant causal mechanisms underpinning vote choice and democratic apathy in the UK. On 
one hand, the results of the conjoint survey add to an extremely small and limited literature on 
the role of specific characteristics in personalised voting behaviour (cf. Lausten and Bor, 
2017). On the other hand, the conjoint survey also reveals a striking overlap between the 
personality characteristics of political elites and the ideal-types of the British public. This 
finding suggests that public discontent, founded upon cynical judgements about self-serving 
elites (Jennings et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2017), may be grounded in a perception gap that 
says more about the consumption of politics in the UK than the 'quality' of its elected 
representatives.  
 This implies that future research must do more to account for the influence of an anti-
political media. In a comparable recent study of voting habits in Tanzania, Ivar Kolstad and 
Arne Wiig (2018) discovered that media coverage of elite tax evasion had a negative effect on 
participants' intention to vote. Moreover, this effect was accentuated among participants who 
received the information in a morally charged format. Whilst this research needs to be 
reproduced in advanced democracies, I argue that charged media treatment of elite (mis-
)behaviour not only undermines trust in politicians but also citizens' confidence in the existing 
social contract and broader political institutions and processes. Kolstad and Wiig’s (2018) 
research, taken together with the results of the conjoint survey in this thesis, provides 
compelling evidence in support of the model developed in chapter 5. Put another way, 
psychologically charged media coverage of individual, isolated or small-n cases of elite 
malfeasance a) heightens the salience of personality characteristics as a voting heuristic, b) 
distorts accurate evaluations of politicians, c) compounds low trust/high distrust interpersonal 
judgements about political elites, and thus d) leads citizens to disengage from formal politics 
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altogether or vote for populist leaders who identify as anti-establishment. There is a large 
comparative literature on the accountability function of a free press (e.g. Besley and Prat, 
2006; Reinikka and Svensson, 2011) but I argue, in line with the inferences above, that more 
research is needed to assess the unintended consequences of personalised coverage of elite 
capture.  
 The conjoint survey conducted for this thesis also makes an original methodological 
contribution to the study of personalisation in politics generally, and during election 
campaigns in particular (see also Adam and Maier, 2010; Boumans et al., 2013). The majority 
of research into candidate preferences relies on observational data from election studies but 
conclusions drawn about the effect of any one variable (i.e. class, race, gender) may be 
correlated with a series of other (often unobserved) factors that influence the election 
outcome. By contrast, conjoint survey experiments - in which participants select from 
hypothetical candidates with randomised attributes - allow researchers to identify the causal 
impact of specific variables on candidate evaluations. Consistent with prior studies that stress 
the role of candidate personality in elections, I applied a conjoint design to demonstrate that 
candidates with specific personality characteristics (high in Self-Transcendence values in 
particular) perform better in an abstract election scenario.  
 There are necessarily a number of limitations to the conjoint design in this thesis. 
Firstly, the conjoint survey purposefully did not include the party affiliation of each candidate. 
This decision was made in order to isolate the personality characteristics preferred by voters 
on the Left and Right without the confounding influence of candidate partisanship (and by 
implication, the connotations these labels carry for partisans and non-partisans alike). Future 
studies should re-run this conjoint design to determine whether the effects of basic values 
upon candidate choice are sustained once participants know a candidate's party affiliation. 
Secondly, more research is needed to ensure that the patterns discovered in this thesis are 
replicable beyond the UK. Given that conjoint surveys are hypothetical simulated choices, 
future designs with a greater number of participants might also account for a broader array of 
paralinguistic messages and signals that voters receive during election campaigns.  
VI. Limitations 
 Whilst this chapter has reflected on the broader implications of this thesis and the 
future research it might inspire, as well as reflecting on what might be achieved through 
further data collection, there are necessarily a number of standalone limitations that should be 
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clarified. In particular, I must be candid about a) the robustness of my critique of Historical 
Institutionalism (HI) as a paradigm in parliamentary studies, b) the extent to which my claims 
about representation hinge on normative assumptions about the desirability of Basic Human 
Values (BHV), and c) the caution that must be heeded in generalising the findings of this 
thesis, based on a relatively small-n sample of MPs, to conclusions about political elites more 
broadly. Each of these will be briefly taken in turn.  
 In chapter 1 of this thesis, I argued that HI research was severely limited by its top-
down focus upon the rules and constraints of Parliament as an institution, rather than as a 
body of (semi-)autonomous actors. I maintain that the path dependence so central to HI 
scholarship does not need to be deterministic and, by contrast, agents in Parliament negotiate 
between the formal and informal constraints they face and their own psychological 
predispositions to navigate the 'job of politics'. The predictive capacity of BHV to explain a 
range of parliamentary behaviours, demonstrated in chapter 9, is testament to this argument. 
However, the underlying assumption here dictates that MPs bring a peculiar set of values to 
Parliament and that these remain stable during their time in Parliament. This assumption can 
only be verified by a longitudinal study of MPs' BHV.  
 Although cross-sectional analysis in this thesis did not reveal a time-cohort effect on 
MPs' basic values [based upon tenure in office], it may be possible that prolonged exposure to 
Parliament and 'the political' influences subtle changes in the values of politicians. In their 
conceptual model of value change, Bardi and Goodwin (2011) elaborate on the likelihood 
framework of persuasion (cf. Petty and Cacioppo,  1986) to argue that values may evolve by 
effortful cognitive or peripheral affective processes. Drawing on this model, Arieli et al. 
(2014) have also shown that short lab-based interventions can affect temporary value change. 
This research has direct applicability in politics, where the struggle between structure and 
agency is not only constant and acute, but also central to the operation of democracy. If our 
political institutions - or indeed the very nature of UK politics - are capable of transforming or 
at least altering personality characteristics that are otherwise incredibly stable (e.g. Milfont et 
al., 2016; Vecchione et al., 2016), then the claims made by this thesis about HI scholarship 
would need to be reviewed. In that scenario - and given the links found in this thesis between 
BHV and behaviour - the institutions of politics and in this case the UK Parliament would 
remain the arbiters of political agency and, by implication, political outcomes.  
 Secondly, I have made a number of big claims in this thesis about the nature and 
quality of political representation in the UK. In this chapter and others, I have argued that the 
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data presented in this thesis exposes a psychological gap between certain demographic and 
partisan groups in the general population and their representatives in Parliament. This 'gap' 
has been used to outline a democratic deficit in the UK whereby citizens (especially in under-
represented groups) do not get preferable descriptive representatives (Dovi, 2002). However, 
this argument necessarily assumes that MPs with the same value orientations as 
corresponding groups would make better representatives and that, in turn, citizens in these 
groups would actually want their representatives to share the same values. By contrast, 
political scientists concerned with the state of representation have argued that voters want to 
hold politicians to higher standards across a range of psychological characteristics related, 
above all, to integrity (Allen and Birch, 2015b; Kane and Patapan, 2012). Data collected in 
Italy would, however, appear to suggest that there is a high degree of congruency between 
voters' BHV and those of the representatives they support (Caprara et al., 2006, 2010), but I 
cannot provide similar comparative evidence in this thesis. I did not, for example, have the 
financial resource to collect additional data on participants' own basic values in the conjoint 
experiment. In order to fully understand the extent to which voters project their own 
personality characteristics onto those of their ideal parliamentary representative, this data is 
needed.  
 This thesis is also hampered by the size of the elite sample. Whilst the data collected is 
unique and the sample size compares favourably to other survey studies of national 
politicians, the participants only account for 16% of the target population. The danger with 
such a sample is that I have only measured one specific 'type' of politician, and in particular 
those who are already motivated by certain basic values to, for example, give time and energy 
to academic research. In this sense, there is a risk of collecting data from a skewed sample of 
particularly prosocial politicians. At the same time, MPs are especially skilled at impression 
management and it is possible that they are able to affect levels of social desirability bias not 
found in mass samples (cf. Schwartz et al., 1997). On one hand, the defence to both of these 
accusations lies in the spread of the data. If MPs in this sample were overwhelmingly pro-
social  and/or engaged in heightened impression management, then I would not expect the 
results to reveal a) distinct differences in the value priorities of MPs within the sample, or b) 
unusually high scores for Self-Enhancement values by comparison to existing research with 
mass population samples. On the other hand, there is no substitute for large-N data in 
empirical research with psychometric measures. Therefore, the inferences and conclusions 
drawn from this thesis should be read carefully until additional studies of this kind are 
conducted.  
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 Finally, this thesis revealed some interesting and possibly worrying trends in the 
structure of MPs' BHV . The anomalous inter-item discrepancy for Conformity values was 
addressed in chapter 7, but the confirmatory factor analysis reported in Figure 9.1 (p.238) also 
shows weak-moderate positive correlations between Self-Enhancement and Self-
Transcendence values.  This should not be the case if the generalisable structure of BHV 
along orthogonals holds - as tested in mass population samples around the world (see Chapter 
2; Schwartz, 1992, 1994). This suggests that either there is a confounding variable in the data; 
the new shortened Twenty Item Values Inventory (TwIVI) used to collect data in this thesis is 
not adequately measuring the theory of BHV; or that the structure of BHV is actually different 
among political elites in the UK (and potentially beyond). The derivation and evaluation 
samples used by Sandy et al. (2017) to create the TwIVI would suggest that - among mass 
samples at least - it does measure the same value constructs with the same interdependent 
relations as any other version of the PVQ.  It is possible, therefore, that this is not a 
measurement problem but a theoretical one. I tentatively suggest that some of the inherent 
motivations implied by Self-Enhancement values and Self-Transcendence values are not 
directly incompatible for those people who go into politics. This claim goes back to the 
contentions I made in chapter 3:  that a more nuanced approach to the study of political 
ambition requires researchers to consider ambition 'for what' and 'for whom', rather than 
assuming ambition to be a unitary concept revolving around self-interest. It may be that those 
people attracted to politics are desirous of success and influence (i.e. Self-Enhancement 
values), but only in order to service 'helping' behaviours implicit in Self-Transcendence 
values.  This demands future research with comparative samples of elites, both across nations 
and within the UK at regional and local level.  
 I set out on this study to make an original contribution to the academic understanding 
of the personal side of UK politics. On one hand, I conclude that politics is a profession few 
'ordinary' people care to enter. On account of the preliminary findings in this study, it would 
appear that the majority of MPs are individuals with an 'extraordinary' dedication to the 
welfare of others and an unusually high propensity for independent and creative thought and 
action. At the same time, they exhibit much higher levels of personal ambition than those they 
govern. On the other hand, I have also demonstrated that MPs' personalities matter for studies 
of public policy and representation. MPs' basic values not only influence their own 
perceptions of what an elected politician on the national stage should do, but also have a 
substantial impact on a range of actual legislative behaviours. In sum I have attempted to 
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provide 'theoretically driven empirical research' (Ostrom, 2000, p.42) that goes a long way to 
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Correlation matrix of centred means for Basic Human Values and 






Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample 
of British men (n = 746) and women (n = 841). Graph shows the 





Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample 
of British 18-29 year olds (n = 311), 30-49 year olds (n = 563), and 
50+ year olds (n = 763). Graphs show the change in predicted 





Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample 
of Labour Party voters (n = 350), Conservative Party voters (n = 470), 
and non-voters (n = 432) in the 2015 UK General Election. Graphs 






Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample 
of British adults in social grades AB (n = 458), C1 (n = 475), C2 (n = 
344) and DE (n = 360). Graphs show the change in predicted 




Conjoint analysis of candidate preferences among a representative 
sample of Leave voters (n = 673) and Remain voters (n = 620) from 
the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union. Graphs 































































































Appendix B – Participant Information Sheet. 
Participant Information Sheet 
1. Research Project Title: Understanding the Personal Side of Politics: A Study of Basic 
Human Values in the UK Parliament 
2. Invitation: You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you 
wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
3. What is the project’s purpose?  
Following on from a successful pilot study with 48 MPs in 2013, this research project aims to 
explore a relatively under-examined area in political science: the value orientations of British 
politicians and the convictions behind modern representation in Westminster. A similar study 
was recently conducted by Caprara et al. in Italy, where correlations were drawn between 
voters' values and those of the politicians they supported. This particular project will take that 
a step further, reversing the focus to evaluate the impact of politicians' values on 
Parliamentary behaviour. Applying the Schwartz theory of Basic Human Values, this study 
will provide an insightful and much needed modern addition to the seminal work of Donald 
Searing in the 1970s, and in turn will add to that body of literature that seeks to reappraise the 
state of democracy in the UK through a careful examination (and defence) of both politics and 
politicians.   
4. Why have I been chosen? 
If you are receiving this invitation to participate, then you are currently serving as a Member 
of Parliament in the House of Commons or as a Peer in the House of Lords. 
5. Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will need 
to complete and return the attached survey. By competing and returning the survey, you give 
consent for your data (anonymised) to be used in this study. If you are later called upon with 
an interview request to discuss your results, you may decline; if you accept to conduct an 
interview you will provided with a written consent form. You are entitled to withdraw at any 
time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any way and all of your data 
will be destroyed. You do not have to give a reason. 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
As a participant in this study you are asked to complete the Portrait Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ), and a few choice questions regarding your political priorities/basic details. The PVQ 
is designed to measure those desirable, transitional goals that serve as guiding principles in 






entail further derivational values. These values have been validated and corroborated in over 
220 samples worldwide and cited over 3000 times by scholars in the social sciences. Each 
question provides a portrait of an anonymous individual; you are required to compare yourself 
to the portrait by choosing from a Likert scale of 1-6, ranging from 'Very much like me' to 
'Not like me at all'. The survey contains only 20 portraits and takes no more than 6-8 minutes 
to complete. If you contacted at a later date about completing an interview, this will be used to 
clarify issues surrounding personal values and how these inform your representative function 
within the constraints of institutional politics. 
7. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Ever since Bernard Crick wrote his 'Defense of Politics', and more recently scholars like 
Medvic sought to tackle prejudices against politicians (2013), there has been a recognition of 
the need to rebalance academic and popular evaluations of democratic representation and 
representatives. By participating in this study you will be providing invaluable data for that 
cause, allowing scholars to understand the human side of national representatives and the 
institutional constraints on their ambitions and ideals. In turn this may help to bridge the gap 
that has arguably emerged not just between politicians and the public but also between 
academia and society more broadly. In light of the looming restoration and renewal of the 
House, a study into the personal side of politics may also highlight institutional changes that 
are needed to allow politicians the room they require to fulfil their representative functions 
properly. 
 8. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?  
All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your raw data will only be handled by the primary researcher named at 
the end of this sheet. You will not be able to be identified in any reports, publications or 
conference presentations. 
9. Who has ethically reviewed the project? 
This project has been ethically approved via the University of Sheffield’s Politics 
department’s ethics review procedure. 
10. Is there any cost involved?     
There is no cost to the participant in this study. The enclosed envelope allows for pre-paid 
postage when you return the survey and in the event of a follow-up interview, the primary 
researcher will travel to your most convenient work location.  
11. Contact for further information: 
James Weinberg (The Crick Centre; Department of Politics; University of Sheffield; S10 








Appendix C – Participant Consent Form. 
Participant Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Research Project: Understanding the Personal Side of Politics: A Study of Basic 
Human Values in the UK Parliament 
 
Name of Researcher: James Weinberg 
 
Participant Identification Number for this project:            Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet/letter 
(delete as applicable) dated [insert date] explaining the above research project 
and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative 
consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular 
question or questions, I am free to decline. You may contact James Weinberg  
about any concerns on 0114 222 1681 
 
3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my 
anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with 
the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the 
report or reports that result from the research.   
 
4.     I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research  
 
5. I agree to take part in the above research project. 
 
 
________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
(or legal representative) 
 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from lead researcher) 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead Researcher Date Signature 




Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated 
participant consent form, the information sheet and any other written information provided to the 
participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form will be placed in the project’s main record, 



















































Appendix E - Scoring Key for PVQ TwIV Value Scale. 
 
 PVQ # 












The score for each value is the mean of the raw ratings given to the items listed above for that 
value. For most purposes, it is necessary to make a correction for individual differences in use 
of the response scale before performing analyses. Below are instructions for making the 
correction that is appropriate to various types of analyses. Failure to make the necessary 
scale use correction typically leads to mistaken conclusions! 
Individuals and cultural groups differ in their use of the response scale.
1
 Scale use differences 
often distort findings and lead to incorrect conclusions.
2
 To correct for scale use: 
(A) Compute scores for the 10 values by taking the means of the items that index it (above). If 
you wish to check internal reliabilities, do so for these value scores. 
(B) Compute each individual’s mean score across all 20 value items. Call this MRAT.
3 
  
(C) Center scores of each of the 10 values for an individual (computed in A) around that 
individual’s MRAT (i.e., subtract MRAT from each of the 10 value scores)  
1.  For correlation analyses: Use the centered value scores (C). 
2. For group mean comparisons, analysis of variance or of covariance (t- tests, ANOVA, 







3. For regression:  
a. If the value is your dependent variable, use the centered value score. If all 10 values are 
included, the regression coefficients for the values may be inaccurate and uninterpreTable due 
to multicolinearity. 
b. If the values are predictor variables: 
Enter up to 8 centered values as predictors in the regression.  
Choose the values to exclude as predictors a priori on theoretical grounds because they are 
irrelevant to the topic.  
If you are interested only in the total variance accounted for by values and not in the 
regression coefficients, you may include all 10 values as predictors. The R
2
 is meaningful but, 
because the 10 values are exactly linearly dependent, the coefficients for each value are not 
precisely interpreTable. 
c.  In publications, it is advisable to provide a Table with the correlations between the 
centered values and the dependent variables in addition to any regression. These correlations 
will aid in understanding results and reduce confusion due either to multicolinearity or to 
intercorrelations among the values. 
4.  For multidimensional scaling, canonical, discriminant, or confirmatory factor analyses:  
Use raw value scores for the items or 10 value means.
4 
Footnotes 
1. For a discussion of the general issue, see Saris (1988). Schwartz, et al. (1997) examine 
meanings of such scale use as an individual difference variable. Smith (2004) discusses 
correlates of scale use differences at the level of cultures. 
2. Two critical assumptions underlie these corrections.  
(1) The set of ten individual level values is reasonably comprehensive of the major 
motivationally distinct values recognized across individuals and cultural groups. Empirical 
evidence supports this assumption. 
(2) Studies of value priorities are concerned with the importance of particular values as part of 
the value system of a person or group. This is because the way values affect cognition, 
emotion, and behavior is through a trade-off or balancing among multiple values that are 
simultaneously relevant to action. The relevant values often have opposing implications for 
the action. The absolute importance of a single value across individuals or across groups 
ignores the fact that values function as a system. The scale use correction converts absolute 
value scores into scores that indicate the relative importance of each value in the value 







3. When centering, do not divide by individuals’ standard deviation across the 20 items. This 
is because individual differences in variances of value ratings are usually meaningful. Even if, 
on average, individuals attribute the same mean importance to the set of values, some 
individuals discriminate more sharply among their values and others discriminate less sharply. 
Standardizing that makes everyone’s variance the same (i.e., 1) would eliminate these real 










Appendix F - Correlation matrix of centred means for Basic Human Values and 'Status' (Member of Parliament [n = 106] Vs. General Population [n = 2154]) 
 MP or 
Public 
Conformity Tradition Benevolence Universalism Self-
Direction 
 
Stimulation Hedonism Achievement Power Security 
MP or Public 
 
1 .047* - .217** .089** .071** .043* .105** -.019 .016 .148** -.180** 
Conformity 
 
.047* 1 .219** -.076** -.147** -.295** -.395** -.301** -.201** -.004 .160** 
Tradition 
 
-.217** .219** 1 .050* -.003 -.197** -.376** -.239** -.372** -.262** .152** 
Benevolence 
 
.089** -.076** .050* 1 .285** .064** -.182** -.220** -.311** -.306** -.010 
Universalism 
 
.071** -.147** -.003 .285** 1 .115** -.113** -.273** -.347** -.387** -.113** 
Self-
Direction 
.043* -.295** -.197** .064** .115** 1 .070** -.126** -.151** -.171** -.191** 
Stimulation 
 
.105** -.395** -.376** -.182** -.113** .070** 1 .199** .107** -.020 -.411** 
Hedonism 
 
-.019 -.301** -.239** -.220** -.273** -.126** .199** 1 .066** .026 -.197** 
Achievement 
 
.016 -.201** -.372** -.311** -.347** -.151** .107** .066** 1 .245** -.153** 
Power 
 
.148** -.004 -.262** -.306** -.387** -.171** -.020 .026 .245** 1 -.136** 
Security 
 
-.180** .160** .152** -.010 -.113** -.191** -.411** -.197** -.153** -.136** 1 







Appendix G - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British men 
(n = 746) and women (n = 841). Graph shows the change in predicted probability of candidate 

































































Appendix H - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British 18-29 
year olds (n = 311), 30-49 year olds (n = 563), and 50+ year olds (n = 763). Graphs show the change 


































































































Appendix I - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of Labour Party 
voters (n = 350), Conservative Party voters (n = 470), and non-voters (n = 432) in the 2015 UK 

































































































Appendix J - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British adults 
in social grades AB (n = 458), C1 (n = 475), C2 (n = 344) and DE (n = 360). Graphs show the change 


































































































































Appendix K - Conjoint analysis of candidate preferences among a representative sample of Leave 
voters (n = 673) and Remain voters (n = 620) from the 2016 referendum on membership of the 
European Union. Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute. 
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